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Summary 
 
 
This thesis provides a genealogical account of ‘Taiwanese’ as a national identity. 
Genealogy is a way of writing a history of the present that de-familiarises us from what we 
now take for granted by revealing in detail how things were otherwise. As argued in this 
thesis, Taiwanese identity, in ontological terms, exists only in discourse. It is a way of talking 
and doing things relative to what sort of people the Taiwanese are; every word and action 
contributes to the idea that there is such a thing as ‘Taiwanese-ness’ and helps to 
substantialise the qualities/features attached to it. This thesis conceptualises Taiwanese 
identity as having no fixed, essential, or permanent identity; rather, it is formed and 
transformed continuously in relation to the ways people talk and act. This thesis investigates 
various social practices/events in post-authoritarian Taiwan that incited people to talk about 
Taiwanese-ness. Certain things, with different positions, forms and organisations, were said 
and done, while other alternatives disappeared or were omitted and repressed. With various 
power relations, different discourses mutually intersected, interacted and competed. The 
social practices/events selected in this thesis include the production of knowledge, the 
publication of a comic book, an election campaign, and a political demonstration. It is 
crucially noted that the social practices/events analysed in this thesis are just a few of the 
numerous events that occur periodically or repeatedly. This thesis, in sum, is an attempt to 
understand how various social practices/events enable or disable certain ways through which 
people make sense of their past and their political lives, thereby coming to terms with their 
belongings, their allegiances, and their situated-ness. Taiwanese-ness is spoken of, not only 
literally but also symbolically, and it is this process of being ‘spoken of’ that constitutes the 
Taiwanese-ness – the birth of the ‘Taiwanese’.  
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 1 
CHAPTER 1 
Introduction  
 
 
1-1. ‘I, Pierre Riviere, having slaughtered my mother, my sister, and 
my brother...’ 
On the morning of 3 June 1835, a dreadful murder was discovered in Calvados, 
Normandy (France). Three corpses were found. The head of a pregnant middle-aged woman 
had been slashed and nearly severed; the skull of an eight-year-old boy had been scored and 
crushed; the face of a dead eighteen-year-old girl had been carved up and mutilated as well. 
The murderer was immediately found. It was Pierre Riviere, a twenty year-old peasant, who 
had slaughtered his mother, his sister, and his brother.  
The case initially was not a notable crime. Riviere was soon sentenced to death. 
However, for various reasons psychiatric experts in Paris drew attention to the case and 
decided to intervene, appealing for mercy. During this period of time, a series of medico-
legal experts, which included a country general practitioner and an urban physician in charge 
of a large asylum, made reports. A report was also signed by leading figures in psychiatry and 
forensic medicine. Moreover, a fairly large number of testimonies were collected, including 
statements made by witnesses – the villagers. And most importantly, Riviere himself had also 
prepared an explanatory memoir that was submitted to the judges during his detention, 
giving an explanation of his criminal behaviour. All the aforementioned materials were 
collected by the French philosopher Michel Foucault and were later published in 1973, as a 
book entitled ‘I, Pierre Riviere, having slaughtered my mother, my sister, and my brother…’ The book 
became the whole of the dossier on the case.   
To Foucault, Riviere’s case, as an affair and as an event, provided an occasion in which 
different discourses that differed in origin, form, organisation and function, intersected, 
interacted and competed.1 ‘All of them speak, or appear to be speaking, of one and the same 
                                                
1 According to Foucault, Riviere’s case is situated in the middle of  a debate on the use of  psychiatric 
concepts in criminal justice. It was a debate between some of  the leading figures in psychiatry and 
forensic medicine such as Esquirol, who advanced the psychiatric concept of  ‘monomania’, and 
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thing; at any rate, the burden of all these discourses is the occurrence on June 3 [1835]’ 
(Foucault 1978a, x). Hence, Foucault argues, the whole event actually manifested ‘a contest, 
a confrontation, a power relation, a battle among discourses and through discourses’ (ibid., 
x). Moreover, the event cannot simply be described as a single battle. In effect, several 
separate yet intersecting battles were being fought out at the same time. Foucault writes,   
The doctors were engaged in a combat, among themselves, with the judges and 
prosecution, and with Riviere himself (who had trapped them by saying that he had 
feigned madness); the crown lawyers had their own separate combat as regards the 
testimony of the medical experts, the comparatively novel use of extenuating 
circumstances, and a range of cases of parricide that had been coupled with 
regicide…; the villagers of Aunay had their own combat to diffuse the terror of a 
crime committed in their midst and to ‘preserve the honour of a family’ by 
ascribing the crime to bizarre behaviour or singularity; and, lastly, at the very centre, 
there was Pierre Riviere, with his innumerable and complicated engines of war; his 
crime, made to be written and talked about and thereby to secure him glory in 
death, his narrative, prepared in advance and for the purpose of leading on to the 
crime, his oral explanations to obtain credence for his madness, his text, written to 
dispel this lie, to explain, and to summon death, a text in whose beauty some were 
to see as a proof of rationality (and hence grounds for condemning him to death) 
and others a sign of madness (and hence grounds for shutting him up for life). 
(Ibid. x-xi)  
Since the whole event manifested a number of complicated and multileveled battles among 
discourses, Foucault therefore decided to publish this dossier in order to ‘draw a map,’ to 
speak of those combats, ‘to reconstruct these confrontations and battles,’ and ‘to rediscover 
the interaction of those discourses as weapons of attack and defence in the relations of 
power and knowledge’ (ibid. xi).  
After the intervention of expert psychiatrists, Riviere’s sentence was commuted to life 
in prison. Riviere’s case became a realm in which different discourses – including medical 
institutions, legal authorities and police apparatuses – competed with each other. This 
dreadful event suddenly became a discursive realm of power struggle. Each force, by 
adopting different tactics, endeavoured to grasp the power to define, determine, and above 
all, reconstitute the body, the psyche and the life of this monstrous figure, ‘Pierre Riviere’. 
The aim of this thesis, drawing closely on Foucault, is to scrutinise a number of 
(un)related events/episodes in the contemporary society of Taiwan that incited people to 
                                                                                                                                            
others including some lawyers, doctors, the prosecutors, the judges and the courts, who very strongly 
resisted the concept (Foucault 1978a, ix). 
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talk about Taiwanese-ness (Taiwanxing), examining how different discourses, with different 
positions, forms and organisations, and what power relations, mutually intersecting, 
interacting and competing with each other, have eventually led to the formation of a 
Taiwanese national identity in the period since the 1990s. This was the birth of ‘the 
Taiwanese’.  
 
1-2. A Discursive Proliferation of Taiwanese Identity Since 1990 
Since the second half of the 1990s, Taiwan has become a global focal point. The 
‘extraordinary’ presence of Taiwan in the global political arena, in which it had long been 
neglected, is a consequence of Taiwan’s role as a ‘troublemaker’ with the potential to lead the 
region into an actual warfare (Cabestan 2000). But why is Taiwan – a relatively small country 
(compared to other players in the region such as China, Japan and the US) with a supposedly 
democratic government – considered a disturber of world peace? Most political 
commentators attribute ‘the threat’ of this small island to the formation of its distinctive 
national identities – the formation of Taiwanese national identity or the rise of Taiwanese 
nationalism (Campbell et al, 2001).  
Indeed, since the early 1990s, people in Taiwan have increasingly claimed themselves as 
nationally Taiwanese, and have sought international recognition of Taiwan’s status as an 
independent sovereign state. This political development has not been welcomed by the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC), which upholds a ‘One China Policy’, that is: there is only 
one China and Taiwan is a part of it. Consequently, the rise of Taiwanese nationalism may 
engender a substantial conflict among the great powers in the region, including the US, 
Japan and China. Therefore, not surprisingly, this small island has become ‘attractive’ among 
diplomatic practitioners as well as academics. Many scholarly studies, both on the island and 
abroad in many different disciplines, have devoted themselves to this subject – the rise of 
Taiwanese nationalism.  
Nevertheless, a rapidly growing body of literature on Taiwanese nationalism has been 
part of a broader trend, the formation of ‘Taiwan Studies’, a newly established subject. Since 
the second half of the 1980s, a novel body of Taiwan-centred research has focused 
exclusively on the island’s political, social, and economic transformations. During the last 
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two decades, the study of Taiwan both on the island and abroad has undergone a dramatic 
change. In the West, most notably in the US but also to some extent in Europe, not only has 
the number of studies increased greatly but the substance of those studies has also shifted 
from being one component of the encompassing category of Sinology/China Studies to 
being Taiwan-centred.2 Increasing numbers of scholars began to examine the island itself: its 
distinctive history, culture, politics, geography, society, and so on. Likewise, in Taiwan, a vast 
amount of research has been produced and a great number of scholars and graduate students 
have devoted their energy to the study of ‘Taiwan’. According to Wang Fu-Chang’s statistic, 
the number of publications on Taiwan studies in Taiwan increased from fewer than 50 
volumes (per year) in 1985 to over 450 volumes (per year) in 1995 (Wang 2003, 154). In the 
same manner as the West, the contents of these publications altered. More and more studies 
are focussing on the island’s indigenous and colonial past, rather than its post-war 
‘Economic Miracle’. The important aspects of the present ranging from ecology to economic 
development to national identity were to be found in Taiwan’s distinctive heritage. Indeed, 
academia has put more and more emphasis on so-called ‘Taiwan Studies’. 
This mushrooming growth of Taiwan studies in academic circles has its institutional 
incitements. Universities and academic associations hold conferences on the subject of 
‘Taiwan’. Through the efforts of some Taiwanese scholars, the North American Taiwan 
Studies Association (NATSA), sponsored mainly by the Taiwanese government, was 
inaugurated at Yale University in 1994, and this marked a new epoch of Taiwan studies. It 
holds an annual conference in different institutes in the US, with about one hundred 
participants taking part each year. Submissions have been encouraged regarding any topic of 
interest within the collective field of Taiwan Studies, which may include politics, economics, 
and social developments as well as issues related to Taiwan’s cultures, languages, history, 
environment and education.3 Moreover, it is not only academic associations that have been 
established – several research institutes have also been set up in the last decade. For instance, 
                                                
2 Taiwan Studies was once being incorporated in the greater category of Sinology/China Studies 
during the Cold War, and was subject to the new political framework of the America-China 
relationship following rapprochement in the 1970s.  
3 Likewise, in Europe, a similar association that based at the London School of  Oriental and African 
Studies (SOAS) – the European Association of  Taiwan Studies – was also established in 2004 (please 
see EATS website: http://www.soas.ac.uk/academics/centres/taiwanstudies/eats/european-
association-of-taiwan-studies.html). In Japan, The Japan Association for Taiwan Studies was 
established at Tokyo University in 1998 (please see JATS website: http://wwwsoc.nii.ac.jp/jats).  
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following the first Graduate Institute of Taiwanese Literature, which was founded at 
National Cheng-Kung University in Taiwan in 2000, there are now at least fifteen academic 
institutes throughout Taiwan established under the title of ‘Taiwanese’ (Taiwanese Literature, 
Taiwan Studies, Taiwanese History) doing the research and teaching of Taiwanese literature 
or history. The establishment of those institutions fostered and increased the localised 
research concerning Taiwan’s politics, economy, society and culture.  Indeed, Taiwan has 
become a significant focus in various academic disciplines, locally and globally. Its history, its 
culture and its people have been intensively studied. There has clearly been a ‘Renaissance’ 
of Taiwan Studies since the 1990s.  
Moreover, it is noted that ‘Taiwan’ has become a hot topic not only in academic circles, 
but outside them as well. In Taiwanese society, people have been enthusiastic and passionate 
in talking about it. Numerous utterances and statements concerning ‘Taiwanese-ness’ in 
terms of culture, history, and people have been made during this period. Politicians/political 
practitioners, political commentators, and journalists have eagerly spoken of it. People from 
every walk of life – doctors, students, businessmen/women, etc. discuss ‘Taiwanese-ness’ on 
websites, on TV talk shows, on the radio, as well as in their daily conversations. Numerous 
magazines and books on the subject of ‘Taiwanese-ness’ have been widely published; TV 
programmes, dramas, and films concerning ‘Taiwan’ have been extensively produced; arts 
exhibitions relating to ‘Taiwanese culture’, ‘Taiwanese history’ or ‘Taiwanese aesthetics’ have 
been held; architecture has appeared, such as monuments commemorating ‘Taiwan’s past’; 
political demonstrations with reference to Taiwan’s politics have been conducted. 
It is not possible to indicate all forms of the way people talk about ‘Taiwan’. Taiwan, 
since the 1990s, has apparently experienced a steady proliferation of discourses on the 
subject of ‘Taiwan’, in which ‘Taiwan’, ‘Taiwanese-ness’, or ‘Taiwanese identity’ came to be 
talked about in large amounts. Four points regarding this wave of discursive proliferation 
can be identified at the inception of this thesis. 
1-2-1. ‘Taiwanese’ as a National Identity 
The Taiwanese identity that has been articulated in this discursive proliferation is a 
national rather than an ethnic or other identity. ‘National’ here simply means that the people 
in Taiwan identify themselves as a nation, which is bounded within those who inhabit or have 
inhabited the Taiwan Island, whether under the name of the Republic of China (ROC), the 
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official diplomatically recognised name of Taiwan, or under the name of the Republic of 
Taiwan – the political objective sought by pro-independence advocates. This signifies that 
the people in mainland China are excluded from this self-identification as co-nationals. 
Taiwanese people are thus distinct from the Chinese (Zhongguoren). 
It should be noted that, crucially, the specific meanings of Taiwanese-ness and its 
significance vary, vertically across time, and horizontally across individuals and ethnic groups. 
Earliest references to Taiwan in extant Chinese historical documents date from the third 
century. By the fourteenth century during the Ming Dynasty of Chinese history, Han-people 
(Hanren) from China’s coastal areas began to migrate to the island. Yet, it is noted that the 
island was inhabited by groups of aborigines before Han-people settler’s emigration. Human 
dwellings appeared on the island as early as six or seven thousand years ago. In the sixteenth 
century, Taiwan started to be known to the West after the Portuguese ‘discovery’ of the 
island. In the following century, the Dutch controlled Taiwan for a while until they were 
expelled in 1662 by Zheng Cheng-Gung, a general of the former Ming dynasty. Twenty years 
later in 1683, the grandson of general Zheng pledged allegiance to the rule of the Qing 
(1616-1912), which had replaced the Ming as the ruling dynasty in China. A large-scale 
migration of Han-people from the coastal provinces of China began after the Dutch 
colonisation and was vastly accelerated during the Qing Dynasty until Taiwan came under 
Japanese control following the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95). Japan’s colonial rule ended in 
1945 with its defeat in the Second World War. Taiwan once again became a province of 
China. Four years later in 1949, the Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party, KMT) relocated 
the capital of the ROC to Taipei when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) gained 
ascendancy in mainland China.4    
The complexity of Taiwan’s history is reflected in its ethnic make-up. It has frequently 
been said since the 1990s that Taiwan has four ethnic groups: the Minnan, Hakka, 
Aboriginal people, and Mainlanders. Nevertheless, none of these four ethnic groups formed 
naturally; they are all socially constructed (Wang, 2003). The aboriginal people are Taiwan’s 
first inhabitants. Although they are discussed as a single group of people, the Aboriginals are 
                                                
4 For general history of  Taiwan, please see: Rubinstein (1999).  
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in fact composed of at least nine tribes.5 Each tribe has its own language, custom and kinship, 
and there was no common language among the aboriginals.6 Besides this, there was no 
shared identity among different tribes before the 1980s. Prior to this period, the differences 
between different tribes, from the perspective of aboriginal people, were perceived as more 
significant and extensive than the differences between aboriginal people and Han-Chinese.7 
The Aboriginals compose only 1.7 percent of the population of Taiwan. The Minnan,8 who 
constitute more than 73 percent of the population, are people whose ancestors were from 
southern Fujian and immigrated to Taiwan from the seventeenth century to the inception of 
Japanese colonisation. They speak Minnan dialect (also known as Hoklos). The Minnan 
ethnic group is not a perennial and homogeneous ethnicity. Although they all came from 
southern Fujian, their language, custom and culture diverged greatly among them since 
Fujian is mountainous. People from different places possessed the identity of their town or 
region (Wang 2003, 25-42).9 The Hakka, making up 12 percent of the population, is a 
distinct ethnic group in China who have their own cultural identity, language and custom. 
The Hakka immigrants in Taiwan came from different parts of China, mainly southern 
Fujian and northern Guangdong. Hakka people with different origins speak different dialects 
of the Hakka language – Hailu and Sixian – and reside in different regions of Taiwan. They 
did not intimately interact with each other until the end of the 1980s (ibid., 121-43).10 The 
Mainlanders is the term by which the native Taiwanese labelled those ethnic Chinese who 
                                                
5 They are thought to have strong biological and linguistic similarities to Malay peoples, being 
categorised ethnographically as Malayo-Polynesian (Roy, 2003, 3).  
6 Different tribes, for example, communicated through the Japanese language under Japanese rule 
(Wang 2003, 102-3). 
7 The pan-aboriginal identity formed in the early 1980s after a series of  political mobilisations of  the 
aboriginal movement. The activists accused the society of Han Chinese’s repression and exploitation. 
In the 1990s, they even requested an autonomous status in a certain region of  Taiwan where the 
aboriginal people live. This kind of  request, according to Sun Da-Chan (1995), indicates that the 
aboriginal identity has reached a level of  ‘national’ consciousness. 
8 The term literally means ‘southern Fujian.’ Fujian is a province of  China just across the Taiwan 
Strait. 
9 During the Qing Dynasty, there were many armed-fights among different groups with different 
origins among the Minnan immigrants in Taiwan. Even nowadays, there is a distinction between 
southern Minnan and northern Minnan. 
10 According to Wang (2003), the pan-Hakka identity in Taiwan is derived from the political 
movement in the late 1980s, which appealed for the preservation of Hakka culture. The Hakka 
activists criticised the Minnan-centred representation of Taiwan’s history, culture and language.   
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settled in Taiwan with Chiang Kai-shek’s KMT regime after 1945, and their descendants. 
However, there was no shared identity among those new immigrants coming from different 
parts of China at that time. They normally identified themselves under the name of their 
respective provinces, counties or cities. In addition, there was no shared language among 
those new immigrants and most of them were not able to speak Mandarin – the national 
language in Taiwan and in China. Chiang Kai-shek’s Mandarin itself was notoriously difficult 
to understand.11 Moreover, the new immigrants did not all support Chiang’s KMT; quite a 
few Mainlanders were murdered and arrested by Chiang’s KMT regime during the White 
Terror in the 1960s. Not until the early 1990s did the Mainlanders form a collective identity 
and became a ‘singular’ and ‘unitary’ ethnic group.12 This group of people now makes up 
around 13 percent of the population.  
Due to the complexity of its history and ethnicity, the connotations of the term 
‘Taiwanese’ differs across different historical periods. What it meant to be a Taiwanese in the 
nineteenth century is different from what it meant in the twentieth century, and in the 1970s 
it is different from in the 1990s. For instance, during the Japanese colonial period, the term 
‘Taiwanjin’ (‘Taiwanese’ in Japanese) was synonymous with the Japanese term ‘Hontoujin’ 
(the islander) in Taiwan, in contrast to another Japanese term ‘Naichijin’ (people from Japan 
proper). While the term ‘Hontoujin’ referred to Aboriginals, Minnan and Hakkas, ‘Naichijin’ 
indicated Japanese residents (ethnic Japanese) in Taiwan. However, during the period of 
martial law imposed by the KMT (1947-87), the term ‘Taiwanese’ became a regional or 
provincial affiliation. The term was by then interchangeable with another Chinese term 
‘Benshengren’ (lit., people from within Taiwan Province, translated as ‘native Taiwanese’ in 
English), which had reference to those Han-Chinese whose ancestors came to Taiwan before 
the colonisation by Japan: Minnan and Hakkas (Brown 2004, 9-10). The term was used in 
                                                
11 This is the reason why almost every TV program, even nowadays, has Chinese subtitles. And in 
this sense, the National Language Policy (Mandarin policy) enacted by the KMT regime in the 1960s 
targeted not only the native Taiwanese but also the Mainlanders. 
12 As for the question why the so-called Mainlander identity emerged in the 1990s, current studies 
(e.g. Wang 2003) on this issue can be summarised into two points: firstly, the Mainlanders’ collective 
identity derived from their shared feeling of being excluded from the society of Taiwan during 
democratisation; secondly, it is a result of the political mobilisation which is led by Mainlander 
political elites in the KMT and the New Party.    
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contrast to another term ‘Waishenren’ (lit., people from outside the province), which refers 
to the Mainlanders.13 
Entering the 1990s, the term ‘Taiwanese’ changed its meaning again. It is now often 
used in Taiwan to speak of the ethnic majority, the Minnan people (Brown 2004, 9), though 
this conception of the term was later, particularly after 2000, challenged by some Taiwanese 
politicians and scholars who have contended that ‘Taiwanese’ should incorporate ‘the Four 
Ethnic Groups’: the Aboriginals, Minnan, Hakka, and Mainlanders (also termed as ‘New 
Residents’, albeit much less frequently used). For instance, Taiwan’s former president Lee 
Teng-Hui promoted a new conception of ‘Taiwanese’ – the so-called  ‘New-Era Taiwanese’. 
He called for the residents of the island to look upon Taiwan as their shared home, unifying 
together and establishing a shared future. Anyone who identifies with his appeal can then 
become Taiwanese – a ‘New-Era Taiwanese’ (Lee 2005). One could tentatively argue that 
this ostensibly all-inclusive discourse of conceptualising ‘Taiwanese’ in effect signifies a 
formation of Taiwanese national identity; that is, the pursuit of self-determination by all 
residents on Taiwan.14 In short, the meaning of ‘Taiwanese’ has not always been consistent 
and it is no surprise that that the concept of Taiwanese-ness continues to lack any 
definitional consensus among the population of Taiwan. 
1-2-2. China as ‘the Other’  
While the people in Taiwan identify themselves as co-nationals, the people in mainland 
China are then excluded from this self-identification. This expulsion of ‘Chinese-ness’ 
(Zhongguoxin) is clear in observing this wave of discursive proliferation of Taiwanese 
national identity. Anti-Chinese sentiments can be easily found in the society of Taiwan since 
the 1990s. For instance, in a demonstration to commemorate the 2-28 Incident on 28 
February 1997,15 the protesters held banners that spelled out the political motto ‘Remember 
2-28, Don’t Become Chinese’. The texts written on the banners were as follows:  
                                                
13 The non-Han Aboriginals were simply ignored, as if  they did not exist on the island. They were 
neither ‘Taiwanese’ nor ‘non-Taiwanese.’ 
14 Although this political rhetoric ostensibly includes all residents of  Taiwan, it is not exactly all-
inclusive. Some groups of  people residing on the island are still excluded, e.g. foreign spouses.   
15 The 2-28 Incident took place on 28 February 1947, Taiwan having previously been returned to 
Nationalist China in 1945. The uprising was directed against the KMT administration in Taipei, 
tarnished by its corruption and incompetent government of the island. The incident led to weeks of 
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Wake up from the dream of the motherland (China), be independent and be reborn.  
Cut the umbilical cord, be independent and be reborn.  
Besides Taiwan, there is no motherland. (cited in Edmondson 2002, 41)   
The wording on display in the rally is not anomalous. This sort of political rhetoric was seen 
frequently in pro-independence political events in the 1990s in Taiwan and appeared 
regularly in the mass media. Likewise, much more recently, Taiwan’s Education Ministry 
dispatched an official document on 20 January 2005 to nine private academic and 
educational institutions in Taiwan, whose names included the word ‘Chinese’ (‘Zhongguo’ or 
‘Zhonghua’).16 The document adjured those institutions to alter their names from ‘Chinese’ 
to ‘Taiwanese’. This incident is part of a whole project enacted by the Exclusive Yuan (the 
Cabinet) of Taiwan in 2003, which demands that all government bodies (including 
diplomatic missions and representative offices) and state-owned enterprises should ‘correct’ 
their names from ‘Chinese’ to ‘Taiwanese’. Since then, many overseas missions as well as 
state-owned enterprises have altered their names, completing this so-called ‘name-correcting’ 
project.     
The examples noted above are just two of many similar incidents that show an ongoing 
process of de-sinicisation which has taken place in Taiwan. Indeed, when the Taiwanese 
people think of themselves as a people, they nowadays do so in contradistinction to the 
Chinese people, and therefore China is their main object of alienation/disassociation. 
However, it is important to note that these two concepts – ‘Taiwanese’ and ‘Chinese’ – are 
not necessarily mutually exclusive. The two words actually mean different things to different 
people. The popular connotation of the two concepts involves a variety of elements, such as 
ethnic origin, language, culture, residency, citizenship, identification, and so on. There is no 
space in this thesis to deal with the concept of ‘Chinese’. Yet, it must be noted that if the 
term ‘Taiwanese’ changes its meaning, its relationship with the term ‘Chinese’ will alter 
accordingly. While some view them as mutually exclusive categories, others find them 
compatible or even complementary. 
                                                                                                                                            
violence throughout Taiwan, and was followed by military repression of the KMT army despatched 
from the mainland.   
16 Those institutions include: ‘Chinese’ Cultural University, ‘China’ Medical University, ‘Chung Hua 
(Chinese)’ University, ‘China’ College of  Maritime Technology, and etc. Among them, the last China 
College of  Maritime Technology has changed its name. It is now named ‘Taipei’ College of  Maritime 
Technology. 
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The tendency for the two not to be mutually exclusive was clearly seen during the 
period of Japan’s colonization of Taiwan. A historian Wang Xiao-Bo (1999) suggests that the 
notion of ‘Chinese’ or ‘Chinese consciousness’ during that period existed among the 
Taiwanese elites. Wang does not deny the existence of ‘Taiwanese consciousness’, but he 
argues that Taiwanese consciousness during the Japanese colonial period was intertwined, 
albeit tentatively and thinly, with the Han-Chinese national consciousness (1999, 11-67). 
Another example can be shown in the debate in the 1970s about native Taiwanese literature. 
It should be noted that some of the main advocates such as Chen Ying-Zhen, who stand for 
nativisation of Taiwanese literature, supported a quick unification with mainland China.17 
Nevertheless, when the concept of ‘Taiwanese’ (and the ‘Chinese’ as well) transforms 
itself into a ‘national’ level, they necessarily have to be mutually exclusive. The ambiguity, 
inter-changeability, and inclusiveness of these two concepts need to be clarified and divided. 
The people of Taiwan are accordingly compelled to ‘become’ either Taiwanese or Chinese; 
any other political possibilities in the middle ground or a grey area were not permitted. China 
as the recurring contrasting image of the Other conversely helps to re-define and re-
construct the ‘Self’ – the Taiwanese. No matter how people in Taiwan interpret their own 
history, tradition and culture, the most important and fundamental task is that of 
demonstrating how ‘Taiwanese-ness’ is different from ‘Chinese-ness’. It is plausible to argue 
that there is no ‘homogeneous’ Taiwan, but that if such a ‘homogeneous’ Taiwan does exist, 
its precondition is that there is an existent China to encounter. Moreover, in this discursive 
proliferation, ‘China’ as the other, internally, often refers to ‘the Mainlander’ and the political 
parties (such as New Party), the regime (KMT regime) or the country (the ROC) closely 
associated with the Mainlanders. Externally, it refers to a China that is now represented by 
the Communist regime in Beijing.   
In short, the presence/absence and spectre of ‘China’ is a crucial aspect of an 
understanding of the discursive proliferation of Taiwanese national identity. China in fact is 
economically the greatest potential market for Taiwan; it is historically the source of its 
ethnicity, culture and languages; it is politically a contestant or enemy; and it is one of 
Taiwan’s deepest and most recurring images of ‘the Other’. China, as Taiwan’s contrasting 
image, has indeed helped the Taiwanese to define what Taiwan is itself. In this sense, ‘China’ 
                                                
17 Chen is a native Taiwanese (Minnan ethnicity) and an anti-KMT political dissenter.      
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is not simply a physical site but a discursive space in which different forms of solidarity, 
affinity and identity are constructed and contested. The political possibilities for Taiwan in 
relation to China are ambiguously undecided and un-decidable.   
1-2-3. Political Context of the Discursive Proliferation about Taiwanese-ness 
It should be noted that this discursive proliferation about Taiwanese national identity is 
a relatively recent phenomenon. It occurs, in effect, during the process of democratisation.    
Taiwan’s political transition from hard totalitarianism to soft totalitarianism to quasi-
democracy was made possible, to a great degree, by a conjunction of changes in the 
international system and changes in Taiwan’s domestic politics, economics and society. 
Those changes created a political climate conducive to democratisation (Wachman 1996; 
Hughes 1997; Roy 2003). Towards the end of the 1960s, political opposition to the KMT – 
the Mainlander-dominated regime – was not permitted and was repressed viciously. 
However, at the very beginning of the 1970s, Taiwan faced a series of foreign crises that 
brought the KMT regime’s (ROC) legitimacy into question, and in turn led to challenges to 
the authority of the KMT within Taiwan.18 One of the most significant events was the 
normalisation of US-PRC relations. The US, Taiwan’s closest ally, in the late 1960s opened 
secret contacts with the PRC. Taiwan (the ROC) was then, in 1971, expelled from the 
United Nations, thereby losing its legitimate status representing China. Signals of the US-
PRC rapprochement opened a floodgate of diplomatic defeats for Taiwan. In 1968, Taiwan 
had formal relations with 64 countries. Yet, by mid-1975, the number of countries having 
diplomatic relations with Taiwan had dropped to 26, compared with the PRC who had 
normalised relations with 112 countries (Roy 2003, 132). The US-PRC relationship was 
officially normalised in 1979. Under these circumstances, the oppositional forces raised 
increasingly public questions about the KMT’s right to monopolise the definition of the 
collective national popular will and to dominate the systems of laws, values, education, media, 
                                                
18 Taiwan is, in the KMT’s view, the location of  the legitimate government of  all of  China.  And the 
US and most of  the rest of  the world acceded in this until 1970s.  It was not until the early 1990s the 
national political bodies, such as Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, kept in place delegates 
representing Mainland districts even though they were divorced from their constituents. 
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popular culture and political activities. Domestic calls for democratic reform became more 
frequent and stronger.19 
In the light of changes in the political and social environment, then-president Chiang 
Ching-Kuo (the son of Chiang Kai-Shek) gradually began to loosen his grip in an effort to 
strengthen the regime’s legitimacy. In 1987, six months before his death, Chiang lifted 
martial law, followed by the end to a ban on the formation of political parties and newspaper 
restrictions. Political liberations had begun, setting in motion other changes leading to 
democratisation. After Chiang’s death, Lee Teng-Hui assumed the presidency and continued 
implementing democratic reforms. Lee promoted a series of constitutional reforms that 
paved the way for full re-election of the legislatures at all levels of the government.20 In 1996 
the people in Taiwan for the first time cast their direct votes in a presidential election. In 
2000, then-oppositional Democratic Progress Party (DPP) candidate Chen Shui-Bian 
captured Taiwan’s second direct presidential election, realising the first rotation of the ruling 
party in Taiwan’s political history. The first change of ruling party signified the 
accomplishment of democratisation in Taiwan (Wu Yu-Shan 2001). 
It is, however, noted that along with political liberalisation, either in Lee’s KMT 
presidency in the 1990s or in Chen’s DPP presidency after 2000, there was a serious political 
power struggle, entangled with partisan, ethnic and ideological confrontations. Lee was the 
first so-called ‘native Taiwanese’ president. 21 After he succeeded Chiang as the president, 
Lee was confronted with various political challenges from, mainly, the ethnic-Mainlander 
political elites within the KMT (Wu Rwei-Ren 2002, 203-9). 22  The alleged ‘Taiwanese 
                                                
19 Alongside aforementioned challenges, the development of  economics gave birth to a well-educated 
and politically conscious middle class, which also demanded large-scale socio-political change. It 
became a major social force that pressed the KMT regime to reform itself  and accelerate its pace to 
democratisation (Rubinstein, 1999). 
20 Since the KMT regime claimed to be the sole legitimate government of all China, it justified 
postponing full national elections until it recovered the Mainland. So the national parliaments were 
filled with politicians elected on the Mainland in 1947, who were frozen in office with indefinite 
terms of office. Only a limited number of seats – with less than a third of seats – were opened up for 
direct election after 1969.  
21 The Mainlanders, a minority of the population, had held onto power in a proportion far 
outweighing their numerical strength, in the central government, media, the army, and parliament. 
22 The other challenge was from the native Taiwanese elites outside the KMT, which was taken up by 
a new-formed political party – the DPP. It should be however noted that opponents within the KMT 
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consciousness’ is then deemed as a trump card for Lee to consolidate his power within the 
KMT regime. The use of ‘Taiwanese consciousness’ was twofold. It was employed, on the 
one hand, to expel the Mainlander elite from the core of power within the KMT, and on the 
other hand, to tackle DPP’s challenges in elections as well as to maintain its tacit alliance 
(Wu 2002). The political struggle in Taiwan in the 1990s was indeed characterised by the 
confrontation between Lee’s KMT (plus the DPP) and anti-Lee factions of the KMT (plus 
the New Party23). During this period, Lee and other native Taiwanese politicians, in both the 
KMT and the DPP, came increasingly to use the terms ‘Taiwanese’ or ‘Taiwanese 
consciousness’ as political weapons to distinguish ‘them’, the ‘Chinese’ or ‘Chinese 
consciousness’, from ‘us’. It is in this sense that democratisation in Taiwan is intimately 
intertwined, interacted and overlapped with the indigenisation/ Taiwanisation. 
However, it would be misleading if one categorises those politicians who opposed Lee 
as purely ethnic Mainlander. In fact, a great number of them were native Taiwanese. It was 
particularly noticeable in the second half of the 1990s after many ethnic Mainlander 
politicians in the KMT (as well as in the central government) were replaced by native 
Taiwanese politicians. Thus, a better way to draw the line on this political division is to 
consider ‘Taiwanese sympathisers’ as opposed to ‘Chinese sympathisers’. The former refers 
to those pro-independence people, calling for a Taiwanese consciousness distinct from the 
Chinese, and pushing for formal independence if possible. The latter refers to the people 
who insist that Taiwanese consciousness interchanged with the Chinese one; they are 
possibly in favour of eventual reunification with China or at least oppose anything that 
seems like a move towards independence. However, it cannot be denied that most of the 
Mainlanders are Chinese sympathisers, while many native Taiwanese are Taiwanese 
sympathisers.  
After 2000, the political situation turned into a confrontation between the so-called 
‘Pan-Green’ and ‘Pan-Blue’, two political coalitions so named because of their respective 
party colours that remained roughly equal in strength. Pan-Green politicians are made up of 
mainly ‘Taiwanese sympathisers’, while the Pan-Blue camp consists of largely the ‘Chinese 
                                                                                                                                            
posed a more formidable challenge to Lee than the DPP, since the KMT then controlled most of the 
social and political resources inherited from its past authoritarian party-state system.  
23 In 1993, some members of  the KMT broke away from the party and established the New Party. 
Most of  them were ethnic-Mainlanders.  
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sympathisers’. The green camp consists of the DPP and the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU). 
The TSU was established in 2001 after Lee Teng-Hui was forced to resign from the KMT 
leadership after the defeat of the presidential election in 2000. Lee was deemed to be a 
‘spiritual leader’ in the TSU. The blue camp consists of the KMT, the People First Party 
(PFP),24 and the New Party. The major battle in this procedure of political struggle has been 
the highly frequent election campaign at all levels of government. The frequency of the 
election campaigns increased rapidly as the pace of democratisation since 1990 has risen. 
There has been an election campaign almost every year since 1995. Moreover, since the 
election campaigns in Taiwan have been entangled with ethnic, ideological and identity 
confrontations, they are often extremely intense. Both sides thought that losing would mean 
being consigned to a permanent minority status. Therefore, regardless of local or national 
elections, both camps have regarded each political contest as a final showdown. Both sides 
mounted frenetic and indeed excessive mobilisation efforts that looked at times like the 
acting-out of a vast national neurosis.  
In addition, the increasing frequency of the election campaigns was accompanied with 
media liberalisation. The political restrictions on newspapers were lifted in 1987. By the mid-
1990s the democratic transition and media liberalisation had basically been completed and all 
restrictions on freedom of speech removed (Roy 2003, 175). This media liberation offered 
political parties and candidates new opportunities for communicating with voters. In the 
election campaign, politicians from all parties have to use every means to gain publicity, 
attracting voter attention. Among many, one of the most significant means was the use of 
the cable TV channels.25  
The number of cable channels has shot up since the mid-1990s. This new media offers 
politicians in Taiwan a new range of campaigning methods to reach the ordinary people. 
One such method was election advertising. Making good election TV ads has become a 
prerequisite of a successful campaign. According to Gary Rawnsley and Dafydd Fell (2007, 
12-18), the degree of change is clear from the comparison of the 245 minutes of free 
                                                
24 PFP was established in 2000 after the popular independent presidential candidate Song Chu-Yu 
lost the election to DPP’s candidate Chen Shui-Bian. 
25 The growth of  cable television during the 1990s was very rapid. In 1990 only 16.1% of  households 
subscribed to cable, however this had risen to 75.9% by 1996 and 84.3% in 2003 (Please see 
Rawnsley and Fell 2007). 
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television campaign ads shown in 1991 with 56,043 minutes of purchased advertising time in 
2000. The amount of election advertisements has meant that it is almost impossible to avoid 
exposure. Another major consequence of the rise of cable TV has been the proliferation of 
politics talk shows. In Taiwan, there are at least ten talk shows each night, in which 
politicians from the major political parties debate the issues of the day. The fact that so many 
of these politics talk shows are able to survive in the market suggests they must be profitable 
for the cable channels to conduct them. Many people watch them. Also, the rise in 24-hour 
cable news has had an impact on dissemination of political rhetoric. In Taiwan, there are at 
least ten Taiwan-based 24-hour news channels. While in the past no more than a few sound 
bites from a speech would be shown on the TV news, since the late 1990s the cable news 
channels have broadcast speeches live. It is however noted that the intensification of media 
reports does not mean that people just sit on the sofa of their living room (ibid., 19). In fact, 
citizen participation in outdoor political activities has actually increased. The political rallies 
became exceedingly common and popular in this period. The use of street rallies appears to 
have actually reached a climax in 2004, with the clear battle for which party can run the 
largest outdoor activities. The DPP’s keynote political event was a Hand-in-Hand human 
chain linking the far north with the far south of Taiwan that was attended by at least one and 
a half million people.26 In contrast, the KMT also held a series of simultaneous anti-Chen 
rallies on 13 March under the slogan of ‘Change the President, Save Taiwan’, in which up to 
three million people participated. Those mass rallies were all televised, with different TV 
channels having live reports on different rallies.  
The large number of newspaper advertisements, the regularity of political talk shows, 
and the intensive media coverage of campaign issues ensure that political rhetoric 
disseminates throughout the whole of society. Politics becomes the common subject of 
people’s daily conversation. The very frequent political elections contributed to the high 
exposition of political rhetoric. And those political wordings/actions are often associated 
with the issues of ethnicity, ideology and, above all, national identity.  
In short, the various discourses (statements, utterances and actions), which had been so 
long suppressed by the KMT regime, were finally liberated amid the process of 
democratisation. The democratisation and more ‘open’ civil society that possessed a greater 
                                                
26 The thesis will discuss this event in detail in Chapter Five.  
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degree of freedom of expression provided a political context for the discursive proliferation 
of Taiwanese national identity.  
1-2-4. Not Everything Can Be Spoken Of 
The aforementioned political environment prompts people to talk about ‘Taiwan’, 
‘Taiwanese-ness’, and ‘Taiwanese national identity’. Those subjects have become a common 
object of the people’s talk – the various statements, rhetoric, knowledges, analyses, conducts, 
etc. Although there is a discursive proliferation concerning Taiwanese identity, it does not 
mean everything can be uttered or conducted. Conversely, this discursive explosion 
simultaneously excludes other statements, utterances or actions on the subject. Many 
alternatives are dismissed, have disappeared, or are prohibited and repressed. The most 
widespread and ‘authorised’ discourse in this wave of discursive proliferation represents 
Taiwanese national identity as an inevitable consequence of historical and political 
developments of Taiwan. It is argued that the consolidation of Taiwanese national identity 
possesses a double guarantee from historical and political developments over the last one 
hundred years at least.  
The historical guarantee refers to Taiwan’s Japanese colonial history and the ruthless 
and autocratic rule of the KMT in Taiwan in the post-war period (Chang 2003; Wu Rwei-
Ren 2001, 2004; Shih 1972; Dai 1994; Chu et al. 2001; Edmondson 2002). It contends that 
‘Taiwanese identity’ was formed in the first place during the Japanese colonisation, and 
Taiwanese discourse of political nationalism was gradually formulated in the situation, in 
which the Taiwanese were abandoned by China but were unable to be Japanese since the 
Japanese governor in Taiwan refused to grant the same citizenship to the Taiwanese as 
Japanese citizens. Taiwanese political elites therefore strove for an autonomous status under 
Japanese colonisation. This autonomous status implies the rights to self-determination of the 
Taiwanese people. It is the burgeoning of Taiwan’s political nationalism. Moreover, the 
KMT’s autocratic governance, was shown in the 2-28 Incident in 1947 and the White Terror 
in the 1950s and 1960s inevitably led the Taiwanese to deeply question their Chinese self-
identification. The convergence of Japanese colonisation and the KMT’s autocratic rule 
made the imagination of Taiwan as a nation possible. And the new wave of Taiwanese 
nationalism in the 1990s came as a result of this lineage of Taiwan’s modern historical 
development.  
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Juxtaposed with the historical guarantee, the political guarantees focus on Taiwan’s 
democratisation under Taiwan’s former president Lee’s presidency as well as China’s attempt 
to intimidate (politically and militarily) Taiwan in the 1990s (Lin Chia-Lung 1998, 2001, 
2002). It is argued that ‘democratisation’ is the main cause of the transition of Taiwan’s 
national identity from Chinese to Taiwanese. The practice of democracy in Taiwan creates a 
shared political identity, common values and a sense of achievement. Increasing numbers of 
Taiwanese realise that ‘Taiwan’s democratic liberalism’ is different from ‘China’s 
authoritarianism’. The gap dividing Taiwan and China emanates not in cultural or ethnic 
differences, but in institutional differences: democracy versus authoritarianism. In addition 
to these, the Chinese military threat against Taiwan and its diplomatic efforts to isolate 
Taiwan in international society furthermore unifies Taiwanese people and produces a shared 
identity. Thus, the practice of democracy ‘pulls’ Taiwanese people together from the inside 
of the island, while China’s threat and oppression ‘push’ Taiwanese people together from 
outside the island. National identity in Taiwan is not ethnic identity at all, but a political and 
territorial identity. According to this strand of thought, Taiwanese nationalism or Taiwanese 
identity should be conceived of as civic nationalism (Lin Chia-Lung 2001), liberal 
nationalism (Wu 2001), and/or state identity (Chiang 1999).  
Consequently, it is commonly assumed that these historical and political developments 
led to the formation of Taiwanese national identity in the 1990s.  This line of reasoning 
implies an assertion of causation; that is, Japanese colonisation, the KMT’s autocratic rules, 
democratisation and the PRC’s intimidation caused the formation of Taiwanese national 
identity. Taiwanese national identity can thus be legitimised since it is the inevitable outcome 
of the historical and political development of Taiwan. 
From these aforementioned two perspectives, the formation of Taiwanese national 
identity was firstly represented as an anti-colonial national movement (Shih 1972; Wu, 2001), 
whenever it is applied to Japanese colonisation on Taiwan in the first half of twentieth 
century or the KMT’s re-colonisation in the second half of twentieth century.27 Secondly, it 
was conceived as resistance towards authoritarianism, either being concerned with KMT’s 
                                                
27 Some people argue that the KMT’s rule in the post-war era is a kind of  recolonisation in order to 
distinguish it from the Japanese colonisation before WWII.  KMT’s rule is also described as a quasi-
colonial situation, in which the colonisers are on Taiwan Island and there is no colonial motherland.   
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authoritarian rules or the PRC’s political and military intimidation. As a result, the formation 
of Taiwanese national identity is always evaluated in the mainstream of society as a sort of 
resistance towards colonialism, a revolt against authoritarian regime and an emancipation of 
the subject. ‘Taiwan’s experience’ in the 1990s in the political respect is deemed as a model 
for developing countries in the Third World. It is said to be a ‘Political Miracle’ in the West.     
Everyone in Taiwan is presumed to feel comfortable to be Taiwanese and to claim that 
they are Taiwanese. Taiwanese-ness or Taiwanese national identity is fixed and taken-for-
granted. Any statements, rhetoric, knowledges, analyses, conducts, etc. that oppose this line 
of thought are conceived as bizarre, incorrect, and even unethical. Social activities that are 
against this line of thought are not approved. For example, the care of the mainlander 
Chinese spouses, the elimination of ethnic or racial discrimination or the protection of 
foreign labourers from South-Eastern Asia are hindered, or to some degree restricted. There 
is very little choice of identity for individuals in Taiwan; in some cases there is no choice at 
all. 
 
1-3. Research Questions   
The phenomenon described above – discursive proliferation and discursive exclusion – 
encourages this thesis to reconsider the role of ‘discourse’ in the constitution of Taiwanese 
national identity. Hence, it is necessary to revisit the formation of Taiwanese national 
identity in the 1990s through an exploration of the discourses or discursive formations about 
Taiwanese national identity. The thesis will thus ask how ‘Taiwanese’ has been discursively 
constituted as a national identity since 1990. This means that the thesis will examine the 
social/discursive practices through which people are being incited to talk about a specific 
‘Taiwanese-ness’ or ‘Taiwanese national identity’. Moreover, it will look at what exactly the 
‘Taiwanese-ness’ refers to. It will also examine the social practices through which such 
discourses are disseminated: how a specific discourse about ‘Taiwanese-ness’ takes 
precedence over alternative discourses, and what alternatives have been repressed, forgotten, 
or neglected. Finally, it will try to contemplate the possibility of resistance: how it emerges in 
the process of this discursive constitution; how counter-discourses get formed or reformed.   
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1-4. Genealogical Method  
The term ‘genealogy’ is the single concept that best explains the methodology adopted 
in this thesis. The German philosopher Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche was the first to propose 
this methodology. In his On the Genealogy of Morality: A Polemic, published in 1887, Nietzsche 
aims to present a critique of moral concepts, which were then taken for granted, by 
providing an ‘actual’ history of morality showing ‘the descent of our moral prejudices’ 
(Nietzsche 1994, 4; emphasis in original).  
Nietzsche asks: ‘under what conditions did man invent the value judgements good and 
evil? And what value do they themselves have’ (ibid., 5; emphasis in original)? In other words, what 
is required in genealogical studies of morality is ‘a revaluation of all values.’ For Nietzsche, 
the value of these values (good and evil) themselves must be called into question. He states: 
We need a critique of moral values, the value of these values should itself, for once, be 
examined – and so we need to know about the conditions and circumstances under 
which the values grew up, developed and changed… (Ibid., 8; emphasis in original) 
Since people have taken the values of these values as given and beyond all questioning, 
nobody has doubted or hesitated ‘in placing higher value on “the good man” than on “the 
evil”, higher value in the sense of advancement, benefit and prosperity for man in general.’ 
But what if, writes Nietzsche, the reverse way were true.  
[What] if a regressive trait lurked in ‘the good man’, likewise a danger, an 
enticement, a poison, a narcotic, so that the present lived at the expense of the future? 
Perhaps in more comfort and less danger, but also in a smaller-mind, meaner 
manner… So that morality itself was the danger of dangers. (Ibid., 8; emphasis in 
original)    
Nietzsche therefore asks us to overturn all that we have believed about good and evil. What 
Nietzsche tells us in his genealogy is that the idea of truth is itself a kind of fiction. 
Everything that we hold as solid, taken-for-granted, and certain about the world is, upon 
closer examination, accidental and contingent. Genealogy in this regard is a way of writing a 
history of the present that de-familiarises us from what we now take for granted by revealing 
in detail how things were otherwise. Inspired by Nietzsche, Foucault proposes his distinctive 
genealogical method. He elaborates his genealogical methods by elucidating a number of its 
characteristics.  
First of all, genealogy rejects the possibility of fixed essences, underlying laws, 
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interiority, or metaphysical grounds for historical entities. Genealogy therefore avoids the 
quest for foundations and argues that it is not possible to understand anything by postulating 
deep hidden meanings or unreachable heights of truth. If one listens to history, Foucault 
writes, one finds that there is no ‘timeless and essential secret’, but ‘the secret that they have 
no essence or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms’ 
(Foucault 1984, 78). ‘Deep meaning’ exists, gets produced and reproduced in so far as there 
are proliferating surface practices. We are nothing but the exteriority of our history. We must 
read our history in terms of our exterior practices. Genealogical method thus opposes any 
supra-historical perspective that seeks to totalize history, but instead looks for and discovers 
the meaning of things in their surface practices. Moreover, genealogy opposes itself to the 
search for ‘origins’ (Ursprung). This assertion is based on three reasons: firstly, such a quest 
incorrectly assumes the existence of immobile forms or primordial truth taken to be already 
there; secondly, it implies, inappropriately, that ‘origin’ is the moment of the ‘greatest 
perfection;’ and thirdly, it mistakenly identifies origins as ‘the site of truth’ (ibid., 79). On all 
these counts, tracing the gradual curve of the evolution of history seems a problematic 
enterprise which genealogy refuses to engage in. The true objective of genealogy should be a 
search for ‘descent’ (Herkunft), that is, according to Foucault, involves a quest for ‘the subtle, 
singular and sub-individual marks that might possibly intersect in them to form a network 
that is difficult to unravel’ (ibid., 81). The genealogist sets out to study the beginnings – 
numerous beginnings – rather than a unitary beginning or ‘origin’.   
It is in this sense that Foucault opposed the (traditional) form of writing history that 
dedicates itself to the search for essences and origins of historical entities.28 Foucault here 
continues his critique, earlier developed in his archaeological works, of traditional historical 
studies. The traditional form of history, according to Foucault, sees the past as a linear, 
continuous, and totalised development from a supra-historical perspective assumed by 
historians. The historian therefore attempts to reorganise the mass of documents and to 
filter out the abundance of material about the past, in order to conform to the teleological 
interpretation of their progressive, evolutionary, totalized, and linear history. They try to link 
disparate events, to establish causal succession between them; to make the continuity or 
                                                
28 Here Foucault refers to the historians of  Annales of  School such as Marc Bloch, who studies 
history by searching its deep structural level that reveals a large continuity of  the historical events.      
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overall significance which they possess, and to define a totality (Foucault 1972a, 3-7). Yet, 
Foucault argues, since traditional historians focus on the origins, continuity and totality of 
history, not only do they fail to reconstitute the original features of the past (and it is in fact 
an impossible task), but also constrain their domains of analysis to a few selected subjects 
and events and distort the meaning of events and the contents of documents. As a 
consequence, many events are erased and many documents are distorted. Foucault therefore 
argues that the historian verbalises something that is not verbalised but remains silent about 
something that is actually verbalised in the document. To Foucault, the traditional form of 
history attains its narrative totalisations in an illegitimate way through the construction of 
abstractions that obscure more that they reveal. Hence, Foucault rejects traditional historical 
studies that seek to totalise history, to trace its internal development, and to offer the 
reassurance of an end toward which history moves. Foucault writes that once the historian’s 
senses are mastered by a supra-historical perspective, it ‘can bend it to its own purpose’ 
(Foucault 1984, 87).29 The world that Foucault presents is a place full of discontinuity, 
difference, conflict, contradiction, diversity and rupture. 
In contrast to the traditional form of history, genealogy aims to write what Nietzsche 
terms ‘effective history’ (wirkliche Historie).30 According to Foucault, while traditional history 
always assumes a supra-historical perspective that ‘finds its support outside of time and 
pretends to base its judgments on an apocalyptic objectivity,’ effective history seeks to put 
everything in a historical motion, and dissolve this comforting illusion of identity and 
firmness and solidity (ibid., 87). The genealogist endorses no constants. Moreover, while 
traditional history perceives the past as a continuous development and thereby tends to 
dissolve the singular event into an ideal continuity, a linear succession, and a natural process, 
effective history reveals the gap in continuity, exposes the contradiction in unity, and 
overthrows the determination of history. Effective history dismantles the continuity of 
                                                
29 Nevertheless, although genealogists oppose a traditional form of writing history that provides a 
linear, continuous, totalised narrative of the past, it should admit that the work by genealogists also 
give their own narrative account of history. The main difference between them is that, whereas the 
traditional historians provide inevitable ends towards which history moves, genealogist on the 
contrary intends to problematise the current world as it is, demonstrating that configurations of the 
world are contingent, and can always be otherwise. On this account, both the traditional and the 
genealogical forms of writing history are political interventions.   
30 In German, the term ‘wirklich’ means ‘actual, real, true’ (Oxford Duden German Dictionary). Yet, the 
English translation of Foucault’s article ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’ in Foucault Reader (1984) 
translates it as ‘effective’. 
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history by dealing with events in terms of their most unique characteristics, and most acute 
manifestations (ibid., 88). It seeks to make sense of history from the surfaces of events: its 
small details, minor shifts, and subtle contours. Genealogy is therefore ‘a study of details,’ a 
‘grey, meticulous, and patiently documentary,’ requiring a knowledge of details that depends 
on the accumulation of a vast scope of materials (ibid., 76). Genealogy only looks at subtle, 
minute and meticulous practices – the surface practices.  
This way of doing history that pays attention to the surface practices was manifested in 
Foucault’s conception of ‘discourse’. The term ‘discourse’ in common usage means ‘a 
coherent or rational body of speech or writing’ (Penguin Dictionary of Sociology: Discourse).  
Foucault however uses this term with a much broader meaning. Firstly, it does not only refer 
to the language, but also to other forms of expression, e.g. visual expression. Secondly, it is 
not restricted to linguistic acts, but also includes the material expressions of those acts. 
Linguistic acts themselves have a material/physical foundation, e.g. printed words. Thirdly 
and most importantly, discourse is understood as, in effect, a social practice that can be 
elucidated in two aspects. The first aspect refers to the way in which discourses are produced 
by various practices, which are, by nature, dispersed, fragmented and heterogeneous, 
including both discursive/linguistic (what people say) and social/non-linguistic (what people 
do) practices. Those practices are diffused in every domain of society. The second aspect 
refers to the way in which discourses get disseminated in society. On the one hand, they 
systematically form the objects/subjects of which they speak – the constitution of social 
entities – and, on the other hand, they reproduce/reshape discourses itself. The social 
entities are accordingly constituted in discourse. It should be however stressed that the use 
of words/statements has limits. According to Foucault, one cannot just ‘say’ and ‘do’ what 
one wishes to ‘say’ and ‘do’. The discourse involves a complex set of practices that keep 
certain statements, utterances, and conducts in circulation but take other statements, 
utterances and conducts out of circulation. A specific discourse thus limits or excludes 
alternative ways in which objects/subjects can be constituted. Discourse in Foucault’s 
thoughts is therefore understood as a set of practices that constitute certain social entities 
while at the same time excluding other alternatives. The object/subject – the discursive 
formation of the social entity – in nature is thus contingent.   
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Nevertheless, those limited and contingent social entities are generally regarded as 
complete and absolute. Genealogy therefore problematises forms of knowledge, rationality, 
and subjectivity that seem given naturally but in fact are contingent socio-historical 
constructs of discursive practices. It aims to provide a critique of our historical era. This 
leads to the final feature of the genealogy: the focus on power and on the subject (body).  
To Foucault, while discourse produces certain social entities and excludes other 
alternatives, the practice of discourse, in effect, entails power relations. Human history, in 
Foucault’s understanding, is a constant struggle between different power blocs that attempt 
to impose their own system of domination. The talk of meaning and value, virtue and 
goodness conceals strategies of domination. The genealogist’s task is to reveal these 
dominations. It is to investigate the play of power and thus to discover subjection, 
domination and conflict. The history of men in the end is not progressive, evolutionary and 
continuous, but power-oriented, contingent and discontinuous. Moreover, Foucault centres 
the impact of power struggles on the human subject, particularly its body. The human 
subject for Foucault is at the centre of the struggle between different power blocs. It is both 
shaped and reshaped by different forces acting upon it. Foucault writes, ‘the body is the 
inscribed surface of events (traced by language and dissolved by ideas), the locus of a 
dissociated self (adopting the illusion of a substantial unity), and a volume in perpetual 
disintegration’ (Foucault 1984, 83). And the task of the genealogist is then to expose the 
subject totally imprinted by history and the destruction of other forms of the subject by the 
processes of history. 
As a consequence, according to Foucault, the genealogist is called to destroy those 
unwarranted beliefs that were taken for granted. The purpose of a genealogical account of 
knowledge therefore should be the act of dismantling truths. The knowledge produced by 
the genealogist ‘is not made for understanding; it is made for cutting’ (ibid., 88). Foucault 
here echoes Nietzsche’s way of writing history that de-familiarises us from what we now take 
for granted. Moreover, since Foucault pays attention to the human subject, the core task of 
genealogy is to challenge any form of subjectification of human being. In other words, 
genealogy challenges people’s understanding of who they are in ways that lead them to resist 
their attachment to their social identities. One needs to renounce oneself. And his 
genealogical studies form part of a strategy of renunciation of oneself, exposing the 
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beginnings and developments of the discourses and practices through which human beings 
are subjectified. As long as we know how they were made, ‘they can be unmade’ (Foucault 
1988, 37).   
To conclude, Foucault’s genealogy rejects the possibility that history has a deep 
meaning, fixed essence or that it reflects primordial truth and instead locates its meaning in 
surface practices, but aims to discover the history from its surface practices; it refuses to 
view history as a linear development that has traceable origins, but aims to perceive history 
which is full of ruptures and discontinuity that has numberless beginnings; and finally it does 
not aim to construct truths, but aims to dismantle truths that are taken to be unproblematic.  
 
1-5. Key Arguments   
Drawing closely from the genealogical method, the thesis, firstly, does not seek a deep 
meaning, distinctive quality and fixed essence of ‘Taiwanese-ness’/being ‘Taiwanese’; rather, 
it aims to discover how those meaning/quality/essence in substance are constituted in the 
surface practices. Secondly, it refuses to view such an identity formation as a linear 
development of history that has origins; rather, it tries to seek the emergence of ‘Taiwanese-
ness’ from numerous points. And thirdly, it does not aim to prove the existence of 
‘Taiwanese-ness’; rather, it aims to dismantle ‘Taiwanese-ness’.  
No Deep Meaning, Distinctive Quality and Fixed Essence of “Taiwanese-ness” 
To elucidate, with regard to the first point, this thesis does not assume that ‘Taiwanese-
ness’ exists beforehand out there waiting to be discovered; rather, the thesis intends to 
explore how it is discursively constituted. First of all, this thesis does not deny that there is 
such a thing as Taiwanese-ness and does not contest prevailing ideas about the substance of 
‘Taiwanese-ness’, i.e. democratic-ness, civil-ness, anti-colonialism/imperialism and so on. 
Indeed, ‘Taiwanese-ness’ is whatever substantive quality that is held to be attaching 
necessarily to being Taiwanese. Nevertheless, admitting the existence of ‘Taiwanese-ness’ 
does not suggest that this concept is fixed, predetermined, defined, indefinite, taken-for-
granted and unproblematic or that we can probe further to discover its origins, 
characteristics, nature and qualities. This thesis rather attempts to challenge this way of 
thought.  
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It is argued: there was no such thing as ‘Taiwanese-ness’ in the first place; nor is 
‘Taiwanese-ness’ a single thing; it is subject to different practices – people’s speech and 
actions. The idea that there is such a thing as ‘Taiwanese-ness’ grew gradually. What this 
thing amounts to is subject to different kinds of practices. Each practice has an input, 
making it possible to talk about ‘Taiwanese-ness’ and attaching a specific substance (i.e. 
qualities, features) to it. And this process of construction is not simply one way, either. 
Particular discourses of Taiwanese-ness in turn make certain actions possible, sustaining or 
undermining what people say and do. Accordingly, Taiwanese national identity is conditional, 
lodged in contingency. It has determinate conditions of existence, including the material and 
symbolic resources required to sustain it. The concept of ‘Taiwanese-ness’ should be seen as 
a dynamic and fluid rather than as a static concept. It alters all the way down. Taiwanese-ness 
is not naturally given, but exists in the way people talk and act. In short, there is no such 
thing as ‘Taiwanese-ness’ outside of this process of constitution; Taiwanese-ness only exists 
in discourse. Taiwanese national identity is itself a discursive entity. This thesis in this regard is a 
refusal of the belief that nation or national identity has a fixed, predetermined, and defined 
ontology.  
The following question, accompanying this line of thought, is: How do various 
practices contribute to ‘Taiwanese-ness’? The proposed answer is that it is constructed 
through meticulous, varied and heterogeneous practices. ‘Taiwanese-ness’ is accordingly 
constituted in the most minute and local practices. This argument is then related to the 
second point.  
Neither Origins nor a Linear Development of History 
This thesis opposes itself to the search for origins of ‘Taiwanese-ness’ and refuses to 
trace the evolutionary courses of ‘Taiwanese-ness’ as it is formed.  Such an enterprise is 
problematic, since it, on the one hand, assumes the existence of immobile forms or 
primordial truth taken to be already there. On the other, it perceives the past as a continuous 
development, tending to dissolve the singular event into an ideal and, indeed, comporting 
continuity as a natural process. This thesis therefore rejects a particular storyline that makes 
it sound as though Taiwanese-ness has its origins and develops ineluctably to the present 
state of affairs. The thesis by contrast sets out to study numberless beginnings of the 
formation of Taiwanese identity and attempt to make sense of the proliferating surface 
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practices. It involves a quest for the subtle, singular and sub-individual marks that might 
possibly intersect in the formation of a network that is difficult to unravel in the process of 
identity formation. This thesis, in short, is a study of details.  
As mentioned above, ‘discourse analysis’ is the best manifestation of this sort of 
meticulous work, and the term ‘discourse’ is understood as a domain in which 
discursive/social practices are exercised. The discursive formation of a Taiwanese identity 
involves two steps. Firstly, a discourse organised around ‘Taiwanese-ness’, understood as a 
national identity, is constituted through various social practices; secondly, a discourse of 
‘Taiwanese-ness’ becomes disseminated in society via various social practices, on the one 
hand transforming the discourse itself and, on the other, forming the subjects of which they 
speak – that is, ‘the Taiwanese’. An analysis of discourse in this regard is threefold: the 
formation of discourse, the practices of discourse, and the constitution of subjects in 
discourse. It should be stressed however that not every discourse can be circulated; only 
certain discourses are disseminated in society, thereby only certain forms of subject are 
formed accordingly. This thesis argues that identity formation in Taiwan is situated in a 
realm in which different historical, cultural and political discourses have mutually interacted, 
intersected and competed. This is then linked with the final point, claiming that the thesis 
aims to dismantle ‘Taiwanese-ness’ that is seen as an unproblematic truth in Taiwan. 
Dismantling ‘Taiwanese-ness’ 
There are two grounds for this political assertion. Firstly, since many other alternative 
discourses and political possibilities are omitted, repressed and made to disappear in the 
discursive formation of ‘Taiwanese-ness’, the concept itself on that account needs to be 
critically interrogated. Indeed, a complex set of practices that keep certain statements or 
utterances in/out of circulation involves the play of power, thereby implicating the 
production of exclusion and inclusion. ‘Discourse’ is a political site of social actions and 
interventions, where power relations are both established and potentially unsettled. 
Therefore, the study of discourse involves exposing the relations of power that exist within 
society at any given moment in order to consider how marginal and subordinate groups are 
oppressed; or alternatively, they might secure or win, however temporarily, space from the 
dominant group. The thesis accordingly lays greater stress on the following question: How 
   28
 
does a specific discourse take precedence over other alternatives, leading the people in 
Taiwan to conceive themselves as Taiwanese.31  
Secondly, since the modern individual is not naturally born as a subject but is 
subjectified in discourse, subjectivity itself is then conditioned through power relations. The 
individual is interpreted as an effect of the political technologies through which its very 
identity, desires, body, and soul are shaped and constituted. The ultimate goal and effect of 
power is to normalise and to eliminate all social and psychological irregularities, producing 
useful and docile subjects through a refashioning of minds and bodies. Thus, 
control/domination is achieved not through direct repression but through more invisible 
forces, aiming to produce a particular type of subject. It is power that makes individuals 
subjects. The modern subject is thus a construct of domination. As such, this thesis intends 
to create a history of the different modes that the people residing in the island of Taiwan are 
made subject and to expose the beginnings and developments of current subjectifying 
discourses and practices. In other words, this thesis always asks how we become who and 
what we are in our present form.  
 
1-6. The Outline of the Thesis: 
In short, this thesis is juxtaposed against conventional forms of writing history that aim 
to search for an origin of Taiwanese-ness, to trace the path of a linear development of 
Taiwanese identity formation, and to seek out a ‘hidden’ nature of Taiwanese that is assumed 
exists out there, waiting to be discovered. This thesis, instead, aims to discover how the 
‘nature’ of Taiwanese-ness is constituted in social practices, to seek the emergence of 
Taiwanese-ness from innumerable practices; and finally, it aims to dismantle ‘Taiwanese-
ness’, which has come to be seen as an unproblematic truth in Taiwan. This thesis sees the 
                                                
31 As argued in this thesis, the method of genealogy is to de-familiarise and de-comfort from what we 
now take for granted. However, in contrast to Foucault’s analysis in History of Sexuality, in which he 
tried to reveal the content of marginalised discourses, this thesis focused mostly on enabling 
discourses and their production, rather than disabling practices. The thesis argues that production 
automatically involves exclusion. When power enables people to talk, it concurrently expels other 
alternative voices. The thesis therefore tried to demonstrate how the dominant discourse of 
Taiwanese-ness has emerged in contemporary Taiwanese society, coming to occupy discursive spaces, 
thereby disabling alternative ways of speaking about identity on the island. The thesis places itself in a 
sub-tradition of Foucauldian genealogy.  
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reality of social phenomena residing in their appearances. There is no origin, no essence, and 
no stable process of internal development, thus the thesis focuses only on surface practices, 
arguing that this is all there is. What this thesis is trying to do is to trace various social 
practices, in which certain things were said and done, things which in turn underpin the 
production of a particular kind of Taiwanese identity. ‘What Taiwanese-ness is’ is constituted 
in and through a variety of subtle social practices, and in which discourses mutually interact, 
intersect and compete. Yet, it is not possible to undertake an exhaustive enquiry of the 
process, examining each and every social practice that may affect its formation. 
Consequently, the thesis, alternatively, explores only certain events involved.  
The thesis, apart from Introduction, theoretical framework (Chapter Two) and 
Conclusion, is composed of four independent essays. Each essay examines an individual 
social practice/event/incident. The selection of each example is not made chronologically. 
The thesis does not intend to provide the linear development, or the grand narrative, of the 
formation of Taiwanese national identity. 
Chapter Three investigates the close relationships between the production of 
knowledge and the constitution of Taiwanese identity. It concentrates on two forms of 
knowledge: historians’ narrations of Taiwan’s history and political theorists’ explorations of 
political lives. The chapter argues that the idea of the human subject as Taiwanese is 
produced in the domains of knowledge. Historians play a significant role in identity 
formation since identity formation in Taiwan is intimately associated with how one narrates 
one’s past, what one excavates from one’s memories, and how one interprets one’s history. 
Likewise, political theorists also contribute greatly to the formation of Taiwanese national 
identity given that they are concerned with the questions of what one ought to be and in which 
way one should live together in the future. The production of knowledge should be regarded 
as a sort of social practice that helps to constitute what ‘Taiwanese-ness’ is.32   
                                                
32 To a certain extent, the analysis conducted in Chapter Three is different from those in the 
subsequent two chapters (Chapter Four and Five). Whereas the later chapters scrutinised specific 
events, demonstrating how the historically concluded process of Japanese colonisation and the 
KMT’s authoritarian rule have emerged again, Chapter Three did not investigate the processes and 
the procedures of knowledge production. Such efforts can be done through studies that, for instance, 
examine specific academic institutes or associations to see how institutions enable and disable certain 
forms of knowledge production. The limited aim of Chapter Three is to identify several widespread 
‘explanations’ of the formation of Taiwanese identity in the current scholarly literature – in the form 
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Chapter Four scrutinises the controversy surrounding the Japanese Cartoonist 
Kobayashi Yoshinori’s manga [comic book], On Taiwan published in 2001. It attempts to 
understand how the publication of a manga, as a social practice, helps constitute people’s 
self-identification in Taiwan. This chapter focuses on how the manga has been received in 
Taiwanese society, identifying the issues/ideologies that have emerged and how they have 
been discussed. It also examines which alternatives, if any, have been repressed, silenced and 
made to disappear in the process.  
Chapter Five deals with political ritual and ceremonies associated with identity 
formation in Taiwan. It focuses on an election campaign rally in the 2004 presidential 
election – the 228-Hand-in-Hand Rally. This chapter provides a thick description of the rally, 
arguing that in a specific political context, the 2-28 Incident was represented both as a 
warning of the potential consequences of unification with China, and as a symbol of the 
reconciliation of different ethnic groups in Taiwan. As a result, the 2-28 Incident must be 
commemorated as a trauma in order to differentiate Taiwan from China on the one hand. 
However, on the other hand, it is also necessary to forget the 2-28 Incident in order to form 
a united and harmonious Taiwanese nation. Thus, Taiwanese nation-building is very much 
intertwined with ‘remembering’ and ‘forgetting’ the history of the 2-28 Incident.  
Chapter Six investigates the so-called Anti-Corruption Movement in 2006. It is argued 
that the movement should be understood as a resistance to the formation of Taiwanese 
national identity for three reasons. The first of these is that it opposed the idea that 
everything under the name of ‘Love Taiwan’, ‘Nation-State-Building’, or ‘localisation’ can be 
legitimised. The second is that the campaigners deliberately rejected all talk of identity issues. 
This rejection itself should be understood as an act of resistance. Finally, it attempted to 
resist the dichotomy of Green/Blue, Independence/Unification, and Taiwanese/Chinese, 
aiming to invoke higher universal values. This movement, however, ultimately failed because 
it unwittingly became trapped in the confrontation between the two political camps, two 
ideologies, and two national identities.  
                                                                                                                                            
of historical narratives as well as political rhetoric – that pave the way for further analysis undertaken 
in Chapters Four and Five, which aimed to show how those historical narratives and political rhetoric 
were replicated in various social practices and events while silencing other alternatives.  
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The limits of this thesis need to be pointed out at this point. The focus of this thesis is 
on discursive strategies that manifested in social practices/events, rather than on the material 
structures that make the constitution of Taiwanese national identity possible. This means 
that the material resources (i.e. finances) that each force obtains are not within the remit of 
this thesis to tackle. Moreover, the population of Taiwan in this thesis is reductively 
classified as Taiwanese sympathisers versus Chinese sympathisers. Other forms of 
categorisation – say, class, gender, generation, etc – are excluded and the analysis of internal 
differences within respective categories is omitted.  
To conclude this Introduction, this thesis seeks to examine what people say and do and 
how that constitutes certain subjectivities and political possibilities. Taiwanese-ness or 
Taiwanese national identity exists only in discourse, as Pierre Riviere ‘exists’ only in a dossier. 
And if the concept of ‘Taiwanese’ is not an essentialism problem of thought but in fact 
exists only on the surface, it follows that it may also be only a transient preoccupation of 
contemporary thought. When people stop talking about ‘Taiwanese-ness’, it will herald the 
end of the subject, the death of the ‘Taiwanese’, in the same way that Foucault writes of man 
being erased, ‘like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea’ (Foucault 1970, 387) 
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CHAPTER 2 
The Discursive Constitution of National 
Identity  
A Theoretical Investigation  
 
 
2-1. Introduction  
This chapter aims to justify the methodology adopted in, and to pave the way for the 
analysis to be undertaken in this thesis. It particularly intends to clarify some key concepts – 
namely, discourse, power relations, and subject – which the analysis throughout the whole 
thesis will refer to. Drawing closely on Foucault, these concepts are understood differently 
from the conventional usage in the scholarly literature on nationalism and/or national 
identity. The term ‘discourse’ is understood as highly divergent, fragmented and 
heterogeneous in nature, and as dispersed in the domain of society through various 
discursive and non-discursive (social) practices. The term ‘power’ is perceived not as 
possessed by particular individuals solely, but as diffused through more devious and invisible 
forms of forces that constitute people’s subjectivities. ‘Subject’ is therefore always subjected, 
and is constituted in power relations.  
This chapter will be divided into three sections. The first section will survey the current 
literature on nationalism and national identity in general, and identify gaps in those studies. 
The second section will then turn to the discussion of Foucault’s conception of discourse. 
The final section will deal with the concepts of power and the subject. 
 
2-2. On ‘National identity’ 
2-2-1. Identity 
The concept of identity has provoked widespread discussion across many academic 
disciplines. It would be impossible to provide a detailed survey here of all the most 
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important theories of identity. Instead, this chapter will focus on the fluidity and changing 
nature of this given identity. 
At first sight, the term ‘identity’ refers to ‘sameness’ and ‘oneness’. In the Oxford English 
Dictionary (OED), the term is defined as ‘the quality or condition of being the same in 
substance, composition, nature, properties, or in particular qualities under consideration; 
absolute or essential sameness; oneness’ (OED, ‘identity’). This sameness/oneness makes 
reference to a person or a thing at all times or in all circumstances. The concept therefore 
indicates a condition that ‘a person or thing is itself and not something else; individuality, 
personality’ (ibid.). John Locke in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1975), explains 
the concept of identity as follows:  
[When] considering any thing as existing at any determin’d time and place, we 
compare it with it self existing at another time, and thereon form the Ideas of Identity 
and Diversity…one thing cannot have two beginnings of existence, nor two things 
one beginning…That therefore that had one beginning is the same thing, and that 
which had a different beginning in time and place from that, is not the same but 
divers (1975, 328).  
One of the deviations of the term indicates a sense of ‘belongingness’. When one identifies 
the sameness/oneness with others, then one forms a sense of belongingness with those 
others. OED also defines the term ‘identity’ as ‘belonging or relating to identity, as in 
identity crisis, a phase of varying severity undergone by an individual in his need to establish 
his identity in relation to his associates and society as part of the process of maturing’ (OED, 
‘identity’).  
However, such an absolute criterion – sameness or oneness – is highly contestable. 
Everything changes constantly. Individual persons change in the course of their lives 
physically and mentally. Likewise, an object changes ceaselessly in terms of its material 
constitution, as a microscopic examination reveals. Aristotle gives a good example when 
discussing whether a polis (city-state) ought to be spoken of as the same or as different when 
it changes its constitution, say, a democracy replacing an oligarchy or a tyranny. He states:     
For if the city is a type of partnership, and if it is a partnership of citizens in a 
regime, if the regime becomes and remains different in kind, it might be held that 
the city as well is necessarily not the same. At any rate, just as we assert that a 
chorus which is at one time comic and at another tragic is different even though the 
human beings in it are often the same, it is similar with any other partnership and 
any compound, when the compound takes a different form – for example, we 
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would say that mode is different even when the notes are the same, if it is at one 
time Dorian and at another Phrygian. If this is indeed the case, it is evident that it is 
looking to the regime above all that the city must be said to be the same; the term 
one calls it can be different or the same no matter whether the same human beings 
inhabit it or altogether different ones. (Aristotle 1984, 88-9) 
The problematic of the absolute ‘sameness’ and ‘oneness’, briefly discussed above, 
demonstrates an important line of argument in the studies of ‘identity’. That is: the concept 
of identity (apart from the formal sense of the term used in logic and mathematics) never 
signifies anything static, unchanging, or substantial, but rather always an element situated in 
the flow of time, ever changing, something involving a process. By acknowledging the 
changing and fluid nature of ‘being identical’, this chapter then turns its gaze to the concept 
of ‘nation’ or ‘nationality’, which by its nature is highly unstable and ambiguous.       
2-2-2. Conceptualising ‘Nation’ – Competing Discourses in Defining ‘Nation’  
Nation (or nationality) is the most universally taken-for-granted, and perhaps legitimate, 
value in the political life of our time. Ernest Gellner in his Nation and Nationalism (1983) 
states that the idea of man without nation goes beyond people’s imagination in the modern 
era. He interprets Peter Schlemieh – a man who lost his shadow – of the French writer 
Adelbert von Chamisso’s proto-Kafkaesque novel as a man without nationality. And that of 
a man without nation as if a man without shadow in effect, according to Gellner, ‘defies the 
recognised categories and provokes a sense of uncomfortable-ness’ (1983, 6). Gellner 
describes this necessity for modern human beings being required to have a nationality as 
they must have ‘a nose and two ears’ (ibid.). Gellner writes, ‘a deficiency in any of these 
particulars is not inconceivable and does from time to time occur, but only as a result of 
some disaster, and it is itself a disaster of a kind’ (ibid.). Having a nationality as ‘an inherent 
attribute’ of human kind has come to be naturalised in the modern era.  
In fact, not only is ‘nation’ indispensable, but it is also powerful. Rupert Emerson (1960) 
points to the overwhelming dominance of national allegiance as compared with all other 
forms of identity, such as the family, the tribe. The nation, states Emerson, is ‘today the 
largest community which, when the chips are down, effectively commands men’s loyalty, 
overriding the claims both of the lesser communities within it and those which cut across 
it…In this sense the nation can be called a “terminal community” with the implication that it 
is for present purposes the effective end of the road for man as a social animal, the endpoint 
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of working solidarity between men’ (1960, 96-7). Any other grouping/community, although 
it may have vanished from the scene, ‘yields pride of place to the nation in the sense that for 
constantly growing numbers of men the claims of the nation have come to act as taking 
priority over claims coming from any other source’ (ibid., 95-6). Indeed, those other group 
loyalties have been absorbed into the nation.  
Nevertheless, although the nation is pervasive, indispensable and dominant in all human 
affairs, it is a fact that neither ‘nation’ nor ‘nationality’ has a clear, comprehensive or 
satisfying definition/connotation, or of what it is. Carlton Hayes notes that the word ‘nation’ 
is ‘tantalizingly ambiguous’ (1926, 89). Everyone has his/her own different ideas. Likewise, E. 
H. Carr points out that ‘the nation is not a definable and clearly recognizable entity’ (1945, 
40). Benedict Anderson also writes, ‘nation, nationality, nationalism – all have proved 
notoriously difficult to define, let alone to analyse’ (1991, 3). Harold Isaac argues that it 
depends on who is looking. He writes, ‘One distinguished scholar after another has made the 
safari over time and come back to describe what he has seen; but each, like an artist, has 
painted his own vision of what he saw, and no two portraits have been quite alike’ (1975, 
173). Indeed, there is no agreement of and no commonly accepted view of what precisely 
‘nation’ is, what it looks like, and more substantially, what it is composed of. As Isaacs 
describes,  
Everyone has his own list of the parts that go into the making of a nation…usually 
mentioning shared culture, history, tradition, language, religion, some adding ‘race’ 
as well as the elements of territory…that all go in their varying measures into the 
making of what is called a ‘nation’. (Ibid., 174)  
‘On closer examination’ however, continues Isaacs, ‘it seems no single part could be shown 
to be unique or indispensable to nationhood’ (ibid.). No one can ever really be confident 
‘what it is that makes the existence of a singularly important national We which is 
distinguished from all others who make up an alien they’ (ibid.; emphasis added). As Isaacs 
describes, nation – being ‘so formidably real in the real world of everyone’s everyday 
existence’ – is indeed an ‘abominable snowman’, which has ‘eluded all efforts of scholars to 
agree on what precisely it is’ (ibid.).  
As Isaacs describes, many scholars have made a concerted effort to understand what 
the ‘nation’ is. Those scholars can be roughly categorized into two pairs of contending 
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schools of thought: the first is Primordialism versus Liberalism while the second is 
Modernism versus Ethnic-Symbolism.  
Primordialism vs. Liberalism 
One of the earliest nationalist thinkers, the German philosopher Johann Cottfried 
Herder, developed the idea of ‘Volk’. For Herder, Volk is ‘a community bound together by 
blood-ties and characterised by a particular language, culture, religion, and set of customs’ 
(Musgrave 1997, 5). Herder understands Volk in organic terms, as if ‘a family’, but ‘only 
spread more widely’ (Herder 1911 XIII, 384; cited in Llobera 1994, 169). Herder particularly 
emphasises the prominence of language. The world for Herder is composed of a variety of 
linguistic nations. Each language grows naturally over a long period of time on the basis of 
the particular natural and cultural environment in which it is situated. ‘A language for 
Herder,’ as Josep R. Llobera summarises, ‘is not only the most distinctive expression of the 
spirit of a nation, but also the only way in which the latter can manifest itself’ (Llobera 1994, 
168). It is ‘the royal path to the identity of nation; Volk and language cannot be conceived 
independently of each other’ (ibid.). The nation therefore is one composed of a single people 
disclosing its own unique national character, which is expressed in terms of a shared 
language. Moreover, Herder argues that nationhood should be the basis for statehood. He 
writes, ‘the family is a product of nature. The most natural state is, therefore, a state 
composed of a single people with a single national character’ (Herder 1911 XIII, 384; cited 
in Llobera 1994, 169). For Herder, each nation should have the right to possess its own 
separate state, uninfluenced and unimpeded by others. While Herder thought of ethnic-ties 
as one of the elements constituting a nation, the socialist Joseph Stalin focuses only on 
cultural attributions but abandoned ethnic ties. He argues that a nation is not racial or tribal 
such as the modern Italian nation, but ‘a historically constituted, stable community of people, 
formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological 
make-up manifested in a common culture’ (Stalin 1973, 60).    
In contrast to the objective (consanguineous and cultural) aspects of ‘nation’, another 
line of thought, as termed liberalism, stresses the subjective facets in defining what ‘nation’ is. 
One of the most important works of this kind is by Ernest Renan. Renan views natural 
conceptions of the nation with great suspicion. He contends that man should not be 
restricted to one race, language or religion. ‘Man is the slave neither of his race, nor his 
   37
 
language, nor his religion, nor the windings of his rivers and mountain ranges’ (Renan 1939, 
205). He, instead, describes a nation as ‘a soul, a spiritual principle’, which is made up by the 
two things that lie in the past and in the present respectively. The former refers to the 
common possession of ‘a rich heritage of memories,’ and the latter speaks of an ‘agreement, 
the desire to live together, and the will to continue to make the most of the joint heritage – a 
willingness to make a common life together’ (ibid., 202-03). Regarding the latter, Renan 
famously contends the existence of a nation ‘is a daily plebiscite’ (ibid., 203). Renan’s 
elaborations of ‘nation’ reveal an important element for liberalism in its efforts to define 
what is ‘nation’, that is, people’s political willingness to be grouped together and the right to 
freedom of association. This subjective criterion is in sharp contradistinction to the 
primordialist emphasis on objective factors like common language, religion or race. In this 
regard, a nation for liberalists is legitimate only when the people join it voluntarily.  
More recently, liberals such as Habermas (1996) have identified the ‘nation’ with its 
citizens. He defines a ‘nation’ as a political community of people that share and obey the 
same laws and institutions within a given territory. In the civic nation, members are related 
through territorial birth and residence; they possess citizenship in a territorial political 
community, and are integrated by a unified legal system and a mass public culture. Liberals 
therefore emphasise people’s ‘institutional’ or ‘constitutional’ identity rather than their 
‘cultural’ or ‘ethnic’ identity. When analysing the tension between republicanism and 
nationalism, Habermas writes that ‘the constitutional principles of human rights and 
democracy give priority to a cosmopolitan understanding of the nation as a nation of citizens 
over and against an ethnocentric interpretation of the nation as a pre-political entity’ (1996, 
286-7). Moreover, the emphasis on institutional or constitutional identity helps Habermas to 
transcend the limits of nation-state and to achieve a supranational ideal. The formation of 
‘European constitutional patriotism’ therefore becomes possible (Habermas 1992, 12).   
The two different conceptions of ‘nation’ introduced above are manifestations of a 
longstanding tendency in the scholarly literature to split the conception of ‘nation’ or 
‘nationality’ into two fundamentally different traditions – primordialism and liberalism. 
Primordialism is used to describe scholars who hold that nationality is a ‘natural part of 
human beings, as natural as speech, sight or smell, and that nations have existed since time 
immemorial’ (Ozkirimli 2000, 64). The scholars from this line of thought lay their stress in 
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the antiquity and naturalness of the nation. They argue that the nation is a primordial 
category, that is founded upon shared primordial attachments, including genetic (i.e. ethnical) 
and cultural ties (i.e. historical, religious and linguistic). In contrast, the liberal 
conceptualisation of ‘nation’, often described as a ‘civic’ model of the nation, refers to 
several components of what it possesses: historical territory, laws and institutions, legal and 
political equality of members, and common civic culture and ideology (Smith 2005, 178-9). 
The dichotomy seems to be widely accepted. 33  Interestingly, it is generally made 
alongside the West-East division,34 and this often seems to lead to normative evaluations, i.e. 
‘good’ and ‘bad’. Musgrave adopts this dualistic approach when considering a people’s right 
to self-determination. He argues that the right to self-determination in the Western tradition 
‘drew its inspiration primarily from the Enlightenment ideas of popular sovereignty and 
representative government,’ inherited from John Locke, Montesquieu and Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau (Musgrave 1997, 2). The concept in the Eastern tradition, by contrast, was based 
on the ‘phenomenon of nationalism’, influenced by Herder and Giuseppe Mazzini (ibid., 2-
13). This means that, writes Musgrave, ‘in Western Europe and United States the concept 
had a political orientation which generally did not take ethnic considerations into account, 
whereas in Central and Eastern Europe the concept was much more strongly linked to 
ethnic and cultural factors’ (ibid., 2). The right to self-determination in the Western tradition 
occurred ‘within the pre-existing boundaries of the state, and was exercised by all citizens of 
the state, whatever their ethnic or linguistic attributes’ (ibid., 13). Self-determination in the 
East conversely took place whenever a ‘nation’ – which is generally defined as sharing the 
same ethnic and cultural attributes – aimed to create its own nation-state.    
However, diverging from the dichotomy being made, some scholars instead attempt to 
blur this division. Yael Tamir (1993) for instance argues that liberalism and nationalism are 
not irreconcilable. She offers a theory she describes as ‘liberal nationalism’, which, she claims, 
allows each set of values to accommodate the other. She contends that  
The liberal tradition, with its respect for personal autonomy, reflection, and choice, 
and the national tradition, with its emphasis on belonging, loyalty, and solidarity, 
                                                
33 Different terminology is often used, such as nationalism versus liberalism, or ethnic nationalism 
versus civic nationalism, or communitarianism versus liberalism, though.  
34 Anthony D. Smith, for instance, speaks of  the Western conception of  the nation being equivalent 
to ‘civic nationalism,’ whereas the non-Western one is ‘ethnic’ in nature (2005, 177-83). 
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although generally seen as mutually exclusive, can indeed accommodate one 
another. The liberal can acknowledge the importance of belonging, membership 
and cultural affiliations, as well as the particular moral commitments that follow 
from them. The nationalist can appreciate the values of personal autonomy and 
individual rights and freedoms, and sustain a commitment for social justice both 
between and within nations. (1993, 6) 
Likewise, David Miller (1995) suggests a theory of national identity that incorporates some 
ingredients extracted from both primordialism and liberalism while rejecting others. Miller 
defined the ‘nation’ as ‘the ethical community’ (1995, 11). He argues that there are five 
elements constituting a ‘nation’, which include: a shared belief and mutual commitment, 
historical continuity, active identity, a particular geographical place, and a common public 
culture. He emphasises people’s common will and rejects the conventional nationalist 
definition of ‘nation’, which is based on biological descent. In this regard, he clearly adopts 
some features of the liberals’ conceptualisation of nation, arguing that a nation only exists 
when its members ‘recognise on another as compatriots,’ and ‘believe they share 
characteristics of the relevant kind’ (ibid., 22). Also, he believes that a nation is a community 
in which its members ‘do things together, take decisions…and so forth.’ This is what he 
called ‘active identity’ (ibid., 24). However, he also inherits the traditional nationalists’ 
political claims that emphasise the need for shared culture. He writes, ‘a national identity 
requires that the people who share it should have something in common, a set of 
characteristics that in the past was often referred to as a national character…’ (ibid., 25; 
emphasis added), though he tries to reformulate the idea of ‘national character’ as ‘a public 
culture’ being seen as ‘a set of understanding about how a group of people is to conduct its 
life together’ (ibid., 26).    
Modernism vs. Ethnic-Symbolism 
Different from the aforementioned two traditions, another line of thought concerning 
the concept of ‘nation’ emphasises the social construction of ‘nation’, or ‘nationality’. 
Orthodox examples of this line of thought are often described as modernist approaches to 
the nation. According to Anthony D. Smith (2000), this line of thinking argues that, nation, 
together with nationalism and the international system of nation-states, are all the ‘product 
of specifically modern conditions, namely, capitalism, bureaucracy, industrialism, urbanisation, 
secularism and the like’ (2000, 4). In other words, the common denominator of modernist 
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approaches is a belief in the modernity of nations. One of the most original exponents of 
modernism is Ernest Gellner.  
Gellner in his Nation and Nationalism (1983) contends that the nation is a product of 
modernity. According to him, a nation is not given in nature, nor is it an intrinsic component 
of the human condition; rather, it is sociologically and economically necessary in the modern 
world, the one he called the age of ‘industrial society’. Gellner argues that in industrial 
society, due to its thirst for affluence and growth, the population has to be mobile and 
literate. People therefore need a shared culture – a literate, sophisticated and homogeneous 
culture – in order that they might communicate with each other impersonally over increasing 
geographical distances. In this circumstance, people gradually formed a shared high culture. 
And it is this high culture, sustained and enacted by the state and co-extensive with society, 
which united the mass and the elites, transforming the villagers into effective modern 
citizens. Nationalism is subsequently formed in this social and economic context. The 
formation of high culture in the industrial society is visible outwardly as the coming of 
nationalism. Gellner writes: 
When general social conditions make for standardised, homogeneous, centrally 
sustained high cultures, pervading entire populations and not just elite minorities, a 
situation arises in which well-defined educationally sanctioned and unified cultures 
constitute very nearly the only kind of unit with which men willingly and often 
ardently identify. The cultures now seem to be the natural repositories of political 
legitimacy. Only then does it come to appear that any defiance of their boundaries 
by political units constitutes a scandal. (Gellner 1983, 55; emphasis in original)     
‘Nationalism’ is thereby understood as ‘the striving to make culture and polity congruent, to 
endow a culture with its own political roof, and not more than one roof at that’ (ibid., 43). 
This line of argument leads to Gellner’s most famous statement: ‘nationalism is not the 
awakening of nations to self-consciousness; it invents nations where they do not exist’ 
(Gellner 1964, 19). In other words, it is not nations that engender nationalism; rather, it is 
nationalism that invents nations. The nation, in this regard, is invented to act as a cement for 
mobile populations in the modern world. And while states and nations do not often coincide, 
the principle of ‘one nation, one state’ is being applied. Gellner writes that ‘nationalism is 
primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be 
congruent’ (Gellner 1983, 1).   
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Similarly emphasising the ‘invented’ nature of the nation by nationalism, Benedict 
Anderson’s Imagined Communities (1991) has also been an influential contribution to this line 
of thought. He argues that nation is an ‘imagined community’. A nation, defined by 
Anderson, ‘is an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and 
sovereign’ (1991, 6).35 Anderson argues that ‘nation’, ‘nationality’ and ‘nationalism’ are all 
‘cultural artefacts of a particular kind’ (ibid.,4). He contends that the construction of these 
‘artefacts’ towards the end of the eighteenth century was ‘the spontaneous distillation of a 
complex “crossing” of discrete historical forces’ (ibid., 4). However, once they were created, 
Anderson continues,  
They became ‘modular’, capable of being transplanted, with varying degrees of self-
consciousness, to a great variety of social terrains, to merge and be merged with a 
correspondingly wide variety of political and ideological constellations. (Ibid., 4)  
According to Anderson, the convergence of capitalism, print technology, and the fatal 
diversity of human language created the possibility of a new form of imagined community, 
setting the stage for the formation of the modern nation (ibid., 37-46). He argues that these 
imagined communities developed following the collapse of the sacred languages of the 
Middle Ages (such as Latin, Arabic, and Chinese), and the substitution of original, vernacular 
languages which were standardised and spread through the printed word in novels and 
newspapers. The development of print technologies enabled millions of individuals to 
conceive of their fellow readers as compatriots. The emergence of the newspaper, in 
particular, enabled the formation of a co-national imagination through a simultaneous and 
constant reading of the same texts among people who never actually met each other. 
Moreover, this new form of imagined community originally developed in Latin America, and 
was then widely ‘pirated’ in North America, in Europe, and subsequently in the rest of the 
world. The nation, as Anderson describes it, is ‘an invention on which it was impossible to 
secure a patent’ (ibid., 67). 
What Anderson aims to demonstrate is that belonging to or identifying with a nation is 
a process of mental-construction rather than an objective fact or a timeless loyalty to the 
                                                
35 As he states, it is imagined because members of  nations never meet most other members; it is limited 
because even the largest of  them has limits; it is imagined as sovereign because the concept was born in 
the age of  Enlightenment and Revolution ‘destroying the legitimacy of  the divinely-ordained, 
hierarchical dynastic realm;’ it refers to communities because the nation is always conceived of  in terms 
of  deeply felt comradeship (Anderson 1991, 6-7). 
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land and the people. He avoids the swamp of discussion of the objective criteria of a nation 
but points out the cognitive process of collective identity as a nation. In other words, he 
characterises nations not by their authenticity but by the way in which they are imagined. For 
Anderson, any existing national identity is the product of historical developments. In this 
regard, nation is not a fabricated consciousness but a real social entity. Anderson’s work 
therefore should not be deemed as an attempt to problematise a holistic view of the nation, 
even though he pointed out the man-made attribute of it. His studies on nationalism, says 
Anderson himself, is to understand how nations ‘have come into historical being, in what 
ways their meanings have changed over time, and why, today, they command such profound 
emotional legitimacy’ (ibid., 4).   
Modernist arguments have however been challenged by those who advocate 
understanding the nation in terms of a so-called ethnic-symbolism. This approach focuses 
on the role of pre-existing ethnic ties and sentiments in the formation of the nations. The 
term ethnic-symbolism is used to ‘denote scholars who aim to uncover the symbolic legacy 
of pre-modern ethnic identities for today’s nations’ (Ozkirimli, 2000, 168). It aims to 
propose ‘a compromise’, or ‘a kind of midway’, between primordial-nationalism and 
modernism (ibid., 168). The proponents of ethnic-symbolism argue that modernists 
systematically overlook or underestimate the ‘ethnic’ origins of a nation. The term ‘ethnic 
origins’ here refers to ‘the persistence of earlier myths, symbols, values and memories in 
many parts of the world and their continuing significance for larger numbers of people’ (ibid., 
167).  
Anthony D. Smith is one of the leading exponents of this line of thought. In his article 
‘The Nation: Invented, Imagined, Reconstructed?’ (1993), Smith argues that the emergence 
of modern nations cannot be understood properly without taking their pre-existing ethnic 
attributes into accounts. In other words, a nation cannot be constructed on the basis of pure 
‘invention’ or ‘imagination’ without any solid ethnic grounds. As opposed to modernist 
arguments, Smith contends that nations are in effect ‘reconstructed’. He states:  
Where the modern nation claims a distinctive ethnic past, as so often happens, 
‘invented traditions’ turns out to be more akin to ‘reconstruction’ of aspects of that 
past. The latter acts as a constraint on ‘invention’. Though the past can be ‘read’ in 
different ways, it is not any past, but rather the past of that particular community, 
with its distinctive patterns of events, personages and milieux. It is not possible to 
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appropriate or annex the past of another community in the construction of the 
modern nation. (1993, 358; emphasis in original)    
Following this line of argument, ‘nation’ is then defined in his National Identity (1991) as ‘a 
named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical 
memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties 
for all members’ (1991, 14). For Smith, the nation-building project relies on their ethnic 
attributes.36 The lack of those would create a serious impediment to the project. It is 
however important to note that to Smith the nation is still socially or historically constructed. 
This way of understanding ‘nation’ is apparently shared with modernists. Yet, in contrast to 
the modernists, his arguments emphasise the importance of ethnic attributes as the essential 
ingredients in the construction of the modern nations. His theory of nation/nationalism is 
therefore seen as a concession to primordial-nationalism.   
The modernist way of conceptualising ‘nation’, which points out the man-made 
attributes of the nation no matter how it is invented or imagined, has assumed the status of 
orthodoxy within the study of the emergence of modern nations. Their argument might be 
amended by ethnic-symbolism. Yet it is generally agreed in the current scholarly literature on 
nationalism that the nation is a product of the modern imagination and a historical invention. 
This line of conceptualising ‘nation’ provides a starting point for many empirical studies of 
the construction of national identities. Those scholarly works on ‘nation’ or ‘nationalism’ 
indicate the constitutive nature of the modern nation: for instance, Krisshan Kumar (2003), 
Alexander Grant et al. (ed.) (1995), Geoffrey Cubitt (ed.) (1998), and Bernard Crick et al. (ed.) 
(1991). 
2-2-3. The Social Construction of Nationality: Invention of Tradition vs. 
Discursive Formation 
If the nation is a modern construction, or if, as Anderson contends, an imagined 
community, a mental construct, and an imaginary complex of ideas containing the defining 
elements of collective unity and equality of boundaries and autonomy, this imagination is 
then real to the extent that one is convinced of it and believes in it emotionally. Whether a 
nation is imagined, invented or reconstructed, an important question has arisen following 
                                                
36 Smith defines ethnic community (or ethnie, the French term used by Smith) as follows: ‘a collective 
proper name’, ‘a myth of  common ancestry,’ ‘shared historical memories,’ ‘common culture,’ 
‘homeland,’ and ‘a sense of  solidarity’ (Smith 1991, 21).  
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this argument. That is: how does this community reach the minds of those who are 
convinced of it and how is it sustained? There are two approaches in the current scholarly 
literature which draw particular attention to answer this question. The first is related to a 
series of studies on the ‘Invention of Tradition’, developed by the historian Eric J. 
Hobsbawm and other proponents. They all pay great attention to various social practices, 
such as commemorations, political rituals, and ceremonies. The second approach concerns 
the works of Stuart Hall and his followers, which argue that a nation is constructed and 
conveyed in discourse, or discursive practice, predominantly in narratives of national culture. 
National identity to them is thus the product of discourse.     
Invention of Tradition  
In his introduction to the book The Invention of Tradition (1983), which he co-edited with 
Ranger, Hobsbawm provides a theoretical discussion of what he means by ‘invented 
tradition’. The term, according to Hobsbawm, refers to two forms of ‘tradition’. One is 
those ‘traditions actually invented, constructed and formally instituted,’ and the other is ‘those 
emerging in a less easily traceable manner with a brief and dateable period – a matter of a 
few years perhaps – and establishing themselves with great rapidity’ (Hobsbawm 1983a, 1; 
emphasis in original). Therefore, those ‘traditions’ which claim to be old are actually invented, 
or quite recent in origins. Hobsbawm defines the term as follows:  
[a] set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a 
ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of 
behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past. In fact, 
where possible, they normally attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic 
past. (Ibid., 1; emphasis added)  
According to this definition, ‘invented tradition’ has significant ritual and symbolic function, 
and is by nature a process of ‘formalisation’ and ‘ritualisation’, characterised by reference to 
the past, being imposed by continuity and repetition. And moreover, Hobsbawm argues that 
the continuity of these traditions is largely fictitious; they are a reaction to new social and 
political needs. He states:  
[Invented traditions] are responses to novel situations which take the form of 
reference to old situations, or which establish their own past by quasi-obligatory 
repetition. It is the contrast between the constant change and innovation of the 
modern world and the attempt to structure at least some parts of social life within it 
as unchanging and invariant…(ibid., 2) 
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Hobsbawm hence takes heed of the break in continuity which is often overlooked. He 
indicates the rupture between the past and present. What is a ‘novel situation’ then? Here 
Hobsbawm particularly makes reference to the nation-building in the modern era. He 
contends that the nation and its associated phenomena are the most prevalent of such 
invented traditions. Those invented traditions have come into existence as part of nationalist 
movements. Hobsbawm indicates three overlapping types of invented tradition, which 
include:  
a) those establishing or symbolizing social cohesion or the memberships of groups, 
real or artificial communities, b) those establishing or legitimising institutions, status 
or relations of authority, and c) those whose main purpose was socialization, the 
inculcation of beliefs, value systems and conventions of behaviour. (ibid., 9)  
These three types manifest a fact that ‘communitarian’ invented traditions were the basic 
type (ibid., 10). And for Hobsbawm, ‘communitarian’ mainly refers to ‘nation’ or ‘nation-
state’ (ibid., 13-4).  
In another article, ‘Mass-Producing Tradition: Europe, 1870-1914’ (1983b), Hobsbawm 
provides a historical analysis of those invented traditions. He contends that the period from 
1870 to 1914 can be considered as the climax of invented traditions. The invention of 
traditions was enthusiastically practised during this period. While some were enacted by 
states (what he calls ‘political’ traditions), others were practiced by social groups such as 
clubs and fraternities. The mass-produced traditions during this period, according to 
Hobsbawm, reflect profound social transformation – rapid industrialization and political 
mobilisation. This transformation made the traditional forms of ruling by authorities more 
difficult and impracticable, requiring ‘new methods of ruling’ or ‘establishing bonds of 
loyalty’, so as to control the newly enfranchised masses in an era of popular mobilisation and 
democratisation (1983b, 263). The invention of tradition in this respect was the main 
strategy adopted by the ruling class to counter the threat posed by this social transformation, 
to maintain or even establish the loyalty, obedience and cooperation of its subjects and 
members, and its own legitimacy among them. While Hobsbawm examined a large number 
of invented traditions in the Third Republic of France, the Second German Empire and the 
United States, he singles out various innovations of the period as particularly relevant, 
including the creation of official public holidays, the invention of public ceremonies, the 
construction of public monuments, massive public buildings and sculptures. Those 
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innovations all aim to produce a wide and genuine popular resonance. Hobsbawm writes, 
‘invention succeeded mainly in proportion to its success in broadcasting on a wavelength to 
which the public was ready to tune in’ (ibid., 263). Moreover, those invented traditions – 
formal and informal, official and unofficial, political and social – were all taken over by the 
‘nation-state’. As a result, the nation-state ‘increasingly defined the largest stage on which the 
crucial activities determining human lives as subjects and citizens were played out’ (ibid., 
264). In the nineteenth-century, according to Hobsbawm, politics was essentially nation-wide 
politics, and nationalism became the most important agent of social control.  
In short, for Hobsbawm, the nation is constructed in the process by which political and 
cultural elites participated in waking the people by reminding their ‘co-nationals’ of their 
common past and destiny, through practices such as cultural festivals, political rituals, 
education, and so on. The ruling elites engineered ‘invented traditions’ of a largely fabricated 
national historical symbolism and mythology, thereby being able to channel the energies of 
the masses into new forms of state system and new kinds of community. It is therefore in 
the interests of ruling elites to foster such sense of continuity, so as to internalize the mass 
and instil new values of order and hierarchy. Only by this means can the ruling elites retrieve 
their control over the dangerous and dislocating processes of social transformation which 
threaten to over turn the existing social order. The historical continuity of the nation and 
nation itself is therefore, for Hobsbawm, invented. His approach underlines the strongly 
instrumentalist nature of the invention of the very nation.  
Hobsbawm’s theoretical and historical analysis on the relations between the invention 
of tradition and the formation of nation of the modern era reflect a fairly great number of 
historical studies that devote themselves to the investigation of the construction of the 
modern nation through the invention of tradition. Hugh Trevor-Roper (1983), for instance, 
when discussing Scottish national identity, argues that the so-called the ‘Highland Tradition 
of Scotland’, such as the kilt woven in a tartan whose colour and pattern indicates the clans, 
which are generally ascribed ‘great antiquity’, are actually very recent. They were developed 
after, sometimes long after, the Union with England. 37  According to Trevor-Roper, 
Scotsmen did not form a distinct people. They were simply the immigrants from Ireland, and 
these two Celtic societies (Ireland and Highland), politically and culturally merged into each 
                                                
37 The construction of  the Scottish nation in this sense should be seen as resistance to the Union. 
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other. It was not until later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries that an independent 
Highland tradition and the Scottish Nation were created.38 Likewise, Prys Morgan (1983) in 
his studies of Welsh nation-building contends that Welsh nationalists put great effort into 
recovering its tradition. However, while the old way of life had disappeared and the past had 
become tattered and threadbare, a great deal of invention was then required. According to 
Morgan, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Welsh intellectuals ‘rediscovered the 
past historical, linguistic and literary traditions, and where those traditions were inadequate, 
they created a past which had never existed’ (Morgan 1983, 44-5). Therefore, the intellectuals 
‘who noted the decay,’ writes Morgan, ‘were the ones who recreated the past’ (ibid., 45). 
Morgan in his lengthy chapter painstakingly examines the creations of Welsh tradition in 
terms of its language (Welsh), religion (Druidism), clan (Celts), music (the Land of Song), 
national dress (the style of Mother Goose), national heroes (Owain Glyndwr and Madoc 
Gwynedd), landscape (the great beauty of the Mountain Land), heraldry (leek, three ostrich 
plumes, red dragon, daffodil, triple harp, and Welsh mountain goat). Morgan not only pays 
attention to the role of individuals (such as bards), cultural festivals (such as eisteddfod), and 
associations (such as ‘Welsh Society’ or the ‘Cymmrodorion Society’), but also to events 
(such as ‘The Treason of the Blue Books’).         
This line of scholarly literature all focuses on the relationship between the past and the 
present, and between memory and identity. The questions they ask, most commonly, are, for 
instance, how do people understand the past? Or, how is public memory shaped (or 
controlled) through various social practices presenting the past to the public? While some of 
these studies give the general accounts of how the past is (re)created in nation-building as 
demonstrated above, others examine carefully various specific social practices or institutions 
charged with presenting the past to the public. For instance, a number of studies particularly 
examine the national museum, asking how museums – including national expositions, 
galleries and archives – construct narratives and histories through processes of collection, 
preservation and exhibition. 39  Those studies aim to explore the ways in which such 
                                                
38 Trevor-Roper argues this process occurred in three stages: (1) the cultural revolt against Ireland, (2) 
the artificial creation of  new Highland traditions presented as ancient, original and distinctive, and (3) 
the imposition of  that new tradition on the lowlands.   
39 Carol Duncan is a pioneer in seeing the museum’s exhibition as an ideological practice. In her two 
essays – ‘The Museum of Modern Art as Late Capitalist Ritual: An Iconographic Analysis’ (1978) and 
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institutions shape public memory and national identity, engage with some of the key debates 
surrounding ideas of nation and national identity; the presentation of history in, and the 
cultural politics of, museums and heritage; and of public memory.40 Some scholars are 
interested in various forms of commemoration, such as historical sites or public sculpture. 
The Book, Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity (1994), edited by John R Gillis, 
represents this sort of scholarly effort. As Gillis writes, we – the modern subject – all live in 
‘a forest of monuments’ (1994, 15). Placing commemorations in their historical settings, the 
contributors shed light on the contested nature of these monuments by showing how groups 
and individuals struggle to (re)produce the past for their own purposes.    
Discursive Construction of National Identity    
Juxtaposed with Hobsbawm’s ‘invention of tradition’, Stuart Hall provides another 
account in theorising the social construction of national identities. For Hall, a nation is 
constructed and conveyed in discourse.  
According to Hall, national identities are ‘not things we are born with, but are formed 
and transformed within and in relation to representation’ (Hall 1995, 612; emphasis in original). 
He said, ‘We only know what is to be “English” because of the way “Englishness” has come 
to be represented, as a set of meanings, by English national culture’ (ibid. 612). Nation is 
therefore for Hall ‘a system of cultural representation’. The term ‘discourse’ is employed by 
Hall to equate to his notion of ‘cultural representation’.41 A national culture is thereby a 
discourse, which constructs the meaning of a nation, influencing and organising both people’s 
behaviours and their conception of themselves. The discourse of ‘Englishness’ for instance, 
writes Hall, ‘represents what “England” is, gives meaning to the identity of “being English”, 
                                                                                                                                            
‘Art Museums and the Ritual of Citizenship’ (1991) – she respectively studies the Museum of Modern 
Arts in New York and the Louvre Palace as two different prototypes, demonstrating how ‘museums, 
as modern ceremonial monuments’ are particularly ‘dedicated exclusively to ideology,’ and how every 
element of an exhibition can be packaged to signify the ideology of the organisers and the sponsors 
(Duncan and Wallach 1978, 28).  
40 See Tony Bennett, The Birth of the Museum (1995), Robyn Gillam, Hall of Mirrors: Museums and the 
Canadian Public (2001), and David Boswell and Jessica Evans, eds., Representing the Nation: A Reader, 
Histories, Heritage and Museums (1999).  
41 Borrowing from Foucault, Hall defines the term ‘discourse’ as ‘a group of  statements which 
provide a language for talking about – i.e. a way of  presenting – a particular kind of  knowledge about 
a topic. When statements about a topic are made within a particular discourse, this discourse makes it 
possible to construct the topic in a certain way. It also limits the other ways in which the topic can be 
constructed’ (Hall 1992, 291). 
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and fixes “England” as a focus of identification in England’ (ibid., 613). National cultures 
construct identities by producing meanings about ‘the nation’ with which one can identify. 
In other words, a national culture as a discourse constructs national identity.  
Hall particularly emphasises five fundamental aspects of the representation of national 
culture, including: ‘the narrative of the nation’, ‘the emphasis on origins, continuity, tradition 
and timelessness’, ‘the invention of tradition’, ‘a foundational myth’, and ‘the idea of pure 
original people or folk’ (ibid., 613-5). Those narrations of national culture, according to Hall, 
are told and retold in national histories, literatures, the media, and popular culture, providing 
‘a set of stories, imagines, landscapes, scenarios, historical events, national symbols, and 
rituals which stand for, or represent, the shared experiences, sorrows, and triumphs, and 
disasters which give meaning to the nation’ (ibid. 613). Hall further argues that with help of 
representations of national culture, the construction of national culture conceals the real 
differences between people’s class, gender, race, and so on. No matter how different its 
members may be, ‘a national culture seeks to unify them into one cultural identity, to 
represent them all as belonging to the same great national family’ (ibid. 616). Cultural power 
in fact unified a nation as a unit so that the differences of its members can be neglected. 
Thus, the discursive construction of unitary and homogeneous national culture is constituted 
through various inventions, imaginations, representations, interpretations and narratives; and 
the national unity exists only as a discursive construct. 
In addition to the discursive construction of national culture, Hall also brings attention 
to the importance of ‘the Other’ in the constitution of ‘Self’. He argues that the construction 
of national identity depends not only on the homogeneity of the community the people 
imagined, but also on their opposition to the ‘Others’, those who cannot be included within 
it. The identification of ‘Self’ is thus produced by the existence of ‘the Other’. Hall therefore 
claims that ‘identities are constituted through, not outside difference’ (Hall 1996, 4). It is 
noted that, for Hall, the role of ‘the Other’, just like ‘homogeneous’ national culture, is 
represented/constituted in discourse as well. This ‘Other’ can be further subdivided into the 
external Other and the internal Other. Edward Said’s (1978) discussion on Orientalism and Toni 
Morrison’s (1992) study on the construction of ‘White American culture’ discuss respectively 
how the external Other and internal Other play a role in the construction of Self. Said is 
concerned with the Orient (which lay outside Europe or the West) as the most recurring 
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images of the Other, as the West’s ‘contrasting image, idea, personality, and experience, help 
to define West’ (Said 1978, 1-2), whereas Morrison contemplates blackness (which exists 
inside the United States) as the Other that helps American White writers to identify what 
White America is.42 
The construction of a nation is therefore dispersed over many fields, through 
representations (discursive constitutions) of a homogeneous national culture as well as 
representations contrasting the identity of the nation with Others. National identities are 
constructed within, not outside, discourse. Many scholarly works have devoted themselves 
to the studies of the discursive construction of national identity. And indeed, the concept of 
‘nation’ as ‘socially constructed through discourse’ has gained increasing importance in the 
relevant scholarly literature. One of the important attempts of this kind is made by 
sociolinguistics.  
The book, The Discursive Construction of National Identity (1999), written by Ruth Wodak et 
al., argues, like Hall’s, that national identities are produced, reproduced, transformed, and 
dismantled discursively. However, it attempts to place on an empirical, rather than merely 
theoretical, footing what Hall means by the discursive constitution of national identities. The 
book should be regarded as a scholarly attempt to investigate, both theoretically and 
empirically, the courses of the discursive construction of national identity, particularly, in the 
case of Austrian national identity. 
Adopting the Vienna School’s approach to Critical Discourse Analysis within the 
tradition of Critical Linguistics, as propounded by Wodak, Fairclough and Van Dijk, the 
authors develop their own method.43 It focuses on the three closely interwoven dimensions 
of analysis: contents, strategies, and linguistic means and forms of realisation. As for the 
dimension of contents, it distinguishes several thematic areas, including the linguistic 
                                                
42 Morrison (1992, 38-9) argues that the existence of  white American culture is constructed by the 
representation of  subordinated Black Americans as slave. Morrison analyses American literature, such 
as Ralph Emerson’s novel, and sees how the representation of  blackness helps American white 
writers to identify what ‘white culture’ is.  
43 The Vienna School of  Discourse Analysis has roots in the sociolinguistic approach as well as 
within the tradition of  Critical Theory. The main concern of  the Viennese School is to ‘establish the 
linguistic relations between specific linguistic subsystems and social structures…in order to explore 
the specific social significance and function of  a concrete linguistic or grammar option’ (Wodak et al. 
1999, 9).  
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construction of the homo Austriacus, of a common culture, of a common political present and 
future, of a ‘national body’ (e.g. territory, landscapes, physical national artefacts), and of a 
common political past. As for the dimension of strategies, it is defined as a plan ‘adopted to 
achieve a certain political, psychological or other kinds of objectives’ (Wodak et al. 1999, 31). 
However, according to the authors, it is not necessarily ‘strictly instrumentalist’. In other 
words, discerning and documenting the actual (objectively oriented) goals pursued by social 
actors is not the primary concern of these studies. Examples of strategies analysed in this 
book are: constructive strategies that aim to construct a certain national identity, strategies of 
perpetuation that intend to maintain a threatened national identity, strategies of 
transformation that attempt to convert a national identity into another one, and finally 
dismantling strategies that aim at denaturalizing parts of an existing national identity 
construct. The last dimension, linguistic means and forms of realisation, is focused ‘primarily 
on lexical units and syntactic devices, which serve to construct unification, unity, sameness, 
difference, uniqueness, origin, continuity, gradual or abrupt change, autonomy, heteronomy 
and so on’ (ibid., 35).  
The book looks at different types of discursive act, including both political speeches 
and media discourse made by powerful elites and group conversations and qualitative 
interviews with ordinary people. The concept of ‘political’ for the authors is ‘far broader 
than that in common usage and not only concentrates on the language of the power elites, 
but also…non-official and informal ones’ (ibid., 3). Chapters Four, Five, and Six of the book 
are devoted to using the authors’ model to analyse three sets of empirical data involved in 
the discursive construction of Austria’s evolving national identity.44 According to the authors, 
the model of national identity construction is a complex of ‘common conceptions’ and 
‘shared emotional dispositions’. The former, on the one hand, includes ‘ideas of a homo 
Austriacus; of a common culture, in the past, present and future; of a distinctive national 
territory; and of notions of and attitudes towards other national communities and their 
                                                
44 Chapter Four explores data from the public sphere in the form of speeches by political elites, such 
as president, prime minister, opposition politicians, on the subject of Austria’s national identity. 
Chapter Five relies on focus groups, aiming to summarise and analyse the so-called ‘semi-public’ 
discussions on the components of Austria’s national identity involving a cross-section of Austrians 
from several regions of the country. It observes the processes through which important concepts like 
‘nation’ are being co-constructed during the discussion. Chapter Six uses qualitative interviews to 
develop and analyse, as it is named, ‘private’ opinions by individual Austrians on their country’s 
national identity. 
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culture, history, and so on’ (ibid., 4). On the other hand, the latter is related to ‘the attitudes 
members of a given ingroup have towards other members of that ingroup, as well as those 
towards members of an outgroup’ (ibid., 4). In other words, it is through discourse that 
national uniqueness and inter-national differences can be produced, sustained, transformed 
and dismantled.  
In short, what this book tries to do is to demonstrate the process of how national 
identities are constructed in discourse; which topics, which discursive strategies, and which 
linguistic devices are employed to construct national sameness and uniqueness on the one 
hand, and differences to other national collectives on the other hand. The theory and the 
methodologies developed in the book are influential and are employed in the studies of 
other national identities. For example, Thomas Ricento’s studies of American identity 
(2003)45 and Elaine Hewitt’s thesis on the topic of construction of Gibraltarian Identity 
(2006)46 can be regarded as similar attempts.  
With respects to the studies of the discursive construction of Taiwanese national 
identity, a fairly great number of works are made in various disciplines, such as in Culture 
Studies, History, Sociology, and Political Science. Thomas B. Gold’s article, ‘Taiwan’s Quest 
                                                
45 In his article ‘The Discursive Construction of Americanism’ (2003), Ricento, as opposed to those 
who propose a differentiation between a ‘symbolic’ and ‘real’ America, argues that the place 
‘America’ where people live and work does not exist apart from discourses that assign cultural and 
social meaning to it. The ideas of America are constructed and conveyed in discourse. The author 
examines a number of (official and unofficial) statements about Americanism that emerged during 
the Americanization campaign, roughly 1914–1924, including some political speeches, bulletins, 
memoranda, being produced by government, industry, education, and civic organisations participated 
in the campaign, in order to characterise national identity and to ‘educate’ the population about the 
reasons the U.S. was fighting in a European war. He argues that they are the founding texts that 
evolved as part of a national narrative and were employed in the construction of what ‘America’ is.  
46 The thesis, under the title ‘The Discursive Construction of Gibraltarian Identity in the Printed 
Press: A Critical Discourse Analysis of Editorial Articles on the Gibraltar Issue, submitted to the 
Department of English Language and Literature at the University of Granada, aims to investigate 
how the distinctive Gibraltarian identity is constructed and represented through discourse. The thesis 
examines a numbers of editorial articles from the mass media, dated surrounding the two 
referendums being held in 1967 and 2002. Those two referendums are, argues Hewit, the important 
events in the historical evolution of Gibraltar. The thesis attempts to illustrate the process of 
competition among discourses articulated by, on the one hand, the local press in Gibraltar, which 
attempted to defend and construct a positive representation of Gibraltar, and on the other hand, the 
press from Spain and Britain, which sought to destroy it or present a negative image. Moreover, the 
thesis also tries to identify which discursive strategies were employed by each side to construct their 
own representation of the situation, and argues that their respective strategies – Gibraltar, Spain and 
Britain – reflect their own views, interests and political intentions.  
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for Identity in the Shadow of China’ (1993), attempts to examine the process of crafting 
Taiwanese identity through his analysis of artistic works, literary and various other cultural 
activities.47 Gold’s article is marked as one of the pioneering works of this kind of effort. The 
scope of his analysis is impressively extensive but the contents are over-simplistic. More 
recently, plenty of academic papers and books dealing with identity issues by analyzing 
literary, cultural activities, and artistic works, have been produced. For example, three 
Chinese volumes that widely collect this kind of academic papers can be identified here: The 
Realms of the Other: Cultural Identities and Politics of Representation (2001), Eleven Outlooks on World 
Literature (2004), and Writing Taiwan: Strategies of Representation (2000). It is not possible in this 
chapter to discuss in detail all of these scholarly works. Rather, I will attempt only to 
summarise them into two strands of argument.  
The first strand of argument addresses itself to the ‘presence’ and ‘representations’ of 
Taiwan’s history or culture in Taiwanese literary and artistic works and how this presence or 
these representations further help define and constitute a collective sense of being Taiwanese. 
Through the analysis of primary texts in the form of words, visual images, and sounds, those 
works aim to investigate how the literary works, paintings, monuments, or artistic exhibitions 
(re)construct and (re)forge a shared memory or imagination of ‘Self’, and create connections 
between individuals and specific historical events, subsequently (re)fashioning a collective 
identity. The second strand of argument revolves around the representation of the ‘Others’ 
in Taiwanese literary and artistic works and cultural activities. It argues the continual 
production of national identity works through the binary oppositions of Self and the Other. 
In this scholarly literature, they all centre around the representation of China as ‘the Other’ 
in comprehending the transformation/formation of Taiwanese national identity. Those 
studies suggest that China as ‘the Other’ helps to define and construct the ‘Self’, the 
Taiwanese-ness. The notion of ‘China’ is referred to both as the Mainlanders inside Taiwan 
and the China outside Taiwan (the historical China and the PRC). Regarding the Mainlanders, 
                                                
47 Gold in the article, examines some efforts made by Taiwanese artists and intellectuals to fashion a 
distinct Taiwanese identity in the various cultural realms including film, popular music, folk arts, 
performance arts, and literature. He writes, ‘those popular and academic works vary in their attempt 
either to link Taiwan with the greater stream of  Chinese tradition or to attempt to sever it’ (Gold 
1993, 190). According to Gold, they all engaged in a debate over the strength of  ties to Taiwan versus 
China as a whole and the concomitant sense of  a Taiwan consciousness as opposed to a Chinese 
consciousness. 
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as many studies (e.g. Lu Jian-Rong 1999, 85-129) have identified, those people are often 
described in Taiwanese literature, films and pictures as old-fashioned, conservative, 
patriarchal and anti-democratic, in contrast to the modern, open-minded, liberal and 
democratic characteristics of the native Taiwanese. Similarly, the political ideologies, political 
parties and regimes associated with the Taiwanese Mainlanders are depicted as characterised 
by a fanatical Chinese nationalism or imperialism, in contrast to a pragmatic Taiwanese 
nationalism and anti-imperialism. The Taiwanese Mainlanders are represented as colonisers, 
and the Taiwanese people as colonised. As for the China outside Taiwan, many studies have 
suggested that China, whether it refers to historical China or the PRC, is represented as a 
backward, dirty, authoritarian, corruptive, poor, imperialist and uncivilised realm, in contrast 
to the progressive, clean, democratic, peaceful and rich domain of Taiwan. ‘China’ is out 
there in contrast to Taiwan. People in Taiwan obtain self-esteem, self-affirmation and self-
identification through representation of China as the Other.  
The aforementioned scholarly literature convincingly demonstrates the validity of a 
discursive perspective on the social construction of national identity, and provides important 
discussions and empirically based analyses of key ways in which the national identity is 
constructed in terms of contents, strategies, and linguistic means and forms, used by various 
participants in the process of building national identity. Their works should be evaluated as 
important attempts to make explicit the connection between the concept of ‘nation’ and the 
term ‘discourse’. Nevertheless, their understanding of the term ‘discourse’ is, to a certain 
extent, incomplete. Although they indeed examine different types of ‘discursive practices,’ 
they basically pay most of their attention to linguistic acts. It is true that it is language that 
makes it possible for members of a community to enter into relation with one another, and it 
is precisely through the use of language in narratives that the differences and values of a 
collectivity are expressed. However, as Hobsbawm and those who have followed him have 
demonstrated, we should not neglect the constructive roles of other, ‘non-linguistic 
practices’, e.g. the invention of tradition in the formation of national identities.   
This thesis therefore attempts to incorporate the aforementioned two approaches – the 
invention of tradition and the discursive constitution of national identity. The former 
addresses itself to the social practice while the latter draws attention to the discursive in the 
social construction of national identity. Foucault’s conceptualisation of ‘discourse’ in this 
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regard is instructive since it synthesises the discursive and social practices. The following 
section therefore addresses itself to Foucault’s conception of ‘discourse’. 
 
2-3. Foucault’s Conception of ‘Discourse’ 
The term ‘discourse’ plays a crucial role in each of Foucault’s major works. Yet, his 
conception of discourse is frustratingly ambiguous. At one extreme in his archaeological 
investigations of scientific statements in post-Renaissance Western human sciences, Foucault 
treats discourses as autonomous systems of internal rules that constitute scientific statements. 
At the other extreme in his genealogical accounts of the birth of prison and sexuality, 
discourses are related to non-discursive practices and processes, such as economic and 
political changes.      
This section firstly explores the term ‘discourse’ in Foucault’s archaeological phase. It 
then illustrates Foucault’s re-elaboration of the term in his genealogical phase. It is however 
important to note that there are continuities with respect to the method and substance 
between these two phases.    
2-3-1. ‘Discourse’ in Archaeology 
In The Archaeology of Knowledge (1972a), Foucault clarifies, formalises, and reflects on the 
results of his earlier works48, intending to explore comprehensively the concept of discourse 
at a theoretical level. Foucault defines the term ‘discourse’ as follows:  
[I] believe that I have in fact added to its meanings: treating it sometimes as the 
general domain of all statements, sometimes as an individualisable group of 
statements, and sometimes as a regulated practice that accounts for a certain 
number of statements. (Foucault 1972a, 80)  
From this definition of ‘discourse’, we can see that the elementary unit of discourse is the 
‘statement’. According to Foucault, the statement is neither the same kind of unit as 
‘proposition’, nor as ‘sentence’ or ‘speech act’ (ibid., 80-4).49 The statement for Foucault is a 
                                                
48 Those works include: Madness and Civilization (1965), The Birth of  Clinic (1973), and The Order of  
Things (1970).  
49 Firstly, it is not the same as ‘proposition’ because the same sentence with the same meaning can be 
different statements, depending on the context – set of statements – in which sentences appear 
(Foucault 1972a, 80-1). Secondly, it is not equivalent to ‘sentence’ because, on the one hand, several 
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‘function’ that operates in relation to these various units, and a function that ‘cuts across a 
domain of structures and possible unities, and which reveals them, with concrete contents, in 
time and space’ (ibid., 87). Foucault identifies five distinctive features of the statement.   
Firstly, a statement cannot operate on its own; it rather functions and reveals its 
meanings in the network in which enunciations, propositions, sentences and speech acts 
interact and intersect. Secondly, there exists a special relationship between the statement and 
the subject of the statement. The subject here refers to one who produced the various 
elements conveying meaning (ibid., 93). For Foucault, the subject does not simply refer to 
the author (writing) or the speaker (enunciating); rather, it is a ‘vacant space’ that may, in effect, 
be filled by different individuals (ibid., 95). For example, a stewardess who explains an 
airline’s safety procedures is not the subject of the statement since anyone can occupy this 
‘space’. Thus, from this line of reasoning, while we study statements in a novel, an academic 
paper or a political speech, we should not ask ‘who’ is the author or speaker, but ask what 
context and which relations enable ‘someone’ to take this position of subject. 
Thirdly, every statement must have a material existence. They might be a voice recorded 
in a tape or a text printed in a newspaper. The statement is always given through material 
medium, even if those mediums are concealed, or soon disappear. Additionally, the 
statement not only needs this materiality, it is actually made up of this materiality. Therefore, 
even though a sentence is composed of the same words, bears exactly the same meaning, 
and preserves the same syntactical semantic identity, it does not constitute the same 
statement if it is spoken in the course of ordinary people’s daily conversation, or enunciated 
by the politician in a speech, or printed in a novel or school textbooks. They are all different 
statements. Materiality is therefore constitutive of the statement itself (ibid., 101). 
Furthermore, the materiality of a statement in its nature is repeatable but those repeated 
material are not necessarily regarded as the same statement. For example, a text can be 
reprinted several times, but those reprinted texts in different occasions, times and spaces 
                                                                                                                                            
different sentences can be the reiteration of one identical statement (for example, a stewardess 
explains an airline’s safety procedures in several different languages); and on the other, the statement 
is not even a grammatical entity restricted to sentences (ibid., 81-2). Something like maps can be 
statement if they are used for representations of a geographical area (Dreyfus et al. 1983, 45). And 
thirdly, it cannot be interchanged with ‘speech act.’ A speech act, as an action, requires more than 
one statement. A contract, for instance, requires a certain number of distinct formulas or separate 
sentences (Foucault 1972a, 82-4).  
   57
 
might be different statements. This repeatable materiality of statements reveals the fact that 
the statement is an object that men/women produce, manipulate, use, transform, exchange, 
combine, decompose, recompose and even destroy, since a statement is not something said 
once and for all.  Foucault states:  
[the] statement, as it emerges in its materiality, appears with a status, enters various 
networks and various fields of use, is subjected to transferences or modifications, is 
integrated into operations and strategies in which its identity is maintained or 
effaced.  Thus, the statement circulates, is used, disappears, allows or prevents the 
realisation of a desire, serves or resists various interests, participates in challenge 
and struggle, and becomes a theme of appropriation or rivalry. (Ibid., 105) 
Fourthly, the statement in its nature is rarified. It seems at first glance that statements 
can proliferate superabundantly and thereby the amount of statement is both plenitude and 
endless wealth. However, statements are always in deficit regardless of how numerous they 
may be. According to Foucault, nothing is ever being said fully. Foucault therefore aims to 
single out the principle of rarefaction, and to make know of this limited system of presences 
of statements (ibid., 119). The rarity of statements manifests a fact that statements are not an 
infinite transparency as the air we breathe. Instead, they are ‘things that can be transmitted 
and preserved, that have values, and which one tries to appropriate; they are repeated, 
reproduced and transformed’ (ibid., 120).  
Fifthly, the statement in character is accumulative without origins. It is always in a 
process in which they repeatedly compete, accumulate and overlap with each other. The 
emergence of one specific statement is always contingent. Thus, Foucault suggests, while 
one tries to analyse a discourse one should not trace an origin of a discourse. That is to say: 
one should not describe it as a closed totality of a meaning, but an incomplete, fragmented 
figure; nor should one delineate it with reference to the interiority of an intention, a thought, 
or a subject, but in accordance with the dispersion of an exteriority; nor should one 
investigate it through tracing its origins, but by virtue of discovering the specific forms of 
accumulation. In short, one should not attempt to uncover an interpretation, to discover a 
foundation of discourse, or to embrace a teleology; but to establish what Foucault calls 
‘positivity’ (ibid. 125).  
Followed by his elaborations of ‘statements’, Foucault then explains how and by what 
criteria one should individualise various and diverse statements as a group of statements – a 
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discourse. Foucault proposes four tentative approaches/hypotheses. The first approach is to 
identify statements ‘when they refer to one and the same object’ (ibid., 32). Foucault 
however soon abandons this approach. It is because, firstly, the object itself (such as 
‘Taiwanese’) is in effect constituted ‘by all that was said in all the statements that named it, 
divided it up, described it, explained it, and traced its development’ (ibid., 32). And secondly, 
the object that the group of statements refers to changes its connotation all the way down. 
Hence, Foucault argues that ‘the unity of a discourse is based on space in which objects 
emerge and are continuously transformed’; and that what enables us to individualise a group 
of statements is ‘the rule of simultaneous or successive emergence of the various objects that 
are named, described, analysed and appreciated’ (ibid., 32). The second approach is that we 
can then individualise those statements as a group if they adopt identical forms and types of 
analysis. For example, medical science since the nineteenth century was characterised as a 
discourse not by its objects or concepts, but by ‘a certain style, a certain constant manner of 
statements’ – descriptive statements (ibid., 33). Yet, again, this approach must fail since, for 
instance, the ‘descriptive’ statements in the case of medicine are not the only formulation 
presented in medical discourse, and moreover, its formulations are constantly displaced. 
Foucault therefore contends that if there is a unity of form or style in discourse, its principle 
is not a determined form of statements but a group of rules that make this form and style of 
statements possible. The third approach is to identify statements by reference to a set of 
permanent and coherent concepts used. However, this approach also has its limitations, 
because while one analyses a discourse, one would soon find that new concepts would 
appear, and some of them might be heterogeneous or even incompatible with the original 
one. Foucault accordingly suggests that ‘one might discover a discursive unity if one sought 
it not in the coherence of concepts, but in their simultaneous or successive emergence, in the 
distance that separate them and even in their incompatibility’ (ibid., 35). The fourth 
approach is that the unity of a discourse could be based on ‘the identity and persistence of 
themes’ (ibid., 35). One can suppose that a certain thematic is able to link and animate a 
group of discourses, as an organism with its own needs, its one internal force, and its own 
capacity for survival. However, this approach, like the previous three, is problematic since on 
the one hand, the same thematic can be articulated on the basis of two sets of concepts, two 
types of analysis, two perfectly different fields of objects; and on the other hand, a different 
thematic can be expressed by the same sets of concepts, types of analysis and field of objects.  
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The four aforementioned approaches demonstrate four attempts, four failures, as well 
as four successive hypotheses. Foucault here problematises the notion of ‘a’ discourse. The 
unity of ‘a’ discourse, firstly, is not based on a full, tightly packed, continuous object; instead, 
it is full of gaps, intertwined with one another, interplays of differences, distances, 
substitutions, transformations. Secondly, it does not rest on a definite, normative type of 
statement; rather, the formulations of a discourse are all very different, various and 
heterogeneous, and thus this is impossible to link those as a single style. Thirdly, it does not 
stem from a set of well-defined concepts; alternatively, ‘a’ discourse is composed of many 
competing, different and excluded concepts which cannot be unified in a logical architecture. 
And finally, a discourse does not have the permanence of a thematic. What one finds in ‘a’ 
discourse are various strategies that permit the activation of incompatible themes or the 
establishment of the same theme in different groups of statement. 
Because a discourse is so divergent, dispersed, fragmented, heterogeneous and full of 
gaps, Foucault suggests that we should attempt to describe these dispersions, and to discover 
whether one can discern a regularity, that is, ‘an order in their successive appearance, 
correlations in their simultaneity, assignable positions in a common space, a reciprocal 
functioning, linked and hierarchised transformations’ (ibid., 37). Foucault writes:  
Whenever one can describe, between a number of statements, such a system of 
dispersion, whenever, between objects, types of statement, concepts, or thematic 
choices, one can define a regularity (an order, correlations, positions and 
functionings, transformations), we will say…that we are dealing with a discursive 
formation. (ibid., 38)  
Discursive formations in this respect are treated as systems of dispersion, established by 
‘discursive practices’. The latter is defined as ‘a body of anonymous, historical rules, always 
determined in the time and space that have defined a given period, and for a given social, 
economic, geographical, or linguistic area, the conditions of operation of the enunciative 
function’ (ibid., 117). Foucault consequently gives a full meaning to the definition of 
‘discourse’. It is, according to Foucault: 
[a] group of statements in so far as they belong to the same discursive formation; it 
does not form a rhetorical or formal unity, endlessly repeatable, whose appearance 
or use in history might be indicated; it is made up of a limited number of statements 
for which a group of conditions of existence can be defined. (ibid., 117) 
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Discourse, in its nature, is dispersed. It is systems of dispersion.50 Following this line of 
conceptualising ‘discourse’, Foucault in his archaeological works proposes description of 
systems and their complex interrelationships. In doing so, he particularly takes the forms and 
internal regularities – the rules of formation – that govern the production of statements as 
his primary object of his investigation, and sets out to examine the way they structure the 
formation of objects, styles, concepts and themes of a discourse. Archaeology in this respect 
aims at the ‘pure description’ of discourse (ibid., 27). Foucault therefore intends to, as if an 
archaeologist, ‘unearth’ the rules of formation that structure the production of discourses. 
An example of this is shown in The Order of Things (1970), in which Foucault tries to identify 
distinctive discursive regularities – or what he terms as ‘episteme’ (1970, xxii), defined as a 
structure that defines the conditions both making knowledge possible and restricting its 
scope.51  
It is not possible to expatiate on his analysis of epistemes here.52 However, one point 
needs to be touched upon briefly at this point. That is: in The Order of Things, Foucault only 
identifies the distinctive epistemes and asserts that there is rupture in the form of 
discontinuities between those distinctive epistemes; he however does not demonstrate how 
epistemes shift from one to another.53 He only suggests that change ‘probably begins with an 
erosion from outside, from that space which is, for thought, on the other side, but in which 
it has never ceased to think from the very beginning’ (Foucault 1970, 50).  
Foucault here very briefly indicates the conundrum of the relationship between 
discourse and its exterior – or more specifically speaking, the relationship between discursive 
                                                
50 Foucault therefore avoids using notions such as ‘ideology’, since these notions are inadequate to 
indicate this system of  dispersion. 
51 Foucault states that his analysis of  episteme is ‘an enquiry whose aim is to rediscover on what basis 
knowledge and theory became possible; within what space of  order knowledge was constituted; on 
the basis of  what historical a priori, and in the element of  what positivity, ideas could appear, sciences 
be established, experience be reflected in philosophies, rationalities be formed, only perhaps, to 
dissolve and vanish soon afterwards’ (Foucault 1970, xxi-xxii).   
52 Basically, Foucault (1970, xv-xxiv) differentiates three epistemic systems that underlie three major 
epochs in Western thought, namely, the Renaissance, the Classical Age, and Modernity. He isolates 
and describes them respectively. He argues that ‘man’ as a subject and object of  human sciences 
(psychology, sociology and literature) was constituted in those sciences.     
53 To Foucault, discontinuity/rupture refers to a situation that ‘within the space of  a few years a 
culture sometimes ceases to think as it had been thinking up till then and begins to think other things 
in a new way’ (Foucault 1970, 50).   
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practices and other non-discursive (social) practices. The latter includes institutions, social or 
economic conditions, etc. which enable the emergence and extension on the one hand, and 
the dissolution and dwindling on the other, of discourse. He however does not further 
investigate this in his archaeological works. Such a gap in the account of the relationship 
between discourse and its exterior engenders a line of criticism, which contends that 
Foucault treats discursive practices as if they were taking place outside their social, cultural 
and political contexts. For instance, Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983) argue that Foucault’s 
archaeology founders for two reasons:  
Firstly, the causal power attributed to the rules governing discursive systems is 
unintelligible and makes the kind of influence the social institutions have… 
incomprehensible. Second, insofar as Foucault takes archaeology to be an end in 
itself he forecloses the possibility of bringing his critical analyses to bear on his 
social concerns. (1983, xxiv-xxv)    
Likewise, McNay (1994, 65) argues that Foucault’s analysis of ‘discourse’ as if it is a 
‘close universe’, gives the impression that they exist in isolation, irrelevant to their social 
contexts, and exempted from any interventions from other social practices. She writes that 
‘discursive formation becomes a hermetically sealed, self-sustaining expressive totality’ (ibid., 
65). As a result, an understanding of discourse as culturally and socially specific formation is 
precluded; and issues raised by a consideration of the necessary social embedded-ness of 
discourse – such as the question of how individuals come to occupy certain discursively 
constructed subject positions – are neglected. To those critics, the ignorance of other non-
discursive (social) practices, say, institutions, political events, economic practices and 
processes, and its interplay with discursive practices become the major deficiencies of 
Foucault’s analysis of discourse in archaeology. On the one hand it fails to provide a further 
and deeper analysis of the production, transition, transformation and exclusion of the 
discourse; on the other, it fails to take the notion of power into account in his analysis. 
Nevertheless, Foucault in his archaeological phase has actually noticed the significance 
of social embedded-ness of discourse (the intimate linkage between discursive practices and 
social practices). To take Foucault’s discussion of the clinical medicine as an example, he 
writes that ‘archaeology also reveals relations between discursive formations and non-
discursive domains (institutions, political events, economic practices and processes)’ 
(Foucault 1972a, 162). Foucault states that the establishment of clinical medicine at the end 
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of the eighteenth century is synchronous with a number of political events, economic 
phenomena, and institutional changes. He then argues that it is easy enough to deduce the 
existence of certain links between them. Foucault subsequently asks how such links can be 
analysed. Instead of providing an interpretative explanation or a causal analysis, Foucault 
situates archaeological analysis at another level. He writes:  
[Archaeology] wishes to show not how political practice has determined the 
meaning and form of medical discourse, but how and in what form it takes part in 
its conditions of emergence, insertion, and functioning. (ibid., 163) 
In other words, Foucault’s archaeology does not aim to show how social practices constitute 
or modify the medical discourse, discovering a causal sequence described point by point; 
rather, he intends to demonstrate how social practices function and penetrate in the 
formation of medical discourse.54 This line of argument in effect indicates the direction to be 
taken by his future analysis of power, or power relations, in his genealogical phase. Foucault 
concludes:     
The autonomy of discourse and its specificity nevertheless do not give it the status 
of pure ideality and total historical independence; what [archaeology] wishes to 
uncover is the particular level in which history can give place to definite types of 
discourse, which have their own type of historicity, and which are related to a whole 
set of various historicities. (Ibid., 164-5)   
In short, the relationship between discursive practices and social practices should be 
seen as synchronised coexistence in a locus in which a discourse is formed. The latter – 
social practices – become the main object of Foucault’s analysis in his subsequent works on 
prison and sexuality, termed his genealogical phase, to which this chapter now turns.   
2-3-2.  ‘Discourse’ in Genealogy  
Foucault in his genealogical phase shifts his focus from a purely formal style of analysis 
of discourse and takes the social contexts of the discursive formation into consideration. He 
pays much greater attention to the impact of social practices on the discursive formation. 
The emphasis on social practices not only marks the changes of Foucault’s analysis of 
                                                
54 It may be useful to view this causality in terms of  what Foucault is working against – that is, 
(orthodox) Marxism. Foucault’s view of  ideology might be useful in this context and it maybe that 
the ‘cause’ avoided is precisely that of  Marxism, that is of  reduction to social and economic practice 
which then ‘explain’ medical practice and institution. This is the cause and effect of  Marxist theory in 
that it shapes the answer by its own presuppositions (by its pseudo-scientific discourse). Problems of  
ideology for Foucault are precisely those of  truth but also of  ‘cause’. 
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discourse but also the re-conceptualisation of discourse. It is however important to note that 
although the turn to genealogical approach shifts his focus of analysis, Foucault does not 
abandon his archaeological perspective; rather, he further develops some ideas that have 
already been discussed in his archaeological works. One of the most important issues is the 
‘rarefaction’ of discourse.  
As demonstrated above, Foucault in his archaeological works has identified the paucity 
of statements – the principle of rarefaction. McNay elucidates it as follows:   
In any era, everything that can be said is never said; that in relation to the wealth of 
possible statements that can be formulated in natural language, only relatively few 
things are actually said. (1994, 74)  
Foucault afterwards expounds on this principle in the lecture under the title ‘Order of 
Discourse’, which signalled the shift from an archaeological to genealogical style of analysis. 
In the lecture, Foucault highlights a series of external social forces – process of control, 
selection, organisation and distribution – that govern the rarefaction of discourse (or 
production of discourse). 55  Juxtaposed to the archaeological approach, which inclines 
towards pure description of the state of rarefaction, Foucault here intends to elucidate how 
there are relatively few statements made at any given point.   
Foucault first of all proclaims that the production of discourse in every society ‘is at 
once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed according to a certain number of 
procedures, whose role is to avert its powers and its dangers, to cope with change events, to 
evade its ponderous, awesome materiality’ (Foucault 1972b, 216). According to him, those 
procedures of exclusion (or production) of discourse include three groups of rules: (1) 
external systems of exclusion, (2) internal rules, and (3) a rarefaction or a delimitation of 
speaking subjects.  
Firstly, discourse is controlled through procedures of exclusion which function via 
strategies of ‘prohibition’, ‘division’, and ‘the opposition between true and false’. As for 
‘prohibition’, Foucault refers to three types of prohibition: the taboo of objects; ritual with 
its surrounding circumstances; and the privileged or exclusive right to speak of a particular 
                                                
55  It is noted that for Foucault the production of  discourse and exclusion of  discourse are two sides 
of  one coin.  According to Foucault, the production of  a discourse simultaneously excludes the 
possibility of  the production of  any other alternative discourse concerning the same subject.  
Discourse in its nature is therefore exclusive. 
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subject.  Foucault states that ‘we are not free to say just anything, that we cannot simply 
speak of anything, when we like or where we like; not just anyone, finally, may speak of 
anything’ (ibid., 216). As for the ‘division’, Foucault here reiterates his analysis in Madness and 
Civilization, which focuses on the opposition of reason and folly. He argued that the words of 
the madman are considered worthless and void, without truth or significance. As for 
‘opposition between truth and falsity’, Foucault centres his discussion on the rejection or the 
imposition of a ‘will to truth’. He argues that, any society (specially modern industrial 
societies) is typified by a ‘will to truth’ which establishes a distinction between truth and 
falsity and hence determines how knowledge is put to work, valorised and distributed (ibid., 
217-20).  
Secondly, corresponding to these external processes of discursive regulation is a series 
of internal rules of rarefaction that control and delimit discourse. These internal rules include 
‘commentary’, ‘author’ and ‘discipline’. The idea of ‘commentary’ controls discourse through 
a constantly revised process of differentiation between primary and secondary works that 
sets up a textual hierarchy determinant of what can be said or thought about the texts. 
Similarly, the category of the ‘author’ confines reception of texts to the terms of authenticity, 
intentionality and creativities. Foucault states, ‘Commentary limits the hazards of discourse 
through the action of an identity taking the form of repetition and sameness. The author 
principle limits this same chance element through the action of an identity whose form is 
that of individuality and the I’ (ibid., 222). ‘Discipline’ – the third internal principle – 
constitutes an anonymous system that makes both the production and elimination of 
statements or discourses possible, through identifying a collection of propositions regarded 
as true and regulating a set of rules and definitions, techniques and legitimised instruments. 
Discipline is a principle of control in the production of discourse.    
Thirdly, the final set of procedures which control the social production of discourse 
operates through a rarefaction or a delimitation of speaking subjects. An individual is 
incapable of taking up a certain discursive position without fulfilling a series of specific 
requirements. Constraints are exerted, firstly, through the imposition of speech rituals, which 
defines the qualifications, gestures to be made, behaviour, etc. of the speaker; secondly, 
through belonging to societies of discourse (which aims to produce or preserve discourse 
within a closed community, according to strict regulations, such as the groups of 
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Rhapsodists) or doctrinal groups (which bind individuals to certain types of enunciation and 
eventually forbid all others, but they also use these types of enunciation to bind individuals 
together); and lastly, through the social appropriation of discourse (for example, systems of 
education determine the extent of such appropriation). 
Although Foucault in this lecture reiterates some of the themes of the archaeological 
approach, it offers a significant new inflexion to these themes. The principle of rarefaction is 
further elucidated by taking the social contexts of asymmetrical relations in which any 
discursive formation is situated into account. And moreover, by trying to elucidate the 
rarefaction of discourse, Foucault is committing himself to the task of describing power 
relations in his analysis of discourse. McNay comments:  
The emphasis on discourse as an internally regulating formation is replaced by a 
notion of discourse as determined by and also constitutive of the power relations 
that permeate the social realm. The rarefaction of discursive formations is 
fundamentally related to the maintenance of asymmetrical social relations. Entry to 
these discursive formations is influenced by relations of power which over-
determine access to certain social goods and resources. This is, then, a decisive 
move from the archaeological postulation of the anteriority of discourse to an 
understanding of non-discursive relations forming the conditions of possibility of 
discourse. (1994, 87)  
Indeed, since Foucault characterises the nature of discourse as rarified (or exclusive) and 
identifies those procedures of exclusion, he then turns his analysis of discourse to the 
genealogical approach, which pays more attention to other social practices and power 
relations implied. 
Foucault subsequently in this lecture proposes an alternative set of methodological 
principles. The first is the principle of reversal, which means that we must regard the 
conventional notions of the author, discipline and will to truth not in a positive relation to 
meaning but in a negative relation that excludes the production of alternative discourses – 
the rarefaction of discourse.  The second principle, discontinuity, suggests that the existence of 
systems of rarefaction does not imply that there is an enormous, silent and continuous 
discourse that lies over and beyond our utterances and speeches. We must not imagine some 
unsaid thing about the world that would interlace with its forms and events. ‘Discourse must 
be treated as a discontinuous activity, its different manifestations sometimes coming together, 
but just as easily unaware of, or excluding each other’ (Foucault 1972b, 229).  The third 
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principle is specificity, which signifies that there is no pre-discursive fate disposing the word in 
our favour. Discourse therefore must be seen as ‘a violence that we do to things, or at all 
events, as a practice we impose upon them’ (ibid., 229). The forth principle, exteriority, means 
that discourse should not be analysed in terms of its hidden core of meaning. Rather, it 
should be examined in terms of ‘its external conditions of existence’ (ibid., 229).56 
As shown above, Foucault here claims that discourse must be analysed in its external 
conditions of existence.  This claim implies that the external conditions of existence – social 
practices – determine the production and exclusion of discourse, and vice versa. The 
concept ‘discourse’, at this phase, becomes a synthesis or an amalgam, which encompasses 
discursive practices and social practices. This synthesis is best manifested in the concept of 
‘Dispositif (apparatus),’ as Foucault termed it. 
Although the concept itself is ambiguous and has not been spelled out, the domain to 
which it refers is relatively clear. According to Dreyfus and Rabinow: 
Dispositif is distinguished from episteme primarily because it encompasses the non-
discursive practices as well as the discursive. It is resolutely heterogeneous, 
including ‘discourse, institutions, architectural arrangements, regulations, laws, 
administrative measures, scientific statements…’ Drawing from these disparate 
components, one seeks to establish a set of flexible relationships, and merge them 
into a single apparatus in order to isolate a specific historical problem. (1983, 121; 
emphasis in original)    
To take ‘Dispositif of sex’ as an example, it designates the complex of psychiatric, medical, 
and legal discourses and practices that produced sexuality as a pivotal element in a network 
of social control. I shall not elaborate this concept further since the aim here is only to 
explain that the notion of discourse at this stage, for Foucault, has been extended and that it 
encompasses both discursive and social practices (non-discursive practices). To borrow 
McNay’s words, ‘discourse, or a particular discursive formation, is to be understood as an 
amalgam of material practices and forms of knowledge linked together in a non-contingent 
relation’ (McNay 1994, 108). 
Discourse as a result is a synthesis that encompasses discursive practices and social 
practices; it is a domain in which discursive practice and social practice are exercised; and it 
is a realm that bounds both linguistic and non-linguistic acts. They are mutually subsumed 
                                                
56 The four principles that are mentioned here also manifest the propositions of  Foucault’s 
genealogical approach that I have indicated in the Introduction.  
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and included in the domain of discourse. And since they are mutually constitutive, the 
distinction between discursive practices and social practices becomes ambiguous. Laclau and 
Mouffe (1985) further elaborate on this point as they argue that the distinction between 
discursive and non-discursive practices is meaningless. The distinction is itself a 
differentiation that can only be made within discourse. To them, language is always 
embedded in practices including linguistic and non-linguistic practices; thereby the unity of 
language, actions and material objects is indissoluble (Laclau et al. 1985, 108). Discourse is 
thus comprised of both linguistic and non-linguistic elements, and of both discursive and 
social practices.  
To conclude, ‘discourse’ in Foucault’s analysis should be understood as dispersed, 
fragmented and heterogeneous in nature; it is diffused in the domain of society through the 
various and diverse discursive/social practices. These dispersed and diffused features of 
discourse indeed not only reflect Foucault genealogical method that look at subtle, minute 
and meticulous practices – the surface of practices; but also designate his microphysics of 
power, to which the next section turns.  
 
2-4. Power Relations and Subject  
This section aims to, on the one hand, elucidate what Foucault means by ‘power’ and 
how one can analyse it; and on the other hand, to spell out his conception of ‘the subject.’ 
The section firstly demonstrates Foucault’s opposition to the two conventional ways of 
understanding power – economistic and juridical forms of power. Then, it elaborates how 
Foucault re-conceptualised it by identifying its distinctive features: omnipresence, pluralism 
and productiveness. The discussion of the final feature – productiveness – leads to 
Foucault’s conception of ‘subject’.  
2-4-1. The Economistic and Juristic-discursive Models of Power 
Foucault opposes two prevailing theories that see power as anchored in 
macrostructures or ruling classes, and as repressive in nature: the former is the economistic 
model while the latter is the juridical-discursive model of power (Foucault 1980a).  
The first model – the economistic model of power – as espoused by the traditional 
Marxist, understands all types of power relations as derived phenomena, in that they are 
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merely the consequences of other economic and social processes: forces of production, class 
struggle, and ideological structures. In addition, this model views power as centralised and 
possessed by the state and its apparatuses. Power is, on the one hand, the instruments 
possessed by the bourgeoisie to repress and to exploit the proletariat; and on the other hand, 
it also serves the proletariat in its resistance to oppression and exploitation. In this respect, 
power is reduced to secondary effects of a fundamental class struggle. The traditional 
Marxist therefore urges the proletariat to struggle for control of the state apparatus, which is 
seen as the centre and source of power.  
In short, from the viewpoint of this model, power is something that can be acquired, 
seized, shared and held; it is a possession of the elites or the logic of bureaucratic institutions; 
it is exercised from a single political centre or source that can be contested; and finally it is 
governed by a single over-arching project. Yet, this way of conceptualising power is rejected 
by Foucault for its reductionistic subordination of power to class domination and economic 
imperatives. As Foucault states in his article ‘Two Lectures’:  
I don’t believe that anything can be deduced from the general phenomenon of the 
domination of the bourgeois class. What needs to be done is something quite 
different.  One needs to investigate historically, and beginning from the lowest level, 
how mechanisms of power have been able to function…We need to identify the 
agents responsible for them, their real agents (those which constituted the 
immediate social entourage, the family, parents, doctors etc.) and not be content to 
lump them under the formula of generalized bourgeoisie. (1980a, 100-1)  
In other words, power is neither the property of elites nor structural forces.  
The second model of power – the juridico-discursive model – analyses power in terms 
of law, legal and moral right, and political sovereignty. According to Foucault, this juridico-
discursive model possesses five principal features. Firstly, it regards power as purely negative. 
In the case of sexuality, power does nothing except negate, reject, exclude, refuse, and block 
sex (Foucault 1978, 83). The second feature is ‘the insistence of the rule’. Power exercises by 
virtue of laying down the law. Power functions ‘through language, or rather through the act 
of discourse that creates…a rule of law’ (ibid., 83). Power is therefore articulated by means 
of juridical language and is in character juridico-discursive. The third feature is ‘the cycle of 
prohibition’, that is, power employs nothing but a law of prohibition (ibid., 84). The fourth 
feature is ‘the logic of censorship’. The banning is thought to take three forms: affirming that 
something (sex for instance) is not permitted, preventing it from being said, denying that it 
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exists (ibid., 84). The fifth feature is ‘the uniformity of the apparatus’. Power is exercised in 
the same way at all levels. It takes effect from top to bottom; it acts in a uniform and 
comprehensive manner; it operates according to the simple and endlessly reproduced 
mechanisms of law, taboo, and censorship: from state to family, from prince to father. One 
finds a general form of power, only varying in scale. This form of power is law and its effects 
are obedience (ibid., 84-5).  
Under this conception of power, one can then distinguish the master who makes law 
and the subject who must be obedient to law. ‘A legislative power on one side, and an 
obedient subject – who is subjected – on the other’ (ibid. 85). In short, this juridical-discursive 
model of power is essentially repressive; it ‘is poor in resources, sparing of its methods, 
monotonous in the tactics it utilizes, and incapable of invention;’ it produces nothing but 
saying ‘no’; and finally ‘all the modes of domination, submission, and subjugation are 
ultimately reduced to an effect of obedience’ (ibid., 85). This model of power is what 
Foucault terms ‘king’s power.’ 
According to Foucault, the western monarchies were constructed ‘as systems of law, 
they expressed themselves through theories of law, and they made their mechanisms of 
power work in the form of law’ (ibid., 87). He continues, although the people in the modern 
era have abandoned these monarchic institutions and endeavour to disengage the juridical 
sphere from the monarchic institutions, they, however, did not challenge the principle which 
held that ‘law had to be the very form of power, and that power always had to be exercised 
in the form of law’ (ibid., 88). The representation of power has remained under the spell of 
monarchy.  We still have not yet ‘cut off the head of the king’ (ibid., 89). Therefore, the 
theory of power still gives priority to the issues of ‘right and violence, law and illegality, 
freedom and will, and especially state and sovereignty’ (ibid., 89). Yet, Foucault argues, this 
juridical form of power is merely one of many forms of power. The juridical form of power 
has gradually been penetrated by new mechanisms of power that are probably irreducible to 
the representation of law. Those new mechanisms of power are not ensured ‘by right but by 
technique;’ they do not operate ‘by law but by normalisation;’ and they do not act ‘by 
punishments but by control’ (ibid., 89). Those mechanisms go beyond the state and its 
apparatus. As Foucault states, ‘we have been engaged for centuries in a type of society in 
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which the juridical is increasingly incapable of coding power, of serving as its system of 
representation’ (ibid., 89).   
Foucault hence urges us to ‘cut off the head of the king’, that is, we must break off an 
analytical method that privileges law and sovereignty, which attaches to a certain image of 
power-law, of power-sovereignty. If we wish to analyse power within the concrete and 
historical framework of its operation, ‘we must construct an analytics of power that no 
longer takes law as a model and a code’ (ibid., 90).  In other words, we must conceive power 
without the king. Hence, Foucault here again rejects this form of power conception. 
It is however very important to note that even though Foucault opposes these two 
forms of power conception, he does not deny the existence of these two forms of power. 
We must distinguish the forms of power from model of power analysis. It would be 
misleading if one considers that Foucault negates the existence of those two forms of power. 
They are both still at work, though their influences are gradually decreasing. In other words, 
neither does Foucault’s conception of power deny the form of power possessed by the 
ruling class nor does it neglect the repressive form of power. Rather, it only opposes giving 
them a theoretical primacy. Foucault’s urge to conceive of power without king should be 
limited to a sense that he intends to show us a more devious and discreet form of power. 
According to Foucault, both juridico-discursive and economistic model of power analysis 
leads to an oversimplified and functionist understanding of power. It is therefore necessary 
to avoid the limited field of state institutions and juridical sovereignty.  
Following Foucault’s critique of the conventional understanding of power, this section 
will then analyse his own view of power. Foucault’s conception of power can be summarised 
into two points that are elucidated, respectively, in the following two sub-sections.    
2-4-2. Omnipresent, Local, Anonymous, Spontaneous, Immanent & Pluralistic 
In opposition to the Marxist understanding of power as shown above, Foucault 
attempts to conduct an ascending and micro analytic of power – a microphysics of power. This 
is to say: if power generates a multiplicity of effects, then it is only possible to discern these 
effects by analysing power from below, at its most precise points of operation. A few points 
elucidate upon this conception and analytics of power.   
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First of all, power is omnipresent. It is exercised from innumerable points at every minute 
without failure and interval. Power is present everywhere in society, in every relation 
between human beings and between human beings and things. It is dispersed, diffused, and 
spread over time and space at varying densities: power relations permeate all levels of social 
existence. Yet, it is important to note that power as omnipresent does not come from the 
top as unified forces such as a structure, which embrace everything; rather, it ‘comes from 
below’ (Foucault 1978, 94). Power is dispersed within society, and exercised in a domain 
where detailed, meticulous and multiple movements intersect and where heterogeneous, 
diverse and various forces intertwine. Foucault states: 
The omnipresence of power: not because it has the privilege of consolidating 
everything under its invincible unity, but because it is produced from one moment 
to the next, at every point, or rather in ever relation from one point to another. 
Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes 
from everywhere. (ibid., 93) 
Therefore, Foucault adopts an ascending rather than descending analysis, which perceives 
power as circulating throughout the de-centred field of institutional networks. This de-
centred and dispersed form of power might be taken up by larger structures or institutions 
such as the class or the state apparatus. Yet, these macro-forces are only the ‘terminal’ forms 
that power takes (Foucault 1978, 92; 1983, 213).  
Moreover, this omnipresent and ascending power is exercised anonymously and 
spontaneously. In his discussion of the effect of Bentham’s Panopticon,57 Foucault explicitly 
illustrates this feature of power. The Panopticon induces in the inmate (the object of power) 
a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power 
(Foucault 1977, 201). Power hence should be ‘visible’ and ‘unverifiable’.  
Visible: the inmate will constantly have before his eyes the tall outline of the central 
tower from which he is spied upon. Unverifiable: the inmate must never know 
whether he is being looked at any one moment; but he must be sure that he may 
always be so. (ibid., 201) 
                                                
57 According to Foucault, Bentham’s Panopticon offers a paradigmatic example of  disciplinary 
technology. It is a correction facility whose architectural design is simple. A tower stands at the 
centre, surrounded by an annular building at the periphery which is divided into cells. In the annular 
building, one is totally seen, without ever seeing, while in the central tower, one sees everything 
without ever being seen (Foucault 1977, 200). Such a facility is to induce a state of  conscious and 
permanent visibility in the inmate that assures the automatic functioning of  power.   
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Accordingly, power is not so much possessed in a person, but is ‘in a certain concerted 
distribution of bodies, surfaces, lights, gazes; in an arrangement whose internal mechanisms 
produce the relation in which individuals are caught up’ (ibid., 202). Thus, the presence of 
power might reside in a design of building or an arrangement of a timetable. As a 
consequence, Foucault states that power ‘is not possessed as a thing, or transferred as a 
property; it functions like a piece of machinery’ (ibid., 177). It is the apparatus as a whole 
that produces ‘power’ and distributes individuals in this permanent and continuous field. 
On that account, power is immanent in the domains in which it is exercised. It is not 
something that represses the object of power from outside institutions or mechanisms, but is 
exercised within institutions or mechanisms internally. Power therefore is both indiscreet 
and discreet. According to Foucault,   
It is indiscreet since it is omnipresent and always alert. It leaves no zone of shade 
but constantly supervises the very individuals who are entrusted with the task of 
supervising. It is discreet because it functions permanently and largely in silence. 
(Ibid., 177)  
Since it is omnipresent, meticulous and is dispersed everywhere at anytime, power 
thereby is pluralistic and heteromorphous. It is exercised from innumerable points, rather than 
from a single political centre, as the possession of an elite or the logic of bureaucratic 
institutions. It is not governed by a single over-arching project. It is highly indeterminate in 
character.   
As a consequence, power is not something that is acquired, seized, or shared, something 
that one holds on to or allows to slip away, as King’s power is. Foucault opposes a binary 
and all-encompassing opposition between rulers and ruled when analysing power. Power 
might be centred in an institution (such as a state apparatus), or in a person (such as a king); 
but it definitely does not merely reside in these specific loci.  
Since Foucault perceives power no longer as a property of one specific individual, nor a 
group of people being used to maintain social hierarchies, his analytic of power extracts the 
forms of power and the techniques of power from the power relations and aims to attack 
those forms and techniques of power, rather than condemning any specific institution, class, 
group of people, or individual (Foucault 1983, 212).  
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In short, instead of regarding power as merely an institution, a structure, and a certain 
strength we are endowed with, it is the name that one attributes to ‘a complex strategical 
situation’ in a particular society (Foucault 1978, 93).  Foucault thus urges that, in the analytic 
of power, we should not look for the headquarters that presides over its rationality; neither 
should we search for the elite groups which govern the people, enact the policy, and control 
the state apparatus. Rather, the task of the analytic of power is to identify the complex 
strategical situation. On this account, the object of Foucault’s analytics of power is power 
relations, rather than power itself. Foucault says ‘what I am attentive to is the fact that every 
human relation is to some degree a power relation. We move in a world of perpetual 
strategic relations. Every power relation is not bad in itself, but it is a fact that always 
involves danger’ (Foucault 1988, 168).    
To summarise, the notion of power conceptualised by Foucault is essentially 
omnipresent, local, anonymous, spontaneous, immanent and pluralistic. It is therefore not 
something that can be acquired, shared and seized. And the analytics of power focuses on 
how power is exercised in asymmetrical power relations.       
2-4-3. Constitutive and Positive 
As mentioned earlier, Foucault opposes the conventional conception of power that 
tends to perceive power in an essentially negative manner, totally repressive forces. When 
discussing the juridico-discursive model, Foucault puts forward a question: why is this 
juridical notion of power so readily accepted? The reason is that: power is tolerable only on 
condition that it masks a substantial part of itself – the constitutive-ness of power. The 
success of power is ‘proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms’ (Foucault, 1978, 
86). Foucault here substitutes the conventional way with a new conception of power as an 
essentially productive, constitutive and positive force which permeates all levels of society, 
engendering a multiplicity of relations.  
In Foucault’s model, power is constitutive in the sense that it works to produce 
particular types of bodies and minds.58 He writes, a power ‘bent on generating forces, making 
                                                
58 Another aspect of the productivity of power is that it aims to enhance the capacity of social 
production. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault argues that the establishment of modern penal reform 
systems aim to set up a new economy of power that was better distributed, more efficient and less 
costly in both economic and political terms. Similarly, in History of Sexuality, Foucault argues that the 
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them grow, and ordering them, rather than one dedicated to impeding them, making them 
submit, or destroying them’ (ibid., 136). In Discipline and Punish, Foucault describes how 
docile bodies are produced by organising individuals in practices of surveillance which train 
comportment according to classifications of normal and abnormal. Modern disciplinary 
power is not exercised through physical force or representation by law, but through the 
normalisation, political technologies, shaping the body and soul.  
This notion of power is then a sort of normalising force. In Foucault’s understanding, 
‘norms’ do not ‘refer to the force of tradition, collectively generated systems of values or 
patterns of moral action. Rather, it refers to the routinised modes of behaviour that are so 
deeply inscribed on the body by disciplinary modes of power that they seem natural and 
normal’ (McNay 1994, 112). Foucault illustrates this form of power at length in his 
discussion of psychoanalysis in The History of Sexuality.  
Foucault first of all conceives psychotherapy as the paradigm of the secularised and 
modern confessional (Foucault 1978, 129-31). He then discusses the irony that in trying to 
liberate him/herself in therapy, the analysand is actually subjecting him/herself to a strategy 
of normalisation which produces the very subject who should free him/herself in this way. 
In psychoanalysis, one is conceived as a subject who possesses secret desires that the subject 
itself is not aware of, secret desires which must be uncovered in order to achieve liberation 
and salvation. The object of confession is thus no longer concerned solely with ‘what 
subjects wish to hide’, but with ‘what was hidden from him/herself, being incapable of 
coming to light except gradually and through the labour of a confession in which the 
questioner and questioned each had a part to play’ (ibid., 66). It seems to us that the truth of 
ourselves, lodged in our most secret nature, demands to surface. We therefore need to 
confess ourselves so as to know, and then liberate, ourselves.  
The double contradiction, according to Foucault, emerges here: firstly, the disclosure of 
one’s inner self and desires does not lead to greater and deeper self-knowledge; instead, one 
just constitutes one’s ‘inner self’ and ‘desires’ – the ‘truth’ of oneself – in the practices of 
psychoanalysis. Secondly, confession in this regard is not extracted from the subject in the 
                                                                                                                                            
discourse of sexuality since the seventeenth century had the tacit aim of reducing or excluding forms 
of sexuality that were not amenable to the strict economy of reproduction, constituting ‘a sexuality 
that is economically useful and politically conservative’ (Foucault 1978, 37).  
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process of psychoanalysis; rather, the urge to confess is so deeply embedded in the subject, 
so that it is no longer perceived as coerced but is regarded as a voluntary act of liberation 
from psychical repression. Foucault writes, 
[The] obligation to confess is…so deeply ingrained in us, that we no longer perceive 
it as the effect of a power that constraints us; on the contrary, it seems to us that 
truth, lodged in our most secret nature, ‘demands’ only to surface; that if it fails to 
do so, this is because a constraint holds it in place, the violence of a power weights 
it down. (ibid., 60) 
Moreover, the constitution of the subject in psychoanalysis takes place in a relationship 
of power in so far as the analysand’s speech, thoughts, and dreams must be interpreted by 
the analyst, who is positioned as an authority in the discourse of psychoanalysis. The analyst, 
Foucault describes, is not simply ‘the interlocutor but the authority who requires the 
confession, prescribes and appreciates it, and intervenes in order to judge, punish, forgive, 
console, and reconcile’ (ibid., 61-2). The ‘truth’ of oneself on this account does then not 
reside in the subject who speaks but belongs to the analyst, the one who listens. It is the 
analyst’s job to verify this obscure truth of the analysand – the subject. Foucault writes, ‘the 
one who listened was not simply the forgiving master, the judge who condemned or 
acquitted; he was the master of truth’ (ibid., 66-7).  
Furthermore, the analyst is required to have a particular kind of knowledge – a 
‘qualified’ knowledge. The understanding of the ‘truth’ of oneself is then also closely 
associated with knowledge that aims to produce ‘true’ discourses concerning oneself (ibid., 
67-9). Yet, knowledge – social sciences particularly – for Foucault is not objective at all; 
rather, it has an intimate relationship with power and is, in fact, a product of power relations. 
Foucault elsewhere describes a circular relationship between knowledge and power, or what 
he terms ‘power-knowledge complex’.  
Foucault argues that knowledges (savoir) emerge within the context of power relations 
through practices and technologies of exclusion, confinement, surveillance, and 
objectification; but they in turn contributed to the development, refinement, and 
proliferation of new techniques of power.  He states:  
[Power] produces knowledge; that power and knowledge directly imply one another; 
that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of 
knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same 
time power relations. (Foucault 1977, 27)  
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Knowledge is thus in-dissociable from the regimes of power. Foucault uses the term 
‘discourse’ to signify those systems of ‘quasi-scientific’ knowledge, which refer to those 
various disciplines of social science such as psychiatry (Foucault 1972a, 178). As argued in 
the previous section, it is important to note that, for Foucault, the term ‘discourse’ 
incorporates both discursive and social practices. Thus, ‘knowledge’ is then not only the sum 
of what is said (the discursive) but also what is done (the social). Foucault writes:  
Knowledge is that of which one can speak in a discursive practice, and which is 
specified by that fact…59 knowledge is also the space in which the subject may take 
up a position and speak of the objects with which he deals in his discourse…60 
knowledge is also the field of coordination and subordination of statements in 
which concepts appear, and are defined, applied and transformed… 61  lastly, 
knowledge is defined by the possibilities of use and appropriation offered by 
discourse…62 (ibid., 182-3)      
Knowledges only exist within particular discourses, rather than in any transcendental or 
timeless sense. There is ‘no knowledge without a particular discursive practice; and any 
discursive practice may be defined by the knowledge that it forms’ (ibid., 183). And while 
power is constitutive, discourses in this regard have an inherent constitutive role in 
producing reality.  
Discourses, said Foucault, are practices that ‘systematically form the objects of which 
they speak’ (ibid., 49). The meanings attached to things depend upon power relationships, 
thus reality/truth itself can be said to be discursively constituted. Knowledge as discourse is 
thus not knowledge of a ‘real’ world as it is in fact constituted in discourse. And while the 
discourse involves a complex set of practices that keep certain statements/actions in 
                                                
59 For example, ‘the knowledge of  psychiatry in the nineteenth century is not the sum of  what was 
thought to be true, but the whole set of  practices, singularities, and deviations of  what one could 
speak in psychiatric’ (Foucault 1977, 182).   
60 For example, ‘the knowledge of  clinical medicine is the whole group of  functions of  observation, 
interrogation, decipherment, recording, and decision that may be exercised by the subject of  medical 
discourse’ (ibid., 182).   
61 For example, ‘the knowledge of  Natural History, in the eighteenth century, is not the sum of  what 
was said, but the whole set of  modes and sites in accordance with which one can integrate each new 
statement with the already said’ (ibid.,183).   
62 For example, ‘the knowledge of  political economy, in the Classical period, is not the thesis of  the 
different theses sustained, but the totality of  its points of  articulation on other discourses or on other 
practices that are not discursive’ (ibid., 183).   
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circulation but take others out of circulation, a specific discourse thus limits or excludes 
alternative ways in which subjects can be constituted.  
Moreover, seeing as power is regarded as a sort of normalising/disciplinary force, knowledge 
is then implicated in the production of docile bodies and subjected minds. The connotation 
of the term ‘discipline’ for Foucault turns to possess a double meaning. It refers not only to 
a branch of knowledge (i.e. political science) but also to a control of people’s behaviour via 
punishment and training. The knowledge produced in disciplines in fact reinforces and 
refines the disciplinary forces of society. It is precisely for this reason that Foucault opposes two 
forms of understanding the notion of knowledge: positivism and Marxism, owning to the 
fact that the former regards knowledge as being neutral and objective while the latter views 
knowledge as a force of emancipation. Power, knowledge and discourse should be perceived 
as trinity in unity. The interrelationship among power, knowledge, discourse and reality can 
be summarised as follows: all knowledge, as a form of discourse, on the one hand is the 
effect of power relations; on the other, forms of knowledge constitute the social reality 
which they describe and analyse.  
In short, Foucault sees power as a fundamentally enabling force. And since power is 
constitutive, it becomes a positive rather than a totally negative phenomenon. Yet, the claim 
that power is positive does not imply it is ‘good’. Power is positive only in a limited, 
technical sense.   
2-4-4. Foucault’s conception of Subject  
What the case of psychoanalysis shows, as discussed above, is that subjectivity itself, the 
very possibility of having a self of which one is aware, of saying ‘I’ with some degree of self-
knowledge, is then conditioned on the exercise of power. It is an example of our 
imbrications in a network of power relations. Individuals regulate themselves through a 
constant introspective search for their hidden ‘truth’, held to lie in their innermost identity. 
The confessional practices that are supposed to reveal ‘true’ meaning only lead to an endless 
explication and production of the proliferating discourse of ‘Self’ – the speaking subjects, 
thereby being produced in discourse. Hence, control is achieved not through direct 
repression but through more invisible strategies of normalisation; the behaviour of 
individuals is regulated not through overt repression but through a set of standards and 
values associated with normality. It is this conception of power as a normalising rather than 
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a repressive force that lies at the base of Foucault’s assertion that power is constitutive. 
Self – the subject – in psychoanalysis, as a result, is not really discovered but produced. Subjects 
are produced in discourses and in power relations, positioning them as speakers in 
possession of self-consciousness and an unconscious that determines desire.  
The concept of subject in Foucault’s thought becomes the constituent subject. That is to say: 
we are not naturally born as a subject; we are constituted in discourses and are subjectified in 
power relations. The modern individual became a subject of power and knowledge, not 
repressed, but positively shaped and formed within power relations. The ultimate goal and 
effect of power is to normalise and eliminate all social and psychological irregularities, 
producing useful and docile subjects through a refashioning of minds and bodies. Self-
knowledge is a strategy and effect of power whereby one internalises social control. The 
individual as a result is interpreted as an effect of political technologies through which its 
very identity, desires, body, and soul are shaped and constituted. It is power that makes 
individuals subjects. The modern subject is thus a construct of subjection. The term ‘subject’, 
according to Foucault, has two meanings. The first is that it ‘is subject to someone else by 
control and dependence;’ the second is that it is ‘tied to his own identity by a conscience or 
self-knowledge’ (Foucault 1983, 212). The former apparently refers to what he means by a 
juridical-discursive conception of power, while the latter signifies his constitutive notion of 
power. Foucault argues that ‘both meanings suggest a form of power which subjugates and 
makes subject to’ (ibid., 212). The subject is thus subjected. It is in terms of subject that 
Foucault departs from the dominant Western modern thought, the Enlightenment tradition, 
which perceives the subject as the source of intentional meaning, self-reflexive, unified, and 
rational. To be a subject, for Foucault, is always to be subjected.  
Nevertheless, it will be misleading if one conceives Foucault’s constituent subject 
merely as an illusionary representation generated in discourses rather than a 
substantial/actual/material existence. It is crucial to note that for Foucault the reality of 
social phenomena resides in their exteriority, and that this is all there is. There is no essence, 
no ontology, of social world, and there is no other reality underneath the discourse. If one 
conceives the constituent subject as an illusionary representation, one in effect presumes that 
there is another ‘true’ self – an ontological existence of Self, thereby falling into the trap of 
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identifying between ontology and representation, and between true-representation and 
misrepresentation.   
To take Edward Said’s ‘Orientalism’ as an example to elucidate this point, Said 
conceives Orientalism as a discourse in the Foucauldian sense of term – as systems of 
discursive practices that constitute the objects of which they speak. Orientalism therefore 
discursively produces ‘Orient’ as ‘the Other,’ so as to help to define the West itself. ‘Orient’ 
in the West is therefore man-made – a European invention. However, Said argues that it is 
wrong to conceive the Orient in essence as an idea, or a creation with no corresponding 
reality’ (Said 1978, 5). He writes:      
One ought never to assume that the structure of Orientalism is nothing more than a 
structure of lies or of myths…Orientalism…is not an airy European fantasy about 
the Orient, but a created body of theory and practice in which, for many 
generations, there has been a considerable material investment. Continued 
investment made Orientalism, as a system of knowledge about the Orient, an 
accepted grid for filtering through the Orient into Western consciousness, just as 
that same investment multiplied – indeed, made truly productive – the statements 
proliferating out from Orientalism into the general culture. (Ibid., 6)        
Therefore, since Orientalism is ‘a cultural and a political fact,’ it then ‘does not exist in some 
archival vacuum’ (ibid., 13). In this respect, to Said, the subject – Orient – is an actual 
existence in the West, rather than a fantasy. And moreover, from a Foucauldian perspective, 
because all social realities reside in their appearances and this is all there is, the representation 
of ‘Orient’ should be the Orient. Orient is constituted in discourses, and there is no other 
Orient outsides this constitution in the West. 
Nevertheless, it would be mistaken to interweave the ‘Orient’ of Orientalism in the 
West and the ‘Orient’ of peoples or cultures whose location is in the East. David Howarth, 
for instance, questions Said’s treatment of the ontological status of Orient or Orientalist 
discourse. He contends that Said is unclear whether Orientalism is a discourse representing 
an ‘Orient’ that exists, or whether the discourse as a practice plays a constructive role of 
bringing the ‘Orient’, the object of which it speaks, into existence (Howarth 2000, 68-71). It 
is important to note that when referring to the ‘Orient’ Howarth actually indicates the Orient 
located in the East.  
This Orient, however, has never actually been the main concern of Said’s Orientalism. To 
Said, there are of course peoples and cultures located in the East, but, writes Said, his study 
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of Orientalism ‘has very little to contribute’ to it (1978, 5). The phenomenon of Orientalism 
he studies ‘deals principally, not with a correspondence between Orientalism and Orient, but 
with the internal consistency of Orientalsim and his ideas about the Orient despite or 
beyond any correspondence, or lack thereof, with a “real” Orient’ (ibid. 5). Said’s two fears 
are ‘distortion’ and ‘inaccuracy’ (ibid. 8). In this regards, Said is justified in claiming ‘Islam’ to 
be ‘fundamentally misrepresented in the West’ (ibid., 272), if he refers this false 
representation to those made within Orientalist discourse in the West. In the latter case, Said 
does not assume that there is an ontological existence of the Orient, but admits that in a 
limited sense there might be representations of the Orient by the people residing in Islamic 
world. The real issue is then, to Said, who can legitimately represent ‘the Orient’ (an ethical 
issue), other than whether or not there can be a true representation of it. From this 
perspective, Orientalism is in effect a discourse representing the ‘Orient’, and at the same 
time a practice playing a constructive role of bringing into existence of ‘Orient’ – the object 
of which it speaks – though it only exists in the West. It is not possible to provide a 
comprehensive discussion of this issue here; the important point is that the discursive 
objects constructed by the statements made about them, from a Foucauldian perspective are 
actually the real subject of social world. The constituent subject is not a fantasy but an actual 
entity, though it exists only in discourses.   
A theoretical difficulty derived from this conception of the subject is how is resistance 
possible and what is it for? As mentioned above, the social world, to Foucault, is constituted 
in a wide range of discourse and practices within a field of power-knowledge complexes; 
there is no pre-existing social world made up of objects with essences; the social world that 
gets constituted in discourses is the only one we have. Following this line of thought, the 
notion of subject is then comprehended as merely an empty container, a place filler, or a 
recipient of moral directives which issue from some other source of authority. In this 
scenario, there is nothing to be liberated from, and more importantly, power can just provide 
the contents of this empty container. Power is diffused throughout the social field, 
constituting the subjectivities of individuals, forming their knowledge, self-identification and 
pleasures, colonising the body itself, and utilizing its forces while inducing obedience and 
conformity. Following this illustration, every individual is caught within a complex grid of 
disciplinary, normalising, panoptic powers that survey, measure and correct their move. This 
depiction provides a concept of society with no space for progressive change, with no 
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possibility of meaningful individual freedom, and with no possibility of resistance. The 
notion of subject becomes arbitrarily constructed and manipulable docile bodies. This way of 
understanding human history is, indeed, enervating. The fatal consequence is that any kind 
of resistance seems impossible and ultimately pointless. Foucault’s thoughts then become 
nihilism, disregarding any form of resistance.  
Yet, the concept of resistance is ever-present in Foucault’s work and vital. For Foucault, 
where there is power, there is resistance. Resistance emerges where power is exercised.  
Where there is no possibility of resistance there can be no relations of power. Resistance is 
then in a position of interiority in relations of power (Foucault 1978, 95).   
In his discussion of ‘the perverse implantation’, Foucault explains how resistance and 
counter-discourses emerged. According to Foucault, the sexed body is to be understood not 
only as a primary target of the techniques of disciplinary power, but also as a point where 
these techniques are resisted and thwarted. The ‘perverse implantation’ of the nineteenth 
century – the massive proliferation of discourse on ‘deviant’ sexualities – served to advance 
social control in the area of ‘perversity’ and to legitimate a notion of ‘normal’ heterosexuality. 
However, this very multiplication of controlling discourses in effect also made possible the 
formation of a ‘reverse’ discourse.  Foucault states:  
Homosexuality began to speak in its own behalf, to demand that its legitimacy or 
‘naturality’ be acknowledged, often in the same vocabulary, using the same 
categories by which it was medically disqualified. (Ibid., 101) 
Indeed, those discourses on the species and subspecies of homosexuality, inversion, 
pederasty and psychic hermaphrodism were used by those considered ‘deviant’ to establish 
their own identity and to demand certain rights. Foucault thus contends that:  
Discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a 
stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy. 
Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and 
exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it. (ibid., 101)  
In short, to Foucault, resistance emerges in the rupture of the exercises of power. The 
exercise of power is not always coherent, all-embracing and overwhelming without any break, 
contradiction, or interval. Rather, one can always find incoherences, ruptures and 
contradictions where power is exercised, and it is in those incoherences, ruptures and 
contradictions occurring in the exercise of power that resistance finds a space.   
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Nevertheless, although Foucault convincingly indicates the possibility of resistance and 
the emergence of counter-discourse, in most of his historical studies, whether Madness and 
Civilization, Discipline and Punish or History of Sexuality, Foucault gives an impression that the 
subject presents no material resistance to the operations of power. And indeed, his works 
emphasise domination over resistance in a significantly unbalanced way. Some critics 
therefore contend that Foucault overrides his emphasis on the ways in which individuals are 
classified, excluded, objectified, individualized, disciplined and normalised. However, one 
should not regard Foucault’s unbalanced analysis as a fallacy. In fact, Foucault exaggerates 
the effects of power as a tool of convenience in order to caution us that everything is 
dangerous. Certainly, Foucault’s elaboration of dominatory power provides us with a very 
powerful explanation of social phenomena. As Foucault demonstrates, power operates and 
thus produces a situation of domination not only through physical violence, repression in the 
form of law, or ideological brainwashing, but also through more devious and discreet 
disciplinary and normalising strategies that constitute the bodies and minds of the subject. 
This explanation is very powerful. It actually provides us with a very useful tool to write a 
vivid critique of our historical era. It shows us that modern forms of knowledge, rationality, 
social institutions, and subjectivity that seem given and natural are in fact constructed in 
relations of power and domination. One should not regard oneself as being free when they 
remove the repression; one is in fact still in the trap of power. Whenever we think we obtain 
freedom, we are in fact in another form of domination.  
Since subjects are produced within power relations, the core task of the social 
movements in contemporary society is therefore to challenge all forms of subjectification. 
Resistance accordingly refers to the challenge of subjectification, or what Foucault calls 
desubjectification or desubjugation. It signifies a renunciation of the Self – to get rid of the 
subject itself, the constitutive subject. Foucault therefore claims that the subject must be 
‘stripped of its creative role and analysed as a complex and variable function of discourse’ 
(Foucault 1977a, 138). He calls for the deconstruction of the subject, and sees this as a key 
political tactic. Foucault urges us to dispense with the subject. He writes, 
One has to dispense with the constituent subject, to get rid of the subject itself, 
that’s to say, to arrive at an analysis which can account for the constitution of the 
subject within a historical framework. (1980b, 117) 
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In other words, we should always ask how we become who and what we are with this 
present form. Hence, ‘the target nowadays,’ writes Foucault, ‘is not to discover what we are, 
but to refuse what we are’ (1983, 216).   
While Foucault emphasises that ‘human beings are made subject’, his goal is then to 
create a history of the different modes that human beings are made subject by and to expose 
the beginning and development of current subjectifying discourses and practices. In ‘Subject 
and Power’, Foucault argues that there are three modes of objectification which transform 
human beings into subjects. The first mode gives itself the status of science; the second 
mode is called ‘dividing practices’ (the mad/the sane, the sick/the healthy, the criminals/the 
‘good boys’); the third one is the way that a human being turns him/herself into a subject. 
Foucault here systematically categorises his whole body of works into these three modes. The 
Order of Things and The Archaeology of Knowledge are the study of the first mode; his studies on 
clinic and prison are in the second mode; and finally his studies on sexuality belong to the 
third one (ibid., 208-9). Foucault’s works should be read as challenges to people’s 
understanding of who they are in ways that lead them to resist their attachment to their 
social identities. This is the political task of genealogy. In this regard, Foucault studies 
actually form part of a strategy of resistance, exposing the beginnings and developments of 
the discourses and practices through which human beings are subjectified. This de-
subjectification task, in short, is demonstrated by a single concept – genealogy, as already 
discussed in the Introduction.   
 
2-5. Conclusion 
In terms of discourse, I began with the thought that I should define the discourse of 
Taiwanese national identity by its underlying reasoning. But since the discourse itself is 
highly divergent, fragmented and heterogeneous in nature and is diffused and dispersed in 
the domain of society through the various and diverse social practices, the task is in fact 
inappropriate and impractical. Alternatively, it is more appropriate and practical to delimit 
the discourse, including not only discursive but also non-discursive practices (social 
practices), regarding Taiwanese-ness or Taiwanese national identity. The social practices 
selected in this thesis are the production of knowledge, the publication of a book, the 
commemoration of historical event, and the political demonstration. The discourse of 
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Taiwanese national identity thus should not be perceived as a composition of a set of 
utterances or statements that have a line of reasoning, but a domain of dispersion in which 
discursive practices and social practices intersect, intertwine and interact. It is the domain 
not only where the discourse is formed by various social practices but also where the 
discourse is disseminated throughout the whole society in Taiwan and where the 
dissemination further reproduces the discourse of Taiwanese national identity itself.  
In terms of power, I began by thinking that power is in the possession of the 
politicians, and the construction of Taiwanese national identity is a consequence of the 
politician’s manipulation of power over the ordinary people in Taiwan for the sake of their 
own benefits. Yet, this understanding of power is too simplistic and too superficial. The 
notion of power as Foucault demonstrates is much more complex. Power is not exercised 
only through the hands of political elites but also through more devious and invisible forms 
of forces that normalise our behaviours and thoughts, and constitute our bodies, desires, 
pleasures and identities. Thus, my inquiries will move less toward the power which is 
possessed by the political elites than toward other forms of disciplinary and normalising 
forms of power. Yet, this does not mean that the politicians play no part in the formation of 
Taiwanese national identity, but it means that politicians’ manipulation is only one of the 
ingredients among many others that help constitute the people’s national identity in Taiwan. 
In terms of genealogy, my initial thought was that the formation of Taiwanese national 
identity was the result of an evolutionary Taiwanese history with a traceable origin. Yet, this 
way of understanding history is problematic since it is interpretative in essence and it only 
legitimises the current world without questioning it. Many events or ingredients in history 
that do not fit into a specific interpretation are therefore filtered out and neglected. Thus, 
this thesis instead provides a genealogical account of ‘Taiwanese’ as a national identity. It 
refuses to view such an identity formation as a linear development of history that has 
traceable origins; it rejects the possibility that the idea of being Taiwanese has a deep 
meaning, fixed essence or that it reflects primordial truth and instead locates its meaning in 
surface practices. In contrast, the thesis attempts to discover the constitution of the meaning 
of ‘Taiwanese’ from its surface practices; it tries to seek the emergence of ‘Taiwanese’ from 
numberless points.   
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In short, this thesis aims to dismantle ‘Taiwanese’, which is seen as an unproblematic 
truth in Taiwan. In this regard, the thesis does not ask the question ‘who am I’ (which 
implies the search for essence), nor does it question ‘where do I come from’ (which implies 
the search for origins); rather, it asks ‘how did I come to be in this present form’. This is a 
genealogical interrogation.     
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CHAPTER 3 
Essay on Knowledge Productions & 
Subjectivity Formation 
Historical and Political Knowledge in the Discursive Constitution of 
Taiwanese National Identity 
 
 
3.1. Introduction  
The formation of Taiwanese national identity in the 1990s is commonly regarded as a 
creation of the subjectivity of Taiwan. This way of understanding the nature of Taiwanese 
identity derives from three prevailing strands of arguments in the current scholarly literature. 
Firstly, the formation of Taiwanese identity is narrated as resistance against Japanese 
colonisation and the KMT’s re-colonisation of Taiwan. Secondly, it is interpreted as a 
consequence of democratisation in Taiwan in the 1990s. Thirdly, it is comprehended as a 
revolt against Communist China’s military intimidation and its authoritarianism. The 
formation of Taiwanese identity in the end is gauged as an emancipation of the subject or a 
creation of the subjectivity of Taiwan/Taiwanese. Nevertheless, the notion of ‘subject’ 
elaborated by Foucault, as shown in Chapter Two, not only refers to subjectivity and 
subject-matter; but more importantly, it also signifies a state of subjection. That is to say, the 
production of knowledges plays a constitutive role in the process of subjectivity constitution 
or the formation of subject. Knowledges are practices that systematically form the 
objects/subjects of which they speak. The subjectivity/subject is then subject to the domain 
of knowledges.  
Drawing upon Foucault’s work, this chapter aims to investigate the close relationships 
between the knowledge and constitution of Taiwanese identity. To this end, this chapter 
scrutinises two forms of knowledge: historical strategy and political strategy.63 With respect 
                                                
63 The term strategy is employed here because this chapter presumes that no legitimate and objective 
approach, as such, could ever exist to produce a ‘correct’, ‘complete’ and ‘neutral’ analysis of  the 
nature of  the Taiwanese identity (even though many approaches claim to do so).  Each approach not 
only gives an explanation or depiction of  Taiwanese identity, but, more importantly, they also engage 
in the process of  the (trans)formation/destruction of  it.  Each approach hence demonstrates one 
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to historical strategy, it addresses the historical dimension of the formation/transformation 
of Taiwanese identity. This strategy attempts to yield the history of Taiwan, aiming at 
delineating the process and elucidating the origins of the formation of Taiwanese identity. 
This kind of history is devoted to producing a correct, continuous and complete history of Taiwan. 
This includes the history of the early settlers in Taiwan, colonial experiences under the 
Japanese administration (1895-1945), and the KMT’s autocratic rule in Taiwan in the post-
war period (1945-1987). In contrast to the historical strategy, the political strategy stresses 
the political dimension of the formation of Taiwanese identity. It expounds the reasons why 
people in Taiwan have formed a shared identity as being Taiwanese in the process of 
democratisation. This strategy emphasises political institutions, ideology, way of life, and 
shared values by focusing on Taiwan’s political reforms – its democratisation at the end of 
the twentieth century – as well as the PRC’s attempts to intimidate Taiwan politically and 
militarily.    
The significant role intellectuals – the producers of knowledge – played in the 
construction of Taiwanese national identity has long been investigated in scholarly literature 
on Taiwanese nationalism. For instance, Gunter Schubert (1999) argues that there are three 
intellectual discourses in Taiwan attempting to construct the meaning of ‘being Taiwanese’.64 
Another work concerning the role of intellectuals in the formation of Taiwanese national 
identity is provided by Daniel Lynch (2004), in which the author discusses intellectuals’ 
efforts to construct a Taiwan nation. He argues that the most fundamental mission for the 
Taiwanese nationalist intellectuals is to cultivate a sense of ‘Taiwanese subjectivity’. Two 
approaches are required: firstly, rewriting history from a Taiwanese perspective; and secondly, 
recasting Taiwanese culture.65 Juxtaposed with the aforementioned two studies, a more 
                                                                                                                                            
analytical strategy (among many others) to explore the whole picture of  the formation of  Taiwanese 
identity with the certain aims of  legitimating/de-legitimating or constructing/deconstructing it. 
64 The first one is what Schubert terms ‘Taiwanese ethno-cultural nationalism’, which describes 
Taiwan as a historically and culturally distinct community, sometimes even suggests the existence of  a 
specific Taiwanese ethnicity or race. The second one, ‘multi-ethnic nationalism’, promotes the idea of  
a nation that is composed of  ‘four great ethnic groups’ with equal rights and status, in attempts to 
overcome the old provincial conflict and making ethnic harmony. The third one, political or state 
nationalism, tries to transcend ethnicity and argues for a Taiwanese nation based on constitutionalism 
and the liberal state.   
65 As for the first approach, Lynch argues that independence-minded historians attempted to rewrite 
Taiwanese history and then used this newly formulated history to socialize children into the concept 
of a Taiwanese nation. As for the second approach, Lynch elucidates the efforts made by intellectuals 
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comprehensive and important work of this sort is provided by Hsiau, A-Chin.   
In Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism (2000), which is rewritten from his Ph.D. 
dissertation, Hsiau attempts to offer a comprehensive study of the intellectuals’ efforts to 
construct a Taiwanese (national) identity. According to Hsiao, the role being played by the 
humanist intellectuals, including ‘writers, literary critics, linguists, activities of language 
revival movements, and amateur and professional historians’, has been indispensable in 
thinking about the creation of Taiwanese identity (2000, 2). Hsiao respectively discusses 
three important realms of intellectual activities, namely, literature, linguistics and history, in 
an attempt to understand how the ideology of Taiwan’s cultural peculiarity has been 
developed. Hsiau argues that those intellectual endeavours helped to substantiate a uniqueness 
of Taiwanese culture set against Chinese culture, and subsequently form a ‘Taiwan nation’ in 
opposition to a ‘China nation’. This cultural uniqueness is manifested in the production of 
collective symbols and the representation of historical memory and cultural tradition, i.e. 
Taiwan’s tragic history.66 Moreover, it is noted that, for Hsiao, the uniqueness of Taiwanese 
culture and history involves not only non-deliberate construction but also ‘deliberate’ 
invention. Cultural nationalism thus is ‘basically a politically induced phenomenon’ (ibid., 20). 
This is the reason why Hsiao uses the term ‘ideology’ to describe the nature of the discourse 
of Taiwanese cultural nationalism, since the term ‘ideology’ implies ‘not simply as the reflection 
of social and historical reality, but as a means for contesting the representation and 
interpretation of that reality’ (ibid., 20). And since it is ideological, Hsiao concludes that 
Taiwanese national identity is a ‘false identity’ (ibid., 184-7). 
Hsiao’s book provides a systematic analysis of the role of humanist intellectuals in 
nation-building in Taiwan. He rightly depicts the significance of cultural elites’ efforts in the 
construction of Taiwanese national identity, and convincingly demonstrates that a specific 
Taiwanese national consciousness is formed through the creation of a literary tradition, a 
major local language revival, and forging a new sense of the past. 
                                                                                                                                            
to ‘recast’ or ‘renovate’ Taiwanese culture. For those Taiwanese nationalists, according to Lynch, 
nations are all ‘constructed entities’ (Lynch 2004, 533). There is a need to put more effort towards 
cultivating a distinctive Taiwanese identity among the broader public.   
66 Hsiau contends that the articulation of a distinct Taiwanese historical experience – being colonized 
by and struggling against different alien regimes – constitutes an important part of Taiwanese 
nationalist discourse. Taiwanese history or Taiwanese culture is therefore tragic in nature.   
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This chapter will push Hsiao’s studies further, in particular, by demonstrating 
knowledges with various analytical strategies, mutually intersecting, interacting and 
competing with each other. The chapter argues that without those knowledges no Taiwanese 
identity, as such, would exist. There was no such thing as ‘Taiwanese-ness’ in the first place. 
‘Taiwanese-ness’ is subject to different historical narrations and political discourses; and each 
narration and discourse has input in making it possible to talk about ‘Taiwanese-ness’ and 
attach a specific substance to it. In other words, many narrations and discourses all 
contribute to the idea that there is such a thing as ‘Taiwanese-ness’, and help substantialise 
the qualities, features and characteristics attached to it. ‘Taiwanese-ness’ becomes a 
discursive realm in which different historical narratives and political rhetoric interact, 
intersect and compete.   
Finally, this chapter does not intend to encompass the entire scholarly 
literature/knowledges concerning the formation of Taiwanese identity. For instance, 
discussion of cultural dimensions of Taiwanese identity is completely omitted from this 
chapter. It is not within the remit of this chapter to tackle that body of knowledge. This 
chapter examines, respectively, historical and political knowledge. The conclusion briefly 
indicates how the discussion in this chapter could help us to rethink, revisit and reorient 
current studies on Taiwanese identity.  
 
3-2. Historical Strategy  
3-2-1. Japanese Colonisation and the KMT’s Authoritarian Rule in the 
Narratives of Taiwanese Identity Formation  
One of the important works concerning identity formation of the early Han-Chinese 
settlers in Taiwan is Chen Qi-Nan’s article, ‘Becoming Native and Becoming Inland: On the 
Development of the Society of the Taiwan Han Folks’ (1984). In the article, Chen contends 
that social attachment to regional community in Taiwan developed among the early settlers. 
Citing evidence of changing patterns of inter-group rivalries or conflicts, Chen demonstrates 
that after settling in Taiwan for more than a century, people gradually developed a shared 
territorial identity rooted in Taiwan. The population in Taiwan was gradually less divided by 
their differences in ancestral lineage linked to different hometowns in the Mainland than by 
their pragmatic interests around their territorial and local bases. In other words, the settlers 
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began to identify with their settlements in Taiwan and make their settlement their new 
homeland. Similar to Chen’s argument, Shih Ming (1979) and Wu Rwei-Ren (2001, 2004) 
both suggest that ‘Taiwanese consciousness’ can first be traced to early Han settlement in 
Taiwan. They, however, additionally stress the momentousness of Japanese colonisation in 
Taiwan (1895-1945).    
Shih Ming, a staunch opponent of the KMT regime since the early 1940s, in his massive 
book, Taiwan’s Four Hundred Years History, provides a Marxist anti-colonial nationalist account 
of Taiwan’s subjugation and resistance to successive ‘foreign’ regimes. Shih locates national 
awakening among the Taiwanese as early as the native revolt against the Dutch in 1652. 
According to Shih, Taiwanese national consciousness is a product of the peculiar historical 
development of Taiwan. For more than four hundred years, the people of Taiwan have been 
governed by external and invading forces including the Portuguese, the Spaniards, the Dutch, 
the Qing Empire, the Japanese, and the KMT. Political and cultural resistance from the local 
people to these forces throughout these periods formed a distinctive island culture that differs 
very much from the continental culture of mainland China, evoking a distinctive Taiwanese 
identity. It should be emphasised that Shih gives very positive and constructive accounts of 
the Japanese colonisation of Taiwan. The relationship between China and Taiwan prior to 
Japanese colonisation, conceived by Shih, is a relationship between oppressor and the 
oppressed. The rule by the Qing Dynasty is ‘feudalistic’ and ‘colonial’ in nature. It was 
Japanese colonisation that led Taiwan to secede from the rule of a feudalistic Chinese society. 
This capitalist development under Japanese colonisation completely disengaged Taiwan from 
a ‘pre-modern’, ‘semi-feudalistic’ and ‘stagnant’ Chinese society, expanding rapidly the gap 
between the two societies. The shift from Qing to Japanese rule was accompanied by a 
transformation of Taiwan from a ‘feudal colonial society’ to a ‘modern colonial society’.  
Japanese colonialism on this account is described as a kind of ‘necessary evil’ in terms of 
socioeconomic development. To Shih, Japan was imperialist but also capitalist: coloniser but 
also modernizer. Thus, the rapid pace of capitalist development under Japanese rule, from 
Shih’s point of view, played a decisive role in the formation of a distinct Taiwanese 
consciousness. The KMT’s subsequent brutal rule over Taiwan just further reinforced 
people’s alienation from China.  
Likewise, a contemporary political theorist, Wu Rwei-Ren, provides another series of 
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important works on the origins of Taiwanese identity with the emphasis on Japanese 
colonisation. In his article, ‘Fragment of/f Empires: The Peripheral Formation of Taiwanese 
Nationalism’ (2004), Wu argues that modern Taiwanese nationalism is a case of peripheral 
nationalism that ‘emerged, submerged, and re-emerged’ in successive yet unfinished state-
making and nation-building projects by various imperial centres – the Qing Empire, the 
Japanese Empire and the American Empire (post-WWII era) (2004, 16). According to Wu, 
for a long period under Qing rule, Taiwan was divided by sub-ethnic animosity among Han 
settlers from different ancestral places. Yet, toward the 1860s, signs of integration as a 
distinct Taiwanese people began to manifest themselves. The local literati with Confucian 
education in Taiwan were among the first to articulate the earliest idea of an island-wide 
Taiwanese identity. After taking over Taiwan in 1895, the Japanese Empire attempted to 
incorporate Taiwan, albeit hierarchically and unequally, into the Japanese national body by its 
tremendous efforts to assimilate the Taiwanese – the colonial subjects.  The consequences of 
Japan’s colonisation in Taiwan are threefold. Firstly, it politicised the regional space of 
Taiwan, thereby creating the territorial basis for the rise of Taiwanese consciousness. 
Secondly, it forced Taiwanese nationalists to adopt a modernist strategy – mainly the notion 
of self-determination – to construct their own identity. Thirdly, after the aggressive 
assimilation project of the Japanese government – kominka (Japanisation)67 – signs of partial 
success of Japanisation appeared, constraining the rise of Taiwanese nationalism. Taiwan 
became a second Okinawa, assimilated, though with shreds of residual identity. In addition, 
Wu emphasises that Taiwan was ceded to Japan before China’s transformation from empire 
to nation, so that the subsequent rise of Chinese nationalism after the Sino-Japan War in 
1894 did not imagine Taiwan as part of a Chinese nation, and Taiwanese nationalism that 
surged during the Japanese colonial period only referred to the residents of the island. Hence, 
Taiwanese and Chinese nationalism are ‘parallel to – yet separate and different from – each 
other’ (ibid. 17).  After the defeat of Japan in WWII, Taiwan was again transferred by the 
victors to the KMT regime. The KMT aimed to ‘colonise’ Taiwan by weakening the 
Japanese influences in Taiwan. Yet, it is noted that the KMT was a coloniser without a 
metropole after it retreated from the mainland China in 1949. The émigré KMT regime was 
                                                
67 The Kominka Movement aimed to assimilate the people in Taiwan into ‘Japanese’ culturally. There 
are many different English translations of  this term. While Wu translates this term as ‘Japanisation’, 
others like Leo Ching (2001) translate it as ‘imperialisation’.  
   92
 
‘nothing but a flickering candle’ (ibid. 18). It was the American Empire of the Cold War that 
created a geopolitical space for the KMT regime’s existence. Wu terms this situation as ‘dual 
colonial structure’. Taiwanese nationalism has thus been severely influenced by changing 
American national interests, both enabling and constraining its development. And this 
dialectic of dual colonialism eventually gave rise to the growth of a ‘liberal Taiwanese 
nationalism’ while constraining its further development into a formal declaration of the 
independence of Taiwan.  
Apart from the aforementioned narrative, Wu in another article (2001) addresses more 
specifically the impact of Japanese colonisation on the surge of Taiwanese nationalism. 
According to Wu, Taiwanese identity was formed in a series of confrontations with Japanese 
colonialism. A Taiwanese discourse of political nationalism was gradually formed in this 
situation, in which the people of Taiwan were abandoned by China, but were unable to be 
Japanese since the Japanese governor in Taiwan refused to grant the same citizenship to the 
Taiwanese as to the Japanese citizens. The people in Taiwan became Japanese politically, but 
not Japanese in terms of culture and ethnicity, and were Chinese in terms of culture and 
ethnicity though not Chinese politically. Under this identity dilemma, Taiwanese political 
elites resorted to striving for an autonomous status under the Japanese Empire. This 
autonomous status, according to Wu, implied the rights to self-determination of the 
Taiwanese people. Moreover, despite the fact that political movements campaigning for 
autonomous status demanded it on legal and economic grounds, they were in fact cultural 
nationalist movements, since incentives to seek autonomous status are cultural concerns: 
those proponents regarded themselves, and indeed were treated by the Japanese, as a different 
people in opposition to the Japanese. As it happened, those proponents asserted that Taiwan 
possessed a peculiar cultural system and particular sentiments and customs that were 
different from the Japanese, arguing that the particularity of Taiwanese culture needed to be 
preserved. To Wu, Taiwanese national consciousness originated from this series of political 
and cultural movements. And the new wave of Taiwanese nationalism in the 1990s, which 
imagined Taiwan as a weak nation possessing a right to self-determination and to future 
sovereign rights, directly derived from this strand of Taiwanese nationalism.   
To Shih and Wu, Taiwanese identity can be traced back to the early Han-Chinese 
settlement in Taiwan, though they both draw particular attention to the prominence of 
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Japanese colonisation.  
Unlike Shih and Wu, Taiwanese sociologist Chang Mau-Kuei (2003) insists that a 
Taiwanese identity did not appear until 1895. Chang suggests that the origin of Taiwanese 
nationalistic ideas can be traced back to the 1920s when Taiwan was the colony of the 
Japanese Empire. However, it did not evolve into a full-fledged nationalistic movement 
overnight. The maturation of Taiwanese identity did not take place until the late 1980s. 
Chang’s article aims to present the zigzag course of the development of Taiwanese identity. 
He identifies four stages of the successive process of identity formation: the early Han-Chinese 
settlement, Japanese colonisation, the KMT’s authoritarian rule, and democratisation in the 
1990s.   
Regarding the first stage (Chang 2003, 26-8), and in contrast to Shih who claims that the 
concept of ‘being Taiwanese’ can be traced back around ‘four-hundred-years’, Chang 
suggests that the collective imagination of ‘being Taiwanese’ cannot be found until 1895. 
The first settlers and their descendents before 1895 all looked to China as their place of 
origin, political centre, and source of cultural practices and ancestral lineage. Thus, the early 
settlers as a whole could not perceive themselves as one larger group called ‘Taiwanese’, 
which is substantially different from the Han-Chinese. According to Chang, it was not until 
the 1920s that the people in Taiwan formed a collective identity.  
In 1895, Taiwan was ceded to Japan in the Treaty of Shimonoseki after China was defeated 
by Japan. The Han settlers had responded to the Japanese troops with bloody resistance in 
the first two years, although the resistance, Chang argues, was not guided by modern 
national consciousness, but by traditional-Han-folk-consciousness. Also, in Taiwan at the 
early stage of colonisation, Han Chinese was regarded as a different race from Japanese by 
the Japanese colonial government. The decade from 1918 to 1928 is, however, crucial in the 
course of Taiwanese identity formation. Inspired by the Wilsonian principle of self-
determination as well as the realisation of the fact that there was no other choice but to 
accept the status of having Japanese nationality with Chinese origin, some of the Taiwanese 
cultural elite, such as Chiang Wei-Shui [Jiang Wei-Shui] and members of the ‘Taiwan 
Cultural Association’, organised a political campaign to strive for autonomous status under 
the Japanese Empire. One of the most noted movements was the petition movement for 
establishing a Taiwanese Parliament (also known as ‘The Movement for the Establishment 
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of a Taiwanese Parliament’ 1921-1935). Chang argues that it is at this point that ‘Taiwanese 
identity’ formed. Chang writes:   
[It] should be clear that both the origins of the idea of Taiwanese nationalism and 
the ways of turning that idea into substantive reality were conceived during this 
period. (ibid., 31)  
Since then, people defined the Taiwanese people as a collectivity, a distinct nation ruled by 
the Japanese colonial government. ‘Taiwan’ as a signifier for the place and the people as a 
whole had been widely adopted. Yet, Chang argues, although Taiwanese identity was formed 
during this period, this call for distinctiveness was ‘definitely not relevant to the calling for an 
unequivocal separation from China and the Chinese’ (ibid., 32). This series of campaigns for 
autonomous political status, however, fell apart soon after the Kominka Movement was 
enacted in 1935 (ibid., 34-42). The success of the movement manifested itself in the 
phenomenon that some Taiwanese were eager to join the Imperial Forces, risking their lives 
for the Japanese emperor. The mentality of the Taiwanese people had changed. All forms of 
resistance were almost completely silenced after 1935. As a result, when the war ceased and 
Taiwan was returned to its ‘ancestral country’ – mainland China – in 1945, the Taiwanese 
and the Chinese became different peoples. Taiwan and China went on their respective paths of 
change in two different political fields with different identities.  
The subsequent authoritarian rule by the KMT, according to Chang, further 
transformed features of Taiwanese identity (ibid., 42-50). After WWII, Taiwan’s return to the 
ROC, the painful and lingering memories of the 2-28 Incident in 1947, the overwhelming 
pressure to assimilate, and the opposition movement against authoritarianism since the 
1970s, helped to crystallise the meaning of authentic Taiwanese, as opposed to ‘the Chinese’. 
The 2-28 Incident in particular marked a watershed for Taiwanese nationalism. Following 
the incident, the call for self-determination and a categorical Taiwanese identity as opposed 
to a Chinese one, was clearly conceived. Moreover, after it retreated to Taiwan in 1949, the 
KMT regime was determined to maintain its claim to be the sole legitimate ruler of all China, 
which had been ‘stolen’ by the communists. They desperately needed patriotism and loyalty 
from both the native Taiwanese and the Mainlanders for their mission to retake the Chinese 
Mainland. The fundamental goal of nationalistic teaching in Taiwan was to instil Chinese 
loyalty into the whole population, despite their origins, to undertake this anti-communist 
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mission of reunification.68 Official Mandarin traditions were upheld as the high culture in 
Taiwan. Taiwanese dialects (of all sorts), traditional customs, folk religious practices, opera 
and music were soon defined as ‘local’, ‘backward’, and ‘superstitious’. Thus, ironically, as 
Chang describes, for many Taiwanese the process of de-colonisation was in fact the course 
of re-colonisation. The dominant Japanese high culture was simply replaced by hegemonic 
Chinese codes. The people in Taiwan after the War entered into another kind of humiliating 
situation through its reunification with the motherland. The KMT regime was considered by 
many Taiwanese to be just another colonial regime, albeit much more backward, poorer, and 
worse than the Japanese. The notion of a categorical Taiwanese identity in opposition to the 
Chinese was planted in the minds of many Taiwanese during the post-war period, even 
though they could not speak out under the authoritarianism until the 1980s.   
According to Chang, Taiwanese identity transformed its meaning again in the 
democratisation of the 1990s (ibid., 50-4). Due to the considerable success of indigenisation 
and democratisation, people in Taiwan tended to support the institutional arrangement of 
the ROC, though the ROC institution was limited within the boundary of Taiwan Island 
(not a sole legitimate government of China). Most people in Taiwan did not think that there 
was a need to declare independence since the ROC institution as a whole had already been 
indigenised; and moreover, they did not want to give up Taiwan’s economic prosperity or to 
endanger themselves as a price for the independence of Taiwan. The democratic political 
institution of the ROC seems to be the preferred overarching consensus among Taiwanese 
with different opinions about their preference for either unification or independence. 
Taiwanese identity for Chang is thus ‘pragmatic’, ‘moderate’ and ‘democratic’ in nature.  
To summarise Chang’s argument, the collective imagination of ‘being Taiwanese’ did 
not exist before 1895; it emerged for the first time during the Japanese colonial period, 
though it was not relevant to the calling for an unequivocal separation from the Chinese; the 
notion of a distinctive Taiwanese identity as opposed to the Chinese one was formed in the 
                                                
68 Likewise, Christopher Hughes (2000) argues that the KMT’s attempts to cultivate loyalty among 
the population consisted of propagating ‘symbols and institutions’, aiming to make individuals 
identify themselves as Chinese. For instance, ‘the calendar…began counting from 1912, the year of 
the establishment of the ROC’; ‘maps of the national territory included the whole of the Chinese 
mainland’; streets in most cities in Taiwan ‘were renamed after mainland places’; children in school 
had to memorise the names of all the railways stations in mainland China as they had existed before 
the KMT regime retreated to Taiwan in 1949 (2000, 67).          
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minds of many Taiwanese during the KMT’s authoritarian period; and Taiwanese identity 
transformed its meaning again during democratisation in the 1990s as a civic identity under 
the ROC institutional arrangement.  
It is worthwhile at this stage to briefly compare and contrast the aforementioned three 
scholars’ works. Shih and Wu both trace the origins of Taiwanese identity back to an early 
period of Han-Chinese immigration, whereas Chang opposes this view. Nevertheless, they 
all indicate the significant role of Japanese colonisation in the formation of Taiwanese 
identity. The ambivalent identity that the residents of Taiwan possessed – the Taiwanese 
‘were’ Japanese, yet Taiwanese culture was opposed to Japanese culture – helped to form 
Taiwanese national identity.  
Indeed, most studies on Taiwanese identity agree on the profound influences of 
Japanese rule in Taiwan in stimulating the surge of Taiwanese consciousness, whether this 
consciousness exists in opposition to the Japanese nation, to the Chinese nation, to neither 
of them, or to both of them. In fact, any attempts to re/narrate or to re/interpret the history 
of the Japanese colonial period are all highly contestable in contemporary Taiwan. While 
some argue that the people in Taiwan had formed a unique Taiwanese consciousness in 
opposition to a Chinese one due to Taiwan’s colonial experience and the distinct 
socioeconomic development under Japanese colonisation, others hold that there might be a 
so-called Taiwanese identity which emerged during Japanese colonisation, but it is subsumed 
under the wider identification of an all-inclusive Han Chinese ethno-national consciousness. 
The latter further argue that any post-war Taiwanese independence movement or identity 
formation in the 1980s in fact has its own origins, such as corruption and the autocratic rule 
of the KMT regime. The most representative scholar who advocates this line of argument is 
the historian Wang Xiao-Bo, a Taiwanese pro-unification intellectual.  
In his Taiwanese History and Taiwanese (1988), Wang suggests that the notion of ‘Chinese’ 
or ‘Chinese consciousness’ during that period existed among the Taiwanese elites. 
Identification with Chinese nationalism was an essential impetus for Taiwanese appeals for 
colonial liberation. Wang argues that although there were various groups of immigrants from 
mainland China, they all shared a consciousness of Han-Chinese. To support his argument, 
Wang provides a historical account of ‘The Movement for the Establishment of a Taiwanese 
Parliament’, in which Taiwanese intellectuals repeatedly submitted petitions to the Imperial 
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Diet (Japanese Parliament) between 1921 and 1935, asking for the establishment of a 
parliament on the island. The political movement was widely interpreted (e.g. Chang Mau-
Kuei 2003) as an origin of the Taiwanese national movement. By describing the works and 
attitudes of the strongest proponents of this movement, Wang shows that they all had a 
strong affinity towards the classical tradition of China (e.g. their refusal to wear Japanese 
clothes) and an allegiance and indebtedness to mainland China (e.g. their associations with 
Chinese nationalist thinkers) (Wang 1988, 11-67). Wang does not deny the existence of 
something called ‘Taiwanese consciousness’. But he claims that Taiwanese consciousness is 
directly related to the universal generality of Chinese ethno-national consciousness because 
of the specific status of colonial Taiwan. To Wang, throughout the Japanese colonial period, 
‘Chinese-ness’ as a cultural, ethnic and political imaginary, loomed greatly in the political 
rhetoric of Taiwanese intellectuals.  
Although Wang’s interpretation of the Taiwanese political resistance during the 
Japanese colonial period differs from Shih, Wu and Chang, all of them explicitly indicate that 
the KMT’s autocratic and ruthless rule after WWII – illustrated by the 2-28 Incident in 1947 
and the White Terror in the 1950s and 1960s – inevitably led the Taiwanese to deeply 
question their Chinese-ness.  
Following Wang’s argument, some intellectuals stress that it was not Japanese 
colonisation, but the KMT’s authoritarian rule in the post-WWII era that led to the 
formation of Taiwanese identity. Dai Guo-Hui (1994), for instance, traces the rise of 
Taiwanese identity back to the ten years between 1945 (when Taiwan returned to Nationalist 
China) and the first half of the 1950s (when the White Terror struck out against the 
intellectual elites). Dai emphasises that there would never have been a conflict between 
Taiwanese and Chinese identity if the KMT regime had a good government after the 
retrocession of Taiwan to KMT rule. According to Dai, there was at the outset no doubt 
among the residents of Taiwan that China was their motherland. But when it became clear 
that the new leadership started to rule in the same way as the Japanese, or even worse, the 
people became disappointed and alienated from the KMT regime. More recently, Chu Yun-
Han and Lin Jih-Wen (2001), by analysing the similarities and differences between Japanese 
rule and the KMT’s rule over Taiwan, also suggest that Taiwan under Japanese colonial rule 
showed ‘no tangible social support for a political struggle for national sovereignty and 
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Taiwan had not yet emerged as a self-contained political community with a distinctive 
political identity’ (Chu et al. 2001, 103). According to Chu and Lin, a vibrant Taiwanese 
nationalist movement with growing and broad-based social support surfaced with the demise 
of KMT authoritarian rule in the 1970s. More importantly, with the indigenisation of the 
KMT power structure, the island was eventually ‘converted from a cultural agent of Chinese 
nationalism into an incubator of a “re-imaged community” based on a new Taiwanese 
identity’ (ibid., 103). As these two authors show, the two cycles of regime evolution – the 
Japanese and the KMT – despite their comparability, produced substantially different 
outcomes in terms of the development of political society and the construction of collective 
identity.    
To sum up at this point, most scholars agree in general, despite their various emphases 
and priorities, that the convergence of Japanese colonisation and KMT’s autocratic rule 
made the imagination of Taiwan as a nation possible. And the new wave of Taiwanese 
nationalism in the 1990s came as a result of this lineage of Taiwan’s modern historical 
development.    
3-2-2. Comments on the Historical Approach   
The past, or the memory of the past is one, if not most, of the key grammars of identity 
formation. The merit of the historical approach is that it provides a ‘meaningful’ historical 
description of political, economic and social developments in the formation of Taiwanese 
identity. Yet, the weakness of the approach is that its understanding of causality between the 
past (causes) and the present (effects) is overly simplistic.    
The historical approach implicitly suggests, as shown above, that Japanese colonisation 
and the KMT’s authoritarian rule are causes that directly and spontaneously led to the 
solidification of current Taiwanese consciousness as an outcome. The formation of 
Taiwanese identity is therefore the consequence of historical development. In addition, it 
also suggests the history of Taiwan was a continuous and linear development from Japanese 
colonisation to KMT’s re-colonisation, and afterwards to de-colonisation or post-
colonisation in the 1990s. Taiwanese identity eventually emerged naturally from this historical 
development. Nevertheless, if Taiwanese identity in its present form as a national identity, as 
opposed to its past forms in either Japanese colonial times or in the KMT’s authoritarian 
period, was formed or moulded in the 1990s, we then should be more attentive to the politics 
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of narrations, representations and interpretations of the past in the 1990s.    
It is crucial to note that the past cannot speak by itself; rather, we speak for it. The past 
in fact can always be narrated in various ways since historians select a small number of 
historical events relatively (from numerous events), and subsequently give their own account 
of interpretations/meanings to the historical events by virtue of ‘a’ specific historical 
contextualisation. A different contextualisation would lead to a different selection of events 
and dissimilar, or sometimes conflicting, interpretations of those historical events. As a result, 
there are always different, and sometimes conflicting, narrations and interpretations of the 
past.69 Indeed, we always arrange our histories to make the present a fulfilment of past 
necessity and a promise toward a particular future. Also, it should be stressed that the gaps 
between what actually happened and what is said to have happened are always involved the 
intervention of power and interest. The relationships between Japanese colonisation (or the 
KMT’s authoritarian rule) and the solidification of Taiwanese identity in this regard should 
not be thought of as direct, spontaneous and continuous, because this kind of understanding 
conceals the intervention of power and interest. Furthermore, while most historians’ works 
are merely forms of narrative, they in practice demonstrate their account of the past as actual 
contents of the past to their audience/reader, and then go on to problematically treat such a 
narrative as an essence shared by both the historical representation and the set of events in 
the past. While historians’ works are deemed as ‘true accounts’ (not narratives), those 
historical works, to a great degree, help construct reality. Hence, the function of history and 
historical work is not only to explain identity formation but in fact to help form that identity. 
As shown in Chapter Two, many nationalism theorists, such as Hobsbawm (1983a, 1983b) 
and Hall (1996a, 1996b) have suggested that ‘a shared past’ is crucial to the formation of the 
national identity. Indeed, historians and their works have played a decisive part in the 
discursive constitution of Taiwanese identity.  
Consequently, it is problematic to see the formation of Taiwanese national identity as a 
result of historical development (i.e. Japanese colonisation and the KMT’s autocratic rule 
afterwards) and a linear process, as many historians suggested. Taiwanese identity does not 
derive from what actually happened in the past, but how the people in Taiwan narrate, represent 
                                                
69 The debate between the pro-independence historians and pro-unification historians in Taiwan over 
the history of  Taiwan exemplifies this phenomenon. 
   100
 
and interpret their ‘past’. The ‘past’ is clearly a discursive realm in which different forces 
compete with each other. We therefore need to subject this view to methodological scrutiny, 
and see history or historical work as narrative or discourse. There is therefore a need for a 
further investigation of the relationship between different interpretations/narrative 
productions – why a specific narrative/interpretation of Taiwan’s history takes precedence 
over alternative ones – as opposed to discovering a true account of the past and exploring the 
relationship between the past and the interpretation/narration of the past.    
To reiterate, since the causality between the past and the formation of Taiwanese 
identity is not as simple as the aforementioned historians suggests, the important task to 
investigate the formation of Taiwanese identity is neither discovering the facts (or true accounts) 
of the past nor finding out which narratives of Taiwan’s modern history are more accurate.  
Rather, the series of questions that I put forward in the following is crucial: how a specific 
narrative/interpretation of Taiwan’s history takes precedence over other alternative ones; 
how some narratives/interpretations disappear and were silenced in a specific period; and 
how history and other ingredients of the past have been used to help constitute Taiwanese 
identity through a much more complex process of meaning-making, deployment, and 
ritualisation. Following this line of thinking, it is appropriate to say that the formation of 
Taiwanese identity does not exist outside Japanese colonisation or the KMT’s ruthless 
governance, but it is unsuitable to claim that Taiwanese identity was naturally formed and 
developed from those historical ‘facts’.  
To summarise, it is important for us to go beyond merely pointing out the truism that 
the formation of Taiwanese identity is the outcome of historical developments. We need to 
examine the processes and the procedures by which the category of ‘Taiwanese’ is produced 
by specific narrations and interpretations of the past, and how they are mobilised in turn by 
the regime in power in contemporary Taiwan.   
 
3-3. The Political Strategy  
Along with historians, many political scientists/theorists have also devoted themselves 
to this issue. Three analytical strategies from those works are identified here. While the first 
indicates that ‘democratisation’ is the main cause of the transition of Taiwan’s national 
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identity from Chinese to Taiwanese, the second one takes the economic factors and Beijing-
imposed diplomatic isolation and the military threat toward Taiwan into account. The third 
one highlights the role of politicians in the process of constructing Taiwanese national 
identity.    
3-3-1. Democratisation and Civic Taiwanese Nationalism Arguments  
One of the earliest comprehensive efforts focusing on the role of democratisation in 
the formation of Taiwanese identity is Alan Wachman’s Taiwan: National Identity and 
Democratisation (1997). In the book, Wachman argues that Taiwanese consciousness and 
society’s quest for separate international identity were long suppressed under the 
authoritarian KMT regime, which justified its ruling legitimacy and political dominance by 
the Mainlander elites on the basis of the ‘One China’ principle. Taiwanese consciousness and 
identity were thus unleashed by the democratic opening. Democratisation offered space for 
the free expression of a ‘repressed’ identity.  
Another representative effort upholding this line of argument is Lin Chia-Lung’s series 
of works (1998, 2001, 2002). Lin indicates that ‘democratisation’ is the main cause of the 
transition of Taiwan’s national identity from Chinese to Taiwanese. He argues that political 
democratisation in Taiwan and threats from the PRC are the two most critical explanatory 
factors that have contributed to the sudden growth of a civic national identity among the 
people of Taiwan during the last decade of political transition. According to Lin, 
democratisation serves as ‘a pulling force’, drawing people together through the process of 
political participation. The practice of democracy accustoms people to participating in the 
deliberation and decision-making of national affairs and makes them implicitly or explicitly 
accept the island as the legitimate boundary of that deliberation and decision-making. 
Constant political participation has indeed gradually formed a collective consciousness 
among the people, transforming the term ‘Taiwan’ into a geographic location and a political society, 
and metamorphosing the term ‘Taiwanese’ from an ethnic term for ‘native Taiwanese’ to a 
civic term for ‘citizens of Taiwan’ (Lin 2001, 219-20). In other words, the practice of 
democracy in Taiwan creates a shared political identity, common values and a sense of 
achievement, and this imagination of a shared community is moreover limited within the 
island of Taiwan, excluding the people of mainland China. More and more Taiwanese realise 
that ‘Taiwan’s democratic liberalism’ is different from ‘China’s authoritarianism’. The gap 
   102
 
dividing Taiwan and China emanates not from cultural or ethnic differences, but institutional 
differences: democracy versus authoritarianism. Along with the democratisation argument, 
Lin contends that the constant threat from the PRC has been a very important element in 
Taiwan’s recent state- and nation-building. Lin uses public opinion surveys to show the 
positive correlation between the escalation of the cross-strait tension and people’s self-
identification as Taiwanese. He contends that the long-existing and ever-growing threat from 
China is fostering ‘a sense of common suffering’ among all people of Taiwan regardless of 
their ethnicity (Lin 2002, 219). The Chinese military threat against Taiwan and its diplomatic 
efforts to isolate Taiwan in international society unifies Taiwanese people and produces a 
shared identity. The Chinese communist regime’s increasing hostility towards a 
democratising Taiwan has obviously served as ‘a pushing force’.    
Thus, Taiwanese identity according to Lin is not inborn, but a socially and politically 
constructed sentiment. More significantly, this newly formed Taiwanese identity by its nature 
is liberal and plural since three aspects of this identity – an ethnic origin (the Han), a cultural 
identity (Chinese), and a political identification (Taiwan) – can cohabit peacefully. A 
significant portion of the population in Taiwan actually has multiple identities, claiming to be 
‘politically Taiwanese but culturally Chinese’ (Lin 2001, 261). Taiwanese identity is thus not 
only an ethnic identity, but also a citizen/territorial-based political identity. Based on this 
strand of thought, Taiwanese nationalism should be conceived of as civic nationalism, and 
Taiwanese identity, above all, is civic in nature.  
Lin’s identification of the political/territorial/civic nature of the Taiwanese identity 
echoes with Christopher Hughes’ (2000) prominent finding: the people in Taiwan identify 
themselves as culturally Chinese but politically Taiwanese. Hughes describes Taiwan as 
moving towards a ‘post-nationalist’ political settlement. He argues that the epic changes in 
the international system since the 1970s first precipitated the state legitimacy crisis and later 
aroused Taiwanese aspiration for independent statehood. Yet, this newly emerged 
nationalism movement has gone beyond the nationalist principle, as set out by Gellner in 
1983, that ‘the political and the national unit should be congruent’. According to Hughes, 
Taiwan has developed a situation in which it retains the special links with China in terms of 
culture, kinship and economics, while the island simultaneously maintains control over its 
own sovereignty through developing democratic politics, albeit within the constraints of the 
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one-China policy imposed by the PRC. Hughes obviously distinguishes political identity 
from cultural identity and holds that the residents of Taiwan possess Taiwanese identity 
politically without abandoning their Chinese-ness culturally and ethnically.  
Lin’s assertion of the civic nature of Taiwanese identity and Hughes’ observation of the 
features of Taiwanese nationalism (politically Taiwanese but culturally Chinese) both 
manifest the mainstream argument of scholarly works produced by political 
scientists/theorists who are concerned with the issues of Taiwanese national identity. For 
instance, Gunter Schubert (2004), by analysing Taiwan’s major parties’ cross-strait policy, 
illustrates that Taiwan has formed an overarching consensus, that is, ‘Taiwan and Mainland 
are both parts of China, which is currently divided into two sovereign states’ (Schubert 2004, 
538). This overarching consensus has been shared as well as shaped by Taiwan’s most 
important parties since the late 1980s. Although Taiwan’s mainstream parties clearly differ 
on the best strategy to de-escalate the tensions in the Taiwan Strait and to engage mainland 
China, they all agree that ‘the liberal constitutional state of the Republic of China must be 
protected and internationally strengthened’ (ibid., 535). Hence, Schubert concludes that a 
Taiwanese nation already exists albeit civic in nature. And sovereignty and democracy are the 
pillars of an overarching consensus among both the people and the political parties on what 
constitutes the Taiwanese nation.  
Likewise, T. Y. Wang and I-Chou Liu (2004) also suggest, using evidence from opinion 
surveys they conducted, that the majority of the population in Taiwan identify themselves as 
culturally Chinese but politically Taiwanese. In their article, Wang and Liu firstly distinguish 
political identifications and cultural orientations, and then respectively assess respondent’s 
attitudes toward these two aspects of national identity (2004, 574). The results of the survey 
suggest that political and cultural identities are not congruent in the context of Taiwan, since 
80% of respondents view Taiwan as their own country but only one-fourth view Taiwanese 
culture as different from Chinese culture. Wang and Liu therefore conclude that a substantial 
number of island residents now believe they can be both Chinese culturally and Taiwanese 
politically. To outward appearances, it seems that Wang and Liu have successfully tested 
Hughes’ observation – culturally Chinese but politically Taiwanese – via a ‘scientific’ and 
‘objective’ survey research design. This section does not intend to discuss Wang and Liu’s 
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survey design in detail.70 Yet, it should be pointed out that the people in Taiwan do not 
necessarily agree with each other as to what the term ‘nation’ means to them.    
Indeed, as shown in Chapter Two, the term ‘nation’ is highly contestable and 
ambiguous and it is surely lacking an overarching consensus on its definition among people 
in both academia/non-academia, and the West/non-West. In the West, the debate between 
nationalism (which highlights cultural or ethnic ingredients of nation) and liberalism (also 
termed ‘liberal constitutionalism,’ which focuses on legal and institutional rights of the 
nation) has long attracted great scholarly attention. In Taiwan, the dispute between 
cultural/ethnic-based national identity and political/civil-based national identity is also 
noticeable. Many political theorists in Taiwan have engaged in and devoted themselves to 
re/defining the term ‘nation’, ‘Taiwanese nation’ or ‘Chinese nation’. Some people consider 
these concepts mostly in cultural terms while others hold that the ‘nation’ ought to be civic, 
constitutional or political in nature. Indeed, the definition of the term ‘nation’ in Taiwan is a 
realm of politics and can be used for making different political claims, serving different 
ideologies.    
Given that most people in Taiwan, as Hughes suggests, identify themselves as culturally 
Chinese but politically Taiwanese, this section should centre its discussion on the scholarly 
literature that contends with the civic nature of (the Taiwanese) nation. It is noted that the 
aim here is not to judge the credibility of their arguments, for example, that liberalism as a 
way of thinking about the ‘nation’ is ‘better’ than ‘nationalism’, or vice versa. Instead, it 
intends to demonstrate the political impacts of this re/definition of the term ‘nation’ on 
identity formation in the context of Taiwan.  
Most intellectuals who are classified as ‘liberalists’ argue that the solely legitimate 
foundation of a nation ought to be political, rather than ethnic and cultural. Chen Qi-Nan 
(1992) for instance, a respected intellectual in Taiwan, emphasises the importance of ‘citizen 
conscience’ in the construction of national identity. For Chen, political pragmatism, way of 
life, and ideology are much more important ingredients in nation-state-building than the 
                                                
70 The problem of  Wang and Lin’s design of  survey research is that they in fact help the people of  
Taiwan conceptualise the notion of  ‘nation’ or ‘Taiwan nation’, since the people of  Taiwan in the first 
place do not necessarily distinguish the cultural and political aspects of  the nation. Nor do they 
prioritise either cultural or political aspects. Wang and Lin’s research thus can be regarded as a 
political intervention that in actuality (pre)defines the meaning of  ‘Taiwanese’. 
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ingredients of ethnicity, culture or history. Only through the principle of democratic 
autonomy developed by an evolving civil society can Taiwanese national identity be 
legitimised. It is this civic liberty that makes Taiwan a strong and widely accepted nation. 
Chen’s line of reasoning about civic conscience or civic liberty manifests the central 
point of so-called liberalist thinking as to the nature of Taiwanese identity. We can find 
parallels between Chen’s argument and those of the aforementioned political scientists, since 
all of them differentiate the cultural from the political identity and give priority to the latter. 
To them, ‘nation’ is a political, territorial and civil entity/community; and national identity 
ought to be political and civil in nature. Nevertheless, not many so-called liberalists can easily 
get rid of the shadow of nationalist ways of thinking considering what constitutes a nation, 
since they all face a theoretical and practical predicament: how to decide who is the people in 
the first place (in other words, who is eligible to be a member of the Taiwan nation?). Very 
few people in Taiwan can accept, for instance, that a Thai labourer in Taiwan would become 
a member of a ‘Taiwanese nation’. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter Two, Anthony D. Smith 
has indicated a nation in practice cannot be ‘invented’ or ‘imagined’ without taking ethnic, or 
at least cultural, attributes into account.    
Facing these predicaments, most intellectuals in Taiwan who study Taiwanese 
nationalism or national identity therefore attempt to combine liberalist with nationalist 
elaborations of the nation, and to resort to cultural, ethnical and historical attributes so as to 
decide who ought (not) to be included into the Taiwan nation in the first place, though they 
might put different weighting in the spectrum between nationalism and liberalism. The series 
of efforts by Chiang Yi-Hua (1998, 2001), Tsai Ying-Wen (1997), Hsiao Kao-Jen (1996), Wu 
Nai-Teh (1996), and Chang Mao-Kui (1993) can be regarded in this way. They all attempt, 
on the one hand, to theoretically synthesise nationalism and liberalism; on the other, they try 
to empirically demonstrate the coexistence of cultural/ethnic identity and political/civil 
identity in the discourse of Taiwanese nationalism, or the dual (cultural and political) identity 
that the people of Taiwan possess.  
To summarise what has been discussed so far, ‘democratisation’ is the main cause of the 
formation of Taiwanese identity since constant political participation has indeed gradually 
formed a collective consciousness among the people in the island. Taiwanese 
nationalism/identity should be conceived of as civic, liberal or state nationalism/identity, 
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and the residents of Taiwan possess Taiwanese identity politically without abandoning their 
Chinese-ness culturally. Also, all the scholars upholding this line of thinking seek to de-
essentialise the ethnic attributes of Taiwanese-ness and provide a more syncretistic reading 
of Taiwanese identity, although, to a certain degree, they also resort to cultural and ethnic 
attributes of nationhood.  
Brief comments on the above-mentioned ‘democratisation’ argument and civic 
nationalism can be offered here. First of all, what does it mean to be a civic nation-state 
without being able to decide whether one is part of another national community, or legally, 
as well as civically, separate and distinct? In other words, this strand of thought provides a 
limited answer to the question of who should be included (and excluded) in the first place in 
nation/state formation. To put the question differently, who is eligible to be granted civic 
rights if citizenship is the cornerstone of nation-building? Secondly, to what extent does this 
line of argument explain the ethnic mobilisation that often occurred and was repeated in 
Taiwanese society in the last decade, particularly during the election campaign? As some 
researchers have suggested, political manipulation and ethnic mobilisation also play a 
significant part in the consolidation of Taiwanese consciousness.71 Thirdly, how well can the 
distinction between political and cultural identities hold up in the face of the ongoing efforts 
at ‘de-Sinification’ and the construction of the Taiwanese culture movement launched in the 
last decade in Taiwan? While quite a few scholars argue the formation of Taiwanese identity 
has been more a matter of political re-identification than cultural de-Sinification or cultural 
re/construction, we should not overlook the importance of the ongoing movement of de-
Sinifying Taiwan’s culture. A vigorous de-Sinification movement has been launched that 
clearly targets Taiwan’s culture and intends to purge it of any Chinese content (Hsiau 2000; 
Lynch 2004). And finally, we should question to what extent those arguments stressing the 
democratisation or civic nationalism, as a discourse, in fact help to define what/who 
‘Taiwanese’ is and constitute the contents and meanings of ‘Taiwanese-ness’.   
3-3-2. Public Opinion Survey Method, Economic Integration and Chinese 
Threats in (Re)shaping Taiwanese National Identity  
Since quite a few scholars consider that Taiwanese identity is formed in the process of 
democratic practices, ‘the will of the people’ becomes a central concern of some researchers’ 
                                                
71 The final part of  this section will demonstrate this line of argument.  
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studies. Survey research is generally regarded as one of the best approaches in assessing 
people’s self-identification. In actuality, a fairly large number of these kinds of works have 
been produced in the last decade. They all aim, by adopting the survey technique, to uncover 
attitudes toward people’s self-identification and to examine which factors might affect these 
attitudes. It is worthwhile here to briefly review those scholarly works.  
Researchers have experimented with various methods for measuring people’s 
preferences regarding identity issues. Among them, the two most popular approaches are: 
firstly, to measure the respondents’ position on the unification/independence spectrum, and 
secondly, to ask whether their self-identification is Taiwanese or Chinese. For many political 
scientists, however, these two approaches have their own flaws, so that they are unable to 
correctly show the real orientation of people’s attitudes towards their self-identification. 
These political scientists therefore propose more ‘sophisticated’, ‘precise’, ‘reliable’, ‘accurate’ 
or ‘advanced’ ways of conducting surveys. As mentioned above, T. Y. Wang and I-Chou Liu 
propose a new method to examine identity issues by distinguishing political identifications 
from cultural orientations. Yet, a more influential survey method is proposed by Wu Nai-Tel 
(1993, 1997, cited in Marsh 2002, 144-6). Wu reformulates the survey questions as follows:   
1. If Taiwan could maintain peaceful relations with the Chinese communist 
government after it announced its independence, then Taiwan should become an 
independent country. Do you agree? 
2. If mainland China and Taiwan were to become similar in economic, social, and 
political conditions, then the two sides of the strait should be united into one 
country. Do you agree?  
Wu then categorised the respondents into four types of national identification preferences: 
‘Taiwanese nationalists’, ‘Chinese nationalists’, ‘pragmatists’, and ‘conservatives’.72 Since Wu 
devised this new measure, the researchers began to use this formulation annually to trace the 
                                                
72 ‘Taiwanese nationalists’ refers to the people who support Taiwanese independence and ‘oppose 
unification with China even if  China becomes as democratic and economically developed as Taiwan.’ 
‘Chinese nationalists’ refers to the people who ‘favour unification with Mainland and oppose 
Taiwanese independence even if  Taiwan could have peaceful relations with the PRC after 
independence.’ People in the category of  ‘pragmatists’ support both ‘Taiwanese independence 
(providing that does not provoke a military attack from the PRC)’ and unification with China (‘if  the 
PRC catches up with Taiwan’s level of  democratic and economic development’), depending on which 
ideal condition occurs first. The category of  ‘conservatives’ rejects both Taiwanese Independence and 
unification with China since they prefer the status quo in which Taiwan is and will remain the ROC 
(Marsh 2002, 145). 
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trends of people’s self-identification as well as their preference towards Taiwanese 
independence/unification with China. The outcomes of those surveys since 1993 to the 
present show that, not surprisingly, pragmatists are much more numerous than the others.   
Academic works have been produced that rely on such survey data and try to give their 
own accounts of the political implication. For instance, Robert Marsh (2002), following Wu’s 
categorisation, investigates further the extent to which two factors – China’s determination 
of the use of force toward Taiwan, and the future prospect of China’s political 
democratisation and economic development – intervene in people’s self-identification. For 
Marsh, the future trends of people’s self-identification in Taiwan should be analysed in terms 
of these two factors. Emerson M. S. Niou (2004) conducts very similar research. Echoing 
Marsh’s findings, Niou observes that a significant portion of the respondents could accept 
either independence or unification because a majority of respondents (72%) could support 
independence if it does not lead to war, and a majority of respondents (64.2%) could 
support unification if the two sides become compatible economically (Niou 2004, 559). Yet, 
compared to Marsh, Niou tries to go further to explore ‘what factors might influence 
respondents to move away from the status quo towards either independence or unification’ 
(ibid., 557). Niou considers the following four factors as hypotheses: (1) China’s threat of 
using force, (2) the willingness of the US to defend Taiwan, (3) the possibility that China will 
become more moderate once it develops economically, and (4) the willingness of Taiwan to 
fight. Niou’s findings suggest that all three players in the game, the PRC, Taiwan and the US 
can influence Taiwanese people’s orientations on identity issues. Niou thus concludes with 
the following policy suggestion:  
For Taiwan, strengthening its will to fight is an effective strategy to boost for 
independence. For China, the threat of using force against Taiwan can effectively 
deter many people from moving toward independence...If China can also convince 
people in Taiwan that it is becoming more prosperous, open, and democratic, then 
more people in Taiwan would find unification an acceptable choice. For the U.S., 
showing some degree of commitment to defend Taiwan could deter China. But 
showing too strong a commitment might encourage people in Taiwan to move 
toward independence. (ibid., 566)  
Marsh’s and Niou’s analysis of the economic factors in shaping Taiwanese self-
identification is shared by political observers in both the US and Taiwan. In the US, 
proponents of peaceful reconciliation such as Morton Abramowitz, Stephen Bosworth (2003) 
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and Nancy Tucker (2002) have all suggested that the growing economic and social ties across 
the Taiwan Strait would improve political antagonism and would discourage public opinion 
on the island from seeking formal independence. In Taiwan, a political scientist, Chu Yun-
Han, also pins much of his hopes on this possibility that political support for separatism will 
gradually decline as economic and social ties grow.  
In his article (2004), Chu argues that if democratisation qua ethnic mobilisation is now 
the primary mechanism in a vicious cycle imperilling cross-strait relations, what drives the 
countervailing benign cycle is the powerful magnet of economic integration. Chu first of all 
describes Taiwan’s former president Lee Teng-Hui’s efforts to thwart a tidal wave of cross-
strait economic integration, along with his endeavours to reengineer the cultural orientation 
of the island. Chu states: 
Leaders [Lee] reasoned that a full-scale economic integration would eventually 
compromise Taiwan’s political autonomy. The acceleration of cross-strait exchange 
was deemed detrimental to Taiwan’s political independence because it would...lead 
to the erosion of a separate Taiwanese identity. (2004, 500)    
Therefore, according to Chu, Lee was determined to re-establish the state’s regulatory power 
over the pace of cross-strait economic exchange, exert dominance over public debate on 
mainland policy, and reassert the supremacy of national security priorities over economic 
pragmatism in the conduct of cross-strait relations, in order to affect people’s self-
identification. Lee’s most notable mainland policy, ‘Go Slow, Be Patient’, has been enacted 
under this political consideration. Lee’s policies, according to Chu, were superficially quite 
successful in consolidating the trend of Taiwanese identity formation, given the fact that the 
surge of exclusive Taiwanese identity and popular aspiration for a separate nationhood was 
dramatic. Nevertheless, as Chu argues, Lee failed to fully accomplish his will (2004, 502).    
This failure derived from the fact that, firstly, despite all the measures enacted by Lee’s 
government, economically, Taiwanese businesspeople still looked for investment 
opportunities in mainland China, albeit indirectly or illegally. Secondly, with respect to 
identity, Lee was unable to manipulate it at will. This incapacity is manifested in three ways.  
Firstly, as Marsh and Niou have already identified, while fewer and fewer people retain an 
exclusive Chinese identity, more people have acquired a dual identity, identifying themselves 
as both Chinese and Taiwanese. Secondly, under the first term of the DPP Chen Shui-Bian 
administration, the tidal wave of emerging Taiwanese identity visibly reached a plateau. And 
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thirdly, the most targeted generation for state-sponsored re-socialisation – the younger 
generation – turned out to be least susceptible to the incubation of an exclusive Taiwanese 
identity (ibid., 502). Chu therefore concludes that it is hard to assert that there is a solid 
foundation that guarantees eventual success for the political project of Taiwanese nation-
building. The existence of a sizable number of ‘rationalists’, as Chu terms it, would in the 
short run serve as a healthy buffer to mitigate the polarised conflict over national identity 
and could, in the long run, shift the political equilibrium in either direction, depending on 
whether external conditions, such as economic integration between the two sides of the 
strait, become more favourable to unification or independence. Chu’s findings, together with 
Marsh and Niou’s, contradict some widely held perceptions that Taiwanese national identity 
is generally accepted by the people in the island; he calls into question the belief that the 
Taiwanese nation has already formed.    
The aforementioned strand of analysis focuses on economic factors in shaping people’s 
self-identification. Their arguments are derived from the theory of neo-functionalism and 
Deutsch’s concept of a ‘security community’ respectively. The former argument is that 
economic integration will eventually lead to some sort of political accommodation, possibly 
political integration such as the European Union, while the latter is that growing functional 
interdependency will make war too mutually costly to be feasible. It is true that mainland 
China has rapidly evolved into Taiwan’s largest export market, its single most important 
source of trade surplus, and an indispensable manufacturing platform for its export-oriented 
sector. Nevertheless, empirically, increasing economic integration and social contacts 
between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait contribute very little to arrest the trend of rising 
Taiwanese identity and dwindling Chinese identity among the island’s public. Also, 
researchers (e.g. Corson 2004; Peterson 2004) find very little evidence to support the claim 
that there is a positive correlation between economic integration and relaxation of political 
and military tension in the case of the cross-strait relationship. Ironically, political and 
military tension is generally regarded as one of the main causes of the surge of Taiwanese 
nationalism.  
In addition to Lin Chia-Lung as mentioned earlier, this argument that the Chinese 
military threat against Taiwan and its diplomatic efforts to isolate Taiwan serve to unify the 
Taiwanese people and produce a shared identity is made by Ho Szu-Yin, Liu I-Chou (2002) 
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and Wu Yu-Shan (1996). Ho and Liu contend that the escalating tension between the PRC 
and Taiwan leads to a continuous decline of Chinese identity and concomitant rise of 
Taiwanese identity in the island. Likewise, Wu argues that ‘Chinese’ as a concept has been 
successfully monopolised by the PRC’s efforts to politically and diplomatically isolate 
Taiwan, so that people in Taiwan fail to demonstrate internationally that they are ‘Chinese’ 
since the idea of ‘Chinese’ refers exclusively to the citizens of the PRC. Taiwanese people are 
deprived of their Chinese-ness, which they recognise as having been pre-empted by the 
Mainland Chinese under the Beijing regime. This cognition is in part based on Taiwanese 
peoples’ exposure to international reports on Chinese affairs in which China is mainland 
China and Taiwan is a separate entity. People in Taiwan see themselves and their relationship 
with the mainland Chinese through the prism of the international media.    
To summarise those works that highlight the PRC’s role in the formation of Taiwanese 
identity, they all attempt to claim, explicitly or implicitly, that the PRC’s threat or its 
diplomatic isolation towards Taiwan gives rise to the formation of Taiwanese identity. It is 
true that we should not overlook the poisonous effects of Beijing’s intensive efforts to 
isolate Taiwan politically and diplomatically from the international community and its hostile 
reunification campaign. Nevertheless, to assume a facile causality in the relationship between 
China’s military threat/diplomatic isolation and Taiwanese identity formation is problematic 
for three reasons. Firstly, since the hostility between Taiwan and China in the 1960s and 
1970s was much more severe than in 1990s, why did people in Taiwan not form a collective 
identity in the 1960s or 1970s? Instead, they formed a collective identity in the 1990s after 
the animosity between China and Taiwan had subsided, relatively speaking.73 Secondly, it is 
difficult to clarify whether the PRC’s military threat/diplomatic isolation toward Taiwan (as a 
cause) leads/led to the creation of Taiwanese identity (as an outcome), or the creation of 
Taiwanese identity (as a cause) engenders China’s military reactions and political measures 
toward Taiwan. This causal relationship can be easily reversed. Some scholars (e.g. 
Christensen 2002) even argue that it is the PRC’s military threat that intimidates the residents 
of Taiwan from seeking independence and therefore constrains the trend towards Taiwanese 
identity. Thirdly, assuming a facile causal relationship between China threat/diplomatic 
                                                
73 The cross-strait relationship between Taiwan and China was normalised after the KMT 
government abolished the Period of  Mobilisation for the Suppression of  Communist Rebellion (Roy 
2003, 174-5). 
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isolation and Taiwanese identity formation masks the complex connection between the 
actuality and its representation, as well as concealing the intervention of power and interest. 
It is crucial to note, for Taiwanese residents, how real the Chinese threat is does not come 
directly from the actuality of the Chinese threat (given that no residents of Taiwan directly see 
the missiles deployed on the other sides of Taiwan Strait) but from how ‘the threat from 
China’ is represented in the media, literature, political rhetoric and so on in Taiwan. Indeed, 
the representation of a ‘Chinese threat’ is manipulatable.74 The issue then becomes not so 
much a true account of the Chinese threat, but rather a representation of it in Taiwan. 
Consequently, it is problematic to see the formation of Taiwanese identity as a result of 
China’s threat or its diplomatic/political isolation, as many political scientists have suggested. 
We need to pay more attention to the politics of representation.   
3-3-3. The Mobilisation of Political Elites 
Apart from the aforementioned arguments, scholars also focus on politicians’ role, 
political mobilisation and political competition in the formation of Taiwanese national 
identity. They investigate how, during democratisation, struggles over democratic reform and 
redistribution of political power between the Mainlanders and native Taiwanese became 
entangled with the national identity conflict and the clash of different visions of Taiwan’s 
future political relations with mainland China. Wang Fu-Chang made one of the earliest 
works upholding this argument.  
In one of his journal articles (1996), Wang argues that Taiwanese consciousness was 
produced in the process of the political mobilisation and competition between the KMT 
regime and the oppositional forces. According to Wang, before 1980 the Taiwanese 
oppositional movement focused on the ethnic inequalities between the Mainlander and 
native Taiwanese under the KMT’s authoritarian rule. Nevertheless, unexpectedly, the 
movement developed into a nationalist project in the early 1980s. According to Wang, the 
reasons why the opposition forces resorted to nationalist rhetoric are, on the one hand, the 
KMT’s successive and continuous repression of the opposition movement, which led to its 
radicalisation. On the other hand, and more importantly, the opposition proponents 
                                                
74 We can observe empirically how the government of  Taiwan manipulates the representation of  the 
China threat. For example, the Ministry of  Defence normally releases news concerning China’s 
missile deployment to the media right before the Legislative Yuan reviews its defence budget. 
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recognised that the bedrock of KMT authoritarian rule was chauvinistic Chinese 
consciousness, officially promoted by the KMT, which justified the ethnic inequalities 
between Mainlander and native Taiwanese. Therefore, they began to challenge this Chinese 
chauvinist ideology by developing a political and cultural discourse of Taiwan-centred 
nationalism, and launched numerous mass demonstrations and street protests to mobilise, 
and increase, public support for the movement.   
Peter Yu Kien-Hong (2001) contributes to this strand of scholarly literature in his 
studies of the courses of Taiwanisation in the 1990s. He defined ‘Taiwanisation’ as a ‘process 
by which political figures, especially those born in Taiwan [native Taiwanese], try to preserve 
Taiwan’s political independence from any Mainland Chinese rule in the future’ (2001, 30).  
According to Yu, there are many reasons behind the Taiwanisation process. The then-ruling 
KMT under Lee Teng-Hui wanted to legitimise its rule.75 And Lee also took advantage of 
the Taiwanese consciousness to deal further blows to the non-mainstream faction within the 
KMT, which was mainly composed of Mainlanders. For the DPP, it is also in favour of 
Taiwanisation. Yu argues, besides using Taiwanisation as a tactic to win votes, the DPP has 
also been under heavy pressure from some party fundamentalists calling for the creation of a 
Republic of Taiwan as the only way out for Taiwan in the cross-strait impasse.  
Likewise, Lin Tsong-Jyi in his article titled ‘The Evolution of National Identity Issues in 
Democratising Taiwan: An Investigation of the Elite-Mass Linkage’ (2002) contends that 
Taiwanese national identity is formed in the interaction between the political elite and the 
masses, and between the political calculations of the politicians and public opinion towards 
identity issues. The article is divided into two parts. It begins with discussing ‘why and how 
political elites raise national identity issues in the 1990s’ (2002, 123). According to Lin, 
identity issues in the 1980s were mainly promoted by the DPP (then the opposition party), 
while it attempted to mobilise mass support during the election campaign. Yet, entering the 
1990s, the ball was in the KMT’s court. After Lee Teng-Hui took office as president, he 
decided to make efforts to reduce Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation in order to regain legitimacy 
                                                
75  To Lee, for the KMT to be accepted by the native people of  Taiwan, it had to be Taiwanised first. 
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for the KMT’s rule in Taiwan.76 These diplomatic efforts are generally termed as ‘pragmatic 
diplomacy policy’.77 This policy gained the consonance of most people in Taiwan. Yet, this 
shift of the KMT’s foreign policy unavoidably encountered external challenges, particularly 
from the PRC and the US.78 Those international reactions in turn required political elites of 
different parties in Taiwan to pull back their actions. Particularly for the DPP leaders, they 
were forced to adjust their mainland policy and to modify their appeal for the independence 
of Taiwan if their ambition was to win a majority of the votes and to become the ruling party 
of Taiwan. In the end, the DPP accepted the maintenance of the status quo without 
abandoning the ideal of independence.79 In the second part of Lin’s article, with reference to 
survey data, he demonstrates that the majority of the people in Taiwan identify themselves as 
both Taiwanese and Chinese and that the maintenance of Taiwan’s current de facto 
independence is the favourite option of the Taiwanese people. Hence, Lin concludes that 
Taiwan’s two major political parties indeed follow the direction of public opinion and there 
is no huge gap between the elite and the mass in regard to national identity issues. 
In Lin’s view, Taiwanese national identity is formed in the interaction between the elites 
and the mass, and it is more or less a consequence of the electoral calculations of the 
political elites. The problematic of Lin’s argument is that he runs the risk of virtual circularity 
because public opinion in Lin’s argument can be both a cause and an outcome. 80 
Nevertheless, Lin is right to identify the significance of political calculations in the rise of 
Taiwanese national identity. Indeed, popularly elected political leaders in Taiwan have been 
                                                
76 As mentioned in the Introduction, the KMT regime suffered from legitimacy crises abroad and at 
home in the early 1980s after the US recognised the Beijing regime as the solely legitimate 
government of China. 
77 Lee tried to develop either official or unofficial relations with other countries, made efforts to 
participate in international organisations, and conducted official or unofficial visit to countries that 
did not have official ties with Taiwan. 
78 After Lee’s six-day trip to the US in 1995, China decided to make concrete warnings by conducting 
several rounds of  missile exercises near Taiwan’s waters. Facing a potentially immediate conflict with 
China, the US also indicated that it would not support Taiwan if  the island unilaterally claims its de 
jure independence. 
79 Lin indicates that the DPP only needs to modify its approach to fostering independence rather 
than completely abandon it, since it is unwilling to lose its supporters in the independence movement. 
80 In Lin’s argument, politicians bring up identity issues because of supportive public opinion, but 
identity issues raised by the politicians subsequently shape public opinion. Public opinion in this 
regard becomes both a cause and an outcome.  
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often motivated to arouse a sense of Taiwanese consciousness as well as a popular desire for 
self-determination for their political benefit. Many political commentators in Taiwan uphold 
this line of argument when analysing the incumbent president Chen’s administration’s 
policies. For instance, they contend that the element of political calculation explains why 
Chen and his campaign strategist went ahead with their pledge to hold an unprecedented 
referendum in conjunction with the 2004 presidential election. In academia, some scholars 
also endorse this line of thought. To give an example, Kao Mily Ming-Tzu (2004) examines 
the interrelations among the referendum, the political calculations during the election 
campaign, and Taiwanese national identity formation. 
Kao’s article investigates politicians’ manipulations of identity issues to create a 
favourable environment for their own interests during election campaigns. She argues that 
the referendum was vital for Chen’s presidential campaign for the following reasons. Firstly, 
it permitted Chen to take credit for being the democratic vanguard by driving the 
referendum movement. Secondly, the referendum provided a convenient instrument for 
Chen not only to mobilise his supporters and spark discussion about domestic politics, but 
also to distract people’s concern with Chen’s poor performance in economic matters during 
his presidency. Third, it helped improve voter turnout for Chen’s presidential campaign by 
holding the referendum on the same day with the presidential election. In short, the issue of 
national identity in the guise of referendum was aroused to create a favourable environment 
for Chen’s re-election. Yet, the exercise of the referendum, according to Kao, also works in 
reverse to help consolidate Taiwanese national identity. First of all, by holding the 
referendum in the name of an imminent military threat from the PRC, Chen was trying to 
establish a state of political coherence amongst the people of Taiwan; and such political 
coherence can be read as a form of distinctive identity. Second, Taiwan’s distinctive 
consciousness is characterised by the living memory evolving from the island of Taiwan and 
continued resistance to mainland China. The ‘defensive’ referendum, by its name, seeks to 
demonstrate that people in Taiwan are constantly threatened by oppression from the 
mainland. Third, the content of the referendum intended to draw a dividing line, 
differentiating Taiwan from China. Voters were asked to choose between the two. Voting on 
the referendum suggested that one was acting to prioritise Taiwan. Accordingly, ‘Taiwan 
first’ can be seen as one definition of Taiwanese consciousness.  
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While some political commentators and scholars like Kao focus on the incumbent 
President Chen, more people centre their studies on the Former President Lee. George Tsai 
Woei (2001), for example, argues that all major political parties were trying to exploit identity 
issues for their own interests. Tsai particularly lashes out at Lee for promoting the idea of 
Taiwanese national identity for the sake of his own interest. Lee was found using his position 
as president to fasten the pace of Taiwanisation (e.g. Lee changed the contents of school 
textbooks), aiming, one the one hand, ‘to win the support of the public to broaden his 
power base’, and on the other, ‘to serve his own personal ideological preference’ (Tsai 2001, 
18). Lee’s influence in this regard cannot be underestimated. Under Lee’s leadership, Tsai 
writes:  
[the] growing Taiwanese consciousness entered a new phase of development.  
Although the majority of people…still believed that they were both Chinese and 
Taiwanese …a different sense of ‘we Taiwanese’ and ‘they Chinese’ kept growing… 
it was under the government’s tacit understanding and the opposition’s active 
encouragement. (Ibid., 18-9; emphasis in original) 
For Tsai, Taiwanese consciousness and Chinese consciousness ought not to be mutually 
exclusive. Yet, due to Lee’s political manipulation, the identity problem in Taiwan becomes 
very sensitive, emotional, and indeed, controversial. Likewise, Stephane Corcuff and Wu 
Rwei-Ren also pay great attention to Lee’s role in the formation of Taiwanese national 
identity, though they give Lee’s efforts a much more positive evaluation.  
Corcuff’s article, ‘The Symbolic Dimension of Democratisation and the Transition of 
National Identity under Lee Teng-hui’ (2002), shows how national identity and its related 
political symbols have been transformed under Lee’s presidency. According to Corcuff, Lee, 
as a leader of the KMT, of Taiwanese origin, initiated reforms of the political system and the 
symbolic environment. Corcuff concentrates on the changes of identity-related political 
symbols under Lee’s presidency. For Corcuff, those political symbols (e.g. banknotes, 
national flower) acted as ‘sources of legitimacy, indications of policy directions, tools of 
political socialisation, or objects of national identification’ (2002, 73). By demonstrating the 
four ‘reform items’ as examples – state doctrine, political commemorations, textbooks and 
banknotes – Corcuff argues that the transition of national identity was already proceeding at 
a fast pace under Lee’s presidency. He contends that the changes in different symbolic fields 
show different stages of the process of Taiwanisation/indigenisation of Taiwan’s polity, and 
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that the specific nature of each symbolic field naturally produces different patterns of change 
or political strategies to get them to change under the Lee’s presidency. However, those 
changes have one thing in common, that is, the accompanying historical movement is a 
process of ‘reform’ but not of ‘revolution’. This attribute can be generalised to most of the 
reforms initiated and implemented during Lee’s presidency. 
Wu Rwei-Ren echoes Corcuff’s argument characterising Lee’s reforms as moderate. Wu 
in his article, ‘Toward a Pragmatic Nationalism: Democratisation and Taiwan’s Passive 
Revolution’ (2002) asks a question – why did Lee’s moderate line towards the identity issue, 
rather than the DPP’s radical line, come to dominate the process of democratisation and 
indigenisation? For Wu, Lee is ‘reform-minded, but he is no revolutionary…he is a gradualist 
reformer’ (Wu 2002, 203). The success of Lee’s moderate line is based on three factors: 
firstly, Lee, being the first native Taiwanese president (in contrast to the Mainlanders) was 
highly legitimated; secondly, concern about the PRC’s military threat made people in Taiwan 
hesitant to supporting the DPP’s radical line – the independence of Taiwan; and thirdly, the 
need to incorporate the Mainlanders discouraged the backing of radical line. The impact of 
the victory of the gradualist approach, manifested in Lee’s victory in the 1996 presidential 
election, is the formation of a specific type of ‘national identity’ – a so-called ROC-style 
Taiwanese independence or independent Taiwan. That is, Taiwan is de facto and de jure 
independent though it is not under the name of ‘Republic of Taiwan’. According to Wu, 
Lee’s successful formalisation of the equivalence between the ‘Republic of China’ and 
‘Taiwan’ is a dramatic evolution, since it helps Taiwanese people to terminate the colonial 
situation. Democratisation is thus the outcome of a synthesis of the DPP’s radical line and 
Lee’s moderate line. Both of them committed to the goal of creating a new, sovereign, 
native-dominated democratic state.   
A question stemming from this elaboration of Lee’s role in the formation of Taiwanese 
national identity is: why was Lee so determined to initiate his Taiwanisation project? This 
question is one of the main concerns of Corcuff’s later publication - Light Breeze and Warm 
Sun: Mainlanders in Taiwan and their Transition of National Identity, published in Chinese in 
Taiwan in 2004.81 In the book, Corcuff analyses how the Mainlanders in Taiwan had dealt 
                                                
81 This book is a Chinese translation of  Corcuff’s Ph.D. thesis, originally written in French and 
successfully defended in December 2000. 
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with and transformed their national self-identification during the intensive process of 
democratisation and Taiwanisation between 1988 and 1997 under Lee’s administration. 
According to Corcuff, Taiwanisation is a historical imperative, which derived from a long-run 
historical and political development of Taiwan; the result of this development was a newly 
formed community. From Corcuff’s point of view, Lee’s initiation of the Taiwanisation 
project was not derived from Lee’s political calculations in favour of his own interests, but 
from the ineluctable and predetermined historical trends that Lee faced in his presidency. In 
other words, Taiwanisation (as well as the formation of Taiwanese national identity) is an 
inevitable and irreversible outcome of historical developments, rather than a consequence of 
politicians’ mobilisation and manipulation.82 As for those Mainlanders in Taiwan, Corcuff 
argues, while Taiwanisation is inevitable and imperative, they have to alter their self-
identification from Chinese to Taiwanese. Corcuff in the last two chapters of his book 
illustrates the necessity and imperative for Mainlanders to alter their self-identification. He 
argues that any opposition to the project of Taiwanisation upheld and advocated by the 
Mainlanders would only trap them in a state of dilemma, a circumstance of identity crisis, 
that is, living in Taiwan but rejecting themselves as being Taiwanese (2004, 143). Corcuff 
clearly employs a structural explanation to illustrate a predestined, inexorable formation of 
Taiwanese national identity.  
To conclude this section, the merit of the aforementioned line of argument is that, if 
Taiwanese national identity is not inborn but is a socially and politically constructed 
sentiment, it is subject to change, especially under the intensive mobilisation of political elites. 
The importance of political elites and their mobilisation in the development of nationalism 
has been stressed in the recent scholarly literature on nationalism (see: Paul Brass, 1991; 
John Breuilly, 1993).83 Yet, if political elites play an important role in the construction of 
Taiwanese national identity, we must then ask, through which social mechanism, political 
platform or cultural apparatus political elites can actualise people’s self-identification in 
Taiwan. As many scholars mentioned above have suggested, one of the approaches is to gain 
                                                
82  This is why Corcuff  insists on using the term ‘phenomenon’ rather than ‘movement’ to describe 
Taiwanisation, since the term ‘movement’ implies that it is initiated by a specific politician (2004, 73).  
83 According to this literature, neither historical roots or foreign threats nor system-level changes can 
directly alter group identity. The effects of  these historical, political and economic forces on people’s 
self-identification must be actualised through states’ actions, competing elites’ strategies, and their 
mutual influences and compromises. 
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control over the governing apparatus, erecting a distinct cultural hegemony and imposing its 
own vision of nation-building, either in the direction of Taiwanisation or Sinicisation. 
Nevertheless, the effects of the mobilisation or manipulation of the political elites should not 
be overly emphasised.   
Foucault’s elaboration of the notion of power as discussed in the previous chapter is 
worthwhile to reiterate here. According to Foucault, power does not exercise itself only 
through the hands of political elites, but also in the more devious and invisible forms of 
forces that normalise our behaviours and thoughts, and constitute our bodies, desires, 
pleasures and identities. Moreover, although certain political consequences were produced 
through political mobilisation and manipulation, politicians cannot fully accomplish their will. 
Furthermore, it is always difficult to clarify whether politician’s mobilisations lead to the 
formation of Taiwanese consciousness, or the existing Taiwanese consciousness encourages 
politicians to utilise identity issues to gain popular support, or both. This is the major 
inadequacy, if not the flaw, of the line of argument that focuses on the role of politicians in 
the emergence of Taiwanese nationalism. Above all, it is fairly right to argue that politicians’ 
mobilisation is one ingredient, among many others, that helps constitute people’s national 
identity in Taiwan. 
 
3-4. Conclusion   
Several plausible explanations of the formation of Taiwanese identity in the current 
literature were identified in this chapter: the legacy of Japanese colonisation, the 
ramifications of the KMT’s authoritarian rule, the practices of democratisation, China’s 
political and military intimidation, and politician’s mobilisations. Those plausible 
explanations can be categorised as two strategies: historical and political. Yet, as this chapter 
argued, these two strategies demonstrate not only two tactics of analysis and two forms of 
knowledge in understanding the formation of Taiwanese identity, but also two manners of 
construction/destruction of people’s self-identification in Taiwan. While knowledge 
concerns ‘Taiwanese-ness’, ‘Taiwanese-ness’ becomes a subject of knowledge and as a 
subject, it is in fact constituted in the domain of knowledge.    
In respect to historical narrative, issues of identity are intimately associated with how we 
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subjectively narrate ‘our’ past, what we selectively excavate as ‘our’ memories, and how we 
partially interpret ‘our’ history. Identity is thus constituted in the narration of the past, 
excavation of memories, and interpretation of history. Identity formation to some degree 
truly possesses retrospective characteristics. In respect of political discourse, it is concerned 
with the questions of what ‘we’ become and in which way ‘we’ shall live together in the 
future. In other words, it asks where ‘we’ shall draw the boundaries of ‘our’ nation and why 
‘we’ need to draw them in this way. This position admits deep and significant differences 
among ‘us’ within a community; ‘we’ therefore do not seek a shared past, a common 
experience or a collective memory; instead, ‘we’ search for a joint future. Identity formation 
in this respect is an ongoing process in which we, at present, can decide what we will 
become. Identity is formed in this shared sentiment of searching for a common future within 
the community. Political discourse participates in this ongoing process of identity formation 
by providing an illusion of what we will become, what sort of life style we shall look for in 
the future. This aspect manifests the prospective features of identity formation.    
Indeed, identity formation in Taiwan is embedded in and diffused by several historical 
and political conditions. Yet, we should not regard there to be a straightforward causality 
between those historical/political conditions and the formation of Taiwanese identity as 
much scholarly literature discussed above suggests. The process of the constitution of 
Taiwanese identity is much more complex. Taiwanese identity is in fact constituted in the 
dissemination of specific historical narratives and certain political discourses. Through 
various social practices, those historical narratives and areas of political discourse take 
precedence over other alternatives, so that the latter disappear and are excluded and silenced. 
Identity formation in Taiwan is indeed situated in a realm in which different historical, 
cultural and political discourses have mutually interacted, intersected and competed.    
This chapter suggested that the important tasks of current studies on Taiwanese identity 
are, firstly, an illustration of the process of how and through which social practices, specific 
narratives/discourses/interpretations take precedence over other alternatives; and secondly, 
an elucidation of how historical narrative and political ideology are used to help constitute 
Taiwanese identity through various social practices – a much more complex and drawn-out 
process of determining significance, deployment and ritualisation. In short, there is a need to 
create a history of the different modes to which the people residing in the island of Taiwan 
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are made subject, and to expose the beginnings and developments of current subjectifying 
discourse and practices. Therefore, the following two chapters (Chapter Four and Chapter 
Five) look at two events – respectively, the turmoil over the publication of a Japanese manga, 
and a political demonstration in commemoration of the 2-28 Incident in 2004 – in an 
attempt to demonstrate how the historically concluded process of Japanese colonisation and 
the KMT’s authoritarian rule have selectively emerged again as an ongoing structuring force in 
the creation of a certain form of identity among the population in contemporary Taiwanese 
society. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Essay on the Turmoil over Kobayashi 
Yoshinori’s On Taiwan  
‘Japan’ as ‘Self’ or ‘the Other’?  
 
 
4-1. Introduction  
4-1-1. ‘Japan’ in Contemporary Identity Conflict in Taiwan 
When my wife, who is Japanese, visited Taiwan for the first time in 1997, we made a 
trip to Tainan, a historical town located in Southern Taiwan. When we visited an old temple, 
there were some old Taiwanese men sitting and chatting in the courtyard, and one of them 
approached us and asked me in Minnan dialect if the lady with me was Japanese. Once he 
knew she was from Japan, he turned to my wife and started talking to her in Japanese. A few 
minutes later, my wife was surrounded by five or six old Taiwanese men. They all showed 
enthusiasm and hospitality towards her, and I was left out and excluded from their sight as if 
a ‘foreigner’. A few days later, we visited my grandparents in Taichung, a city in central 
Taiwan. My grandparents were born and educated during the Japanese colonial period, and 
they only speak Minnan dialect and Japanese, with little knowledge of Mandarin, the official 
language in Taiwan. I introduced my wife to my grandparents. They were pleased about her 
Japanese nationality and started chattering about the beauty, politeness and cleanness of the 
Japanese people. I was puzzled at that time by their good impression of the Japanese, since 
my grandmother sometimes spoke to me about her unpleasant experiences dealing with 
Japanese policemen in her childhood during the colonial period. Another unforgettable 
memory concerning ‘Japan’ comes from my time as an elementary school pupil in Taipei in 
the 1980s. I was taught how brutally Chinese citizens were treated by the Japanese army 
during WWII, with the aid of some repulsive photos. Nevertheless, the school textbook 
taught us that we, as Chinese, should return Japan’s brutality with generosity and 
benevolence, though the class teacher (a Mainlander) still referred to the Japanese as 
‘Japanese devils’.       
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Only much later did I realise that these personal experiences in different times and 
places are embedded in and shaped by several historical conditions: Japan’s colonial rule 
over Taiwan (1895-1945), the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), the Cold War, and the KMT’s 
authoritarian dominance in Taiwan (1945-1987). ‘Japan’, as a coloniser of the native 
Taiwanese for fifty years, as an antagonist towards the Chinese (as well as the Mainlanders) 
during the Sino-Japanese War, as a crucial ally of Taiwan during the Cold War, and as a 
major competitor towards China in the wake of the Cold War, plays a crucial but 
controversial and contradictory role in the society of Taiwan. And this multifaceted role 
played by ‘Japan’ in Taiwanese society produces contradictory emotional responses in the 
Taiwanese people. The ambivalent relationship has served to make ‘Japan’ one of the most 
sensitive and emotive subjects in the post-authoritarian era particularly. Japan-related issues 
have always been intensely debated in Taiwan for some time, and lie at the heart of the 
country’s ethnic feud. Any attempts to (re)evaluate, (re)narrate or (re)interpret the history of 
the Japanese colonial period are all highly contestable, sensitive and politicised in 
contemporary Taiwan. Also, any public remarks by a Taiwanese/Japanese person on 
‘Japan/Taiwan’, ‘the Japanese/the Taiwanese’, or ‘Japanese-ness/Taiwanese-ness’ 
immediately become fodder for ethnic debate in Taiwanese society.84  
It is obvious that people in Taiwan hold ambivalent, conflicting and widely divergent 
opinions and feelings concerning ‘Japan’. The straightforward explanation for this 
phenomenon is that, as many studies have demonstrated (Ching 2001; Chen Kuan-Hsing 
2001), not everyone shares a common and collective historical memory about Japan due to 
her/his different ethnic, class or gender identity. For instance, while some native Taiwanese 
see Japan as a modernizer that is crucial for the socioeconomic development of Taiwan, the 
Mainlanders and their descendants, who fled to Taiwan with Chiang Kai-Shek in 1949, still 
harbour painful memories of ‘Japanese aggression’ during WWII. Indeed, it is not difficult to 
understand why Taiwanese such as former president Lee Teng-Hui who belong to the 
Japanese-educated generation (or Japanese-language generation, as they are termed) are so 
nostalgic about the Japanese colonial period. As a member of the intelligentsia who grew up 
                                                
84 For example, the uproar caused by the controversial discussion of the ‘sadness of being Taiwanese’ 
by former president Lee Teng-Hui in his interview with Japanese author Ryotaro Shiba, and at the 
time of the publication of the Japanese sex-tour guidebook Paradise in Taiwan, is an indication of the 
sensitivity and controversy of Japan’s role in the society of Taiwan. 
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during the Japanese occupation, Lee experienced the 2-28 Incident and the strict 
‘Sinification’ imposed by the KMT regime in the wake of Japanese rule. Yet it is also possible 
to understand the ‘hate Japan’ sentiments of those people who followed the KMT to Taiwan, 
or students who were, if not affected by their experiences of direct combat with the Japanese, 
instilled with hatred for the Japanese during their schooling.  
The native Taiwanese and the Mainlanders, with their respective psychological states 
and emotional structures produced by different experiences and memories of the past 
regarding ‘Japan’, in fact stand on parallel historical trajectories in mentality, even though 
they have all lived together in Taiwan for over sixty years. These divergent mentalities 
revolving around the image of ‘Japan’ should be understood as the bedrock of the 
opposition between native Taiwanese and the Mainlanders, between advocates of 
independence and unification and, above all, between Taiwanese identity and Chinese 
identity. They can also be perceived as the essence (if any) of an immanent contradiction 
within the so-called ‘Taiwanese national identity’. Indeed, the Japan-Sino War and Japanese 
colonisation had the result of propelling native Taiwanese and Mainlanders on different 
developmental courses in different political fields with different identities – two different 
subject positions. 
Nevertheless, even without reference to native Taiwanese or Mainlanders, ‘Japan’ 
equally plays a considerable and indispensable role, being one of the most important 
ingredients in the identity formation or the subject constitution of people in Taiwan. For the 
native Taiwanese, Japanese colonialism and its related disciplines have been imbedded in the 
psycho-structure of the constituent subject and become one of the most significant historical 
layers of the subject constitution. For Mainlanders, on the other hand, war experiences with 
Japanese army that subsequently caused them to be exiled from their motherland also had 
profound impacts on their body and mind. Moreover, Sino-chauvinism and the anti-
Japanese mode of propagandistic education imposed by the KMT’s state apparatus on the 
descendants of either ‘the imperial subject’ (the native Taiwanese) or ‘the combatant of the 
Japan-Sino War’ (the Mainlanders) during the authoritarian period further exaggerates and 
intensifies the already ambivalent and divergent feelings about ‘Japan’ among the population 
of Taiwan. Those various historical forces (or ‘discourses’) are profoundly inscribed on the 
mind and body of the population of Taiwan, individually and collectively. In other words, 
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the Taiwanese as a subject is produced in those conflicting, contradicting and competing 
historical forces/discourses, layer upon layer. And the axis of those historical 
forces/discourses in the subject constitution is ‘Japan’.  
Furthermore, the abrupt dissolution of the Japanese empire and the new world order 
configured after WWII assisted in deterring and deferring the exploration and interrogation 
of the colonial experience and subsequent war. Leo Ching (2001) rightly identifies Taiwan’s 
lack of a decolonisation process in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Japanese Empire 
in 1945.85 In addition, the subsequent configuration of the Cold War system after WWII also 
prevented Taiwan from reconsidering colonial problems and war issues associated with 
Japan. Many scholars (e.g. Chen 2001; Tetsushi 2004) have indicated that a problem of the 
Cold War system is that the management of the problems of colonialism and war was frozen 
in order to avoid internal opposition within the West camp. 86  In Taiwan under the 
authoritarian KMT regime, discussion of Japanese colonialism was completely forbidden. 
Hence, various emotions and sentiments towards ‘Japan’ or Japanese colonialism were 
suppressed both among native Taiwanese and the Mainlanders. Yet, those complex and 
ambivalent sentiments would not disappear through this external repression, particularly 
when those sentiments were intimately associated with people’s self-identification. 
Consequently, the return of those sentiments was inevitable after the 1990s when the Cold 
War ceased and when Taiwan became democratic. It is precisely for this reason that, 
following the dissolution of the Cold War system and the decline of the KMT’s authoritarian 
rule, nostalgia about the Japanese colonial period is explicitly expressed by some native 
Taiwanese political and cultural elites, alongside active demands for compensation and 
protests against the Japanese government by former Taiwanese soldiers employed in Japan’s 
Imperial Army and by the ‘comfort women’ pressed into service by the military. The 
contemporary society of Taiwan is directly facing the legacies of the fifty-year Japanese 
                                                
85 According to Ching, decolonisation in Taiwan was neither the result of  a metropolitan political 
decision nor a new form of  nationalist assertion, as was common in European decolonisation 
experiences. The people of  Taiwan found themselves suddenly ‘liberated’ and they ‘reverted’ to 
China after Japan’s military defeat (Ching 2001, 34-8). Thus, the problem of  Japanese colonisation 
was not really overcome in Taiwan. 
86 In the 1950s, the complete split between the Communist world and the liberal world in East Asia 
further averted serious reflection on Japanese colonialism and WWII in East Asia. Japan, Taiwan and 
South Korea became major allies of  the US in the confrontation with communist countries. 
Historical issues of  colonialism were repressed, becoming a political taboo in those countries. 
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colonisation and Japan-Sino War, after the nearly fifty-year long absence (1945-1990s) of 
colonial and war-related issues. 
In short, although the current identity conflict in contemporary Taiwan is a post-
Japanese phenomenon, Japanese colonisation and the Japan-Sino War in the early twentieth 
century remain a powerful subtext in which the questions of ‘Taiwanese identity’ and 
‘Chinese identity’ are embedded and contested. The aim of this chapter is to investigate how 
the historically concluded process of Japanese colonisation has emerged again as an ongoing 
structuring force in the creation of a certain form of identity among the population in 
contemporary Taiwanese society.  
4-1-2. Literature Review  
Many scholars have indicated the profound influences of Japanese colonial rule on 
Taiwan in stimulating the surge of Taiwanese consciousness. Some historians, as shown in 
the previous chapter, contend that Japanese colonisation directly, continuously and 
spontaneously led to the solidification of current Taiwanese consciousness. Juxtaposing with 
those historical studies, Joyce Liu (2003d, 2004b) and Leo Ching (2001) adopt different 
approaches, in which they both devote themselves to investigating the psychological 
ramifications of Japanese rule during the colonial period.  
Liu’s approach aims to explore the psychic impacts of Japanese rule on the people in 
Taiwan during the colonial period. For Liu, the discourse of the ‘xin’ – the heart, psyche, or 
immanent essence – plays an important role in constituting the ‘imperial subject’. According 
to Liu, ‘xin’ is constituted in discourse and serves as a token to be invested and exchanged 
for various political values and ideologies in the process of nation-building. Through this 
process, it eventually helps to attach every individual to the whole body of the nation. In 
other words, it is something that can be manipulated through the modern techniques of 
government; and when certain abstract qualities of ‘xin’ are predetermined, they serve as the 
external delineation of the nation. Individual differences are accordingly discursively erased, 
and a historical process of homogenization is conducted.87 In her article, ‘Immanentism, 
Double-abjection and the Politics of Psyche in (Post) Colonial Taiwan’ (2003d), Liu 
                                                
87 Liu (2001b, 2002, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2003d, 2004a, 2004b) has produced a series of works 
investigating the changes of ‘xin’ in the process of nation-building during modernisation in the 
twentieth-century in both China and Taiwan.  
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particularly focuses on Japan’s assimilation scheme in Taiwan – the Kominka Movement – 
in an attempt to understand how a specific subject – the ‘imperial subject’ – was constructed 
in colonial times. Liu examines the discourse of kominka and argues that the discourse made 
a success of the islander (the inhabitant of Taiwan) metamorphosing from Han-Chinese (the 
aboriginals as well) into the imperial subject. According to Liu, the central concern of the 
kominka discourse was: how the islander could become ‘Japanese’ given that they are 
different to ethnic Japanese in consanguinity. Liu argues that the only way to solve these 
predicaments is to alter the immanent essence – the ‘xin’ – of the subject. There are three 
ways to change it.  
Liu explains that the concept of  ‘Japanese’ in the discourse of  kominka is defined not by 
its consanguinity, but by its ‘spiritual inheritance’ (Japanese spirits) and ‘national language’ 
(Japanese language). The former – spiritual inheritance – is said to be shared by every 
member of  the Japanese nation. Liu analyses that in this discourse the inborn interior 
essence of  every individual can be removed and subsequently replaced by an abstract 
spirituality, which is fitted to the spiritual inheritance of  the Japanese nation as a whole. In 
other words, the colonial subject has to cleanse his/her ‘barbarian heart’ so that the spiritual 
inheritance, the purity of  the Japanese spirit, can be reconstructed. As for the latter, Japanese 
spirits and lifestyles can only be presented through mastery of  Japanese language. Japanese 
language in this respect is not just a device for communication, but has a theological 
orientation. Japanese language is described as the ‘spiritual blood’ of  the Japanese nation.88 
Through sharing this ‘spiritual blood’, the individual can partake of  the life of  the nation and 
thus become a national subject. Moreover, apart from the aforementioned two ways to 
become ‘Japanese’, Liu also identifies that joining the Imperial Army, serving the Japanese 
Emperor, is also imperative to be a ‘complete’ Japanese. To give oneself  up to the emperor 
means to efface the unclean parts in one’s heart. Serving the Imperial Army is the way to 
obtain salvation and leap into the realm of  the gods. This spiritual leap of  faith would 
transcend the limitations set up by blood genealogy and would enable the subject to 
communicate with the Japanese spirit.89 
                                                
88  According to Liu (2003d), the concept of  ‘spiritual blood’ was introduced firstly by Ueda 
Kazutoshi in 1894 and later by the philosopher Tokieda Motoki while he developed the concept of  a 
‘trinity’, to define the equivalent relationship among the nation, the people and the national language. 
89 Three psychic impacts of  the kominka discourse on the colonial subject, which is revealed in 
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For Liu, Japanese colonisation and the practices of kominka discourse are the key to 
understanding identity politics in contemporary Taiwan. Liu argues that the subjectivity of 
the ‘imperial subject’ was constituted in this kominka discourse. While her paper mainly 
discusses the psychological politics in the Japanese colonial times, she emphasises that such 
politics of  psyche recurred in an uncanny way in post-colonial Taiwan, especially in the last 
decade. 
Along with Joyce Liu’s studies, Leo Ching’s Becoming Japanese (2001) provides another 
influential work in understanding the legacies of Japanese colonialism. The book 
demonstrates an attempt to understand how historical events during the Japanese 
colonisation ‘have enabled, or disabled, certain ways in which people make sense of and 
come to terms with their belongings, their allegiances, and their situated-ness’, and to 
understand ‘how these formations of identity in turn rearticulate and redefine historical 
events and the way people imagine political possibilities’ (Ching 2001, x). Ching examines 
the formation of Taiwanese political and cultural identities under the dominant Japanese 
colonial discourse of doka (assimilation) and kominka from the early 1920s to the end of the 
Japanese Empire in 1945. He also analyses the ways in which the residents of Taiwan 
struggled, negotiated and collaborated with Japanese colonialism, and delineates the shift 
from a resistance to Japanese colonisation into a personal and inner struggle to ‘become 
Japanese’. Ching draws particular attention to the triangulation between colonial Taiwan, 
imperialist Japan and nationalist China as a prerequisite to understanding the struggle over 
identity. He argues that, while Japanese colonialism attempted to delineate and delimit the 
relationship between China and Taiwan, China or Chinese nationalism has played an 
important role, at first as the necessary impetus for emancipation of colonial Taiwan and 
subsequently as the main object of resistance in post-colonial Taiwan. Taiwanese identity is 
apprehended as a contradictory and irreducible ‘triple consciousness’. As a result, the 
                                                                                                                                            
Taiwanese literature during the colonial period (known as kominka literature), are identified. First, the 
islander was self-imagined as an ‘incomplete’, ‘impure’, and ‘immature’ man. According to Liu 
(2003d; 2004b), one striking feature of  this literature is its multiplicity of  self-debasing bodily images, 
such as ‘unmanliness’, ‘incompleteness’, ‘rottenness’, ‘diseased blood’, ‘stinking odour’, etc. Then, the 
effacement and abjection of  the old self  is required. The strong demand to purify themselves through 
blood-cleansing and transcendence is found in those literary writings. In this sense, joining the holy 
battle in the Pacific War for many Taiwanese was not only to conquer the barbarian West, it was 
more a battle against oneself  – to purify our barbarian hearts. And finally, after the cutting off  and 
effacing of  the alien within oneself, one becomes an empty container; and the Japanese spirit 
subsequently occupies the locus of  self. One can then become a ‘complete’ and ‘decent’ man.  
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formations and transformations of colonial identities during Japanese colonial times 
inherently possess irreducible tensions and contradictions. And those identity positions, 
Ching argues, continue to mark and remark the cultural politics of post-war Japan, mainland 
China, and postcolonial Taiwan.   
The book in general is more a work of historiography and literary critique than a work 
of history. Ching does not aim to produce a comprehensive history of colonial identity; 
rather, he paints a vivid picture illustrating that the legacy of Japanese colonialism remains 
crucial in current Taiwanese political discourse and serves as a marker in differentiating 
contemporary Taiwanese identity from mainland Chinese identity. Thus, the focus of the 
book, as Ching (2001, 10; emphasis in origin) notes, is the ‘cultural dimension of Japanese 
colonialism and its legacy’, rather than the structure or history of Taiwan’s economic, 
political, and military domination.  
4-1-3. Research Questions, Methodology & Key Arguments 
Joyce Liu’s series of works and Leo Ching’s influential book contribute immensely to 
the growing body of new scholarship that has begun to explore the rich colonial experiences 
heretofore buried in the dustbin of history. Indeed, it is undeniable that Japanese 
colonisation as a past is acknowledged, but remains latent, in Taiwanese contemporary 
society, and people’s self-identification is formed and regulated with reference to this past. 
Nevertheless, as it is argued in the previous chapter, the present does not directly, 
continuously and spontaneously derive from what actually happened in the past, but from 
how the past is narrated, represented and interpreted in the present. We should therefore be 
more attentive to the politics of narrations, representations and interpretations.  
Consequently, there is a need for further investigation of the conflictual and 
competitive interrelationships between different interpretations/narrative productions, as 
opposed to discovering a true account of the past or examining the accuracy of a specific 
interpretation/narration of the past. Hence, this chapter does not aim to provide a grand 
narrative of Japanese colonial history, as many historians cited in Chapter Three have already 
done. Nor does it aim to illustrate how and why the people of Taiwan were forced to 
become ‘Japanese’ during the Japanese colonial administration or to elucidate the psychic 
structure of the ‘imperial subject’ during the colonial period, as Leo Ching and Joyce Liu 
have convincingly demonstrated. Instead, this chapter pushes their studies further and asks 
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how and through which practices the past is replicated in a certain way and what other 
alternatives are excluded from this process. In other words, the chapter is not interested in 
discovering exactly what happened in the past; rather, it is more concerned with how the 
past is represented and is revived in certain forms that constitute a specific type of identity in 
contemporary Taiwan.       
In terms of methodology, this chapter scrutinises the controversy surrounding the 
Japanese cartoonist Kobayashi Yoshinori’s manga, On Taiwan in 2001.90 On Taiwan is a book 
about Taiwan’s history, culture, ethnicity, politics and national identity based on Kobayashi’s 
own observations in Taiwan.91 The work presents itself as both a travelogue and a history 
book, and is presented in a lively, somewhat exaggerated manga style. Kobayashi himself 
appears in the book as a reporter, visiting many places in Taiwan and interviewing various 
Taiwanese people. He wants to present Taiwan as the site that remains the perfect 
embodiment of the ‘Japanese spirit’ that he would like the Japanese to salvage. In this aspect, 
although Kobayashi’s comments are on Taiwan, he in fact addresses his Japanese 
contemporaries, aiming to revive national pride and to reignite the Japanese spirit, so as to 
reconstruct Japanese national identity among young Japanese people. This manga could 
therefore serve as a tour guide for the Japanese seeking the lost home of Japanese virtues.  
The book was firstly published in Japan in 2000, which was a part of the author’s 
serialised comic, ‘New Arrogantist Manifesto’, issued in the Japanese magazine SAPIO. In 
February 2001, a Chinese translation of the book was brought out in Taiwan, which 
immediately aroused strong reactions and touched on some very sensitive nerves, inspiring 
serious debate and identity-related conflict in Taiwanese society. On the one hand, 
                                                
90 The term ‘manga’ is the Japanese word for print ‘cartoons, comic books, and animated films with a 
science-fiction or fantasy theme’ (Oxford English Dictionary: manga). The term is composed of two 
words in Japanese: ‘man’, which literarily means ‘indiscriminate’, and ‘ga’, which literarily means 
‘picture’. In Japan, manga are read by people of all ages. Therefore, a wide scope of topics and 
themes are covered in manga, including violence, romance, sports, historical drama, sex, science 
fiction, fantasy, and etc (Gravett 2004). 
91 Kobayashi is a founding member of  the Liberal Historiography Study Group (Jiyushugi shikan 
kenkyukai), a right-wing organisation in Japan that seeks to recast Japan’s wartime history in a 
positive light. Kobayashi received a remarkable amount of attention in the wake of  his earlier 
publication On War (Senso ron) in 1998, which was a bestseller in Japan. On War is also in a comic 
form, and argues that modern Japan’s inability to take pride in the history of  the war has lead to a 
crisis of  national consciousness. For a further introduction to Kobayashi‘s On War and the Liberal 
Historiography Study Group, please see Rebecca Clifford (2004).      
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protestors went into the streets. Some extremists even burned copies of the book as well as 
the Japanese flag. Loud and angry voices in the media called for the book to be banned and 
used phrases such as ‘traitors’, ‘enslaving education’, and ‘generations of the imperial 
subjects’ to attack those who voiced support for Kobayashi. On the other hand, equally 
strong voices welcomed Kobayashi’s idealistic and nostalgic depiction of Taiwan. They 
distributed the book in the street, arguing that Kobayashi had presented a convincing case 
for colonial modernity and demonstrated his understanding and appreciation of the virtues 
of the Taiwanese people. To them, Kobayashi’s view presented a ‘Taiwanese perspective’. 
Despite the controversy, the book undeniably sold well both in Taiwan and in Japan. 
The debate over On Taiwan lasted almost three months from late December 2000 to 
early April 2001. During this period, newspapers, magazines and broadcasters of all political 
stances gave extraordinary attention to the event. Politicians also fiercely debated about it in 
the parliament of Taiwan. Numerous reports, comments and essays on the topic appeared in 
newspapers and on the Web, and two volumes collecting these debates have been 
published.92 The event also attracted some scholars’ attention in academic circles.93 The 
manga apparently unleashed all kinds of feelings that the people of Taiwan had had towards 
Japan, and politicians – both opponents and proponents of the manga – also seized the 
opportunity to fan up the flames of conflict and to vilify their political enemy, in order to 
strengthen their political interests. The event became a discursive realm of a political battle, 
in which different discourses interact, intersect and compete with each other.  
This chapter aims to analyse those reports, commentaries, essays, articles and 
statements. Through analysing those texts made by people taking various positions (i.e. 
native Taiwanese vs Mainlander, pro-independence advocates vs pro-unification advocates, 
Taiwanese sympathisers vs Chinese sympathisers), the chapter attempts to comprehend how 
the discourses of Japanese colonialism and Sino-chauvinism reciprocally conflict and 
                                                
92 The Storm of  Yoshinori Kobayashi’s On Taiwan (Taipei: Qianwei, 2001), and The Three-Legged Person: the 
Komin Faces in Yoshinori Kobayashi’s On Taiwan (Taipei: Haixia Xueshu, 2002). 
93. In Japan, the principal criticism of  the content of  the book was made in Beyond Kobayashi’s ‘On 
Taiwan’ (East Asia Writers’ Network Japan, 2001), edited by some young Japanese researchers who 
are involved in the East Asia Literary, Historical and Philosophical Network. In Taiwan, a series of  
forums concerning Kobayashi’s work were held by the academic journal Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in 
Social Science in 2001. The forum minutes were collected in the book Reflections on Thesis of  Taiwan: 
Dialogues between Critical Circles in Taiwan and Japan, published in 2005. 
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compete with each other in ways that affect people’s self-identification, producing a 
particular form of subjectivity of Taiwan. In other words, the primary concern of this 
chapter is not whether or not (or to what degree) what Kobayashi said about Taiwan is 
accurate in depicting the politics and history of Taiwan. Rather, it focuses on how the book 
has been discussed in Taiwanese society, including which issues/discourses/ideologies have 
been raised and how they have been discussed, as well as what other alternative 
issues/discourses/ideologies, if any, have been repressed, silenced and made to disappear in 
the process of the event.  
In short, this chapter is an attempt to understand how a social event enables or disables 
certain ways in which people make sense of their past and thus come to terms with their 
belongings, their allegiances, and their situated-ness. It is also an attempt to understand how 
people’s self-identification in turn rearticulates and redefines the social event and the way 
people imagine political possibilities. The chapter wishes to argue that the emerging 
dominant Taiwanese national identity is not a static or fully-constituted identity, but a 
contradictory and conflicting identity. The embodiment of contemporary Taiwanese national 
identity must be apprehended and articulated in the contradictory and irreducible triangular 
interrelation among residual Japanese colonialism during the colonial time, the once-
dominant Chinese nationalism during the KMT’s authoritarian period and the currently 
dominant Taiwanese nationalism in the democratic era. 
Section Two elucidates how Kobayashi in his manga On Taiwan represents ‘Taiwan’, the 
‘Taiwanese nation’ or the ‘Taiwanese identity’. Section Three discusses the debates stirred by 
the publication of its Chinese version in Taiwan in 2001. Through an exploration of the 
debate, this section aims to answer the following questions: What issues were raised/omitted? 
What statements and utterances were made and who spoke? Whose voices and what 
statements were repressed and therefore disappeared? Also, it attempts to understand how 
the image of ‘Japan’ had been partially represented in Taiwan as being rightist, conservative, 
and nationalistic.  
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4-2. Yoshinori Kobayashi’s On Taiwan 
4-2-1. ‘Japanese Spirit’ in Taiwan  
The book cover of the Chinese edition is dominated by an image of a peanut, a symbol 
of the Taiwanese spirit, mounted by a Japanese samurai (Figure 4-1). On the back cover is a 
peanut that has been split and filled with white rice, a red plum in the centre, readily 
conjuring up the Japanese national flag (Figure 4-2). The design of the book cover indicates 
the main theme of this manga – the ‘Japanese spirit’. According to Kobayashi, the term 
‘Japanese spirit’ refers to pre-war Japanese virtues, values and moralities that have been lost 
in post-war Japan but preserved in contemporary Taiwan. In the book, he painstakingly 
illustrates what the ‘Japanese spirit’ is, albeit not directly through his own words, but through 
the mouths of the Taiwanese. 
Originally, the concept of ‘Japanese spirit’ in Taiwan was related to nostalgia for the 
Japanese colonial period. According to Jin Mei-Ling, a pro-independence advocate, the 
concept has a more general meaning of ‘the qualities of cleanliness, justice, honesty, diligence, 
politeness, trustworthiness, responsibility, lawfulness and service to the state’ – all attributes 
of modernity that a good modern citizen of the nation should display (Jin et al. 2001, 152-3). 
However, in Kobayashi’s rhetoric, the ‘deeper’ meaning of the concept is emphasised, that is, 
an implementation of a slogan – commitment to the public good and the annihilation of self. 
Every member of a collective Self should forsake his/her own private/selfish interests for 
the sake of the public good. Borrowing from the former president Lee Teng-Hui, Kobayashi 
says promoting the public good means the ‘death of self’: ‘If one wants to lead a meaningful 
life, one has to consider the question of death constantly. It is not physical death but 
absolute negation of the self. One needs to totally negate oneself, thereby devoting oneself 
to the public good’ (On Taiwan [OT], 39). It is worth noting that the public good in this 
context is directly and exclusively regarded as identical to the ‘state’, ‘country’ and ‘nation’ – 
a collective Self (OT, 57).      
Throughout the course of his interviews with former president Lee and pro-
independence business entrepreneurs (such as Xu Wen-Lung), Kobayashi found that such 
Japanese virtue was preserved in Taiwan, particularly among the Japanese-language 
generation in Taiwan. The book repeatedly praises Lee as a great leader who devoted himself 
to his nation, Taiwan. Kobayashi argues that Lee demonstrated the perfect spirit of ‘self-
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sacrifice for the sake of the country.’ For example, Kobayashi writes that ‘the peaceful 
transfer of political power accomplished by Lee is the best performance of forsaking private 
personal need for the sake of the public good so that the nation has a larger space for 
development’ (OT, 38). He compliments Lee as the best inheritor of the Japanese spirit, 
describing Lee as an authentic samurai who exemplifies ‘the death of the self’ (OT, 206).94  
In contrast to Taiwan, Chinese society is incapable of cultivating a concept of ‘public 
good’. The Chinese seemingly lack any concept of ‘public’ (OT, 79). Kobayashi criticises the 
Chinese for only being aware of themselves but not of the public. That feeds an attitude 
amongst the population that public affairs are none of their business, resulting in a lack of 
public morals. Chinese people are traditionally concerned with relationships between people 
but not relationships between individuals and society, which has bred a national character 
where power is exercised without corresponding accountability. The Chinese people do as 
they see fit with reference only to individuals. The possession of the concepts ‘public’, 
‘public good’ and ‘public morals’ by theTaiwanese people inherited from the Japanese has 
made the society of Taiwan nowadays much more developed than that of China. This is also 
the main differentiation between the native Taiwanese and the Mainlander (of Taiwan) since 
the native Taiwanese, again, due to their Japanese colonial experience, is more concerned 
with the public good than the Mainlander is, despite the fact that both of them share the 
same Han-Chinese ethnicity (OT, 75).  
Notwithstanding his comments on Taiwan, Kobayashi actually addresses his Japanese 
contemporaries. He wants to represent Taiwan as the perfect embodiment of the ‘Japanese 
spirit’ that he would like the Japanese to revive. He criticises Japan’s loss of ‘Japanese spirit’ 
and its lack of patriotism. The prevailing ‘left-wing thoughts’, as Kobayashi terms them, in 
post-war Japan have led to the deprivation of a sense of duty to the nation. The primary 
societal ill for Japan is its abundance of selfish interests with a dearth of consideration for 
the public good – the national interest.95 He writes, ‘Japan no longer exists; there is no citizen 
                                                
94 Lee regards himself as the way Kobayashi describes. Lee expressed on several occasions his 
willingness to visit Japan to give lectures for Japanese students on the essence of the Japanese spirit. 
He also published a book in 2004 on the spirit of the samurai, entitled as Wushidao Jieti.  
95 Also, Kobayashi refers to the concept ‘public good’ to legitimise Japan’s participation in WWII. He 
disapproves of those ‘left-wing’ thoughts that condemn Japan’s assaults on Korea and China during 
the WWII as a succession of aggressive and immoral acts. Conversely, he argues that Japan waged 
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but a selfish individual’ (OT, 51). The lack of a desire to die willingly for Japan is indicative 
of an impure and morally corrupt society. It is precisely to this end that Kobayashi claims 
that the ‘past’ of Japan is frozen in Taiwan;96 he intends to introduce Taiwan to his 
compatriots in order to enlighten the Japanese youth about what ‘Japanese-ness’ is. In short, 
Kobayashi takes Taiwan as a mirror that, he hopes, reflects authentic Japanese spirit. 
4-2-2. Taiwan’s Modernisation 
Alongside the ‘Japanese spirit’, another prominent inheritance of Japanese colonial rule 
in Taiwan is the country’s modernisation. In the manga, Kobayashi repeatedly alludes to 
modern development under Japanese colonial administration: building infrastructure in 
agriculture, transportation, communication, etc. As Kobayashi tries to convince his readers, 
the course of modernisation that the Japanese embarked on transformed Taiwan into a 
modern civilised society. The Taiwanese people under his pen are grateful for Japanese 
colonial rule. He goes to some lengths to find supporting evidence. For instance, Kobayashi 
quotes the Taiwanese businessman Xu Wen-Long, saying that Japanese rule in Taiwan 
actually helped people in Taiwan to experience the ‘taste of happiness’ (OT, 134). According 
to Xu, the people in Taiwan were not concerned about who their rulers were. Their true 
concern was whether rulers would protect their economic interests and improve their 
livelihoods and living conditions. By virtue of this perspective, in Xu’s view, ‘Japanese rule 
over Taiwan is indeed a conscience…policies enacted by the Japanese government led to the 
modernisation of Taiwan society’ (OT, 134). Xu is also quoted as saying, ‘we certainly need 
to appreciate the Japanese colonisation and grant them a positive appraisal’ (OT, 135). The 
former president Lee echoed this line of thought. In the book, Kobayashi quoted Lee as 
saying that, ‘if not for Japan’s fifty years of rule, Taiwan would be as underdeveloped as 
Hainan Island…It is important to let young Japanese understand what an excellent job their 
ancestors had done in Taiwan’ (OT, 23). Apart from Xu and Lee’s remarks, Kobayashi also 
provides a few examples to illustrate this nostalgic sentiment of the ordinary Taiwanese 
people by referring to many respectable Japanese officers (policemen, soldiers, 
                                                                                                                                            
war for justifiable reasons. As he writes in the book, ‘If we take the public interest of the totality of 
Asia into consideration, the invasion into China can be justified…The interest of public good 
through Japanese occupation can bring better happiness to Asian countries’ (OT, 90). 
96 He intriguingly describes in the book the flight between Taiwan and Japan as though a time 
traveller (OT, 65). 
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schoolteachers and architects) who devoted their lives to the people of Taiwan during the 
colonial era and are still enshrined in temples or commemorated in local ceremonies in 
Taiwan today (OT, 130-33 ;191-96). 
Kobayashi therefore contends that Japan should be remembered as a benevolent 
colonial country that brought positive results for its subjects: ‘Japanese rule over Asian 
countries during the Pacific War brought greater well-being to Asian people’ (OT, 90). 
Accordingly, Kobayashi suggests that Japan should abandon the so-called ‘masochistic 
historiographical perspective’ and ‘apologetic diplomacy’ that have over-emphasised and 
demonised pre-war and wartime militarism. Moreover, he also believes that those Japanese 
who feel guilty about Japan’s wartime behaviour should alter their attitudes and take pride in 
their ancestry. He writes in the book, ‘unlike those pre-war Japanese who are still being 
enshrined in Taiwan’s temples, their descendants in Japan contrarily lost their self-
confidence, thereby distorting a sense of national consciousness of being Japanese’ (OT, 196).   
Kobayashi here aims to remind his Japanese readers that they should cherish the values 
of being Japanese. The Japanese people today do not need to feel ashamed of their fathers or 
grandfathers. The conviction of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was just. Here, 
Kobayashi reiterates his argument in his earlier book On War that modern Japan’s inability to 
take pride in its wartime history has led to a crisis of national consciousness – which echoes 
the arguments of the Liberal Historiography Study Group, a right-wing organisation that 
seeks to recast Japan’s wartime history in a positive and deeply nationalistic light.      
4-2-3. Taiwanese National Identity  
Kobayashi in the book frequently emphasises the imperative for the modern subject to 
consider the issues of self-belongingness and self-identification. He keeps asking himself the 
following questions – ‘where do I belong?’, ‘who am I?’ and ‘what is my existence?’ Such 
questions for him are different formulations of the self-identification problem.97 Only by 
assuring one’s self-belongingness is one capable of interacting with others, thereby 
establishing an ethical relationship with the society as a whole. He writes, ‘If there is no 
                                                
97 Identity is defined here as ‘sameness’, ‘belongingness’, and ‘the foundation of  existence’ (OT, 61). 
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sense of belonging, how can there be any ethical differentiation’ (OT, 58)? This line of 
thinking apparently echoes with the modern political ideas of communitarianism.98   
Nevertheless, what makes Kobayashi’s line of thinking particularly striking is that he 
makes self-belongingness interchangeable with national identity. The question of self-identity 
is the same as that of national identity. The meaning of one’s existence is therefore solely 
defined by one’s nation. For Kobayashi, identity, existence, a sense of belonging, and ethics 
all make sense only in the context of the nation. National belonging or national identity is 
imperative for the modern subject to define the meaning of Self, thereby to exist. Therefore, 
Kobayashi claims that ‘the time being is an era of nationalism, which is indispensably 
required’ (OT, 52). Without national belongingness, the life of individuals became 
meaningless. Kobayashi writes:  
As a human being, it is necessary to seek self-belongingness, which is defined as 
national identity. Those individuals who lost their belongingness would inevitably 
perish themselves and become fortune-seeking materialists. (OT, 83)  
Thus, everyone should forsake their selfish interests for the sake of the ‘public good’ – the 
interests of the nation.  
On this basis, Kobayashi further elaborates the concept of ‘nation’. He opposes efforts 
to define nationality, nationhood, or national identity by consanguinity; rather, they should 
be defined by ‘spiritual inheritance’ and ‘national language’ (OT, 78). Kobayashi suggests that 
nationalism does not come from blood ties or racial homogeneity; rather, it is nurtured from 
a joint history thereby fashioning a shared spirit, and a common language on the same plot 
of land.99 As Joice Liu (2003d, 2004b) has analysed, Kobayashi’s understanding of the nature 
of nationality requires that the spiritual essence that constitutes the nation is the spiritual 
inheritance said to be shared by everyone in the community, and that the partaking of such 
abstract spirituality demands the voiding of the interior of an individual – the death of self – 
so that it can be replaced by the abstract spirit. In other words, in order to become a subject 
defined by the nation, one has to renounce/dissolve one’s self so that one can enter the 
                                                
98 The political ideas of  communitarianism referred to here are developed in Michael Sandel’s 
Liberalism and the Limits of  Justice (1982), Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory 
(1984), and Michael Walzer’s Sphere of  Justice: A Defence of  Pluralism and Equality (1983) and ‘Liberalism 
and the Art of  Separation’ in Political Theory 12 (1984).  
99. In this regard, Kobayashi is clearly influenced by philosophically idealist thoughts. 
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domain guarded by the constitution of the nation. Consequently, the subject position in 
terms of modernity is a non-I subject, directed toward the aims of the nation. 
This is how Kobayashi considers the essence of the ‘Taiwanese nation’. Since the 
spiritual inheritance, national language and common history take precedence over blood ties 
and racial homogeneity in determining the boundary of a nation, people in Taiwan should 
not embrace ‘consanguineous nationalism’ as Kobayashi terms it, identifying themselves as 
Chinese; instead, they should be unified by their common history (Japanese colonial 
experience), shared spirit (Japanese spirit) and distinctive language (Minnan dialect), 
upholding their self-identification as Taiwanese. 
In his manga, Kobayashi provides a specific interpretation/narration of modern 
Taiwanese history. Like many Taiwanese nationalists, Kobayashi also contends that the 
modern history of Taiwan is a story of alien rule and foreign occupation: the Dutch, the 
Japanese, the KMT, etc. Notwithstanding the fact that those alien ethnic groups/foreign 
forces are all ‘foreign regimes’, Kobayashi sharply distinguishes between the ‘good 
governance’ and ‘bad governance’ of those foreign regimes.  
Kobayashi especially juxtaposes Japanese colonisation – good governance – with the 
KMT rule over Taiwan – bad governance – in his illustrations and elucidations in the manga. 
First of all, while the Japanese generated modernisation for Taiwan, the ‘Mainlander KMT 
regime’ only brought about the massacre of the people of Taiwan, i.e. the 2-28 Incident (OT, 
146). Secondly, on several occasions (OT, 19, 143, 144, 145) Kobayashi portrays the Chinese 
Mainlanders, both in the text and in the illustrations, as dirty, cheating, greedy, lazy, brutal, 
superstitious, ill-educated, lawless and irresponsible, in opposition to the Japanese (the 
soldiers/officers in particular) who epitomise the qualities of cleanliness, justice, honesty, 
diligence, politeness, trustworthiness, responsibility and lawfulness (Figure 4-3). Kobayashi 
approvingly quotes the Taiwanese proverb, ‘when the dog leaves, the pig comes’ – wherein 
‘pig’ was used in the post-war period by the Taiwanese as a degrading term for the Chinese 
(the Mainlander), as ‘dog’ was used for the Japanese – as the best demonstration of the 
viewpoint of the Taiwanese people towards Japanese colonisation and the KMT’s 
authoritarian rule. Kobayashi elucidates that this proverb signifies that ‘the dog is at least 
somehow useful while the pig – being greedy, lazy and dirty – is futile’ (OT, 19, 145).  
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Alongside his juxtaposition of the KMT’s brutal rule with Japan’s better-natured 
governance, Kobayashi emphasises the momentousness of the Japanese colonial period in 
forming a collective and shared identity among the people of Taiwan. Japan’s colonisation 
over Taiwan helped to forge a shared identity in four aspects. Firstly, Taiwanese rebellion 
against the Japanese in the early stage of the Japanese colonial period unified different ethnic 
groups that were previously antagonistic towards one another, cultivating a shared 
consciousness for the first time (OT, 126). Secondly, although the Taiwanese suffered 
discrimination and exploitation under Japanese rule, Taiwan took major strides towards 
modernisation at many levels that helped produce a shared identity. An island-wide 
transportation network and the free flow of information, in particular, helped enable various 
ethnic groups to become a unified and integrated ‘people’ – a Taiwanese nation (OT, 125-35). 
Thirdly, Taiwan under Japanese rule cultivated a shared spirit – the ‘Japanese spirit’ – thereby 
acquiring modernised/civilised socio-cultural values and systems that are different from 
Chinese ones, which are pre-modernised/uncivilised (OT, 75). Fourthly, the spread of the 
Japanese language as the national one during the colonial period eliminated the hurdle of 
communication caused by the lack of a common language shared by the different ethnic 
groups in Taiwan (OT, 76-7). As mentioned above, Kobayashi emphasises the importance of 
a common language as being one of the foremost ingredients in forming a shared identity. 
His great emphasis on language in this respect serves a double function. Kobayashi on the 
one hand implies that those who are termed ‘Japanese-language generation’ possess a 
residual Japanese identity/Japanese-ness. They are to some extent Japanese, or, at least, once 
were Japanese, as opposed to being Chinese. On the other hand, he highlights the 
importance of creating a writing system of a ‘Taiwanese Language’ in order to purge 
Taiwanese minds of ‘Chinese cultural contaminants’ and to represent ‘authentic’ Taiwanese 
culture, thereby consolidating an emerging Taiwanese national identity (OT, 165). Kobayashi 
sheds light on Japan as an exemplification. He notes that the affirmation and consolidation 
of a distinctive Japanese identity/Japanese-ness in their history is derived from the utilisation 
of archaic Chinese characters without abandoning their own (Japanese) language. 
Nevertheless, the ‘Taiwanese language’ for Kobayashi seems to solely refer to the Minnan 
dialect. Other languages (such as the Aboriginal language) or dialects (such as Hakka) are 
ignored. 
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Above all, the fifty years of Japanese colonisation had made ‘the Taiwanese’ and ‘the 
Chinese’ become different ‘peoples’ and ‘nations’. Japanese colonisation in Taiwan with its 
legacies of the Japanese spirit and modernisation gave the people of Taiwan a vibrant and 
advanced personality. A vast cultural gulf separated Taiwanese from China’s feudal, stagnant 
society. This difference in cultural characters played an important role in the subsequent 
development of Taiwanese national identity. The inherited Japanese spirit and shared 
Japanese colonial experience had become the most important ingredients of ‘Taiwanese-
ness’. 
It should be noted that, although Kobayashi’s line of thinking opposes defining the 
(Taiwanese) nation by its blood-ties but instead by socio-cultural attributes, he still intends to 
argue that the ‘Taiwanese’ are genetically distinct from the ‘Chinese’. He claims that the root 
of the Taiwanese in consanguinity is a hybrid of the Han-Chinese and the Aboriginals. As he 
describes, the aboriginal tribes were the primary inhabitants of the plains of the island before 
the Dutch first established a colony in Taiwan. After establishing a colony, the Dutch 
encouraged Chinese immigrants to settle and farm in Taiwan. Most Chinese immigrants 
were young, able-bodied men and there were very few women, children or the elderly. As a 
result, men consistently outnumbered women among the Chinese immigrant population in 
Taiwan’s early modern history. Marriages between Chinese bachelors and Aboriginal women 
produced a large number of the mix-blood ‘Taiwanese’ – the origin of the Taiwanese people 
(OT, 123). 
In short, the successive periods of colonisation under those foreign regimes respectively 
heralded different physical and mental impacts on the populace of Taiwan, forging a 
distinctive Taiwanese-ness, a Taiwan nation and Taiwanese identity. Kobayashi writes in the 
final frame of the chapter on ‘Taiwan’s History’, ‘what are the authentic Taiwanese people? 
The authenticity of the Taiwanese people cannot be traced back in consanguinity. Only by 
facing and assessing one’s own history sincerely one can find the truths of the fact’ (OT, 156). 
Finally, it is again noted that, although Kobayashi’s comments are on Taiwan, his primary 
concern is that of Japan.100  
                                                
100 He writes, ‘I just hope young men in Japan can understand that people in Taiwan think hard every 
day about their identity and survival. Japanese do not have to worry if  they are Japanese or not, and 
they want to be so-called global citizens. I want to propose the question “What if  I am a Taiwanese?” 
to Japanese people, to show them they should cherish the values of  being Japanese. And only when 
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4-2-4. Modernisation Discourse   
Kobayashi’s political rhetoric manifested in the manga demonstrates a specific form of 
modernisation discourse. This discourse is threefold. First, Taiwan under Japanese 
colonisation had reformed ‘pre-modern/backward’ Chinese culture, transforming it into a 
‘modernised’ Taiwanese culture. The people in Taiwan accordingly evolved from the 
‘uncivilised Chinese’ to the ‘civilised Taiwanese’. Chinese cultural contaminants in this 
respect must be purged. The Taiwanese figures represented in the manga display their strong 
willingness to embrace the values of the ‘Japanese spirit’, thereby demonstrating themselves 
as being ‘modernised’. In addition, for Kobayashi, the Chinese-led KMT’s rule over Taiwan 
not only deterred and deferred Taiwan’s modernisation, but, more seriously, it engendered a 
sorrowful and brutal catastrophe for the Taiwanese. When the ‘civilised’ and ‘modernised’ 
Taiwanese people were governed by an ‘uncivilised’ and ‘pre-modern’ Chinese regime, it 
inevitably led to a massacre such as the 2-28 Incident. Meanwhile, it is clear that, from this 
point of view, the unification with Communist China, which is regarded as a ‘benightedly 
authoritarian regime’, would, of course, cause another 2-28-Incident-like tragedy for the 
Taiwanese in the 21st century. Second, for Kobayashi, the modernisation project under 
Japanese rule helped to form a shared identity. This line of argument in fact recapitulates a 
modernist argument, shown in Chapter Two, which argues that the course of modernisation 
created the possibility for a new form of imagined community – the morphology of modern 
nation. Following this line of argument, it is not difficult to appreciate Kobayashi’s remarks 
that the different aspects of Taiwan’s modernisation under Japan’s colonisation, such as the 
building of an island-wide transportation network, the free flow of information and the 
spread of Japanese as a common language, all made significant contributions to the 
formation of a Taiwanese identity. Third, the modernisation discourse suggests that the only 
way to achieve modernisation is to comply with the regime of the nation-state. National 
belonging or national identity is imperative for the modern subject to define the meaning of 
Self, so as to exist. Everyone in the modern era should therefore possess a nationality; and 
only with a nationality would a group of people achieve progress and modernisation. In this 
regard, nationalism is not merely engaged in the modernisation project; rather, nationalism is 
in fact part and parcel of the modernisation project itself.   
                                                                                                                                            
Japan retrieves her glory and awakening can she lead Asia into the next generation’ (OT, 59). 
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Under this modernisation discourse, the positive image of, and even nostalgia towards, 
Japanese colonialism held by many native Taiwanese becomes intelligible. Unlike Koreans, 
who vehemently detested and tenaciously opposed the Japanese and their colonial 
occupation, the Taiwanese are said to have retained a positive image of the Japanese and 
approvingly recollect the virtues of Japanese rule. If Koreans speak of oppression and 
resistance, the Taiwanese speak of modernisation and development, as Kobayashi has 
demonstrated in his manga.  
Moreover, this modernisation discourse in fact profoundly shapes, if anything, 
boundaries and connotations of a ‘Taiwan nation’. A series of dichotomies is created to mark 
the striking difference between the people in China and the people in Taiwan. The 
‘Chinaman’ is perceived as inflexible, feudalistic, reactionary, oppressive, and lacking any 
sense of the ‘public good’, while the Taiwanese, who benefited greatly from Japan’s 
colonisation, is flexible, modern, progressive, democratic and full of ‘public good’. No 
matter how ill-defined these descriptive terms are, the set of dichotomies in practice indeed 
helps to form a distinctive Taiwanese national identity. Representing the two cultures – 
‘Chinese’ and ‘Taiwanese’ – in terms of the pre-modern/modern polarity, the people in 
Taiwan essentialise the difference between the two. Consequently, modernisation discourse 
operates in a particular way in Taiwanese national identity formation, serving the practices of 
marking ‘us’, the Taiwanese, and ‘them’, the Chinese.   
In summary, On Taiwan is a comic text in which Kobayashi introduces and comments 
on Taiwan’s history, politics and culture. His illustrations and comments on Taiwan 
advocates not only legitimising past Japanese imperial history but also his intention to 
reignite the pre-war ‘Japanese spirit’ among young people in contemporary Japanese society. 
Taiwan under his pen is more or less like ‘Jurassic Park’. The dinosaur (‘Japanese spirits’) 
that is considered to be extinct is now ‘rediscovered’ living on an island (Taiwan). No matter 
whether Kobayashi’s illustrations are accurate or not, if one can truly examine them, his 
remarks not only provide an interesting, and somehow convincing, perspective to introduce 
Taiwan to his compatriots; but, more importantly, his discourse in practice has had real 
political ramifications for Taiwanese society which this chapter deals with in the following 
parts. Yet, it is important at this stage to indicate the problematic features of his manga. 
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The major problem with his manga is that its image of Taiwan is in fact to a great extent 
partial, if not distorted. The representation of Taiwan under his pen is incomplete and 
limited. Firstly, Kobayashi purposefully over-embellishes or over-beautifies the image of 
Taiwan in order to manifest the glory of the ‘Japanese spirit’. Japanese people might be 
disappointed when they come to see the ‘real’ Taiwan. In the end, Japanese readers would 
have a biased understanding of contemporary Taiwan and, quite possibly, Japan itself. 
Secondly, Kobayashi ignores all other experiences and opinions of Japan that are particular 
to ethnic groups, classes, genders and so on in Taiwan. The historiographical perspective 
presented in the manga is solely enjoyed by the so-called ‘Japanese-language-generation’, or 
more precisely speaking, a small group of Minnan-based (as opposed to Hakka, Aboriginals, 
the Mainlander, etc.), masculinist-oriented (as opposed to feminine, homosexual, etc.) and 
aristocratic-centred (as opposed to proletarian, tenant farmer, etc.) people who were once 
‘Japanese’. As a result, it is not surprising that, after the Chinese translation of On Taiwan was 
published, it soon prompted strong outrage among different peoples in Taiwanese society.   
 
4-3. The Turmoil over On Taiwan 
4-3-1. The Early Stage of the Turmoil: Publication of the Manga in Japan and 
in Taiwan   
The Japanese version of the manga On Taiwan was published as a paperback in 
November 2000. The book soon became a bestseller in Japan, with more than 250,000 
copies being sold in the country in the first two months alone (TT 12/02/01, 11). The 
widespread publication of the manga attracted Taiwanese media’s attention. China Times, a 
leading newspaper in Taiwan, initiated the first wave of reports concerning the manga. The 
newspaper’s political correspondent in Japan, Liu Li-Er, gave an exclusive series of reports 
on the manga at the end of December 2000. 
In those reports, Liu first of all portrays Kobayashi as one of Japan’s most controversial 
cartoonists and labels him as a right-wing opinion leader, who advocates rewriting Japan’s 
modern history and to abandon the so-called masochistic historiographical perspective. Liu 
then provides a general account of the contents of the manga. Particularly in her 4,000-
word-long article issued on 25 December, Liu comprehensively introduces the contents of 
the book, summarising each chapter, spelling out the purposes and the context of the book. 
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The role played by Taiwan’s former president Lee in the manga is specially stressed in Liu’s 
report. Lee’s comments in interviews appear in the manga and his recommendations for it 
are especially quoted.101 Moreover, the report also illustrates the popular support enjoyed by 
this manga in Japan. She describes how it was very influential in Japan among the youth 
since the medium of the manga is a highly effective means of communication in Japan for an 
author who wishes to target the youth as his or her principal readership. Liu therefore warns 
that Taiwan should not overlook the cultural and political ramifications of this book.  
Those reports were followed by a flurry of criticism in the press of Taiwan. One of the 
first commentaries, written by a senior political commentator Peng Hui-Xian, appeared in 
China Times on 25 December 2000. In her article, Peng censures Taiwanese politicians and 
entrepreneurs who appear in the manga. She argues that their remarks that endorse 
Kobayashi’s arguments would legitimise Japanese colonialism. Peng specially condemns the 
former president Lee for his remarks that Kobayashi’s perspective presents every aspect of 
Taiwan. Peng writes that it is ‘absurd’, ‘pitiful’, ‘lamentable’ and ‘dangerous’ to hear what Lee 
had said, especially when he frequently advocates constructing Taiwan’s subjectivity. Peng 
further casts aspersions on those figures’ double standards towards Japan’s and the KMT’s 
rules over Taiwan. She asks why those Taiwanese did not draw attention to Japan’s cruelty to 
Taiwan, which included comfort women and the Musha Uprising102 during the colonial 
period if they were to condemn the KMT’s brutality in the 2-28 Incident; and why they did 
not appreciate the KMT’s contributions to Taiwan’s economic development if they gave 
great credit to Japan’s involvement in the modernization of Taiwan (CT 25/12/00).   
Peng’s criticism of Lee’s sympathies with Kobayashi was reiterated by other 
commentators. A senior journalist, Chen Shi-Chang (CT 25/12/00), for example, describes 
Lee as an ‘aged-Japan-junky’, a ‘guardian of the Japanese spirit’, who, being mentally 
disordered, tends to seek imaginary roots, thereby misplacing his self-identification. Likewise, 
Huang Jing-Juan (CT 26/12/00)., a professor at National Sun Yet-san University, also wrote 
an article, sneering at the shallowness of the Taiwanese people’s Japan-admiring-mentality. 
                                                
101 Lee said that since there is this manga, the people do not need textbooks on Taiwan’s history 
anymore. The manga has represented every aspect of  Taiwan. 
102 The uprising occurred in 1930 when 139 Japanese were slaughtered by a tribe of  Aborigines at an 
Aboriginal school sports day. The Japanese army subsequently cracked down on the uprising.  More 
than 644 Aborigines were killed in the incident (Zhou 1997, 130). 
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She ridicules the fact that the so-called ‘Japanese spirit’ in Taiwan had been limitedly 
comprehended as committing hara-kiri (a ritual suicide under the Japanese samurai code of 
honour). 
Along with the aforementioned series of criticisms aimed at Taiwanese figures that were 
included in the manga, another line of commentary dwelled upon the linkage between 
Taiwan’s independence corps and Japan’s right-wing forces. Zheng Xiu-Juan (CT 26/12/00), 
a Taiwanese PhD student at the University of Tokyo, suggests that the publication of On 
Taiwan in Japan is not a coincidence but a consequence of the mobilisation by some native 
Taiwanese who reside in Japan, aiming to attract the notice of the Japanese populace to 
Taiwan. Zheng admits that it indeed successfully ‘advertised’ Taiwan in Japan. Nevertheless, 
writes Zheng, if the volume remains merely at the level of promulgating an image of Taiwan 
in Japan, it would not be the target of criticism among intellectuals in both Japan and Taiwan. 
The problematic of this attempt, according to Zheng, springs from Kobayashi’s arbitrary 
interpretation of Taiwan’s history, ascribing the development/modernisation of Taiwan 
solely to the Japanese (or Japanese colonialism). This way of thinking that praises Japan’s 
role played in East Asia prior to WWII, however, has a warm reception among many 
Japanese youth since the right wing forces in Japan are steadily and progressively emerging. 
Zheng reprimands those trying to build a distinctive Taiwanese identity upon the basis of the 
legacy of Japanese colonialism (i.e. the Japanese spirit) as being ‘too shallow and dangerous’. 
This attempt, Cheng suggests, negates the Mainlanders’ contribution to Taiwan on the one 
hand and overlooks the condescending face of the former coloniser on the other. 
Dai Guo-Hui, a renowned Taiwanese scholar residing in Japan for over forty years, 
holds a similar opinion. In an interview conducted by the Chinese newspaper United Daily 
News (27/12/00), Dai contended that the cooperation between Taiwan’s independence 
advocates and Japan’s right wing forces would not only limit Taiwan’s further development, 
but would also sharply deteriorate the relations between China and Japan. Like Zheng and 
Dai, Peng Hui-Xian (CT 25/12/00) also disagrees that Taiwan should, while facing China’s 
military intimidation, act jointly with Japanese right-wingers and approve of Japanese 
colonisation in Taiwan, since by doing so the people in Taiwan would internalise Japanese 
colonialism, thereby failing to take the opportunity to reflect on the complex and ambivalent 
impacts of Japanese colonialism in Taiwan. To those commentators, the publication of 
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Kobayashi’s manga and the warm reception it received signify the revival of Japan’s right 
wing forces and militarism. 
In short, during this period, the focus is on Kobayashi’s interpretation of history, the 
legacy of Japanese colonisation in Taiwan, and the revival of Japanese militarism. While 
some commentators provided a critique of the Japanese-language-generation’s longing 
affections towards Japan, others regarded the publication of Kobayashi’s manga as a tie-up 
of Taiwan’s independence movement and the ghost of Japan’s militarism.   
4-3-2. Disputes over Issues of ‘Comfort Women’ 
After the Chinese version of On Taiwan was published in Taiwan, several human 
rights/women’s rights groups including the Taipei Women’s Rescue Foundation, a non-
governmental organisation long dedicated to fact-finding on Taiwanese comfort women,103 
held a press conference in Taipei on 21 February 2001, launching a campaign against On 
Taiwan, which included a call on the public to boycott it.  
In the manga, Kobayashi quotes Taiwanese business leader Xu Wen-Long 104  as 
contending that the Japanese government could not possibly have forced comfort women to 
work against their will. As Xu said in the book, according to his personal investigation, 
working in a Japanese military brothel had been the best possible thing for many Taiwanese 
women. He continued that the women were often sold into prostitution by impoverished 
parents but worked in sanitary conditions and were able to save money. The Japanese 
military at that time was very concerned about human rights. Also, hygiene standards there 
could not have been better. The job of comfort woman was a lucrative one and all women 
therefore entertained a hope to enter the military in this way – far from being coerced to join 
it (OT, 203-4). Xu’s comments are illustrated with a drawing of Taiwanese women cheerfully 
                                                
103 Historians say some 200,000 young women, mostly Koreans but also women from Taiwan, China, 
the Philippines, and Indonesia, were forced to serve as sex slaves in Japanese army brothels during 
the Second World War. Japan has so far refused to pay compensation or to offer an official apology 
to those women. The Japanese government instead set up a ‘private’ Asia Women’s Fund for those 
ageing victims. Most of  them, however, refused to accept its help, calling instead for direct state 
compensation from the Japanese government. 
104 Xu is the president of  Chi-Mei Electronics Corp. He is normally labelled as a pro-independent 
tycoon and was invited by President Chen after his victory at the presidential election in 2000 to be a 
senior advisor to the president. Xu spent the first 17 years of  his life under colonial rule – and 
received a Japanese education – until the island was given to the KMT government in China 
following the end of  WWII in 1945. 
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lining up to be recruited by a seated Japanese officer (Figure 4-4). Xu is quoted asking 
Kobayashi that, ‘It simply takes an investigation to bring the whole truth to light, so why has 
Japan not conducted any probe into the event’ (OT, 204)? According to Xu, the Japanese 
government has only made the uproar bigger by blindly offering apologies. Xu subsequently 
adds that the Nanjing Massacre is in a similar vein. The massacre was an American and 
Chinese invention. He suggests that the Japanese government should interrogate those 
allegations by itself, thereby finding out the truth.  
The aforementioned illustration of comfort women in the manga sparked strong anger 
in Taiwan. Human rights groups accompanied by female scholars and opposition legislators 
in the press conference not only condemned Kobayashi’s twisted representation of the 
history of Taiwanese comfort women, but also lambasted the senior national advisor Xu and 
another Taiwanese entrepreneur Cai Kun-Can, who was also interviewed by Kobayashi. 105 
They refuted Kobayashi’s statements on the basis of their own research on Taiwanese 
comfort women. According to their research, while the recruited comfort women indeed 
included a few already working as prostitutes, the majority of them were recruited against 
their will, either by means of coercion, force or deception carried out through colonial 
government-sponsored corporations, notably the Taiwan Colonial Trade Corporation, at the 
request, and with the assistance, of the Japanese military forces (CTE, 21/02/01; TT 
22/02/01, 2).106  
The protest against the manga quickly spread across the political arena of Taiwan.  On 
the following two days, a series of press conferences were held by various opposition 
legislators in Legislative Yuan,107 expressing their profound disapproval of Kobayashi, Xu 
and Cai’s remarks. One of the legislators even dramatically tore the book in half at a press 
conference (TT 23/02/01, 2). The demands made by those legislators are twofold. Firstly, 
                                                
105 Cai  was also quoted on a different occasion as saying he found it incomprehensible that a court in 
Yamaguchi Prefecture ruled in favour of  the comfort women in a lawsuit. Cai said if  these women 
could get compensation, then Japanese women who were compelled to prostitute themselves to US 
soldiers in order to ensure the safety of  all Japanese women, should also get state compensation (OT, 
102). 
106 Aside from the Taiwan Colonial Trade Corporation, as human groups claimed, the Japanese 
government also used prefectural officers and local police to recruit comfort women by forcible 
means. 
107 Opposition parties include KMT, PFP, and New Party. 
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they asked that Xu and Cai apologise for their comments on the comfort women and 
requested that President Chen remove Xu from his position as a senior national advisor to 
the President. Secondly, the opposition legislators requested that the Executive Yuan (the 
cabinet) start a probe to see if any government officials have been involved in what they 
called ‘practices disgracing the nation’. They criticised Taiwan’s representative to Japan, Luo 
Fu-Quan, and the national policy adviser, Jin Mei-Ling.108 The former is featured in the 
comic as singing songs praising Japanese militarism in Kobayashi’s receiving banquet, the 
latter arranged Kobayashi’s tours to Taiwan (CT 23/02/01; TT 23/02/01, 2).   
Along with those press conferences, two eighty-year-old former comfort women were 
organised to have an informal meeting with the premier Zhang Jun-Xiong on 23 February 
during a break in an interpellation session at the legislature, asking him to protect the dignity 
of Taiwan’s comfort women. Two former comfort women presented their case to the 
Premier, condemning Xu for his distortion of the history of the comfort women. The 
legislators pressed Premier Zhang to make a public, official refutation of the book’s contents 
during an interpellation. Premier Zhang finally asked the Japanese government to offer a 
formal apology for the humiliation inflicted on Taiwanese comfort women during WWII 
(CTE 23/02/01; TT 24/02/01, 2).  
The public resentment towards the manga not only appeared in parliament but also in 
the streets. A book-burning ceremony outside Taipei’s biggest bookstore was hosted on 25 
February by a Mainlander legislator, Feng Hu-Xiang, who is widely known for his hatred of 
the Japanese. Protests also occurred in the city of Taichung and Keelung, where 
demonstrators protested in front of a chain store appealing to the public not to purchase 
products from Xu’s food company. In addition, a big demonstration against the manga took 
place in Taipei Main Railway Station on the same day, calling for a boycott of the manga and 
demanding an apology from Xu and Cai (CT 26/02/01; TT 26/02/01, 2). Scenes of weeping 
ex-comfort women and indignant book-burning sympathisers demonstrating in protests 
intensively graced the television news in those days. 
                                                
108 Jin Mei-Ling is a former exiled Taiwanese dissident and had herself  been blacklisted by the KMT 
between 1961 and 1992. She is a native Taiwanese ethnically and was born in Taiwan in 1934 during 
the Japanese colonial period. She grew up in a wealthy Taiwanese family and received her education 
in Taiwan until she moved to Japan in 1959, doing her higher education in Waseda University. She 
also appeared in Kobayashi’s manga as a friend who accompanies Kobayashi to visit the former 
president Lee, incumbent president Chen, and Taiwanese entrepreneur Xu Wen-Long. 
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Under such heavy pressure from the public, both Xu and Cai primarily refused to 
comment on the issue or confirm if they were correctly quoted in Kobayashi’s book. Yet, 
after public discontent increased, Xu responded for the first time to the controversy on 25 
February. At the conference he denied ever having said that comfort women had willingly 
accepted their work as sex slaves for the Japanese or used it as a way of raising their social 
status. Yet, as Xu expressed his sympathy for those comfort women who were not voluntary, 
he reiteratively stressed that ‘the Japanese military did not force those women to become 
comfort women, rather it was their own parents that forced those women’ (TT 26/02/01, 2). 
Xu then went on to claim that if the public was really interested in what happened to the 
comfort women, they would also look into similar violations by the KMT military on the 
outlying island Kinmen and Matsu in the past fifty years and the circumstances of the 
military prostitutes who were employed there by the armed forces.109 In addition, Xu also 
suggested that Taiwan should not jeopardise its relationship with Japan due to this manga 
since Japan, as an important business partner of Taiwan, actually contributes greatly to the 
development of Taiwan’s economy. And finally, he dismissed cries from the opposition 
legislators who called for him to step down from his post as a senior adviser to the president 
(CT 26/02/01; TT 26/02/01, 2).  
Xu’s responses to the public in his press conference did not calm the public fury but 
only triggered another fiercer wave of protest. While some people publicly castigated Xu as 
being a businessman who ‘runs after the cash by discarding his dignity’, ‘earns money from 
his compatriots to flatter the Japanese’, others accused Xu of intending to divert the public 
gaze by inappropriately comparing comfort women in the Japanese army with the military 
prostitutes in the KMT’s army. People condemned Xu as undeserving of being Taiwanese 
(CT 26/02/01). A few protestors gathered around the publisher of the manga on 26 
February, burning a Japanese national flag and demanding that Kobayashi be banned from 
visiting Taiwan again. Derogatory terms such as ‘Japanese-dog’, ‘slaver-of-the-Japanese’, 
‘Han-Chinese-traitor’ and ‘aged-imperial-subject’ were widely used to refer to Xu, Cai and 
the former president Lee – the Japanese-language-generation – in the media and on the 
Internet. A mass of complaints swamped Xu’s and Cai’s companies. The Presidential Office 
                                                
109 For decades, it was common practice on the outlying island groups of  Kinmen and Matsu to 
provide soldiers with prostitutes. Some women who were employed at such brothels were reportedly 
forced into their occupation. The practice was halted in the mid-1980s. 
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and the DPP headquarters, which had been tight-lipped about the controversy, also became 
the target of complaints. Some prosecutors even expressed the idea of putting Xu on trial for 
his libel of the comfort women (CTE 26/02/01).                   
Xu was then forced to issue another statement on the following day (26 February) in an 
attempt to silence the firestorm of criticism over comments he made earlier. The statement 
explained that modern people are unable to fully understand the life of people in Taiwan in 
the early part of last century, lack a sufficient understanding of historic events, and cannot 
judge whether the women were forced into prostitution or not. Xu uttered in the statement: 
Modern people are clueless about the historic background of that era [during 
WWII]; neither do [people today] understand the thoughts and concepts of the 
Taiwanese who were once governed by the Japanese. These factors all triggered a 
gap of historic interpretation between Taiwan’s older and younger generations. (TT, 
27/02/01, 3)   
However, Xu insisted in the statement that, in accordance with what he had heard and saw 
during Taiwan’s colonisation by Japan, comfort women were indeed not coerced. Xu 
therefore suggested that the Taiwanese should spend more time and energy solving existing 
problems – such as issues concerning child prostitutes as well as Aboriginals who have 
succumbed to poverty and become prostitutes (ibid.).   
Xu’s second statement attempted to highlight the cognitional gaps between those who 
once were ‘Japanese’ and those who were brought up under the KMT’s propagandistic 
education. In addition, he also implicitly indicated that the voices of his generation were 
repressed in Taiwanese society. However, this explanation did not receive much sympathy. 
His attempts seem only to have added to the fury. Opposition legislators and women’s 
groups still stood firm that Xu should resign from his post as a presidential advisor. On 27 
February Xu finally released a written apology (TT 28/02/01, 3). In this written apology, Xu 
said he felt ‘terribly sorry’ for the hurt done to the victims by his remarks, which he admitted 
were ‘biased’ because of his ‘limited experience’. He said he never meant to insult the victims. 
The comfort women episode, writes Xu, was a historical tragedy as inhumane as the war 
itself and he promised to support research on the issue as well as on that of the prostitute 
system which used to exist in the KMT’s military. This was the first time Xu apologised for 
his remarks made in the manga. After Xu admitted his ‘limited experience’, the fury of the 
public eventually calmed down somewhat, though some still insisted that Xu need to show 
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his sincerity by offering a face-to-face apology to the comfort women and continued to 
argue that Xu should resign his post as a national senior advisor.  
During this period, voices from the pro-Kobayashi camp including DPP politicians and 
Taiwan independence advocates were very restrained and low-key.  Their earliest response to 
the public fury over the comfort women issue was made by DPP legislator Cai Tong-Rong 
on 24 February, calling for attention to the KMT’s military prostitutes as constituting a 
similar example of human rights/women’s rights violations. On the same day, the author of 
the manga, Kobayashi, also reacted to the criticism he received from Taiwan by saying that 
the issue of comfort women had already become a political means manipulated by the 
opposition politicians (CT 25/02/01). Similarly, Taiwan’s Vice President Lu, when 
interviewed by the press on 25 February, also attributed the entire public fury to ideological 
conflict between independence and unification advocates. She said that, if the person quoted 
in the manga had not been Xu, who rather supported the DPP and possessed such ‘strong 
Taiwanese consciousness’, public discontent would not have been intensive in the same way 
(CT 26/02/01). Briefly, from the viewpoint of the DPP government, the attacks against the 
manga and Xu, while ostensibly in the name of comfort women, have in fact been very 
political and ideological. They accused the opposition politicians of seizing an opportunity to 
wage political warfare, using the issue to wage attacks against pro-DPP or pro-independent 
figures for their own political purposes.  
Anti-Kobayashi Rhetoric in the Press 
When the debate revolved around the comfort women issue, hundreds of articles had 
been widely issued in Taiwan. In the mainstream of the press, most commentators still 
found it hard to accept the fact that Kobayashi’s reactionary nationalistic arguments found 
sympathy in Taiwan. A large number of articles continued to blame pro-Japan attitudes 
upheld by the Japanese-language-generation, though a small number also targeted the Japan-
fever phenomenon among the Taiwanese youth (the so-called ‘Japan junkies’). For instance, 
an article written by a renowned member of the Academia Sinica contends that those 
‘imperial subjects’ (i.e. the former president Lee and Xu) had been nurtured in the Japanese 
culture and felt they are superior to others. He further criticised that those imperial subjects 
have neither been accepted by mainstream Japanese society nor understood the profundities 
of Japanese culture. Such a pro-Japan attitude possessed by those imperial subjects, as those 
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commentators bitterly described, is a sort of a ‘mentality of the colonised’, ‘identity disorder’, 
or ‘humiliation of the Taiwanese’. Similar to the earlier critics, those commentators also 
showed their reservation, if not total refutation, of ‘Taiwanese national identity’ if it is based 
upon an ‘unabashedly pro-Japanese account of Taiwan history’. A senior political 
commentator, Xia Zhen, for instance, argued that a subconscious nostalgia for Japanese 
colonial rule, possessed by the older generation, could have twisted the understanding about 
the history of Taiwan, such as the history of comfort women. She claimed that the older 
generation who had been educated under Japan’s rule had little experience of Japanese 
atrocities tended to side with Japan; and they came to miss Japanese rule especially after the 
brutalities of the 2-28 Incident and the White Terror. She then strongly urged that Taiwanese 
identity ‘should not be built upon the Japan-nostalgia mentality’ (Xia, CT 25/02/01).  
Along with the aforementioned articles that revolve around Taiwan’s affectionate and 
nostalgic attitudes towards Japan, some articles directly attacked Japanese colonialism and 
Japanese colonisation of Taiwan. This line of criticism contends that, no matter how 
different aspects of Japanese colonial rule over Taiwan were exercised, their oppressive 
nature is identical. The dignity and human rights of the colonised people are similarly 
deprived and infringed. A column in China Times (27/02/01), for instance, suggested that, 
although Japan’s colonial regime indeed contributed greatly to the modernisation of Taiwan, 
it was the same group of people that destroyed the native culture of the Taiwanese, absorbed 
the natural resources of Taiwan’s economy, and exploited the people of Taiwan. Far from 
bringing the enlightenment of modernisation to the people of Taiwan through education, 
Japanese colonisation was a process that involved enslaving the Taiwanese people. Likewise, 
Huang Wei-Fung, a research fellow at Academia Sinica, criticises the immorality of Japanese 
colonisation through reflecting the case of comfort women (CT 01/03/01).110 
                                                
110 As Huang elaborated, the most direct power relationship is that the Japanese colonial rulers 
directly coerced the women to become comfort women. A less direct relationship exists when the 
colonial rulers control the options of  colonised people’s behaviour (i.e. the comfort women who 
were sold by their family because of  unbearable economic burdens), thus the latter would rather opt 
for what the rulers prefer. A third relationship occurs when comfort women not only voluntarily 
served, but thought such acts were morally justified – serving as comfort women for the Japanese 
army brought not only economic benefits but also the pride and prestige in being associated with the 
rulers.  By identifying these three asymmetrical power relationships, Huang concluded that Japan’s 
colonial government should be condemned, whether or not facts prove the women were coerced. 
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While some articles concentrated upon Japan’s colonisation of Taiwan, others lashed 
out at the ‘Japanese nation’ itself (or ‘the Japanese people’ themselves). Ho Sheng-Fei (TT 
26/02/01, 8), for instance, criticises Japan for its refusal to apologise sincerely and to face up 
to its past wrongdoings. He attributes to Japan’s national character its reluctance to express 
its regret to its neighbour countries. Ho employs American cultural anthropologist Ruth 
Benedict’s famous but controversial book, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, which argues that 
Japanese society is moulded by a ‘shame culture’, as opposed to a ‘guilt culture’ possessed by 
the West. In a shame culture like Japanese society, people believe that, once mistakes are 
made, no amount of atonement can do any good. But one does not have to worry unless 
one’s wrongdoing is discovered. They therefore try to escape responsibility by erasing and 
blurring their history of conquest. Benedict’s analysis of the Japanese national character, for 
Ho, indeed correctly explains Kobayashi’s attempt to gloss over, or even beautify, their 
wrongdoing in the past.   
Ho’s psychoanalysis of ‘Japan’s national character’ indeed reflected a phenomenon that 
anti-Japanese sentiment was widely disseminated in the society of Taiwan amid the wave of 
debate over the comfort women issue. Although some commentators tried to convince the 
public that the fringe status Kobayashi enjoyed in Japanese society and rightist disposition 
represents a very small minority of the Japanese, most showed their disapproval of Japan’s 
attitudes and behaviours while facing war crimes during WWII. Those commentators 
contended that the majority of the Japanese people are not aware of their government’s 
appalling wartime criminal record. Not only do schoolchildren not learn the truth, the 
Japanese government has done its very best to ensure that all citizens grow up thinking that 
they were the victims, not the perpetrators of WWII.  
The image of ‘Japan’ in Taiwan during this period, then, was represented as right-wing, 
nationalistic, and somewhat militaristic. Ironically, this image is produced by the 
collaboration of both pro-independence and pro-unification advocates. While pro-
independent proponents appealed only to Japan’s right-wing arguments in order to get 
public support from the society of Japan and to differentiate Taiwanese-ness from Chinese-
ness, pro-unification proponents in return used the same materials to attack independence 
advocates’ remarks. The image of ‘Japan’ represented in Taiwan as a result was limited to 
those reactionary voices of Japanese society. Other voices were simply left out. It is precisely 
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for this reason that some political commentators in both Taiwan and Japan call for creating 
more comprehensive communication between the two societies, rather than solely relying on 
the interaction between Taiwan’s Japanese-language generation and Japan’s right-wingers.111 
As a matter of fact, the promotion and maintenance of the relations between Taiwan and 
Japan have indeed heavily relied on Taiwan’s intelligentsia from the Japanese-language 
generation. Subsequent generations in both Taiwan and Japan lacked a kind of intimate 
mutual understanding since both sides’ intelligentsia had begun to emulate trends in Western 
countries (in the US, particularly) in the post-war period. It is indeed easier for the old 
intelligentsia like former president Lee to interact with Japan on the basis of their personal 
relationships.112  
Yet, this manner of interaction between Taiwan and Japan causes the mutual 
understanding of both societies to become unbalanced, since the Japanese-language 
generation only constitutes a small part of society of Taiwan and they enter into dialogue 
with only one of the two poles of Japan’s political spectrum. Moreover, this incomplete and 
unbalanced dialogue between Taiwan and Japan not only affects the Japan-Taiwan relationship, 
but, more importantly, it profoundly fashions the characteristics of Taiwan’s collective 
identity. Owing to the fact that ‘Japan’ played a significant role in the formation of 
Taiwanese national identity, the unbalanced representations of Japan then turn out to be a 
thorny issue for many Taiwanese in forming a shared identity. The constitution of Taiwanese 
national identity as a result is regarded as somehow intimately associated with Japan’s right-
wing forces or militarism. This way of identity formation is totally distasteful for those 
Mainlanders who went through traumatic experiences of war with Japan during WWII and 
those subsequent generations (of both the native Taiwanese and the Mainlanders) who were 
instilled with loathing for ‘Japan’ and Japanese colonialism/militarism during their schooling. 
They therefore tend not only to refute the colonial intelligentsia’s Japanese experiences as 
well as their interpretations of Taiwan’s history stressing the momentousness of Japanese 
                                                
111 Please see Yang Yong-Min (CT 26/02/01) Hsu Tung-Ming (TT 21/03/01, 8) and Takefumi 
Hayata (TT 28/05/01, 8; TT 07/11/02, 8). 
112 Undeniably, Lee is attractive to many Japanese in some ways. First, Lee’s goodwill towards the 
Japanese has satisfied their nostalgia for the old days. In addition, while Japan has constantly been 
reproached by the world for its wartime invasions, Lee has been the only foreign leader who praises 
Japan. Also, many Japanese are deeply attracted to Lee’s personal charm, his erudition in Japanese 
culture and his fluent Japanese.  
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colonisation, but also to attack their elaborations of the connotation of Taiwanese-ness that 
insist upon Japanese-ness existing significantly within it. They urged that, if the KMT has 
had to face a painful re-examination of its fifty-year rule over Taiwan, the fury caused by the 
publication of On Taiwan had shown that the attitudes held by some people about the 
Japanese colonisation need to be re-examined as well.  
In consequence, the Japanese-language generation’s interpretations of history as well as 
their elaborations of Taiwanese-ness are refuted in the mainstream of Taiwanese society. 
This refutation is paradoxical and sarcastic because their voices in fact have been dominant 
in the courses of Taiwanese identity construction and have played a significant role in 
Taiwan’s political discourse. In fact, there is always a collective anxiety circulated in the 
native Taiwanese community, agonising that the voices of native Taiwanese would be 
suppressed by the Mainlanders, though the latter are actually even more marginalised. This 
collective anxiety is clearly manifested in the pro-independence proponents’ opinions over 
the comfort women issue amid this wave of debate over comfort women.  
Pro-Kobayashi Rhetoric in the Press 
The pro-independence proponents published their articles in pro-independent 
newspapers (such as Liberal Times, New Taiwan Magazine, Taiwan Daily News, and Taipei Times) 
responding against those who condemned Kobayashi and the figures cited in the manga. 
Their viewpoints can be summarised as follows. First of all, they refer to the so-called 
‘Military Paradises’ – military prostitution in the KMT’s army – operated during the 
authoritarian period, questioning the double standards held by those opposition parties and 
human rights/women’s rights groups.  
According to those articles (Yao Chi, TT 27/02/01, 8; Lin Zhao-Yi The Storm of Yoshinori 
Kobayashi’s On Taiwan [Storm], 62-3, also in TDN 24/02/01; Lin Zhao-Yi Storm, 67-8, also in 
TDN 26/02/01; Wei Rui-Ming Storm, 64-6, also in TDN 24/02/01; Li Xiao-Feng Storm, 74-
6, also in ZEN, 26/02/01), after the KMT government and its army of six hundred 
thousand soldiers retreated to Taiwan in the late 1940s, the government set up ‘Military 
Paradises’ to fulfil the sexual needs of its soldiers, who were mostly Mainlander lads, in order 
to ‘stabilise the army’s heart’. Particularly, those military brothels mushroomed in front-line 
islands like Kinmen and Matsu. The reports portray that the largest source of the ‘Military 
Paradises’ was perhaps illegal prostitutes who were caught by the police and subsequently 
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sent to the military camps. Such operations gradually ended as the generation of Mainlander 
soldiers aged in the 1960s and 1970s. Those pro-independence proponents questioned that, 
while those opposition politicians, human rights groups and media lambasted Kobayashi and 
Xu, they simply overlooked the existence of the KMT’s ‘Military Paradises’ as well as other 
violations of human’s rights such as the 2-28 Incident and the White Terror. Meanwhile, 
many commentaries also expressed suspicions that, while the comfort women issues had 
been in the news for quite a few years since 1992, those issues became a hot topic after the 
row over On Taiwan put a political gloss on the issue. They thus concluded that those human 
rights and women’s rights groups criticising Kobayashi and Xu’s remarks on the comfort 
women were not sincere in their concerns. Under this rhetoric, the comfort women issue 
turned from a human rights issue into a political one. Thus, from the views of those pro-
independence proponents, the rise of the comfort women issue was apparently a conspiracy, 
initiated by opposition parties, the pro-unification human rights/women’s rights groups, and 
the pro-unification media. As a result, the controversy over comfort women (and the manga 
On Taiwan) in Taiwan in the end was interpreted as an ethnic clash between the native 
Taiwanese and the Mainlanders, as a political confrontation between the ruling party and the 
opposition parties, an ideological conflict between pro-independence and pro-unification, a 
friction between pro-Japanese and anti-Japanese sentiments, and, above all, an identity 
collision between Taiwanese identity and Chinese identity.    
A renowned pro-independence writer, Song Ze-Lai, issued a series of articles in Taiwan 
Daily News. Sung contended that the furore against On Taiwan is a stratagem launched by the 
Mainlander-led media, which he referred to as comprising China Times and United Daily News, 
intending to suppress the ‘aged-native-Taiwanese’ from telling the truth about Taiwan’s 
history and proposing to demolish the histographical perspective of the native Taiwanese. 
According to Song, the old generation of the native Taiwanese who experienced Japanese 
colonial rule would agree with the former president Lee’s and entrepreneur Xu’s remarks 
quoted in Kobayashi’s manga (Storm, 60-1, also in TDN 23/02/01). In another article, Song 
challenged the justification of those Chinese Mainlanders’ criticisms by saying that those ill-
fated-aged-native-Taiwanese-women (the comfort women) are used as a political implement 
to struggle against the native Taiwanese, stirring up the internal conflict within the native 
Taiwanese community (Storm, 77-9, also in TDN 27/02/01). The issue of the comfort 
women from this point of view turned out to be exclusively a matter of the native Taiwanese 
   157
 
community. The Mainlander, as an outsider, should not engage in this affair. This line of 
thinking, surprisingly, found sympathy in contemporary Taiwan. A fairly large number of 
articles manifested similar arguments. While some (e.g. Hu Chang-Song Storm 148-52, also in 
LT 03/06/01) suggest that the ethnic group of the Mainlanders is not entitled to comment 
upon Taiwan’s national affairs like the comfort women issue because Taiwan was ceded to 
Japan by their (the Mainlanders’) ancestors one hundred years ago, others contend that the 
Mainlanders, while trying to ‘take advantage of the comfort women issue to serve their own 
party political agenda’, should not forget that ‘their predecessors also committed heinous 
crimes against humanity in more than fifty years of autocratic control of Taiwan’ (Jennifer 
Chen, TT 28/02/01, 8). 
In addition, along with the aforementioned commentators ascribing the rise of criticism 
over the comfort women issue to the ethnic conflict, others (pro-independence proponents) 
associated it with the political struggle between the pro-independence ruling party and pro-
unification opposition parties. Many articles (Editorial Storm, 80-2, also in TDN 27/02/01; 
Wang Mei-Xiu Storm, 94-6, also in TDN 28/02/01; Sun Qing-Yu Storm, 100-3, also in TDN 
02/03/01) suggested that opposition politicians had tried to exploit the comfort women 
issue to embarrass the incumbent president Chen and the ruling party DDP. For them, those 
issues such as comfort women or Japanese colonialism/militarism were used by pro-
unification parties or media to incite the public’s resentment towards the DPP government 
and other pro-independence supporters like Xu. In this respect, the hidden agenda of protest 
against Kobayashi’s book is nothing but a political struggle.  
The Vanishing of Comfort Women in the Confabulation of ‘Comfort Women’   
In respect to the turmoil over comfort women issues during this period, the nature of 
the debate owes very little to human rights/women’s rights but to national/ethnic identity.  
When women’s groups first went public with their complaints against the manga, they 
presumably addressed a worthwhile and serious issue. However, since comfort women were 
a product of Japanese colonisation, the subject immediately converted to a sensitive subject 
of national identity in the eyes of many Taiwanese people. In this respect, the pro-
independence proponents are fairly right to interpret the turmoil over comfort women as an 
ethnic or identity conflict. Nevertheless, this transformation of the nature of the turmoil 
does not come innately; rather, it is what both sides – pro-independent/Taiwanese 
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sympathisers and pro-unification advocates/Chinese sympathisers – made of it, since they 
are all imprisoned in a masculinism-based nationalist way of thinking.  
The gender aspects of nationalism have, until recently, been rarely addressed in the 
scholarly literature on nation and nationalism (Walby 1996, 235). However, in recent decades, 
feminist scholars have begun to investigate nations and nationalisms from feminist 
perspectives.113 Most of them agree that nations and nationalisms are themselves gender 
formations. Nira Yuval-Davis and Floya Anthias (1989) provide pioneering and influential 
research on the role of women in the nation and nationalism. In the introduction of their 
volume Woman-Nation-State, they summarise women’s roles in the nation and nationalism as 
follows:  
(1) as biological reproducers of members of ethnic collectivities; 
(2) as reproducers of the boundaries of ethnic/national groups; 
(3) as participating centrally in the ideological reproduction of the collectivity and as 
the transmitters of its culture; 
(4) as signifiers of ethnic/national differences;  
(5) as participants in national, economic, political and military struggles. (1989, 7) 
On this account, the implications of masculinism-based nationalism are twofold. First, 
women are urged to take their jobs as mothers more seriously for the good of the nation. If 
women’s role as public citizens is defined by their ability to produce children, then those 
women who use sex for other ends necessarily threaten this assumed role. Second, for a long 
time the concept of nation has commonly been given maternal imagery and the virginity of 
the female sex has been perceived as the purity of the nation. Virginity – the purity of 
women’s body – is a metaphor of the purity, dignity and integrity of nation. Therefore, 
invasions of a nation by foreign forces are analogised as intrusions into a woman’s body 
thereby contaminating her purity and stealing her virginity.  
Under this masculine-nationalist discourse, some Chinese sympathisers regarded the 
mentality behind Kobayashi’s illustrations of the comfort women in On Taiwan as a variant 
of Japanese jingoism and called the book an insult to the dignity of the Chinese/Taiwanese 
                                                
113 Please also Silvia Walby (1996), Andrew Parker et al. (eds.) (1992), Partha Chatterjee (1993), Anne 
McClintock (ed.) (1995), Nira Yuval-Davis (1997), Joan B. Landes (2001), and Tricia Cusack and 
Sighle Bhreathnach-Lynch (eds.) (2004). 
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people. It was even more unacceptable for Chinese sympathisers when they found some 
native Taiwanese siding with Kobayashi in such disputes. Many Chinese sympathisers had 
long held suspicions that the native Taiwanese had betrayed their Chinese roots during the 
Japanese colonisation. This explains why some of those politicians who had never been 
concerned with women’s rights issues before were so outraged when they were faced with 
the manga, and strongly condemned Kobayashi’s illustrations of comfort women and Xu’s 
pro-Japanese mentality.      
For the pro-independence camp, their responses to the furore over comfort women 
also manifest its masculine-nationalist way of thinking. Bringing the ‘Military Paradise’ 
matters forward to the public not only shows their anti-Chinese/KMT/Mainlander 
sentiments but more importantly, it also demonstrates different subject positions (as 
opposed to ‘the Chinese’) associated with ‘Japan’ when considering their self-identification. 
For those native Taiwanese who were once ‘Japanese’, ‘Japan’ is the object that the Self 
intends to be, thereby being part of the Self. This sort of mentality of the colonised is 
depicted vividly by Albert Memmi:  
The first attempt of the colonised is to change his condition by changing his skin.  
There is a tempting model very close at hand – the coloniser…The first ambition of 
the colonised is to become equal to that splendid model and to resemble him to the 
point of disappearing in him. (Memmi 1965, 120)      
Once one conceives of ‘Japan’ as part of the Self and China/the KMT/the Mainlander as 
out of the Self, it is then intelligible that one does not condemn the operation of comfort 
women by the Japanese army during the war period but censures the KMT’s exercise of 
‘Military Paradises’. Moreover, it also explains why those who were once ‘Japanese’ like Xu 
Wen-Long or Cai Kun-Can said that working in a Japanese military brothel had been the 
‘best possible thing’ for many Taiwanese women.   
Under this masculine-nationalist discourse, those comfort women in Taiwan endure 
double shackles: the virginity of a woman and the virginity of a nation. Those severe gender 
discriminations have been imposed on them for over fifty years. They are not able to utter 
their voices since their purities as women and as national subjects were ‘contaminated’ by 
men and by ‘foreigners’. This explains why the plight of comfort women during WWII (and 
the KMT’s ‘Military Paradises’) came to light in the 1990s. Here, we can see overlapping 
impositions between nationalism and masculinism. Furthermore, since masculinism and 
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nationalism were so dominant in the debate over comfort women, the real issues concerning 
women’s rights/human rights had been overlooked. The voices of the real victims – comfort 
women – were hardly heard in the media of Taiwan. And some important issues that needed 
to be addressed were missed out, such as demanding compensation from the Japanese 
government, or government complicity in acting as an agent to recruit women to serve the 
troops’ sexual needs. 
4-3-3. Disputes over Human Rights/Speech of Freedom and National Identity 
The government of Taiwan announced on 2 March 2001 that it would ban Kobayashi 
from visiting Taiwan. The decision was made in a committee meeting reviewing the case of 
Kobayashi. The committee was organised by the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) in 
accordance with Immigration Law, which states that foreigners might be banned from 
entering Taiwan if they ‘are believed to endanger national interests, public security, public 
order, or the good name of the State’ (Item 13, Article 17). The Vice Minister of the MOI 
explained the reasons of the decision to the press as follows:   
The opinions and viewpoints depicted in the comic book…have triggered strong 
criticism in Taiwan. It has damaged our country’s image, damaged our national 
dignity, affected what the international community thinks of us and endangered our 
national interests…and posed a threat to public safety. (CTE 02/03/01; TT 
03/03/01, 1)   
Critics arose immediately after the order was issued. They argued that the contents of 
the manga belonged in the realm of free speech and should not be cited as a reason for the 
government to ban the author’s visit. Keeping the author out of the country is an 
infringement on personal freedom. Some pro-independence advocates, Huang Fu-San for 
instance, contended that the move was a step too far and could damage Taiwan’s image as a 
democracy. Huang said,  
Kobayashi is only a cartoonist. Because of this small book, the government has 
decided to ban him from visiting. I think some might therefore equate Taiwan with a 
communist country where free speech is banned. (TT 03/03/01, 1; emphasis added) 
He further claimed that the government’s move was meant for domestic consumption, a 
response to demands made by pro-China politicians from the opposition parties. Huang 
further predicted that, since most of the book depicted Taiwan’s spirit as a sovereign and 
autonomous country, the decision would trigger protests from pro-independence supporters. 
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Likewise, the vice president Lu, who is often regarded as a pro-independence fundamentalist 
in the DPP’s government, also denounced the decision. She said in the press:  
The DPP has praised itself for advocating reform in the field of human rights in the 
past, and president Chen has also pledged to rule the country on the basis of human 
rights…whether to protect freedom of speech is a very important index by which to 
judge the standard of human rights in the country and, therefore, neither the 
decision [to bar the controversial cartoonist] nor to burn his comic books conforms 
to the principle. (CT 04/03/01; TT 04/03/01, 1)  
Lu insisted that Taiwan should not jeopardise its hard-won reputation as a ‘liberal-
democratic country’ in the international community. From the viewpoint of pro-
independence advocates, the furore over comfort women issues (and On Taiwan) was 
shepherded by pro-China/unification politicians and the decision made by MOI was a 
concession to pro-China/unification voices, violating freedom of speech, thereby infringing 
human rights and harming Taiwan’s national reputation as a democratic country in 
international community.   
This line of argument was not only upheld by the pro-independent camp. Some notable 
scholars and human rights activists also proclaimed that Taiwan was overreacting to the 
manga. Bo Yang – the renowned author of The Ugly Chinaman and also a member of the 
president’s human rights advisory group – made a remark that:  
We could refute his opinions, or we could choose not to read his book, but that’s 
only as far as we should go. Anything else is unnecessary or inappropriate (CT 
03/03/01; TT 03/03/01, 2).   
He said in the press that such conduct does not make any sense and simply reminds the 
Taiwanese people of the White Terror era when freedom of expression was strictly suppressed.   
The decision to ban Kobayashi from entering Taiwan was then represented in the 
media of Taiwan as an affront to freedom of speech and, subsequently, as reminiscent of the 
repression of the martial law era. When Taiwan was still under the grip of martial law, the 
exiled Taiwanese dissidents were not permitted to come back to their own country. The 
mechanism that produced the list of the island’s persona non grata – known as ‘blacklist’ – 
during that time was blurred and hazy, controlled mostly by the country’s secret police as 
well as other related national security agencies. But when the KMT-led government in the 
1990s began gradually to democratise, calls for establishing a transparent mechanism to 
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review the blacklist emerged. In a similar manner, the critics of the decision to ban 
Kobayashi questioned the mechanism at play behind the decision and demanded that the 
government make the whole process transparent. They lashed out at the officials’ insistence 
in keeping names of non-officials who had attended the discussion confidential. Since the 
critics threw doubt on the process leading up to the committee’s decision to bar Kobayashi, 
the decision itself was then analogised with the ‘blacklist’ during the KMT’s authoritarian 
period. This analogy is, however, somewhat unfitting and ironic since ‘the blacklist’ during 
the authoritarian period targeted Taiwanese residents rather than foreigners, and the 
mechanism (the then-two-year-old Immigration Law) that made the decision to bar 
Kobayashi was in fact a consequence of the demands for transparent mechanisms when the 
island’s ‘black list’ was reviewed in the 1990s.  
Following a chorus of criticism from Taiwan’s public opinion, the cabinet on 3 March 
formally backtracked, saying that the decision to bar Kobayashi was ‘not definite’ and should 
be reconsidered in order to avoid damaging ‘Taiwan’s democratic image’ in the international 
community (TT 04/03/01, 1). The Interior Minister Zhang Bo-Ya became the subject of 
condemnation. She was forced to amend the decision, albeit reluctantly, saying in the 
legislature: 
I did not hear any criticism of the Japanese government nor the US government for 
violating human rights when they refused to allow Taiwan’s former president Lee 
Teng-Hui into their countries. (Ibid.) 
The subjects of the controversy over On Taiwan at this point deviated from the comfort 
women issue and interpretations of Taiwan’s colonial history, turning to the issues of the 
breach of human rights, the violation of freedom of speech, the harm of national reputation 
as a ‘democratic country’, as well as the reexamination of KMT’s authoritarian history in the 
past decades. This trend of metamorphosis of the nature of the controversy was reinforced 
and accelerated after Jin Mei-Ling – a Japan-based national policy adviser who is also a 
longstanding supporter of Taiwan’s independence – returned to Taiwan to defend 
Kobayashi and his right to visit Taiwan. She held a press conference on 4 March. 
In the press conference, Jin expressed bemusement at criticising Kobayashi, an action 
she characterised as jumping on a bandwagon, and for which she finds the interior and 
foreign ministers particularly at fault, and called on both ministers to step down. Jin 
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emphasised Kobayashi’s ‘affections’ towards Taiwan and the Taiwanese people, and 
demanded that the government should issue a formal apology to Kobayashi. She also argued 
that, while Taiwan’s international space is constrained by the PRC, the only selling point for 
Taiwan to appeal for a formal recognition of Taiwan’s statehood is ‘liberty’ and ‘democracy’. 
Banning Kobayashi from entering Taiwan would seriously damage Taiwan’s democratic 
image (CTN 04/03/01; TT 05/03/01, 3).   
Although she returned to Taiwan to defend Kobayashi, Jin herself however created a 
new furore. The opposition legislators were particularly outraged after Jin stated on a 
television talk show that she does not recognise the ‘Republic of China’ and considers 
herself as ‘an adviser to president Chen,’ not ‘a national policy adviser of the Republic of 
China’. At various legislative sessions, the opposition legislators fiercely interrogated the 
cabinet. While some still questioned the decision to ban Kobayashi from entering Taiwan, 
most of the uproar turned to issues over national loyalty and the national identity of the 
members of the cabinet and national advisors in particular. They called for the president to 
remove Jin from the post as national advisor. 
In the Home and Nations Committee, while some legislators gave support to the MOI 
by arguing that the government should put the significance of ‘national dignity’ or 
‘sovereignty’ ahead of an insistence of the observation of ‘human rights’ or ‘freedom of 
speech’, others conversely held that human rights as ‘cosmopolitan values’ should take 
priority over other issues in the administration led by President Chen, who had been long 
advocating those values. Interior Minister Zhang, when fielding questions from the 
legislators, proclaimed that the recommendation to block Kobayashi’s visit was prompted by 
concerns for his personal safety rather than displeasure over the contents of his book. Yet, 
Zhang promised to the legislators to take ‘human rights’ into consideration before handing 
down a final decision. She said that MOI would reconvene a committee at a later date to 
reconsider the case as to whether or not to deny Kobayashi’s entry (TT 06/03/01, 3). 
Likewise, Premier Zhang, in responding to a legislator’s question at a routine interpellation 
session, said that he had already instructed the MOI to re-evaluate the government’s policies 
and regulations related to denying entry to blacklisted persons. Zhang said that although 
Kobayashi’s controversial manga ‘twisted the truth’ in sections about comfort women, 
Taiwan’s international image and human rights track record would suffer and could be 
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sullied if the government were to name the right-wing writer a persona non grata simply 
because it does not agree with his opinions (TT 07/03/01, 2).  
Meanwhile, in the Organic Laws and Statute Committee, the opposition legislators 
strongly demanded the dismissal of the two presidential advisers. New Party Legislator Lai 
Shi-Bao requested a full investigation over national advisor Jin’s national allegiance, so as to 
determine whether her loyalty lay with Japan or Taiwan. Lai said that, Jin’s inappropriate 
remarks had signified ‘an insult to Taiwan by the Japanese’, and it was mortifying that the 
administration did not refute her remarks (CTE 05/03/01). In a similar manner, at a Routine 
National Affairs Forum, legislators were particularly incensed by Jin’s statements that she did 
not recognise the Republic of China. PFP legislator Qin Hui-Zhu, for instance, said that if 
Jin continued to say that she does not recognise the Republic of China, then the president 
should not simply sit by while she ‘tramples all over the Republic of China,’ but should 
instead dismiss her from her post (TT 07/03/01, 2). Taking a step further, New Party 
legislator Feng Ding-Guo suggested removing both Xu’s and Jin’s posts from the 
government payroll (TT 06/03/01, 3). Some legislators even intended to revise the laws 
relating to the Presidential Office by adding a provision to the statute on the organisation of 
the national policy advisers committee requiring recognition of the ROC (CT 07/03/01). To 
those legislators, only dismissing Jin from the post as national advisor could rescue Taiwan’s 
dignity.    
Fielding the opposition legislators’ onslaught on national advisor Jin, the deputy 
presidential secretary-general Chen responded by insisting upon the protection of freedom 
of speech. He said, ‘whatever Jin says reflects merely her personal opinions’, but her freedom 
of speech should be guarded (ibid.). Also, in response to the opposition attack, some pro-
independence legislators retaliated in the legislature by questioning the opposition’s national 
identity. For instance, DPP legislator Zhang Chuan-Tian remarked:  
Those who criticised Kobayashi’s book are all Chinese. They are not Taiwanese…an authentic 
Taiwanese would not insult Xu and Jin if they read On Taiwan through the 
perspective of the Taiwanese. (CT 06/03/01; emphasis added) 
Alongside questioning national advisor Jin’s national allegiance, the opposition 
legislators also interrogated other members within the cabinet who were associated with 
Japan. The controversy to some extent escalated into all-out anti-Japanese sentiment. The 
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General Secretary of National Security Council Zhuang Ming-Yao, who was born during the 
Japanese colonial period and has a Japanese spouse, was demanded to make known his 
position towards the manga (CTE 07/03/01). Another prominent ‘Japan-associated official’ 
being scrutinised by the opposition legislator is Taipei’s de facto representative to Japan, Luo 
Fu-Quan.114  
Luo had come to the spotlight earlier because he had been featured in Kobayashi’s 
manga as singing a Japanese martial chant and praising Japanese militarism in a banquet 
receiving Kobayashi. He was invited to give a report on ‘Taiwan’s Current Relations with 
Japan’ and ‘Taiwan’s Comfort Women Case Proposal’ on 7 March at a legislative committee 
meeting of Foreign and Overseas Chinese Affairs. Although Luo had rebutted charges in 
public earlier of singing a Japanese martial chant at the banquet, he was challenged by New 
Party legislator Feng Hu-Xiang to sing the ROC national anthem to demonstrate his 
patriotic credentials and to illustrate his loyalty to the country. Lo retorted: ‘is it a mark 
against me because I was educated during Japanese colonial rule?’ (CTE 07/03/01; TT 08/03/01, 4; 
emphasis added). In the legislature he was also asked to declare where he stands in the 
controversy over On Taiwan. Luo responded by stating that the contents of the manga were 
‘very improper’ but fell within the realm of freedom of speech. He added that he was 
surprised about the fuss surrounding its publication. ‘It never occurred to me that a manga 
could cause such a tremendous impact in Taiwan’, said Luo (ibid.). Moreover, opposition 
legislators also urged Luo to refute the contents of the manga and condemn Kobayashi 
officially as a representative to Japan. He, however, refused to do so, saying that it was up to 
the government to decide how the issue should be handled. Luo’s explanation and continued 
refusal elicited a tirade of angry responses by legislators. KMT Legislator Lin Hong-Zong 
deplored Luo by saying that fifty years of Japanese colonisation of Taiwan had produced two 
types of people: one is the beneficiary such as national advisor Jin, and the other is the 
victim such as comfort women. The Legislator criticised Luo as a representative of Japan’s 
lack of courage to condemn Kobayashi (ibid). Indeed, Luo’s Japanese experiences and his 
participation in the Taiwan independence movement during the 1970s incited some doubts 
                                                
114 Luo Fu-Quan worked as the Deputy Director of  the Tokyo-based Institute of  Advanced Studies 
at the United Nations University before taking up the post as Taiwan’s de facto ambassador to 
Tokyo. He was blacklisted in the authoritarian period due to his support for Taiwanese independence 
and had his passport revoked until 1992. 
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over his national allegiance. Another KMT Legislator, Chen Xue-Sheng questioned Luo’s 
ability to do his job as Taiwan’s de facto ambassador to Japan in light of his past Japanese 
experiences (ibid.). 
It is also noted that the controversy during this time had fanned the flames of ethnic 
strife between the native Taiwanese and the Mainlanders. While the debate over comfort 
women was taking place, the already existing ethnic tensions had been boosted further. For 
instance, some Taiwanese independence advocates from the Taiwan Nation-building Forum 
held a rally on 1 March to protest against opposition parties. They displayed a placard saying 
‘When the dog leave, the pig comes’ as a figurative expression, to satirise the Mainlanders’ 
(KMT’s) uses of Taiwanese women to serve as prostitutes for its army, in comparison with the 
Japanese Imperial Army’s use of comfort women. Likewise, it was reported in Taiwan’s press 
on 8 March that several ethnic-assaulting banners, ‘Chinaman and dog not permitted to 
enter’ and ‘Get Out! China Pig’, were found in a communal park in the city of Kaohsung 
(CTE 08/03/01).         
Commentaries in the Press 
Most political commentators during this time, whether they were working in the 
mainstream or pro-independence media, focused on freedom of speech and human rights 
issues. Those opinions (Xia Zhen, CT 03/03/01; Editorial, CT 03/03/01; Yu Zheng, CTE 
03/03/01; Editorial, TT 03/03/01, 8; Hu Wen-Hui, LT 09/03/01) can be categorised into 
the following ways of reasoning.     
First of all, although the manga had indeed triggered an uproar and many people found 
it hard to accept Kobayashi’s right-wing views, many commentators proclaimed that Xu’s 
and Kobayashi’s freedom of speech must be respected since it is protected by Taiwan’s 
Constitution. The use of government authority to ban Kobayashi from entering Taiwan 
constitutes a violation of his freedom of speech. Voltaire’s renowned remark – I disapprove 
of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it – was frequently quoted in 
the press of Taiwan during that time (e.g. Editorial, CT 03/03/01). The commentators 
further contended that, since virtually all of the high-ranking officials in the DPP-led 
government fought hard against the KMT in the past to win this precious democratic 
freedom, they should not be so willing to let it go now. One of the columnists questioned 
whether the DPP would ‘leave behind its human rights insistences with which they fought 
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with KMT’s authoritarian regime after it came to power’ (Zheng Xiu-Juan, CT 05/03/01). 
The MOI’s move reminds them of those ‘not-so-long-ago days of martial law, when 
Taiwan’s political dissidents were banned from returning home’ (Editorial, TT 03/03/01, 8). 
The recollection of the so-called ‘black list’ had been resurrected. If the DPP-led 
government did not correct its own mistake, not only would Taiwan destroy its hard-won 
democratic image, but also its path of democratisation would be backtracked to the level of 
‘China’. For those commentators, Taiwan and China are diametrically opposite of each other 
in many aspects. Yet it appears to them that the two have actually integrated in at least one 
way when Taiwan’s government decided to place the author of the manga on the list of 
unwelcome persons and prohibited his entry. One of the commentators stated: ‘How will 
the government be able to argue that the two sides of the [Taiwan] Strait are different 
because Taiwan is a democracy and China is a totalitarian regime?’ (ibid.). This line of 
argument was, however, challenged by the following two alternatives.  
A major competing rhetorical argument stressed the imperatives of national dignity, the 
national interest and sovereignty. This alternative line of argument asked the following 
questions (Sandy Yeh, TT 11/03/01, 8): ‘Does the government have to grant permission to 
all foreigners who wish to visit the island if those foreigners potentially endanger the 
interests of Taiwan?’ ‘Does the government have the obligation or the capacity to protect the 
human rights/freedom of speech of all local residents, both the ROC nationals and 
foreigners, who obey the law and pay taxes here?’ ‘Does this obligation extend to cover 
nationals who do not even reside in Taiwan?’ Above all, ‘Is the government really 
‘backtracking on democratic politics and violating human rights by making the decision?’ 
The prototype of those series of questions is whether the national 
interest/dignity/sovereignty takes precedence over human rights/freedom of speech, or the 
other way round. This line of argument (Xia Zhen, CT 09/03/01; Sandy Yeh, TT 11/03/01, 
8) therefore suggested that the MOI’s move was a legitimate exercise of Taiwan’s national 
sovereignty, if the ban on Kobayashi’s entry was a decision made by government agencies 
through a legal procedure. They argued that, whether or not Kobayashi really loves Taiwan 
as he claims, his status as a ‘foreigner’ to Taiwan is unquestionable. And the decision is made 
by the review committee, which consists of representatives from relevant government 
agencies, in light of the Immigration Law. Moreover, they contended that international 
norms have never required countries to issue visas to all foreigners, just as we do not 
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necessarily have to allow all visitors who ring the doorbell to come into our houses. The 
rationale behind this line of thought is that national interests or sovereignty should take 
priority over considerations of human rights/freedom of speech.  
Another alternative approach (Xia Zhen, CT 09/03/01; Editorial, TT 09/03/01, 12; 
Wang Jian-Xuan, Liu Guang-Hua, CT 11/03/01) took the ideas of ‘ethics of speech’ or 
‘position of speech actor’ into account when reviewing the controversy. It suggested that 
‘ethics of speech’ and ‘positions of the speech actor’ do matter when considering freedom of 
speech. One is not free to say just anything; one cannot simply speak of any thing, when one 
likes or where one likes. In respect of Xu’s remarks on comfort women, some commentators 
argue that it is simply not morally right to make such comments on the basis of his personal 
experiences. Even though Xu enjoys freedom of speech, it does not mean that he can 
legitimately say anything that might cause others harm. Likewise, the case of national advisor 
Jin’s open denial of the legitimacy of the ROC – saying she does not recognise it – can also 
be viewed through the prism of this argument. For those commentators, free speech is not 
an issue here; what is at stake is the government’s political accountability towards its people. 
They urged that Jin must not forget that the ‘ROC on Taiwan’ has, through democratisation, 
become a government derived from the consent and free will of the people to whom it owes 
political accountability. How can the government be politically accountable when its 
members do not even concede the government’s legitimacy? They argued that if Jin had 
been an ordinary citizen, rather than a member of the government, she would have been free 
to make such a statement. But she was not. They therefore called on Jin to do the right 
thing – either retract her statement or resign as presidential advisor.  
‘Human Rights’ as an Identity   
Those concerns that lay stress on ‘ethics of speech’ or ‘position of speech actor’ are 
particularly worthy of consideration when reflecting on the whole event, though they are not 
the focus of this chapter. This final section instead argues that the turmoil over On Taiwan at 
this stage shows us the significant role played by ‘human rights’ in the formation of 
Taiwanese national identity. ‘Human rights’ in Taiwan is in fact a function of identity, 
serving as a mechanism to differentiate Taiwan from China.   
It is noted that national identity in Taiwan has always been defined in terms of its 
relationship with ‘mainland China’. As Shih Chih-Yu (2000) argues, for decades, anti-
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communism ideology played the role of laying a foundation of distinctive (Chinese) national 
identity in Taiwan to differentiate it from Communist China. The KMT propaganda before 
the 1980s concentrated on the question not ‘why the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was 
evil, but how it was evil’, for instance, highlighting its suppression of the freedom of the 
Chinese people under the CCP totalitarian regime, elimination of the Chinese cultural 
tradition during the Cultural Revolution, etc. (Shih 2000, 230). Internationally, the Cold War 
system helped to legitimise the KMT’s practices of human rights abuses, since, whenever 
violations of human rights met overseas criticism, the KMT appealed to anti-communist 
ideology. Domestically, the KMT’s struggles to maintain its goal of recovering the mainland 
gave people in Taiwan a clear objective and a distinctive sense of self-identification. As a 
result, human rights issues seemed trivial for Taiwan at that stage of maintaining its 
distinctive national identity and were of course not germane to political legitimacy before 
1980s.  
Nevertheless, according to Shih (ibid., 231-2), several developments challenged this 
anti-Communist identity to which the KMT had long subscribed. Firstly, as most countries 
in the world began to recognise the PRC as the sole representative of China in the 1970s, not 
only did the KMT’s claim to recover the mainland China become increasingly untenable but 
Taiwan (ROC) also lost its orthodox status representing China in world politics. Secondly, 
when the Cultural Revolution ended at the end of the 1970s, the CCP opened its market to 
the world and initiated economic reform. In a definite, albeit limited sense, China became 
capitalist. Thirdly, the ideologically-based confrontation of the Cold War ceased at the end of 
the 1980s, and Taiwan’s anti-communist ideology came to be meaningless. Those 
developments as a result made anti-communism in Taiwan a trivial matter. Anti-communism 
lost its function economically, internationally, politically and culturally, to maintain an 
identity distinctive from China. The task to maintain a distinctive national identity for the 
Taipei regime then became extremely difficult. According to Shih, Taiwan’s official position 
on human rights issues consequently transformed. In order to redefine Taiwan’s national 
identity vis-à-vis China, the KMT under the presidency of Lee Teng-Hui began to use the 
concept of ‘democracy’ or ‘human rights’ not only to struggle against his political rivals 
domestically – Mainlander politicians of the KMT – but, more importantly, to further 
differentiate Taiwan from China ‘internationally’. The Taipei regime now looked for signs of 
anti-democratic/human rights incidents in mainland China in order to firmly establish the 
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differences between China and Taiwan. ‘Human rights’ under this circumstance came to be 
seen as an identity, and play a significant role in the discourse of Taiwanese nationalism. 
Moreover, for the DPP regime after it came to power in 2000, human rights issues also 
served as a differentiation of ‘New Taiwan’ under the DPP’s administration from ‘Old 
Taiwan’ under the KMT’s rule.  
To summarise this section, the debate over On Taiwan at this phase demonstrates how 
human rights issues help to constitute a distinctive Taiwanese identity. As this section has 
shown, those remarks made by either politicians or commentators who appeal to freedom of 
speech or human rights are more concerned with Taiwan’s differentiations with China. And 
in reaction pro-unification politicians or commentators use nationalist terms, such as 
‘national dignity’ or ‘sovereignty’. Human rights concerns, borrowing Shih’s words, became 
‘a showcase of the new identity’ (ibid., 243). They serve to draw a boundary between insider 
and outsider. Under this circumstance, the real issues of human rights then were being 
neglected. This explains why, as some Taiwanese political commentators had already 
questioned, while the president and vice president of Taiwan had spoken on Kobayashi’s 
behalf several times in the name of free speech, the DPP government still filed a slander suit 
against some members of the Taiwanese media. Also, they questioned why, while the 
government proclaimed the importance of protecting Kobayashi’s human rights, they spoke 
very little of their concerns about the rights of former comfort women, e.g. of assisting them 
to demand compensation from the Japanese government (e.g. Wang, TT 28/03/01, 8). In 
short, the discussion of Kobayashi’s freedom of speech does not reflect a convergence 
toward universal standards such as human rights but is better viewed as a reflection of 
identity politics in Taiwan.  
 
4-4. Conclusion 
By way of conclusion, to summarise the episode of the turmoil over On Taiwan, when 
the manga was for the first time published in Japan, it drew public attention to the legacies 
of Japanese colonialism. Subsequently, after its Chinese version was issued in Taiwan, the 
controversy turned to the subject of comfort women, as women’s rights groups refuted 
Kobayashi’s remarks saying that Taiwanese comfort women had volunteered to become sex 
slaves. As the uproar continued with the decision of the Taiwanese government to bar 
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Kobayashi from entering the country, the situation reversed dramatically. People started to 
attack the government’s decision from a so-called universal standpoint, appealing, for 
example, to human rights or freedom of speech. It is noted that even though the debate over 
On Taiwan revolves around Japanese colonialism, the history of comfort women and the 
issue of freedom of speech, the nature of the debate concerns ethnic (Native Taiwanese vis-à-
vis the Mainlander), ideological (pro-independence vis-à-vis pro-unification), and above all, 
identity (Taiwanese vis-à-vis Chinese) conflicts. People make arguments either for or against 
Kobayashi by virtue of their own sense of identity.   
After a fierce three-month-long discussion over the manga, the uproar seems to have 
gradually receded from people’s thoughts in Taiwan.115 On 23 March 2001, the Ministry of 
the Interior lifted the ban on Kobayashi from entering Taiwan. Yet, the turmoil, as a social 
practice, has in fact been profoundly inscribed in the mentality of many people in Taiwan 
concerning their self-identification and the country’s relations with ‘Japan’. As this chapter 
has argued, through the publication of a manga, Taiwan’s past Japanese colonial experience 
had been discursively constituted in a certain way, with the exclusion of alternative voices. 
The historically concluded process of Japanese colonisation has emerged again as an ongoing 
structuring force in the creation of a certain form of identity among the population in 
contemporary Taiwanese society. The event became a discursive realm of a political battle, in 
which different discourses interact, intersect and compete with each other. Whereas this 
chapter focused on the Japanese colonisation, the next chapter will cast its gaze at the 
KMT’s authoritarian rule, examining how the 2-28 incident, a historically concluded 
traumatic event, ‘emerged’ again in contemporary Taiwanese society.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
115 On Taiwan is a bestseller in Taiwan. It has sold more than 130,000 copies – a record-breaking 
number since the publisher – Avant Garde – was launched in 1982. The profits gained from this 
manga were reported to have helped the publisher pay off a big portion of his debts.  
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CHAPTER 5 
Essay on Traumatic Memory, Commemoration 
& Subjectivity Formation  
The 2004 Hand-in-Hand Rally  
 
 
5-1. Introduction 
The Great Wall of China  
The Great Wall of China has been completed at its most northerly point. From the 
south-east and the south-west it came up in two sections that were united here. 
This system of piecemeal construction was also followed within each of the two 
great armies of labour, the eastern army and the western army.  It was done by 
forming gangs of about a score of labourers, whose task it was to erect a section of 
wall about five hundred yards long, while the adjoining gang built a stretch of 
similar length to meet it. But after the junction had been effected the work was not 
then continued, as one might have expected, where the thousand yards ended; 
instead the labour-gangs were sent off to continue their work on the wall in some 
quite different region. (Kafka 1973, 1992, 1) 
The paragraph above, describing the peculiar way of building the Great Wall through a 
system of piecemeal construction, is from Franz Kafka’s fictional short story, ‘The Great 
Wall of China’. The authorities, Kafka writes, deliberately chose this way of building. Having 
completed five hundred metres of the Wall, the workers were exhausted and demotivated. 
Hence they were dispatched to a farther location of the empire where they could meet new 
subjects, feeling that through their work they were achieving something of significance, 
which demanded their personal sacrifice. This atmosphere tuned the strings of their souls 
and calmed their impatience. They were reinvigorated. In addition, when the workers were 
sent up and down the Wall they saw how great, rich and beautiful their country was. Their 
work became meaningful. As Kafka writes: 
Each fellow-countryman was a brother, for whom one was building a protecting 
wall, and who returned his thanks for that throughout his life with all that he had 
and all that he was; Unity! Unity!, shoulder to shoulder, a great circle of our people, 
our blood no longer confined in the narrow round of the body, but sweetly rolling 
yet ever returning through the endless leagues of China. (ibid. 5) 
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They then left their homes and families to continue working on the Wall to protect their 
compatriots. 
However, the major problem with this method of construction was that the Wall 
comprised a combination of built-up sections and empty space. Most of these openings were 
closed gradually and slowly and some did not at all. The Wall, as generally believed, was 
meant to ward off the invasion of barbarian nomads from the North. One problem was that 
only a continuous construction can offer such a protection. But the Wall, Kafka argues, 
would not have provided a sound defence even if it had been fully continuous because it 
could easily be destroyed in its remote areas. The structure was in constant danger. But why 
was the Wall built then? For Kafka, this is the central issue and the answer he gives is that it 
was designed to bring people within the boundaries of the empire together, through a large-
scale effort of collective labour. The wall was supposed to provide the people with a sense of 
unity or a common purpose. While human nature is fragmented, Kafka suggests, collective 
labour, such as erecting a de facto useless Great Wall, was the best way for Chinese rulers to 
unify the people within a political community, and to maintain the existence of the Chinese 
empire itself. Indeed, the authorities chose a piecemeal construction because a continuous 
build-up was unnecessary for their practical purpose.   
For Kafka, moreover, the Great Wall reveals the nature of the empire. The decision to 
construct such a wall had been taken at some undefined time and by an undetermined 
authority – it was not ‘the admirable innocent emperor’ who gave orders to begin 
construction. This ambiguity surrounding the origins of the Wall reflects the nature of the 
empire itself. For Kafka, the empire is ‘immortal’ and ‘ceaseless’, while emperors and even 
dynasties cannot escape death. There is, then, a higher authority that exists above and 
beyond emperors and dynasties, its power operating ceaselessly within the boundaries of the 
empire. In effect, Kafka refers to the contemporary notion of sovereignty.  Kafka goes on to 
argue that the empire itself was also an ambiguous institution whose presence was not 
immediately felt by the subjects. However, this ambiguity helped it to preserve its power 
even it the most remote areas. On the other hand, though, it also prevented the empire from 
acquiring direct symbolic sway over the subjects. The Wall construction was meant to serve 
this goal, by serving as a physical reminder of the existence of an ambiguous but also 
immortal empire. The Great Wall is thus a physical symbol of the presence of sovereignty – 
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and indeed of the Chinese Empire.   
Kafka’s story poses fascinating questions about the relationship between physical action 
such as mass labour and symbolic order, expressed in great architectural projects, and how 
the two contribute to the institution and reproduction of political community. Kafka’s 
narrative about Ancient China can be extended to the present world of sovereign/nation 
states. Notwithstanding that as a physical artefact there is only one Great Wall, there are 
numerous constructs or symbolic ‘Great Walls’. One such example is to be found in the 
politics of contemporary Taiwan, where citizens were mobilised into a ‘Great Wall of 
Democracy’—an edifice whose materials were not stone or bricks but living human beings.  
A Commemoration of the 2-28 Incident in 2004: 2-28 Hand-in-Hand Rally  
On 28 February 2004, three weeks before the contested presidential election, an 
estimated two million people formed a human chain of 486 kilometres, running from the 
island’s northernmost point to its southernmost cape. The event, dubbed the ‘228 Hand-in-
Hand Rally’, was the biggest mass demonstration ever held in Taiwan. The people, mobilised 
or spontaneous participants, joined the rally where strangers held hands with other strangers. 
The incumbent Taiwanese president Chen Shui-Bian urged protesters to oppose China’s 
military threats and create the ‘Great Wall of Taiwan’s Democracy’. The event was meant to 
convey a festive atmosphere of national unity. It was timed to coincide with the 57th 
anniversary of the 2-28 Incident of 1947.  
This incident took place on 28 February 1947, when Taiwan had just returned to the 
ROC after the defeat of the Japanese Empire in the Second World War.116 The incident was 
triggered after a native Taiwanese woman was arrested in a Taipei City street for selling 
contraband cigarettes. The KMT’s police shot at a crowd who were attempting to protect 
the woman. The story spread quickly and overnight the whole island was boiling with rage. 
Angry native Taiwanese stormed police stations and government agencies, seeking out and 
beating up the Mainlanders. A few organised military revolts occurred across Taiwan. In 
response, the KMT governor of Taiwan asked Chiang Kai-shek in Nanjing to send troops to 
Taiwan. When the troops arrived in Keelung (a port in Northern Taiwan) in early March, 
they entered Taipei and then headed south, quelling riots across the island. During this 
                                                
116 For the most comprehensive scholarly studies on the Incident in English, please see Lai Tse-Han 
et al. (1991), and George Kerr (1965) 
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period, individuals who had participated in the riots were arrested or killed. Privately owned 
newspapers and magazines were shut down. The crush of rebellious activity was followed by 
a ‘Qing-xiang’ (literally ‘to clean up hometowns’) campaign. People were forced to hand over 
weapons, and many were jailed and executed without due legal process, accused of 
‘conspiring with Chinese communists’.117  
A great number of Taiwanese died during the incident, though there is no accurate 
count of the total number of those killed or injured. The most frequently mentioned figure 
ranges between 10,000 and 20,000. Although the incident was officially declared to be over 
on 15 May 1947, it seems to have lasted longer. The brutal suppression not only enabled the 
KMT regime to establish an authoritarian rule of unchallenged power based on martial law 
(lasting until the late 1980s) but it also produced a collectively traumatic memory for many 
Taiwanese. It has often been pointed out that the incident has had implications for Taiwan 
beyond the tragic break-up of families and the huge death toll. Aside from being a traumatic 
memory for those who directly experienced the catastrophic event and their descendants, it 
has had a psychological impact on the Taiwanese people as a whole.118 Indeed, the 2-28 
Incident can be seen as a collectively traumatic memory for many Taiwanese even today. 
Research Question, Methodology & Outline of the Chapter 
This chapter aims to explore how, in the context of an election campaign, the 
commemoration of the 2-28 Incident in 2004 – the ‘228 Hand-in-Hand Rally’ - produced a 
specific collective memory of a traumatic historical event. The key questions addressed in the 
chapter are: What has been remembered and forgotten, or remembered but forgotten again 
during this process of commemoration? And, how has this commemoration – a set of 
                                                
117 The generally accepted causes of  the incident are not only the cultural and political alienation of  
the native Taiwanese people from their ‘motherland’ after 50 years of  Japanese colonial rule, but the 
extreme dissatisfaction with the corrupt KMT regime, which was subjecting people in Taiwan to 
even more difficult political, social and economic conditions than they had experienced under pre-
war Japanese colonial rule. 
118 For instance, the pro-independence writer Li Qiao (1998) suggests that certain patterns of  
behaviour that the Taiwanese have had, i.e. a tendency not to become involved in political affairs, 
mark the traumatic affects and effects of  the incident on the collective psyche of  the Taiwanese. 
Another well-known psycho-impact of  the event on the Taiwanese, elaborated by psychiatrist Lin Yi-
Fu (2004), is the so-called ‘Stockholm syndrome’, which refers to an ironic situation that the victims 
of  a traumatic event sympathise with the perpetrator. This explains why the native Taiwanese as 
victims/masochists who suffered greatly from the KMT’s massacre during the 228 Incident have 
been supporting its perpetrator/sadist – the authoritarian KMT regime/party. 
   176
 
recollections and oblivions constituting a social practice – discursively constituted people’s 
self-identification as Taiwanese? What characterises this national self-identification? The 
chapter’s goal is to contribute to an increased understanding of the particular ways in which 
subjectivity is constituted in contemporary Taiwanese society.  
Methodologically, the following pages seek to provide a ‘thick description’ of the 2004 
demonstration. Thick description as employed here refers to a methodology that sets an 
event, the 228 Hand-in-Hand Rally, within its historical and political context, and by 
examining a multitude of significant details comprising it as a meaningful event. The term 
thick description was first used by philosopher Gilbert Ryle and later elaborated by 
anthropologist Clifford Geertz. It reflects the assumption that human behaviour cannot just 
be explained via abstract analysis but that it demands researchers to consider its social 
context.119 By doing so, the behaviour becomes meaningful action that an outsider (i.e. the 
anthropologist) can understand. David Cannadine, for example, employs this approach in his 
studies of the British Monarchy. He argues that political rituals ‘cannot be interpreted merely 
in terms of their internal structure’ (Cannadine 1983, 105). In order to discover the meaning 
of ritual, ‘it is necessary to relate it to the specific social, political, economic and cultural 
milieu within which it was actually performed’ (ibid., 105). Analogously, Cannadine writes 
that locating an event in a context is ‘not merely to provide the historical background, but 
actually to begin the process of interpretation’ (ibid., 105). More radically, one can argue that 
locating an event within different contexts would lead to a variety of differing interpretations 
of the event.120 Contextualising an event becomes political.121 
                                                
119 Geertz uses Gilbert Ryle’s discussion of a ‘wink of an eye’ as an example to clarify this point. As 
Geertz illustrates, when boys rapidly contract the eyelids, it might mean ‘an involuntary twitch’, ‘a 
conspiratorial signal to a friend’, a ‘malicious amusement to his cronies’, or anything else (Geertz 
1973, 7). Therefore, Geertz points out that without a context we do not know what people’s 
behaviour means to us. And as the context changes, the meaning of the behaviour also changes. In 
discussing the role of the ethnographer, Geertz claims that the ethnographer’s aim is to observe, 
record, analyse, and interpret a culture. More specifically, he or she must interpret human behaviour 
to understand its meaning within the culture itself. Only through this ‘thick description’ one can see 
all the possible meanings of human behaviour, thereby, Geertz hopes, opening and/or increasing the 
dialogue among different cultures. 
120 Similar kinds of  arguments are made in some empirical studies concerning the case of  2-28 
Incident in Taiwan. Some studies devoted themselves to an investigation of  the changing meaning of  
the 2-28 Incident in different historical contexts/periods: for instance, Robert Edmondson (2002); 
Steve Phillip (2006); Stefen Fleischauer (2006).  
121 In contrast to the conventional use of  the term ‘politics’, which refers to ‘politics’ taking place in 
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Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that our understanding of an event is also 
shaped by the political, historical or cultural context in which we are situated when we recall 
that event. Maurice Halbwachs (1877-1945), a French Durkheimian sociologist, while 
studying human memory, provided an instructive theoretical insight that highlights how 
social contexts – or ‘social frameworks’, as Halbwachs terms them – construct the memory 
of the individual. In his ‘Social Frameworks of Memory’ (1992a), Halbwachs first dismisses 
the idea that the past is in itself preserved within individual memories. Rather, every 
individual memory is always socially constructed as a product of collective and social 
frameworks. According to Halbwachs, people appeal to their memories only when they try 
to answer questions which are asked, or which are supposed to be asked, by others. People 
place themselves in others’ perception and consider themselves as being part of the same 
group or groups as the others. Thus, Halbwachs asserts: ‘There exists a collective memory 
and social frameworks for memory’ (1992a, 38). Memories require ‘the support of society’ – 
or a social contact with other people. ‘In order to remember, one must be capable of 
reasoning and comparing and of feeling in contact with a human society that can guarantee 
the integrity of our memory’ (ibid., 41). In other words, memories depend on those of our 
fellows, and on the wider social background of memory production. As Halbwachs 
expresses it, ‘it is in society that people normally acquire their memories. It is also in society 
that they recall, recognise, and localise their memory’ (ibid., 38). Thus, a social framework is 
the instrument for (re)constructing an individual’s memories. 
Moreover, any and every individual is located in numerous and various groups – social 
frameworks. Halbwachs does not suggest that it is groups which remember; it is of course 
individuals who remember. Yet, these individuals, being located in a specific group, draw on 
the collective context in remembering or recreating the past. Accordingly, there are as many 
                                                                                                                                            
parliaments, political parties and governments, the political, from a post-structuralist point of  view, 
and as elaborated by Laclau (1990), signifies a ‘power to definition’. For Laclau, society as is 
discursively constituted is an unstable system of  differences. Meanings of  words/things in general are 
never closed and finalised; instead, they are open, unstable, and contingent, always in a process of  
being articulated in one form or another and always negotiable. The political turns out to be possible, 
unavoidable, and necessary in this process. Any choice of definition involves the issue of  power 
insofar as it requires the repression of  alternatives, with the consequence that these alternatives then 
become more difficult to emerge. There is politics wherever there is repression. However, the 
possibility of  resistance also emerges in the domain of  the political, since it involves opening up the 
possibilities that are repressed in the constitution of  any taken-for-granted way of  thinking (Laclau 
1990, 31-6).      
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collective memories as there are groups, institutions, or communities in a society. Different 
families, ethnic groups, social classes construct different memories. Such recollections are 
richer when they reappear at the junction of a greater number of those frameworks. In effect, 
different social frameworks compete, interact and intersect each other, overlapping in part. 
More importantly, frameworks of memory are not static but fluid or in the process of 
transformation. They exist both within and outside the passage of time.122 Forgetting is then 
explained by the disappearance of those frameworks or of part of them, or the 
transformation of those frameworks from one period to another (ibid., 172-3).  
Furthermore, for Halbwachs memories of the past are affected by the mental images an 
individual employs to solve present problems. In effect, memories are reconstructions of the 
past in the light of beliefs, interests, and aspirations of the present. In his ‘The Legendary 
Topography of the Gospels in the Holy Land’ (1992b), Halbwachs elaborates this presentist 
approach in greater detail. Through his studies of the modification of the story of Jesus, of 
the conversion of the meaning of the Gospel and of the changing images of Jerusalem in the 
course of history, Halbwachs asserted that collective memory (of Christianity) is always 
‘selectively’ ‘reconstructed’ in accordance with a social group’s ‘present needs’, thereby 
distorting the original features of the past. He writes:  
…in each period the collective Christian memory adapts its recollections of the 
details of Christ’s life and of the places where they occurred to the contemporary 
exigencies of Christianity, to its needs and aspirations. (1992b, 234)  
These ‘present needs’ are determined by the ‘predominant thoughts of society’, produced 
and disseminated by various dominant groups and hegemonic discursive powers. As a result, 
social frameworks accord with the predominant mode of thinking and acting in society. 
There is no continuity between the past and the present: the past is always silent, totally open 
to presentist appropriation and manipulation. Once the ‘present needs’ have changed, the 
‘collective memory’ of a group will be transformed accordingly. In other words, the past is 
not preserved but is reconstructed on the basis of the present. And social thought is 
essentially ‘a memory and…its entire content consists only of collective recollections or 
                                                
122 As Halbwachs elaborates, ‘External to the passage of time, they communicate to the images and 
concrete recollections of which they are made a bit of their stability and generality. But these 
frameworks are in part captivated by the course of time’ (1992a, 182).  
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remembrances’ (ibid., 189). It follows that only those recollections which are in accordance 
with present needs can be re/constructed.  
Halbwachs’ argument about the social construction of collective memories in the light 
of present needs offers insight into the various forms of remembering the past. Drawing on 
Halbswach’s legacy, this chapter will explore how the coupling of the 2-28 commemoration 
with the presidential election was motivated by electoral strategy and how political 
calculations – the concerns of present needs – got involved in the process of 
commemorating the 2-28 incident. The chapter argues that the beliefs, interests, and 
aspirations that entered into political calculations during the 2004 Taiwanese election 
campaign shaped the views of the past as they are manifested and conditioned by the 
political possibility for the remembrance of the 2-28 Incident. Hence, the memory of 2-28 
Incident must be regarded as a constructed process as opposed to a retrieved process.  
The contextualisation in this regard functions in two ways: on the one hand, it serves, 
methodologically, as a tool to begin a political interpretation of the event; on the other hand, 
as a social framework, it produces and shapes the very features of the demonstration and the 
memory of the incident.          
In addition, this chapter also asks: what is the role of sovereign power in remembering, 
or shaping through memories of the past, the 228 Incident as a traumatic event? It suggests 
that the memory of the 2-28 Incident is in effect selectively constituted in favour of 
sovereign power. The 2-28 Hand-in-Hand Rally as a mass mobilisation was designed to 
remember the incident as a historical trauma in order to be forgotten, thereby constituting 
people’s self-identification as Taiwanese. In addressing these issues, my discussion builds 
upon Jenny Edkins’s writings on trauma and memory.  
In her book, Trauma and the Memory of Politics (2003), Edkins brings the role of sovereign 
power into the studies of traumatic memories. She investigates how the memorialisation of 
traumatic events often constitutes a form of forgetting. Since memories of traumatic events 
ruin the legitimacy of sovereign power and threaten the existence of contemporary forms of 
political community – state/sovereign state, in the end they must be forgotten. According to 
Edkins, modern sovereign nation-states have an ironic and intricate connection with 
traumatic events. As she asserts, ‘sovereign power produces and is itself produced by trauma’ 
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(2003, xv). To understand what Edkins means by this claim, it is pertinent to elaborate on 
her notion of ‘trauma’.  
Trauma, Edkins suggests, has three dimensions. Firstly, events that we categorise today 
as trauma generally involve violence – that is, a threat to people’s lives and integrity. 
Secondly, trauma refers to those situations in which a threat of violence comes from the 
ones who are supposed to protect the victims, give them security, and act as their trustees –
such as the political community towards its citizens or the family towards its children. The 
trauma occurs when the ones who are meant to offer protection are ‘no longer a source of 
refuge but a site of danger’ (ibid., 4). Thirdly, and in a more profound sense, the notion also 
refers to the sudden change of a social order that previously gave ‘meaning’ and ‘dignity’ to 
our existence in relation to the outside world, but which no longer provides this. Trauma, 
thus, is a menace to one’s own self-identification. Human beings, for example, participate in 
a group, a political community, as members; they situate themselves as citizens of this 
political community, acquiring an identity through it. ‘The traumatic’ takes place when this 
community betrays them. They are not and cannot be who they used to be. Above all, a 
traumatic event has to involve ‘a betrayal of trust’; it is a suspension of ‘safety’ and ‘security’ 
(ibid., 3-4). The aforementioned three dimensions of ‘trauma’ all indicate that the state as 
sovereign power is the key, if not the only, source of human suffering. While states are on 
the one hand ‘a promise of safety, security and meaning’, they are also sources of ‘abuse, 
control and coercion’ (ibid., 6). People need states to fulfil their sense of security and 
belonging. But states can also murder their own citizens, as in the case of the concentration 
camps in Nazi Germany, and send their citizens to the battlefields in the cases of the World 
Wars and Vietnam.  
Moreover, sovereign power does not only produce but, more importantly, is and has to 
be produced and reproduced though the traumatic. It is first of all importantly noted that 
Edkins differentiates linear time from trauma time. While the latter refers to ineffable 
experiences of horror, repeatedly re-experienced by the victims, which are often incoherent, 
fragmented, and purposeless, the first, favoured by the sovereign power, gives/produces a 
meaning to the suffering of the victims as part of its own ‘continuous’ and ‘grand’ narrative. 
As Edkins argues, the sovereign power encapsulates those incoherent, fragmented, and 
purposeless traumatic memories in a ‘coherent’, ‘integrated’ and ‘meaningful’ narrative. The 
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modern state remembers its lost lives in the traumatic events as accounts of heroism, 
sacrifice and redemption, in order to tell the story of the founding of the state, a linear 
narrative of glorious origin - thereby reinforcing the legitimacy of the state itself and 
preserving its power. The cases of the Holocaust and the birth of the State of Israel clearly 
demonstrate this.  In this vein, the sovereign power not only writes its history as a linear 
narrative, it also justifies itself through this linear narrative; in effect, it exists and survives in 
a linear notion of time frame. Therefore, the forms of statehood, Edkins contends, ‘are 
themselves produced and reproduced through practices of trauma and memory’ (ibid, 11). 
Yet, as mentioned earlier, trauma is generated by the sovereign power. As a result, the 
sovereign power must reveal the trauma it produces, but also conceal it.123 In this way, 
intense remembering often turns to intentional forgetting.124 
To summarise, this chapter aims to investigate how and in which forms a collective 
memory of trauma in Taiwan is produced in the commemoration of 2-28 Incident in 2004 in 
the context of the election campaign, and how this traumatic memory production – 
remembering and forgetting – leads to the formation of Taiwanese national identity in the 
process of nation-building in Taiwan. To this end, two aspects of the event will be stressed: 
                                                
123 While the memorialisation process is a search for meaning and the state has a propensity to use 
this process as a method for establishing meaning, Edkins accordingly pays great attention to different 
forms of memorialisation through her studies on the Great Wars, Vietnam War, the Holocaust, the 
NATO intervention in Kosovo and September 11. Her study demonstrates that various practices of 
memorialisation, conducted by the sovereign power, aim to insert meaning into traumatic events by 
providing a specific narrative of the past in the light of a linear notion of time. Many of these 
practices seek to contain and appropriate traumatic experience for the purposes of reproducing 
sovereign power. Sovereign power intends to both expose and conceal the trauma that it produces, 
so as to legitimise itself. Edkins therefore questions the role of commemorations, arguing that they 
simply reinforce sovereign power – the nation-states. Yet, for Edkins, resistance is always possible. 
The book in short is an exposition of the competence (domination) and incompetence (resistance) of 
the sovereign state’s efforts to fix the collective memories of traumatic events. She clearly exhibits 
deep scepticism towards the role of sovereign power in memorializing the traumatic events of human 
beings. Her works on the memories of trauma should themselves be perceived as resistance to the 
power of the sovereign state. 
124 Similar to Edkins’ argument, Chen Hsiang-Chun (2005) investigates in her thesis the collective 
forgetting of  the traumatic. In her empirical work, she asks why people in Taiwan so easily remember 
to forget the 2-28 Incident. She examines the commemorative art exhibitions in Taiwan since the 
1990s, and in particular an exhibition in 1997 – ‘Sadness Transformed: 2-28 Commemorative Art Exhibition, 
and the materials related to these exhibitions, such as some artists’ aesthetic works, curatorial 
statements, category essays, and so on. Chen argues that this way of  commemoration – a collective 
oblivion – cannot resolve the long-term affects and effects of  the historical trauma. As she suggests, 
only through witnessing to and listening to the wound can this collective sadness in Taiwan be 
transformed.   
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the political context of the mass-rally and the precise manner of the performance. The 
former refers to the political competition during the election campaign in 2004 against the 
background of identity politics in Taiwan since the 1990s, while the latter deals with the 
actual performance in the campaign, including a series of press conferences and rehearsals in 
the run-up to the demonstration, the itinerary of the demonstration on 28 February 2004, 
the location of the assemblage, the design of the geographical route of the human chain, the 
decoration of the venue, the activities of the campaign and the list of the invitees.125  
This chapter firstly contextualises the demonstration. The analysis of the political 
calculations of the organisers in the 2004 presidential election campaign, and, more broadly, 
the political environment of identity politics since the 1990s is briefly discussed here. Next, it 
portrays the actual performance of the demonstration, including a series of activities in the 
run-up to the demonstration and the precise performance of the ‘human chain’ on 28 
February 2004. The chapter’s final section examines the role of sovereign power in 
commemorating the traumatic event in the case of Taiwan.       
 
5-2. Contextualising the 2-28 Hand-in-Hand Rally  
5-2-1. Taiwan’s 2004 Presidential Election  
On 20 March, 2004, the DPP incumbent president Chen Shui-Bian, along with his 
running mate Lu Xiu-Lian (also known as Annette Lu), was reelected president of Taiwan by 
a slim margin (29,518 out of 13 million votes cast), defeating their opponent, the Pan-Blue 
                                                
125 This method of meticulous description was employed in Bernard S. Cohn’s ‘Representing 
Authority in Victorian India’ (1983). In this article, Cohn explores how the British governor 
established his authority over India after the uprising of 1857, by adopting and revising a series of 
ceremonies of the Mughal Empire. In particular, Cohn focuses on the Imperial Assemblage in 1877. 
He contends that the assemblage, as a symbolic ritual or ceremonial performance, constructed the 
British colonial authority in India. Cohn provides a meticulous description of the assemblage, 
including the intention of the planners of the imperial assemblage, the list of the invitees and their 
dresses, the location of the assemblage, the physical planning of the camps, the design and 
decoration of the amphitheatre, and so on. Cohn concluded that although many people treated it as 
‘a kind of folly, a great tamasha, or show’ (Cohn 1983, 207), the assemblage, to a great degree, 
successfully constructed British authority over India, and through its representations of British and 
Indian culture, among the British itself and the Indians. Through his meticulous description, Cohn’s 
study demonstrates how a political ritual or ceremonial performance facilitates the colonizer to 
govern its colonized, and helps to construct people’s self-identification, for both the colonizer and 
the colonized.  
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coalition, composed of the KMT’s Lian Zhan as presidential candidate and the PFP’s Song 
Chu-Yu (also known as James Soong)126 as vice presidential candidate.  
The result of the election surprised many political observers. Most analysts, along with 
the opinion polls conducted prior to the election, had predicted the triumph of Pan-Blue. 
Such a prediction was based on two assumptions. Firstly, in the 2000 presidential election, 
the DPP-nominated Chen was elected by capturing only 39 percent of the popular vote, 
compared with the KMT’s Lian’s 23 percent and the KMT-abandoned independent 
candidate Soong’s 37 percent of the total vote. For many, the KMT’s split allowed Chen to 
win the election without capturing a majority vote. However, in 2004, the two losers of the 
previous round cooperated in placing a common bid for the presidential election campaign, 
with Lian as presidential and Soong as vice-presidential candidate in a grand Pan-Blue 
alliance of three political parties: the KMT, the New Party and the PFP. This coalition 
teamed up against a Pan-Green coalition formed by the DPP and the TSU. Under this new 
political umbrella, a joint ticket consisting of Lian and Soong was forged, whose combined 
vote tallies in 2000 would have garnered 60 percent of the votes cast had they run together 
(Bedford et al. 2006, 29). Secondly, analysts also felt that the economic and government 
organisational problems experienced during Chen’s first term (2000-2004) – a weak economy, 
increased cross-Strait tension, assorted administrative and political missteps, and 
corruption – would possibly serve to diminish public support for Chen.  
Despite these obstacles, Chen was able to win his bid for reelection in March 2004. It is, 
of course, hard to gauge what factors determined the results of the actual vote. Most political 
analysts attributed this unanticipated result to a number of events: Taiwan’s first-ever 
nationwide referendum, large political demonstrations, and a shooting incident that injured 
the incumbent candidates (Mattlin 2004; Chu 2005; Bedford et al. 2006).127 Yet, behind the 
                                                
126 James Soong, who had left the KMT because of its failure to nominate him as the party’s 
presidential candidate, reached the second place in the presidential election; and soon after formed 
his own political party, the PFP. 
127 One day prior to the election, Chen and vice-president Lu were shot and slightly wounded while 
riding in a motorcade through the large south-western port city of Tainan. The injuries were not life 
threatening, and both Chen and Lu were released from hospital on the same day. Nevertheless, the 
attack provoked shock and unease among the population. Subsequently, all candidates agreed to 
cancel all campaign activities. Supporters of Pan-Blue doubted the authenticity of the attack. After 
the election, hundreds of thousands of furious Pan-Blue protesters ringed the Presidential Office to 
demand an immediate recount and an independent investigation into the shooting. The Pan-Blue also 
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scene of those decisive events, one should not neglect Chen’s well-designed campaign 
strategy – controlling the political agenda by focusing on appropriating the so-called 
Taiwanese identity (or Taiwanese consciousness).  
Identity politics has been played out in Taiwan since the late 1990s. Identity 
conflict/cleavage between the Taiwanese and the Chinese has been one of the most notable 
developments in Taiwan’s politics since the 1990s. While some residents identify themselves 
as Taiwanese, others consider themselves to be Chinese. Related to this polarisation over the 
question of national identity are unsettled questions about Taiwan’s sovereign status within 
the international system – whether the island constitutes a de jure independence under the 
name of Republic of Taiwan, a de facto independence under the name of Republic of China 
(the home of the legitimate albeit exiled government of all China). The most acknowledged 
manifestation of this identity/ideological conflict is the battling between two political 
coalitions throughout the years – the Pan-Green and the Pan-Blue. Pan-Green voters tend to 
call for a Taiwanese national identity distinct from the Chinese, and push for formal 
independence if possible. In contrast, supporters of the Pan-Blue incline to the view that 
Taiwanese are Chinese, opposing anything that seems like a move toward independence. 
Each side fears that the other seeks power in order to impose its own political agenda and 
make irreversible changes in the way in which national identity is construed. Identity politics 
is a hugely divisive issue in Taiwan.  
Above all, these confrontations all gave the 2004 presidential election an unfortunate 
bent. As a political scientist describes,  
Die-hard supporters of either camp saw the contest as the final showdown. The 
DPP desperately needed a convincing victory to consolidate its shaky hold on 
power. Leaders of the KMT feared that their party’s cohesion would not survive 
another electoral debacle. Both thought that losing would mean being consigned to 
permanent minority status. In this sense, winning indeed was – or at least seemed to 
be – everything. (Chu 2005, 50-1)  
Both sides mounted excessive mobilisation efforts that looked at times like the acting-out of 
a vast national neurosis. ‘All of society became hyperpoliticised’. ‘No corner of daily life 
seemed safe from outbreaks of partisan acrimony’ during the campaign season. ‘Emotions 
                                                                                                                                            
filed a lawsuit to nullify the results. On 4 November, 2004, the High Court ruled against the Pan-Blue 
and in favour of upholding the election result.  
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rose to fever pitch while tempers frayed to the breaking point’ (ibid. 51). In this political 
atmosphere, the nature of the election as a zero-sum national identity battle had been 
predetermined. Indeed, the 2004 presidential election cannot be understood without 
reference to the background of these identity politics.  
The successful union of the Pan-Blue and the poor performance of Chen’s first term 
placed Pan-Green under enormous pressure. As expected, Pan-Blue’s election strategy was 
to focus on the question of the state of domestic economy. Facing severe challenges from 
the opposition parties, the most, if not the only, effective tactic Chen used was to ‘play the 
identity card’ – as a way of reversing his declining support prior to the election and of 
diverting voters’ attention away from a sagging economy. The Pan-Green was obviously 
trying to define the 2004 election as a duel between Taiwanese identity and Chinese identity, 
nourishing the island’s burgeoning sense of separate identity and pro-independence 
sentiment. Chen, ostensibly, advocated the advance of democracy in Taiwan, which was 
interpreted as a move toward independence and the construction of Taiwanese national 
identity. Indeed, ‘developing Taiwanese consciousness was the key to advancing the DPP 
agenda’ (Bedford et al. 2006, 20)  
In fact, it was not the first time that the ‘identity card’ was being played in Taiwan’s 
election campaign. From early on, when the DPP was an opposition party, its leaders built 
up their electoral support by highlighting the shared sense of suffering and deprivation 
among the native Taiwanese, mainly Minnan-speaking people, the ethnic majority in Taiwan. 
Pan-Green politicians perceived that ‘Taiwanese identity’ in terms of ethnicity was the 
ultimate weapon with which to unite non-KMT supporters of different social and economic 
interests under this shared ethnicity, challenging the KMT’s authoritarian rule (ibid., 85). 
Identity politics is therefore likely to play a role for some time to come. The ethnic conflict 
between the native Taiwanese and the Mainlanders seemed to characterise domestic politics 
in Taiwan throughout the 1990s.  
Nevertheless, there was also a danger in over-emphasising the ethnicity of the native 
Taiwanese. After nearly five decades of social integration, mostly through intermarriages, 
work and school, most native Taiwanese have relatives, friends and neighbours who are 
Mainlanders, which makes it too costly and nearly impossible for the DPP to pursue the 
building of a Taiwanese state on an island that politically excludes Mainlanders. In addition, 
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there exists a sub-ethnic division between the Minnan-speaking and Hakka-speaking native 
Taiwanese. If the DPP overplays the ethnic tone, which has been essentially Minnan-centric, 
it is bound to loose favour among the Hakka-speaking native Taiwanese (Chu et al. 1998). 
As pointed out by Juan Linz (1985), in a heterogeneous society such as post-Franco Spain 
where people of various primordial backgrounds are mixed-living, building a nation-state 
solely on primordial ties is nearly impossible and always too costly. Therefore, most 
nationalists who promote separatism are eventually forced to put more emphasis on 
territoriality and to focus less on primordial characteristics. People’s self-identification 
evolves accordingly from ‘primordial’ criteria such as language, culture to more ‘objective’ 
indicators, e.g. territoriality. However, it is noted that, as Linz reminds, nationalists would, to 
a certain degree, still persist with primordialism, because they find the absolute territorial 
definition would endanger their nationalism claims. It ‘dilutes the distinctiveness of the 
ethnic, cultural, linguistic, national identity’ (1985, 250). 
The case of Taiwan’s 2004 presidential election bears out Linz’s argument. In the 2004 
presidential campaign, the Pan-Green, instead of playing up ethnic identity, laid stress on 
gaining a separate territorial identity for Taiwan, distinguished from that of the Chinese.128 In 
order to nourish the island’s burgeoning sense of separate consciousness, the Pan-Green 
decided to make the PRC/China an issue. President Chen began to raise his tone of criticism 
against the PRC, playing to his people’s resentment of Taiwan’s international isolation and 
China’s military threat to Taiwan.129 The rationale behind this campaign strategy is threefold.  
Firstly, to highlight the significance of Taiwanese national identity and the need to seek 
independence for Taiwan would provoke China. Yet, increased hostility from China could 
be used to give rise to a sense of shared destiny among the people of Taiwan, consolidating 
anti-Chinese sentiment. Secondly, it would also provide the opportunity to label those 
against such efforts as willing to ‘sell out Taiwan’, and cast them as being the same as the 
Chinese communists. If China has ill intentions, then the Pan-Blue that adhered to Chinese 
                                                
128 Another reason for not highlighting native Taiwanese ethnicity was that the KMT president 
candidate Lian Zhan is a native Taiwanese as well.  
129 Interestingly, China this time pursued a relatively cautious, low-key approach towards the 
presidential election, especially in comparison with its heavy-handed rhetoric and threatening missile 
launches of 1995-96 – Taiwan’s first presidential election – and Premier Zhu Rongji’s stern warnings 
in the 2000 presidential election.  
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identity must be condemned for siding with Beijing. President Chen established his party as a 
‘Taiwan-first’ party and branded the Pan-Blue as ‘China-first’. Many Pan-Blue politicians 
feared that anti-Chinese sentiment originally directed at Beijing would be transferred to them 
by accusations that anyone opposing Chen (and the DPP) was the mouthpiece of Beijing in 
Taiwan (Bedford et al. 2006, 30). Thirdly, this campaign strategy capitalises on a long trend 
toward localisation/indigenisation and self-rule by native Taiwanese. As mentioned 
elsewhere, previously the central government under the KMT regime was almost dominated 
by Mainlanders. Combined with political liberalisation, however, the dominant trend in 
Taiwanese society in recent years, as Mikael Mattlin (2004) indicates, has been encapsulated 
in the expression ‘Dangjia zuozhu’ (which means, ‘to be the master in one’s own house’). He 
adds that ‘the Pan-Green took a chance on this trend having already reached a critical mass, 
and hoped that people would feel an additional need to vote for Chen as an expression of 
their support for this political claim’ (Mattlin 2004, 17). Not surprisingly, ‘love Taiwan’ was 
‘one of the key themes of the Chen campaign’ (ibid. 17). While the election was viewed as an 
important battle for ‘Dangjia zuozhu’, the DPP victory was interpreted as proof that Taiwan 
had emerged from the shadow not only of the Mainlanders, but also of China. Thus, for 
many, Chen’s victory is more than a construction of Taiwanese national identity; it is a 
consolidation of Taiwan’s democracy. As a political scientist comments, ‘The symbolic and 
emotionally charged cross-Strait issues always help the DPP to paint itself as the true native 
political force’ (Chu 2005, 52). As a result, Taiwanese identity as a national one has been 
clearly highlighted during the election campaign, though this identity in many ways cannot be 
dissociated from ethnic origins.  
With this strategy, the Pan-Green apparently succeeded in defining the election 
campaign with an issue that the competing side would find hard to counter. Any other 
alternative political issues or discussion were excluded and de-legitimised. For instance, the 
advice to put aside disputes over identity issues, suggested by some impartial intellectuals in 
terms of political affiliation, was disparaged as not in line with the dictum of localisation and 
as an attempt to denationalise the country and to jeopardise the democracy. And the 
suggestions that Taiwan should take advantage of China’s immense market and cheap labour 
and speed up the ‘three direct links’, proposed by some economists and businessmen, were 
brushed aside as conspiracy to ‘marginalise’ Taiwan and support China’s tactics to ‘facilitate 
unification through economic means.’ ‘Identification with Taiwan’ has become such a 
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precious commodity that politicians and political parties are competing against each other in 
order to prove their love of the people and the land. It is something to which the Pan-Blue 
has found difficult to respond to: it is forced to make concessions and accept policies that 
have compromised its traditional positions, and it never found a way to effectively counter 
the DPP accusation that it represented ‘alien’ interests and values. As a result, the Pan-Blue 
has been forced to be defensive in this political game of winning the hearts of the whimsical 
Taiwanese voters.   
To summarise, the political goals of Chen’s campaign strategy were to stress the threat 
from China, to rebuke the KMT by affiliating it with China, to show his dedicated efforts in 
accelerating the localisation movement, and above all, to nationalise ‘Taiwan’, asserting a 
separate sovereign status for Taiwan in the international community.  
5-2-2. 20 March Referendum 
One of Chen’s most successful campaign instruments to achieve those goals was 
Taiwan’s first-ever referendum, held on the same day as the presidential election. Two 
questions were posed in the referendum:  
(1) If China refuses to withdraw the missiles it has targeted at Taiwan and to openly 
renounce the use of force against us, would you agree that the government should 
acquire more advanced anti-missile weapons to strengthen Taiwan’s self-defence 
capabilities? 
(2) Would you agree that our government should engage in negotiations with China about 
the establishment of a ‘peace and stability’ framework for cross-strait interactions in 
order to build consensus and for the welfare of the peoples on both sides? (TT 17/01/04, 
1) 
The two questions in the end both failed since they did not reach the legal quorum.130 
Nonetheless, the DPP spoke of a success. They claimed that it was for the first time that the 
people of Taiwan had the right to express their views through a referendum. In many ways, 
the result and the questions being asked were of secondary significance. Rather, what 
mattered most was that the introduction of the referendum opened the window of 
opportunity for Chen’s reelection.  
                                                
130 The two questions only obtained, respectively, 45.15 percent and 45.10 percent of  the votes 
(Mattlin 2004, 11). According to the Referendum Law, at least 50 percent of  the entire electorate has 
to cast their ballots. 
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The referendum became an election issue in the latter half of 2003, when the Chen 
administration began pushing for the creation of a Referendum Bill. Referendum issues in 
Taiwan are highly sensitive. They are intimately associated with issues of independence, since 
it is claimed by most independence advocates as the best way to justify Taiwan’s self-
determination claims. Chen repeatedly said on several occasions during this period that a 
new constitution would be completed by 2006 and implemented by 2008,131 with its contents 
being decided by a referendum that was planned for 2004. Many Taiwanese nationalists 
enthusiastically welcomed this audacious plan. They had long been averse to the mainland-
crafted constitution under the name of the ‘Republic of China’, reviling both the contents 
and the title as tokens of the last legal chain binding Taiwan to what they viewed as the 
fictitious notion that Taiwan is a part of China (Chu 2005, 52).  
In November 2003, four months before the election, Chen signalled the DPP caucus in 
the Legislative Yuan to begin pushing hard for passage of the bill in order to carry out his 
plan to hold an island-wide referendum. Initially, the Pan-Blue was in strong opposition to 
the move. Yet, its politicians found it hard to oppose this political appeal, especially when 
the presidential election was approaching. Indeed, as some studies have argued (Mattlin 2004; 
Chu 2005; Bedford et al. 2006; Lampton et al. 2005), this campaign pledge not only helped 
Chen to reassert himself as the champion of the Taiwanese-nationalist cause but, more 
importantly, it also served: 
to throw the Pan-Blues on the defensive and to tempt Beijing into sabre-rattling, 
thereby giving the Pan-Greens a pretext to discuss the ‘non-native status’ of Lien 
Chan [Lian Zhan] and James Soong, make insinuations about their alleged lack of 
loyalty to Taiwan, and perhaps brand them as soft on sovereignty or even as 
‘collaborators’ with Beijing’s malicious designs. (Chu 2005, 52-3)  
Consequently, the Pan-Blue ended up having no option but to support the referendum 
legislation, in order to escape the label of ‘anti-democratic’ and ‘collaborators with Chinese 
communists’. They proposed their own version of a referendum law. At the end of 
November, the Pan-Blue pushed through its version of the bill, defeating the Pan-Green’s 
one. The adopted version did not contain the controversial clauses in the original proposal 
                                                
131 Many Taiwanese nationalists such as the former president Lee believe that 2008 should be the 
deadline for declaring Taiwan formally independent. As they argue, after 2008, the Beijing regime 
would be too strong for U.S. containment efforts, and would no longer have its hands tied by worries 
about spoiling the Summer Olympic Games scheduled to be held in the mainland capital that year. 
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offered by the DPP, which would have enabled the government to initiate sensitive issues 
like independence to be decided via referendum; it only permitted referenda in cases relating 
to reconfirmation of a law, creation of a legislative principle, confirmation of a major policy, 
or reconfirmation of an amendment to the constitution (Lampton et al. 2005, 4).132 
In the beginning, the Pan-Blue believed it had successfully defeated the Pan-Green. 
Nevertheless, Chen found a loophole in this passed law that allowed him to carry out his 
proposed referendum. The bill gave the president the right to initiate a ‘defensive 
referendum’ on national security issues in the event of an imminent threat to sovereignty.133 
Three days after the bill was ratified, Chen claimed that the PRC’s build-up of ballistic 
missiles targeting Taiwan constitutes a national security threat, thereby allowing an island-
wide ‘defensive referendum’, which was planned to be held on the day of the presidential 
election (Bedford et al. 2006, 44). The Pan-Blue, not surprisingly, was angered by this move, 
not believing that Chen’s proposal fit the criteria outlined in the law. It charged Chen with 
abusing the newly passed law by interpreting the ‘direct threat’ clause in the bill too broadly; 
Chen’s intention, the Pan-Blue argued, was to gain votes by mobilising his voters to go to 
the polls coinciding with the presidential election (Lampton et al. 2005, 4). Therefore, the 
Pan-Blue decided to boycott the referendum, discouraging its supporters from voting in it.134  
In retrospect, to many observers, the questions – whether Taiwan should buy more 
weapons if the PRC refuses to withdraw the missiles and whether Taiwan should negotiate 
with the PRC on the proposal of peace and stability – did not seem appropriate as 
referendum questions. Most people would hardly disagree with these statements. Therefore, 
as many studies show (Mattlin 2004, Chu 2005), the referendum cannot be well understood 
as an inquiry into voters’ opinions on a policy issue; it was rather a campaign tactic. Mattlin 
                                                
132 For comparison of these two versions (DPP and Pan-Blue), please see Mily Kao (2003, 596); also, 
for a summary of the Referendum Law passed on 28 November, please also see Kao (2003, 601).  
133 In the ‘Referendum Bill’, the Article 17 states that ‘When the nation is threatened by an external 
force that could cause a change in the nation’s sovereignty, the president may, via a resolution of  the 
Executive Yuan Council, refer a matter relating to national security to the citizens for a vote’ 
(Lampton et al. 2005, 4). 
134 Not only the Pan-Blue camp sharply opposed the idea of referendum, but international society 
also placed huge pressure on Taiwan through the US. Beijing and Washington were both alarmed at 
the referendum issue, fearing that the referendum was introducing a precedent for a future 
referendum that would be used to sanction some form of de jure independence. 
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argues that the referendum was used in a highly instrumental way. It drew ‘on tried and 
successful campaigning methods in Taiwan: mobilising mass rallies to create the impression 
of strength; demands by politicians that supporters visibly display loyalty/support; and the 
instrumental use of almost any means that is deemed beneficial to election success’ (Mattlin 
2004, 1). And those campaigning techniques embodied in the referendum strategy can be 
understood as a form of ‘Zaoshi’ – a Chinese concept, which literally means ‘to create 
circumstances favourable to a desired outcome’ (ibid, 5).  
One of the most effective campaign techniques to create circumstances that facilitate 
the candidate’s desired outcome is to organise mass rallies during the election campaign. As 
Mattlin indicated, mass rallies were originally linked to opposition movement demonstrations 
and later to DPP campaign activities. The opposition movement, due to its lack of resources 
in comparison to the KMT, used street protests to attract public support. Supporters were 
mobilised via massive and boisterous campaigns (ibid, 7-9). These types of campaign 
activities became widespread after they proved successful in the 1994 mayoral elections. 
Every political party, including the KMT, imitated these activities. Campaign activities, 
especially high-level elections, leaned heavily on mass rallies. As a result, the size of election 
rallies became larger and their number became more frequent. More election rallies were 
held and more people took part in such activities throughout each election. In the 2004 
presidential election, the scope and nature of the election rallies were record-breaking.  
In the run-up to the elections, the DPP and the TSU together organised a huge human 
chain on 28 February to commemorate the 2-28 Incident, in which two million people took 
part. With the intention of countering the success of the green camp, the Pan-Blue also 
planned to stage a rally on 13 March, attracting even more participants. The former event, 
which is known as the ‘228 Hand-in-Hand Rally’, played a decisive role in the 2004 
presidential election.  
5-2-3. The Formation of Hand-in-Hand Alliance  
The 228 Hand-in-Hand Rally was organised by a nationwide private association 
supporting president Chen’s reelection, a joint alliance headed by the former president Lee135, 
                                                
135 Although he retired after 12 years as president, Lee did not rest on his laurels. After leaving the 
KMT in 2000, Lee has played an active role in civic movements promoting the establishment of  a 
Taiwan-centric identity and building ‘a complete nation of Taiwan’.  
   192
 
comprising most pro-independence groups, leading independence activists, and Pan-Green 
politicians. As mentioned earlier, there was an uncertain atmosphere in Taiwan the year 
before the 2004 presidential election, for the supporters of Pan-Green and Pan-Blue were 
almost equal in numbers. The Pan-Green thus needed to consider what they could do to get 
more supporters for Chen. These election considerations finally converged with another 
pro-independence movement – ‘Rectifying the Name (of Taiwan) Movement’, in which its 
members greatly overlapped with the association.  
The entitled ‘Rectifying the Name Movement’ emerged on 2002 Mother’s Day (11 May) 
when thousands of protesters marched through the city of Taipei, shouting pro-Taiwan 
slogans, in a show of support for the campaign to change the official name of the country 
from ‘Republic of China’ to ‘Republic of Taiwan’. The organisers chose Mother’s Day to 
express their voices because they wanted to emphasise that ‘Taiwan is Our Mother’. The 
march was organised by the ‘Alliance to Campaign for Rectifying the Name of Taiwan’, 
composed of over 70 pro-Taiwan independence groups, which have been promoting the 
name change to help Taiwan assert its place in the international community. The march was 
held to demand the entire world call the nation ‘Taiwan’, which should not be confused with 
‘China’. The protest, according to their Joint Statement issued on 11 May 2002 (511 Rectifying 
the Name of Taiwan 2002, 21), urged the government to inculcate the concept of ‘being 
Taiwanese’ in textbooks so the next generations would develop ‘a uniform identification’. 
Also, they called on authorities to remove designations of ‘China’ and ‘Chinese’, promoting 
‘Taiwan’ at all-levels of governmental agencies, embassies, and state-run enterprises (i.e. 
China Airline). In addition, they appealed to the government to disallow/remove the use of 
‘China’ in the titles for all civic organisations to be registered in Taiwan, and private 
companies that were incorporated in Taiwan. The ultimate goal was to enact a new 
Constitution for the Republic of Taiwan. The organisers of the movement also arranged to 
hold the same rally annually until the tasks are completely fulfilled.   
In 2003, the parade to rectify the name of Taiwan, which originally designed to take 
place on 11 May again, was postponed until 6 September due to the outbreak of SARS. The 
parade on 6 September had more than 150,000 participants taking to the streets in Taipei. It 
is important to note that through its deferral, the rally became inextricably bound up with 
the election, which was just five months away. Many people, including the organisers, had 
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taken election calculations into account while referring to the rally. For instance, a political 
researcher at the Academia Sinica, Hsu Yung-Ming, said that the rally was drawing the battle 
lines between the blue and green camps for the 2004 presidential election campaign. 
According to Hsu’s analysis,  
The scale of the rally showed that the Pan-green forces performed a successful drill 
for campaigning in the next presidential election by highlighting the issues of 
rectifying the nation’s name and national identification. Those issues would draw a 
line that separates supporters of Taiwan-centred awareness, advocated by the Pan-
green forces, from the other group that upholds the existence of the ROC as 
enshrined by the pan-blue parties. (TT 07/09/03, 8) 
Although the campaign was mobilised mainly by Pan-Green members, president Chen 
decided to keep a low profile in responding to the name-change campaign, considering the 
possible negative impact on the DPP in the presidential election. Therefore, the Presidential 
Office arranged for Chen to attend several activities in southern Taiwan to avoid getting 
involved. Nevertheless, although Chen did not attend the rally, he had an ambiguous attitude 
towards the campaign. Chen remarked on the other occasion not only that he would have 
been there had he not been president, but reiterated that the movement to change the name 
of the nation required more effort. In addition, DPP Deputy Secretary-General Li Ying-
Yuan also paid tribute to the marchers on the president’s behalf (TT 07/09/03, 3). Indeed, 
for Chen, his strategy was to back the rally to win the support of the Taiwanese nationalists-
hardliners while taking care not to upset the more moderate and swing voters by affirming 
his acceptance that he was the president of ‘Republic of China’.  
The success of the two rallies had invigorated the Pan-Green and the pro-independence 
forces. The organisers of the movement therefore planned to hold another 500,000-people 
demonstration on Mother’s Day in 2004. Yet, when the alliance’s co-conveners reported to 
the former president Lee, Lee reacted by saying that the 2004 presidential election (20 March) 
would be the most important battle in the fight to safeguard local political power and that 
only then could they smoothly push forward a campaign to change Taiwan’s official name. 
The main task for the Pan-Green, said Lee, was to think of a way to integrate their local 
resources and strengths to help DPP candidate Chen in the 2004 Presidential Election 
(Interview with Wang, 17/08/06). Likewise, the DPP Deputy Secretary and chief event 
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planner for the 228 Hand-in-Hand Rally, Li Ying-Yuan,136 when recalling how the idea of 
organising the Hand-in-Hand Rally came about, also expressed similar concerns. As he 
recalled asking, ‘after launching this successful “Rectifying the Name of Taiwan” event [6 
September 2003], what else can we contribute to Taiwan’ (Interview with Li, 23/08/06)? 
They therefore began to prepare for the organisation of the biggest-ever mass rally – 
mobilising one million people – before the presidential election. The event date was set very 
quickly – 28 February 2004. To the organisers, it was a perfect date for them because it is 
not only a historically significant date but also a public holiday. Li continued,  
Yet, it will be a difficult task to coordinate an event involving one million 
participants and we must all devote considerable endeavour. For example, finding 
the perfect location will be difficult. And we have thought of dividing the event into 
four sections but there will be a huge budget for labour, resources and visual and 
sound effects. Moreover, we’d have to think of something better than a boring 
speech. (Ibid.)  
Fortuitously, Lee met a friend who lives in the US, who mentioned that the Baltic States 
once also held a hand-in-hand rally. Li said that he was so touched by the picture of 
Taiwanese holding hands together when he heard of it. He said that  
The Baltic people showed their determination for freedom when they faced military 
threats. And Taiwanese should not stay silent when facing the missile threats from 
China. If we want peace, then we should support a referendum. We should also 
speak out with dignity and tell the world that we will not succumb to military threats! 
(Ibid.)  
Thereafter, Li Ying-Yuan showed the Former President Lee and other independence 
movement leaders his initial road map blue print of the ‘Hand-In-Hand Rally’ during a 
gathering meeting in October 2003. Everyone agreed with his idea. On 31 October 2003, the 
‘Hand-in-Hand Taiwan Alliance’ was established. The former president Lee was appointed 
as the General Chairman. He then called for the collaboration of the DPP, TSU, the Alliance 
                                                
136 Li Ying-Yuan was the then-Minister of Council of Labour Affairs, Executive Yuan of Taiwan. He 
was a political dissident during the KMT’s authoritarian period, being denied entry to Taiwan for 
advocating Taiwan independence. After returning to Taiwan through illegal channels, he was arrested 
with other independence advocates. Li was finally released due to the strong pressure from the 
international community and within Taiwan itself. He started to display his strong leadership in 
public affairs after being elected to the National Parliament, the Legislative Yuan, in 1996. Following 
DPP’s successful presidential election in 2000, Li was appointed by President Chen as the Secretary-
General of the Executive Yuan.  
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to Campaign for Rectifying the Name of Taiwan, The Presbyterian Church in Taiwan as well 
as various other pro-independence organisations.  
When he envisioned the ‘Hand-in-Hand Rally’, Li Ying-Yuan organised a working team 
and actively began to plan the various activities. Nevertheless, some difficulties immediately 
arose. Among many others, one of the most difficult tasks was to mobilise one million 
participants holding their hands together at a specific moment. Zhang Yi-Shan, one of the 
key members in Li’s working team, was concerned with this difficulty. He recalled that when 
he was instructed with other staff-members to inspect the planned event route, starting from 
the northernmost tip of Taiwan and travelling all the way down to the South along the 
north-south provincial highways, he really thought that mobilising a million people to form a 
human chain along the road would be an impossible task, especially in sparsely populated 
areas (Interview with Zhang, 21/07/06). Zhang added,  
We have held parades and speeches before but there was always a leading role and a 
stage. Yet this time, it is a totally new experience and we do not have any visual 
focus or famous people to inspire each participant. And we do not have any 
spiritual power to make participants willingly stand in remote areas, and believe that 
they are part of this event. What kind of inspiration do we need to give the 
participants to make one million people continuously hold hands for three minutes? 
(Ibid.) 
Indeed, it was not the first time in the history of Taiwan’s independence movement that 
this hand holding idea had been brought up (Interview with Li, 23/08/06). The activists 
never thought that Taiwan could make it even after seeing the successful campaign in the 
three Baltic countries. As Li Ying-Yuan said, even after proposing his idea of this hand 
holding event, people of the working unit still questioned in staff meetings the possibility of 
carrying it out (Interview with Li, 23/08/06). Since nobody really believed that the idea 
could be realised, it was not considered a good idea even within the DPP and Chen’s 
Presidential Campaign Office. On the one hand they worried that, since the presidential 
election was only three weeks away, the failure of this event would have a huge negative 
impact on the results of the campaign. On the other hand, they were concerned that the 
extremist position being taken up by former president Lee on issues of Taiwan’s 
independence might force some moderate voters away (New News 2004 No.886, 55-6).  
Clearly, the DPP was deeply divided over the priority that should be accorded to the 
independence issue. While some campaigners appeared to recognise that the demonstration 
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could repel some voters, and were aware of the need to limit the strength of their message in 
such situations, others contended that such a demonstration was the best tool available to 
boost Chen’s election campaign. In the end, the event took place and was judged to be a 
great success. The realisation of this idea was due to the determination of former president 
Lee and the chief event planner Li Ying-Yuan. After the success of the event, there was 
much praise for their will power in the Taiwanese press of all ideological affiliations (e.g. CT 
29/02/04, A6). However, the well-designed promotional activities in the run-up to the rally, 
such as a press conference, fora, rehearsal and so on, and the actual performance on the day 
of 28 February all contributed to the success of the event, thereby helping to constitute in 
the citizens a sense of self-identification as Taiwanese nationals. The following section 
focuses on those activities.    
 
5-3. Representations of the ‘2-28 Incident’ as Threat from China and 
Ethnic Reconciliation 
This section aims to show that the rally defined the 2-28 Incident as a warning about 
the consequences of Chinese rule for Taiwan, yet was careful to offer the population of 
Taiwan a message of inclusiveness. The rally now depicted the incident as a cross-strait 
conflict, rather than as a fight among the island’s current inhabitants, as previously perceived. 
Under this discourse, ethnic harmony, the protection of Taiwan, and the prevention of rule 
by China represented the greatest gifts from the martyrs of the incident. The people in 
Taiwan therefore needed to both remember and forget the incident.  
5-3-1. Campaign Proposal and the Remarks Made by President Chen and 
Former President Lee in Hand-in-Hand to Protect Taiwan 
The main theme of the rally was clearly manifested in the inception of the campaign 
proposal. As it states, 
On 23 August, 1989, fifty years after the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, more than two 
million people from the three Baltic States – Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania – joined 
hands to create a 600-kilometre human chain and demonstrated their determination 
to regain their independence. Their effort received enormous international attention 
and support. With our third democratic presidential election and first ever ‘peace 
referendum’ approaching, China once again instils fear in the Taiwanese public with 
the military threat. On the 57th anniversary of the 2-28 Incident, we want to 
remember the past as well as demonstrate our optimistic outlook for the future. We 
will bring more than a million people together to form a 500-kilometre human 
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chain along the west coast of Taiwan. This chain will symbolise a wall created by 
the bare hands of the people – regardless of ethnic background, gender, age, or 
political differences – to protect the freedom and peace of Taiwan. A lone voice is 
easily drowned, but more than a million voices will be heard throughout the world. 
With our hands together, our message is clear. We want peace, not war. We have 
the right to decide our own future and it is time for us to take Taiwan’s future in 
our own hands. (Internal document, provided by the organisers in October 2006) 
In this statement, the threat from China is highlighted. To counter this threat, the 
people in Taiwan should stand together to protect the country, regardless of their ethnic 
background, gender, age, or political differences. President Chen, in the preface of the book 
Hand-in-Hand to Protect Taiwan (HHPT) also gives a similar interpretation of the rally. Under 
the title of ‘Let the Great Wall Which Protects Taiwan and Democracy Stand Firm Forever’, 
Chen begins by saying that 
For many Taiwanese, 2-28 has been a symbol of taboo and suffering. The 2-28 
Incident which happened 57 years ago and the later White Terror kept the 
Taiwanese silent under an enormous shadow. An invisible barrier was also built up 
among ethnic groups. Although Taiwan continued to move forward, the shadow 
still silently surrounded the island and the mental barrier still remained. These 
common memories of the past affect everyone in Taiwan. Taiwanese went through 
several generations of efforts, and finally released themselves from the shadow of 
authoritarianism. They stepped into a country of democracy and law and order. In 
the process of democratic transformation, the governing party started to learn 
introspection and sensitivity to public opinion, so the truth of the 2-28 Incident 
could be exposed to the public gradually. (HHPT, 6)   
President Chen then continues by emphasising the importance of ethnic reconciliation when 
facing such a traumatic past. He writes that 
I believe that only by facing the tragedy of history can the wound be healed, and 
can the people gain new power and encouragement. I also believe that evil cannot 
stop evil. Only love and tolerance can reconcile us, in the face of the accumulated 
anger and sorrow of several generations; the 2-28 Incident can thus lose its stigma 
of suffering and become a new symbol of ethnic harmony and cooperation. In this 
way, Taiwanese people can tear down the barriers in their minds and stand together 
for a better future for Taiwan, regardless of political allegiance or ethnic group. And 
this is the valuable meaning of the 2-28 Hand-In-Hand Rally. (Ibid, 6)  
Chen then alters his tone to highlight the intimidation from the PRC. He insists that two 
million people joining together to form an island-long human chain to protest China’s 
military threats would give the world a clear message that the people of Taiwan want peace, 
not war. He writes that   
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Another significant meaning of the Hand-in-Hand Rally is that, while facing the 
threat of Chinese authority, millions of Taiwanese showed the willpower of unity by 
holding hands to make a ‘Great Wall of Democracy’. They expressed the firm will 
to pursue peace to the international community and to China. (Ibid, 6-7)  
He then states that this meaningful activity triggered vast power, letting the world know the 
will of the Taiwanese people. This is the unfinished task of building a country of Taiwanese. 
In the future, more people will have to be mustered in order to unify 23 million Taiwanese 
to cultivate the land and protect each individual’s future. He concludes that we should let the 
democratic great wall stand firm forever. ‘This day will be remembered in history, because 
Taiwanese have proved that love can conquer hatred and trust can replace suspicion…We 
are as a whole, and don’t need the mental barriers anymore’ (ibid, 7). 
Former President Lee also expressed a similar opinion. In his article ‘No More Cold 
Winters’, Lee interprets the 2-28 Incident as follows:  
After World War Two in August 1945, the Taiwanese were all cheering the dream 
of ‘returning to the mother land’ and celebrating the so-called ‘retrocession’. 
Nevertheless, after the retrocession, the political status and the living standards of 
the Taiwanese never improved, yet corrupted politics, degraded social orders, 
lawless troops, inflated goods, high unemployment rates, food shortage, plague and 
so on returned to Taiwan. Sixteen months later, the 2-28 Incident flared. More than 
ten thousand civilians and educated Taiwanese were massacred in this brutal 
incident. The incident awakened the souls that were once drunk on happiness of 
the restoration of China’s power over Taiwan. Two years after the incident, a 
‘settler state’ was established after the KMT power totally dissembled in mainland 
China and retreated to Taiwan. The KMT attempted to assimilate and ruled the 
Taiwanese in absolute dictatorship. Not long after the ‘2-28 Incident’, another 
tragedy, the so-called ‘White Terror’ subsequently happened which resulted in 
thousands of people being executed and imprisoned over the period of a year…It 
was truly the sadness of the Taiwanese. (Ibid. 3; emphasis added) 
Lee then goes on to describe how he seized the chance to reform Taiwanese politics and to 
promote localisation and democratisation, transforming Taiwan into a true democratic 
country. The people nowadays living in this ‘democratised Taiwan’, Lee suggests, should 
leave behind this sadness, looking forward and moving on to a bright future. Yet Lee 
cautions that Taiwanese people, while enjoying democracy, should be aware of China’s 
threat. Lee states:         
Taiwan, as a democratic nation, should leave deep-seated historical bitterness 
behind. However, the people of Taiwan also face the trials and tribulations that 
come from within and outside the community. Particularly China, who always 
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claims to be our motherland and tries to subsume Taiwan into their regime, have 
deployed hundreds of missiles on the other side of the strait aimed towards Taiwan, 
threatening to harm Taiwan’s democracy. Taiwan’s beautiful dream of the 
unification with China was dashed fifty-seven years ago after the 2-28 Incident. 
(Ibid, 4) 
He goes on to say, 
Taiwan is the one and only fatherland. This year, a new mileage was set in history 
on the day of 28 February. We have walked out of the shadow cast by the incident 
in order to guard our democracy and freedom. Taiwanese of all ethnic backgrounds 
hold hands together from the Northern to the Southern part of Taiwan, forming a 
human chain of two million people. We said ‘No’ to China’s missiles and said ‘Yes’ 
to Taiwan’s democratic freedom, demonstrating to the whole world our 
determination to protect our democracy, and showing China our resolution for 
freedom and peace. Apart from China and the old domestic powers [which referred to 
the Pan-Blue], everyone would be touched by what we had done. This great event 
will touch the hearts of our descendants. (Ibid, 4-5; emphasis added) 
In short, the aforementioned document interprets the historical lesson of the Hand-in-
Hand Rally as the need for Taiwanese people, based on their national identification with 
Taiwan, to stand up and say ‘no’ to foreign invaders – namely China, which has said it will 
not hesitate to use military force to annex Taiwan. In addition, to counter China’s invasion, 
Taiwanese people need to join hands in a demonstration of harmony and solidarity among 
all ethnic groups. This is the historical significance of the 2-28 Incident. 
5-3-2. The Run-up to the Hand-in-Hand Rally 
In order to promote the rally, the organisers held a series of press conferences, forums 
and a sequence of rehearsals.137 In what follows, the section investigates a number of 
representative examples. 
Press Conferences 
The organisers held a series of press conferences to promote the event. Apart from the 
press conference that targeted domestic society, the organisers also intended to bring an 
                                                
137 The organisers held a series of rehearsals across the island in the run-up to the rally. The success 
of these rehearsals not only helped to boost people’s confidence and motivate more people from 
other cities and counties to join the event, but also helped the organisers to gain experience in how to 
act when the million-strong rally took place on 28 February. One of the most successful rehearsals 
was held on 1 February, in which more than 70,000 people formed a 63-kilometre-long human chain 
in Tainan County in the south of the island, the home region of President Chen, in which he received 
the highest support across the island in the 2000 president election.  
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international awareness of the people’s will for independence in Taiwan. The international 
media press conference, ‘Yes to Peace! Hand-in-Hand with Taiwan’ was held on 22 February 
2004. The organisers invited foreign reporters to join this conference hosted by Li Ying-
Yuan and Xiao Mei-Qin (DPP Legislator and the Director of the DPP International Affairs 
Department). Various domestic and foreign guests were invited to the press conference, and 
during the panel discussion they held hands to show their support of the rally. Followed by 
the release of the campaign theme-song and a candle-lighting ceremony, a question-and-
answer session concluded the press conference.    
The message that the organisers intended to deliver about the meaning of the mass rally 
was clearly manifested in their press conference invitation. As it is stated,  
Facing the threats of the 496 missiles along the coast of China, Taiwan’s 23 million 
people want to give the world a clear message – ‘We want peace, not war!’ More 
than a million people in Taiwan have already made the commitment to join the 
500-kilometer long human chain on February 28 – Peace Memorial Day – to 
protect their rights to peace and liberty (Internal document, provided by the 
organisers in October 2006). 
Xiao Mei-Qin elaborated further the meaning of the event by emphasising the lesson that 
the Taiwanese people had learned from the historical tragedy of the 2-28 Incident. Xiao said 
that 
This is a historical event, because we are not only commemorating the tragedy that 
took place in Taiwan, we are also indicating our willingness to move forward. We 
are calling this event not only to protect Taiwan, but also as an event to promote 
reconciliation…We are reconciling the oppression and bitterness of ethnic conflicts 
of the past and moving forward in the spirit of solidarity to protect Taiwan from 
unwanted external threats. (TT 23/02/04, 3)  
Xiao added that this spirit of solidarity is reflected in the event’s name, because ‘holding 
hands’ (kanchui) also means ‘spouse’ in Minnan dialect. ‘It not only signifies the literal 
meaning of holding someone’s hands, it also embodies the values of love and partnership,’ 
she explained (ibid). 
It is important to note that the domestic media were also invited to attend this so-called 
‘international’ press conference. Although this press conference aimed to draw attention 
from the international community, it was also intended to promote the event domestically, 
showing the people in Taiwan that the event was receiving support in the international 
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community. The main feature of this ‘international’ press conference was the story of the 
‘Baltic Way.’ Indeed, the story of the three Baltic countries was widely promoted and 
disseminated in the run-up to the campaign.  
As mentioned earlier, the idea of the ‘Hand-in-Hand Rally’ was inspired by the 1989 
Baltic Chain. On 23 August 1989 the three Baltic states formed a two million-person human 
chain covering 600 kilometres to protest against the former Soviet Union’s occupation and 
to express their opposition to interference by the Russian Army. Following this massive 
event, the three countries started the process of holding referendums to vote for 
independence. In 1990, Lithuania became the first to declare its independence by means of a 
referendum, despite Russia’s military threat. Estonia and Latvia later used the same process 
to peacefully regain sovereignty that had been lost for more than 50 years. On 22 February 
2004, the organisers invited Mart Laanemets to attend a press conference. Laanemets, a 
then-Taipei-based academic, is a research fellow in the Centre for Oriental Studies at the 
University of Tartu in Estonia. He made a speech at the press conference under the title of 
‘The Expectation from Three Baltic States’. The analogy between the situation of Taiwan 
and that of Estonia was drawn in the speech. Laanemets stated that the political situation in 
Taiwan reminds him of his own country a few years ago. Particularly, Taiwan’s internal 
divisions between pro-unification and pro-independence forces are similar to the situation in 
Estonia before gaining independence, in which one part of the Estonian public supported 
independence while the other wanted to remain part of the Soviet Union (TT 23/03/04, 3).  
Laanemets spelled out this analogy elsewhere. In an article entitled ‘In Estonia, An 
Example for Taiwan to Draw On’ (Laanemets, TT 20/12/03, 8), Laanemets argued that 
after Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms of the 1980s, democratic movements grew throughout 
the Soviet Union. As part of this wave of democratisation impulses, the Party for the 
National Independence of Estonia was established in 1988, calling for a restoration of the 
independence of Estonia. A Moscow-backed democratic movement, the People’s Front, 
opposed it and upheld a kind of autonomy within the Soviet Union. In the following years, 
the pro-independence forces gradually gained the support of the public. They finally seized 
the opportunity to become an independent country when the conservative wing of the 
Communist Party in Moscow staged a coup in August 1991, attempting to overthrow 
Gorbachev’s government. Although the plan failed, it brought to an end Gorbachev’s 
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political life. A new leader Boris Yeltsin took power in Russia. During these critical days, the 
Estonian Congress declared the formal independence of Estonia. Yeltsin’s new government 
in Moscow, in need of any diplomatic support it could possibly be offered, quickly 
recognised it, as it did Latvia and Lithuania. Other countries elsewhere in the world followed. 
One month later, the three Baltic countries were admitted into the UN. 
Thus, in the light of the Baltic experience, Laanemets urged that Taiwan must prepare 
carefully for the future when the move to full independence would become more likely. He 
suggested that the people of Taiwan should strive to gain more international support 
demonstrating their willingness to pursue such independence, because the international 
community would put pressure on the Beijing government to change its attitude towards 
Taiwan. In addition, the people in Taiwan also need to acknowledge that Beijing’s attitude 
towards Taiwan would determine the success of the venture. Beijing would recognise the 
independence of Taiwan only if it is profitable for its leadership to do so. And it is only a 
matter of time before the communist regime in China collapses, Laanemets stated. Therefore, 
in the long run, Taiwan is very likely to attain de jure independence. The people in Taiwan, 
Laanemets concluded, ‘should not fear China, because we have learnt from experience that 
even a superpower like Russia…would concede to Estonia’s independence drive. The 
international situation changes and the people quickly learned to use this change to promote 
the independence movement’ (TT 23/03/04, 3).  
Academic Fora  
In addition to the press conferences, other activities were arranged to foster the event. 
For instance, Taiwan Advocates, a think-tank founded by the former president Lee to 
promote Taiwanese national consciousness, held a series of nationwide fora since the 
beginning of February 2004 to preach the importance of the referendum and the need to 
create a new constitution for Taiwan. The last in a series of fora was held on 21 February in 
Hualien, the major city in the eastern Taiwan, which is recognised as a Pan-Blue stronghold. 
Several pro-independence politicians and intellectuals all joined this event to whip up 
support for the rally, the referendum and Chen’s election campaign.  
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Chinese dissident writer Cao Chang-Ching, speaking at the opening of a forum, 
condemned Pan-Blue by linking it with communist China.138 Cao stated that the pro-China 
Pan-Blue, which had no vision for Taiwan’s future, had been kowtowing to Beijing 
throughout the election. If they won, Cao continued, it would be a step back for Taiwan’s 
democracy. The Pan-Blue’s policy of not touching the sovereignty issue would only invite 
Beijing to increase its efforts to impose the ‘one country, two systems’ policy, which is 
absolutely not acceptable to the Taiwanese people. He therefore asserted that a vote for the 
Pan-Blue means a vote for rule by communist China. He said:  
This is the first time I have visited Hualien. I went around the place and really liked 
it. But there are also some Chinese officials who like Hualien a lot and said that if 
the Lien-Soong [Pan-Blue] ticket won the election, Taiwan might accept the ‘one 
country two systems’ concept and Chinese military ships can then come to 
Taiwan…Let’s use our ballots to vote out the candidates that the Communist Party 
likes. Don’t let Hualien become communist China’s military port. (TT 22/02/04, 2) 
In contrast to the Pan-Blue, according to Cao, the president Chen had a clear plan and 
timetable of a new constitution for Taiwan. This effort will demand the world to take note 
of the reality of the existence of Taiwan. Chen’s administration has proven that his 
administration will bring hope and dignity to Taiwan. Cao believed the continuation of the 
DPP government will further the nation’s democratic progress, helping the people to pursue 
their sovereign rights and promise for Taiwan’s future. He remarked:  
I came to campaign not for Chen Shui-Bian, but for the values of democracy and freedom. 
(Ibid.; emphasis added) 
Contrary to a widespread prediction that a win for Chen would increase instability in the 
Taiwan Strait, Cao believed that Chen’s re-election would bring to a halt and eventually 
terminate Beijing’s decades of delusion and efforts to annex Taiwan. There are three reasons 
for this belief, according to Cao. Firstly, the victory of Chen would highlight the people’s 
desire for sovereign rights and their decision to determine their own fate. Secondly, it would 
show the world the inevitability of the establishment of an independent Taiwan. And thirdly, 
it would force Beijing to face reality and adopt realistic policies toward Taiwan. He therefore 
urged the people in Taiwan to vote for the re-election of Chen.  
                                                
138 For full transcription of  Cho’s speech in the fora, please see: 
http://advocates.tomeet.biz/wooooa/front/bin/ptdetail.phtml?Part=forumE07&PreView=1 
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News Editorials  
A great number of editorials and opinion pieces were published in the press 
commenting on the event. One such piece, ‘The Historical Significance of the 228 Hand-in-
Hand Rally’, written by Hsu Shih-Kai, a co-founder of the Hand-in-Hand Taiwan Alliance, 
was published in Liberal Times (LT 25/02/04, 15; also TT 28/02/04, 8).  
The author writes that since he started taking part in organising the rally, he has been 
thinking about why 28 February was chosen as the date for this massive event. Hsu said that 
the 2-28 Incident is a very important collective memory for the Taiwanese people, and a 
decisive point in Taiwan’s contemporary nationalism. There are two historical meanings of 
this collective memory. The first one, writes Hsu, is    
The 2-28 Incident smashed China’s pipe dream, helping the Taiwanese people to 
become aware of the distinction between themselves and the Chinese people, and 
more decisively strengthening the self-awareness of the Taiwanese people. Then, in 
the 1990s, Taiwan’s localisation developed when China intimidated Taiwan through 
propaganda and military force, resulting in a great transformation of Taiwanese self-
awareness into national self-identification. (Ibid.) 
The second one is 
At the same time, also starting from the advent of Japanese rule, Taiwanese ethnic 
groups adjusted their attitudes toward each other, as evidenced in the Wushe 
Incident [Musha Uprising] in 1930, when Aboriginal people killed only Japanese, 
not Han people. Provoked by the 2-28 Incident, self-awareness continued to grow. 
For example, faced with the strength of people with roots in China, other ethnic 
groups developed attitudes of mutual solidarity. Then in the 1990s, when 
democratisation was under way, the four main ethnic groups were encouraged to 
strengthen their identities while at the same time showing respect (not integration 
and assimilation) toward each other. (ibid.) 
Hsu suggests that people’s identification with the new nation and harmony inside the nation 
are two issues of great significance to Taiwan’s contemporary nationalism. The 2-28 Incident 
began the process, which accelerated during the 1990s under the former president Lee’s 
presidency. He then writes that 
The historic significance of the 228 Hand-in-Hand Rally is that Taiwanese people, 
based on their national self-identification with Taiwan, will stand up to say ‘no’ to 
foreign invaders – namely China, which has said it will not hesitate to use military 
force to annex Taiwan. Moreover, Taiwanese people joining hands will demonstrate 
harmony and solidarity among all ethnic groups. (ibid.) 
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In this vein, the rally is an expression of Taiwanese contemporary nationalism, the growing 
consciousness of the need to oppose China and the great leap forward in national solidarity. 
Hsu then concludes that, for the public to reject Chinese influence, there are three concrete 
measures which need to be followed: First, stand up and join hands. Second, vote for 
President Chen, who advocates ‘one country on each side’ of the Taiwan Strait, and help him 
push for a new constitution and eventual realisation of the nation-building goal. Third, vote 
in the referendum on 20 March. In Hsu’s view, if the Taiwanese people say ‘no’ to China 
and ‘yes’ to Taiwan, Taiwan’s national security will be ensured.  
Theme Song and Logo for the Rally  
The organisers also released the theme song and logo for the rally. The song was 
frequently broadcast in the mass media of Taiwan during that time. The theme song, under 
the title ‘She is Our Baby’ (
&) was written by Chen Ming-Zhang with music 
composed by Chen Ming-Chang and Xiao Fu-De. The song signifies the fate of Taiwan 
through the metaphor of a little girl.139 
A flower comes into the world (#! ")  
Father and Mother love her all ()  
When the wind blows, keep her warm (.)	 $)  
Don’t let her fall into the dark world ('"/)  
A bud needs our care (+ !-%,)  
Give her a land to grow (*)  
Hand in hand ()  
Heart by heart (()  
We stand together (
)  
She is Our Baby (
&) 
It is nevertheless important to note that the song was not originally written for the 2-28 
Hand-in-Hand Rally. It was written in 1993 for a Christian charity that helps young girls who 
have suffered from domestic violence, sexual abuse and exploitation, aiming to raise social 
awareness of child prostitution and to support the rescuing of child prostitutes in Taiwan. 
                                                
139 The song was originally written in Minnan dialect. English translation is made by Chen Hsiang-
Chun (2005, 148).  
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According to Chen Hsiang-Chun (2005), the ‘flower’ and the ‘bud’ in the lyrics refer to 
‘young girls’, and the song ‘calls for parents and society to protect them and treat them well’ 
(2005, 149). In 2004, this song was used again by the organisers of the Hand-in-Hand Rally. 
Yet, this time, Chen comments:  
The ‘flower’ and the ‘bud’ seemed to signify the ‘fragile’ new Taiwan nation and 
Taiwan’s democracy that needed to be taken good care of, especially under the 
missile threat from China seemingly represented by ‘the dark world’ in the lyrics. 
(Ibid., 149) 
As Chen argues, this song was a very successful strategy. ‘Unusual in using a feminine image 
to represent the new Taiwan nation and Taiwan’s democracy, it effectively raised collective 
patriotism for Taiwan against China’ (ibid.). 
The logo for the campaign was designed as an image of Taiwan, being held by a hand 
with five fingers. The five fingers of the hand would represent the major ethnic groups of 
Taiwan – Hakka, Mainlander, Minnan, Aboriginals and their foreign spouses – coming 
together to protect Taiwan (Figure 5-1).  
5-3-3. The 2-28 Hand-in-Hand Rally on 28 February 2004 
On Saturday, 28 February 2004, around two million people of all ages joined hands to 
form an island-long (approximately 500km) human chain from Hoping Island near Keelung 
to Changlung in Pingtung County, protesting against China’s military threat. The Chinese 
characters for ‘hoping’ and ‘changlung’ literally mean ‘peace’ and ‘prosperity’. 140 
The event began with the official memorial ceremony of the 57th anniversary of the 2-
28 Incident in Keelung City, northern Taiwan, where the former KMT government landed 
its troops from China to begin its bloody suppression in 1947, also the place where many of 
the victims’ bodies were buried in the incident’s aftermath. The ceremony was solemn and 
dignified. The venue of the ceremony was decorated with a red and white colour backboard, 
with some bullet marks embellished, which the three digital numbers ‘2’, ‘2’, ‘8’, attached to 
it (CT 29/02/04, A3).  
                                                
140 The original plan of the route was designed to terminate at Chienkuo Road in Pingtung City. The 
Chinese character ‘Chienkuo’ means ‘nation-building’.  This route, from Hoping Island to Chienkuo 
Road, therefore signifies the road from ‘peace’ to ‘nation-building’. This proposal was abandoned 
later since it was too controversial, and might deter some more moderate people from joining the 
campaign (Interview with Zhang, 21/07/06).    
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At the ceremony, with music played by trumpet and a string quartet, President Chen as 
well as the family members of the 2-28 victims observed a moment of silence for those who 
suffered in the incident. Chen then granted recognition to the family members of victims 
and led them in laying bouquets of flowers on a temporary monument in their honour, 
located on the stage (UDN 29/02/04, A4). Afterwards, the president made some remarks at 
the ceremony. He said that the 2-28 Incident had been a taboo subject for much of the last 
fifty-seven years and many people believed that this traumatic past should not be mentioned 
and that the historical scar should not be revealed, in order to avoid possible ethnic clashes. 
Yet, Chen stated, he did not see the incident in this way. Stressing ethnic harmony, Chen 
said that all the peoples of the island had suffered together regardless of their ethnicity; the 
Taiwanese therefore had to work hard together and support each other. He stressed the 
importance of the common travails and destiny of all Taiwan’s ethnic groups. Despite the 
fact that tragic massacres and bloodshed perpetrated 57 years ago by the totalitarian KMT 
government had served as a prelude to decades of white terror and the martial-law era, Chen 
called on people in Taiwan to reflect on the event with ‘love’, ‘tolerance’ and ‘introspection’. 
He stated that 
Love for Taiwan, this nation and its people; tolerance for history and each other; 
introspection about the mistakes of the past and about ourselves; this should be our 
basic attitude toward the 228 Incident (TT 29/02/04, 1). 
While urging to commemorate the incident with love, tolerance and introspection, Chen 
continued by saying that ‘since we have come this far together, it should be said that the 
people of Taiwan are not forgetful, stupid or numb. Rather, they are unrivalled in tolerance 
and courage’ (ibid.). 
In his speech, Chen struck a positive and conciliatory tone. Yet, he also issued a thinly 
veiled warning to the nation that only the DPP could continue to safeguard the people’s 
right to determine Taiwan’s destiny. He reminded the audience that ‘for over 300 years, 
Taiwan was not a sovereign state and that the people of Taiwan were not the masters of 
their own household’ (ibid.). Nevertheless, Chen urged, now was the time for all groups to 
‘affirm their sovereignty’ over the island. And only the DPP, rather than the Pan-Blue, which 
represented the interests of the PRC, could help Taiwan to be its own sovereign (ibid.). This 
official ceremony was followed by another religious ritual held on Hoping [Peace] Island. 
Various religious groups, including Buddhists, Taoists and Christians prayed together for the 
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peace of Taiwan. The organisers released flocks of white doves at the end of the ceremony, 
which marked the launch of the event.  
The Rally, beginning at Hoping Island, was held primarily along the Taiwan National 
Highway No.1 and partially along Highway No.3 and No.5, stretching down to the south 
(Figure 5-2). All participants who had signed up to take part were designated to check-in 
points, where they should assemble at 11 a.m. Those who had not signed up could just stop 
at any part of the designated route and join the line. People joined hands all the way from 
northern Taiwan, down along the western coast of Taiwan across bridges, along the beach 
and mountains, and finally ended at the southern tip of the island of Taiwan. The rally 
stretched 500 km through 18 cities and counties. Details of the routes were organised by 
local coordinating groups in each city and county. This route was designed to cross the most 
densely populated areas, where the majority of the Taiwanese people resided. By crossing 
these areas, the organisers aimed not just to facilitate the participation of greater numbers of 
people, but also to promote the incumbent president Chen as part of the election 
campaign.141  
The organisers encouraged the participants to bring three gadgets with them on the day 
of the rally: cell phones, digital cameras and radios. The cell phones were used to spread text 
messages about the event, while the digital cameras were used to keep photographic records. 
The organisers encouraged people to send their pictures of the event to their website to 
share the information with people around the world. Information regarding the rally was also 
broadcast on the radio.  
The highlight of the event was in Maioli County, the central part of Taiwan, where the 
National Rally Headquarters was located. President Chen and former president Lee held 
hands as a symbol of their joint effort to promote Taiwan’s independence. The choice of 
Maioli County for the main stage of the event was not made without conscious decision. It is 
noted that Maioli County is a remote, mountainous and Hakka-populated area. Hakka 
                                                
141 As some studies have indicated (Mattlin, 2004), candidate visibility is crucial in Taiwan’s election 
campaigns, although the forms differ slightly depending on the election.  In local elections, emphasis 
is placed on direct contact with voters. Campaign activities in Taiwan’s high-level elections lean 
heavily on mass parade and other forms of mass activities.  
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community has long been regarded as a loyal supporter of the KMT.142 Linking the human 
chain continuously without a break in Miaoli became the most difficult organisational task of 
the event, as one of those involved testified. They therefore decided to make this area the 
focal point, aiming to mobilise more participants in this hugely remote area (Interview with 
Zhang, 21/07/06). A great number of buses was used by the organisers to transport 
participants from other counties to this area. A high turnout in this area could boost the low 
morale of the Pan-Green, attract any undecided Hakka ballots in this area, and above all 
shatter the KMT’s monopoly in the Hakka community. Breaking the deadlock presented by 
the Pan-Blue’s dominance in this region was then a huge task for the DPP, and one of the 
most crucial factors in determining the party’s overall electoral outlook in the 2004 
presidential election. Moreover, another benefit of setting the main rostrum of the event in 
Miaoli for Chen’s election campaign was that it gave the Pan-Green a great opportunity to 
boost its support through personal contact between the candidate and the population.  
As Chen arrived in the northern headquarters of Miaoli county at 1:00 p.m., he then 
stood atop a campaign car to greet the people along the human chain heading down to the 
South. The former president Lee, accompanied by some TSU legislators, began his tour in 
the southern part of the county, greeting the people as he headed northwards (CT 29/02/04, 
A2). At around 2:15 p.m., Chen and Lee met at the national rally headquarters in central 
Miaoli as a symbol of their concerted effort to protect Taiwan and to promote democracy. 
At noon, people of different ages and backgrounds began to form queues along the planned 
route meandering through scores of towns and cities in Western Taiwan. The two presidents 
appeared on a performance stage set up at a stadium, joining hands with representatives of 
Taiwan’s ethnic groups, genders, classes, and so on (UDN 29/02/04, A3). The human chain 
formed a circle in the shape of Taiwan on the stage (Figure 5-3; 5-4). At 2:20 p.m., everyone 
held their hands at once. After a one-minute nationally broadcast countdown, the rally 
reached its climax at 2:28 p.m. with two million participants lifting their hands. At that 
moment, Chen and Lee raised their hands, inspiring the two-million crowd across Taiwan 
through ten huge TV screens that represented ten major venues. In this highly emotional 
                                                
142 A common reason why Hakka people feel estranged from the DPP is its extensive use of  Hoklo 
language used by Minnan people. The language barrier is also reinforced by the Hakka community’s 
anxiety about losing their mother tongue and their ethnic minority status, as they have historically 
competed for land and other resources with the Minnan people.  
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atmosphere, the two leaders turned to face the Jade Mountain, the highest mountain in the 
island of Taiwan (3996 metre high), chanted slogans such as ‘Solidifying All Ethnic Groups, 
Joining Hands To Protect Taiwan’, ‘Believe In Democracy, Insist On Reform’, ‘Love Peace, 
Oppose Missiles’, ‘Love Taiwan, Wish For Democracy’, and ‘Taiwan Yes, China No’. 
Following Chen and Lee, the participants of the human chain joined their hands and 
performed exactly the same actions. They chanted their deep affection for Taiwan, shouted 
slogans calling for peace and democracy, and urged China to remove missiles aimed at the 
island. Organisers subsequently released multicoloured ribbons and balloons and launched 
fireworks.  
President Chen then gave a speech to the crowd. He remarked,  
More than one million people have joined hands together to form a Democratic 
Great Wall. This is a historic attempt by the people to show the world their love for 
Taiwan and the power that people have to write history with their own hands…Our 
228 Hand-in-Hand Rally was like a carnival to open our minds and invite everyone 
to guard Taiwan…The rally showed how Taiwanese love their country…Taiwan’s 
democracy can never be defeated by China’s authoritarianism, Taiwan’s referendum 
cannot be defeated by China’s missiles. (CT 29/02/04, A2; TT 29/02/04, 1)  
Chen sent his regards to the participants, saying that they had made this event possible, 
despite the doubts of some regarding the success of the event. Chen said that the people of 
Taiwan had used the mildest, most joyful and dignified way to proclaim their solidarity and 
determination for peace to the world. He continued, ‘however, this is just the beginning. We 
must continue our efforts and cast referendum ballots on the day of election to maintain 
Taiwan’s security’ (ibid.). 
The former president Lee also made a speech following Chen’s remarks. Lee 
interpreted the success of the rally as signifying ‘the people’s affirmation of Taiwan’s national 
identity and a rejection of Chinese missile threats’ (ibid.). Lee said, 
Seeing a big spectacle like this, in which more than one million people have come 
out to show their love for Taiwan, is the most touching moment…Such is the power of 
the people, and this is a victory for the people of Taiwan. (Ibid.; emphasis added) 
The event was notable for the diversity of people who took part; people of all ages and 
backgrounds found different ways to express solidarity. It was not only designed to 
demonstrate the unity of all the different ethnic groups in Taiwan, but also the integration 
and collaboration of people from different generations, genders, religions and social and 
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racial backgrounds in opposing China’s rule. Prominent members of the Pan-Green all took 
part in the rally.  
In Taipei City, four generations of president Chen’s family, including the first lady, all 
took part in the gathering, holding hands with the masses in Taipei’s 2-28 Memorial Park, 
together with other Pan-Green politicians’ families. According to the organisers, more than 
100,000 people participated in the nation’s capital, including 20 four-generation-families (TT, 
29/02/04, 3). In Taipei County, ten women and girls, with ages ranging from just a few 
months to 105 years, came to the rally with Vice President Lu, a woman, to express solidarity. 
Lu addressed the rally, saying that ‘women can stand at the nation’s frontline…show 
concern for Taiwan, bringing about love and peace instead of war’ (ibid). In Taichung City, 
the biggest metropolis in central Taiwan, the highlight was around one hundred couples 
singing a famous Mandarin love song with the then-Premier Yu Shyi-Kun. Yu held hands 
with his wife, telling the couples that he hoped ‘2-28’ would from now on become a 
wonderful day to remember instead of a tragic day to mourn. In southern Taiwan, more than 
120,000 people turned up for Kaohsiung County’s rally. Kaohsiung is a historical stronghold 
for the DPP. Undaunted by the hot weather, men, women and children began lining up 
along the planned route around noon, holding small flags and banners saying ‘Yes Taiwan’ 
and ‘No Missiles’. Taiwan’s major religious groups also turned out to support the event. The 
Taiwanese Presbyterian Church marked the day with prayers for the nation in Taipei County. 
Among the throngs of participants in the northern city of Miaoli were around 1,000 people, 
each carrying a statue of Buddha in their arms, to pray for the blessings of the gods on 
Taiwan. Premier Yu beat a peace gong provided by a Taoist Temple in Tatsoon township, 
Chunghua County, the midpoint of the 500 km-long human chain (ibid.).  
Despite lingering memories of the tragedy of 2-28, the event proceeded more like a 
festival, taking on a carnival atmosphere with musicians and dancers performing on open 
stages. Many participants were dressed in costumes or brought with them elaborately made 
props and banners to add a festive atmosphere and play down the political overtones of the 
event. Each area demonstrated its own local specialties. For instance, in Chunghua, around 
100,000 participants gathered and many of them carried chrysanthemums.143 There were also 
                                                
143 Chunghua has earned its reputation for being at the heart of  the nation’s flower trade, and 
chrysanthemums are one of  the county’s biggest money-making products. 
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many traditional Taiwanese folk art performances staged during the rally to add to the fun. 
At Hoping Island, aboriginals performed traditional dances. In the city of Taichung, some 
city councilors led a group of people wearing bamboo hats with a paper missile bearing the 
pattern of China’s five-starred red flag on top. Written on the missile was the slogan 
‘Referendum Yes, Missiles No’. A lion dance was performed on the old Xiluo Bridge in 
Chunghua. In Sangchung, 2,000 supporters stood in formation to create a picture consisting 
of the numbers ‘2-28’, a hand, and a map of Taiwan. Rock concerts continued for the rest of 
the afternoon in Taiwan and in the south of Taiwan. The fifth ‘Say Yes to Taiwan Music 
Festival’, an event held by the Taiwan Rock Alliance in memory of the 2-28 Incident, took 
place in front of the Presidential Office following the rally. In addition to local bands 
including metal stalwarts Chthonic, the punk trio Pangu from China and some other groups 
from Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea and the US attracted a number of young people. A 
night rally took place in Pingtung’s Oluanpi, Taiwan’s southernmost tip, marking the end of 
the event (Figure 5-5; 5-6; 5-7; 5-8; 5-9; 5-10).  
5-3-4. The Political Impacts of the Rally  
In terms of the political impact of the event on the election, the following section 
argues that the rally, together with the referendum, was vital to the incumbent president 
Chen’s campaign for the presidency for three reasons. First, the mass-rally set the agenda of 
election campaign issues. It provided a convenient instrument for Chen not only to spark 
debate about the topic in favour of the Pan-Green, but also to distract people’s attention 
from Chen’s poor economic performance during his presidency. In the run-up to the rally, 
campaign issues gave way to discussion over ethnic harmony, China’s threat, expression of 
the will of the people, and love of and self-identification with Taiwan, which presumably 
benefited the Pan-Green side. Topics that the Pan-Blue attempted to bring into the 
campaign – such as the poor state of the economy, cross-Strait relations, and corruption – 
failed to define the campaign. The news about the mass rally dominated the major media in 
Taiwan at that time. Indeed, the Hand-in-Hand Rally received widespread coverage in 
newspapers and on TV programs. 
Secondly, it helped to occupy the moral high ground in defiance of the Pan-Blue’s 
eagerness to accommodate it. The core strategy was to integrate the rally, the referendum 
and support for Chen based on a growing self-awareness among the people, and to attempt 
   213
 
to associate this triad with concepts such as ‘loving Taiwan’ and ‘democracy’. The Pan-Blue 
candidates were being positioned as opponents of these concepts. The rally permitted Chen 
to portray himself as the protector of Taiwan’s democracy and identity. The extraordinary 
spectacle of the event touched the hearts of many Taiwanese people, and these feelings were 
transformed into support for Chen in the election. 
Third, it helped to raise the morale of the Pan-Green during the presidential campaign. 
The rally obviously boosted the Pan-Green’s spirit. The large number of people taking part 
incited the Pan-Green’s confidence. The event was viewed as highly successful. It was 
estimated that 500,000 participants, standing in one line, would have been enough to form 
the human chain. Actually, two million people showed up, some of whom had to stand in 
two, three, and even four lines in many segments of the human chain. While some Pan-Blue 
campaign organisers at the time were visibly nervous after the rally, the Pan-Green people 
appeared elated. The then-DPP-Secretary-General Zhang Jun-Xiong said right after the 
demonstration that the rally would be significant for Chen’s campaign, and the passion 
people showed in turning out in such huge numbers would be reflected in support for Chen 
(TT 01/03/04, 2). The esprit de corps of the Pan-Green and its supporters was indeed strong at 
that moment. And the high rally turnout also boosted Chen’s electoral prospects, having had 
a great effect on the orientation of the undecided voters in Taiwan’s presidential election 
campaign. Indeed, the public gathering not only consolidated the Pan-Green’s traditional 
support base, but also had the significant effect of swaying undecided voters, expanding the 
party’s voter base. With less than two weeks to go, the inclination of undecided voters was 
expected to be the key factor in determining the election. 
In short, the Pan-Green created an environment in favour of its own interests during 
the election campaign through commemorating the traumatic history of the 2-28 Incident. 
The Pan-Green hoped that this 2-28 enthusiasm would continue while it drummed up 
support and fought cut-throat battles at the grass-roots level in order to gain a lead in the 
race. They also expected people to remember the rally’s spirit and to harness such 
democratic enthusiasm to support Chen. To keep this momentum, the DPP campaign 
headquarters organised quite a few medium and large campaign activities in the run up to the 
election. There were at least two campaign rallies each day, rising up to four every day during 
the last 10 days of the campaign.  
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The Pan-Blue, in response, held an event under the title ‘Heart-to-Heart Rally,’ where 
people donated blood and ran in a torch relay to symbolise reconciliation among the nation’s 
ethnic groups in remembrance of the 2-28 Incident. The torch relay was brought to an end 
at Kaohsiung in southern Taiwan, after a two-week journey through 319 cities, towns and 
villages around Taiwan. They called for reconciliation among the nation’s ethnic groups and 
chose the act of blood donation to express this ethnic reconciliation. KMT presidential 
candidate Lian recited a poem in the Minnan dialect describing eternal companionship. The 
poem, entitled ‘I am in your blood and you are in my blood’, referred to both the blood 
donation drive and the message of ethnic harmony. Lian made a remark after finishing the 
poem: 
Reconciliation does not mean asking all to have the same opinion, but to harbour 
respect and treat one another with respect despite having a different 
opinion…Regardless of whether one is Hoklo, Hakka, Mainlander or Aboriginal, 
blood keeps life going, and blood does not distinguish between political stance, 
ethnicity, province of residence, gender or age. (CT 29/02/04, A4; TT 29/02/04, 4)  
As the Pan-Green’s nationwide human chain rally reached its crescendo, the Pan-Blue’s rally 
offered a much more modest spectacle to mark the day. The Pan-Blue rally of a few tens of 
thousands in Kaohsiung on the same day looked meagre in comparison.  
It is of course hard to determine precisely what the impact of the 228 Hand-in-Hand 
Rally was. The 2004 presidential election result was the best for the Pan-Green in any 
election up to date. Neither Chen’s personal vote in 2000, nor the Pan-Green vote in 
previous elections had ever exceeded 50 percent of the total ballots. Of course, there are 
many other possible reasons for the extra votes garnered by Chen, such as the coupling of 
the referendum with the presidential elections and the shooting incident. Nevertheless, it is 
hard to dismiss the fact that, as a result of the success of the rally in the final countdown 
phase of the presidential election, most opinion polls showed that approval ratings for the 
blue and green camps were drawing closer, given that Chen had been far behind his 
counterpart at the beginning of the election campaign.144 Although the organisers maintained 
that the rally had been aimed at highlighting Taiwan’s determination to maintain peace using 
                                                
144 For instance, the opinion pool conducted by China Times between 1 and 5 March (the result was 
released on 6 March) shows that DPP Chen’s supporting rate for the first time takes precedence over 
KMT Lian’s supporting rate (CT 06/03/04, A2).     
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their bare hands and had no direct connection with Chen’s reelection campaign, the 
subsequent opinion polls showed a great boost to Chen’s ratings. 
  
5-4. The Commemoration of the ‘Traumatic’ Event of the 2-28 Incident 
in the Formation of Taiwanese National Identity  
The 2-28 Incident, as many studies have shown, has been interpreted differently at 
various times and has continuously changed its meaning. The incident, when it first 
happened, was defined as a Chinese communist conspiracy. Immediately after the uprising in 
the late 1940s, it was blamed by the KMT regime on communist agitators among some 
Taiwanese who had received Japanese military training (Phillips 2006, 6-7). In the 1950s, by 
contrast, the Incident was interpreted among the overseas Taiwan Independence Movement 
activists as ‘a violent struggle for national independence – a failed revolution, which they 
intended to repeat and bring to a successful conclusion’ (Fleischauer 2006, 5). This armed 
uprising was to be directed against the Mainlanders and yet the PRC was considered to share 
the same antagonism towards the KMT regime, which made it a potential ally of the Taiwan 
Independence Movement. The 2-28 Incident was by then conceived as an ethnic 
confrontation between the native Taiwanese and the Mainlanders. Entering the 1970s, when 
the democratic movement started in Taiwan, the ‘2-28’ was no longer hailed as a first 
uprising which had to be repeated. Rather, it was regarded as ‘a great calamity and tragedy 
for the Taiwanese people (including the Mainlanders), for which, of course, the KMT 
government was blamed’ (ibid., 7). The then-opposition forces (against the KMT regime) 
urged the KMT to rectify its past mistakes by relinquishing its grip on absolute power and 
allowing a democratic society which provided equal opportunities. The ‘2-28’ came to be 
regarded as the symbol and most visible manifestation of the KMT’s oppression of the 
Taiwanese. In the process of Taiwan’s political liberalisation since 1987, the ‘2-28’ symbol 
continued to have enormous significance, and its interpretations have been to a great degree 
shaped by political calculations in electoral politics. Under Lee Teng-Hui, the KMT reversed 
its former policy of denying the Incident’s existence and touched upon the question of ‘2-28’. 
Lee offered an official apology and a full rehabilitation to all 2-28 victims in 1995 
(Edmondson 2001, 35-7; Phillips 2006, 13). While this yielding by the KMT was mainly due 
to relentless pressure from public opinion, it was also in the interest of Lee’s indigenous 
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faction of the KMT to do so. Lee regarded the incident’s ‘clarification’ as an opportunity to 
distance himself from its authoritarian past and depict the KMT as a new democratic party, 
fitting to compete in a democratic society. As for the DPP, the ‘2-28’ was one of many issues 
that the DPP could use to mobilise the masses to attack its major rival, the KMT, and to 
consolidate its public support among the native Taiwanese electorate.145 Yet, while doing so, 
they also needed to avoid alienating the undecided, neutral, moderate and non-native 
Taiwanese voters (such as the Mainlanders).  
The 2-28 Incident thus became an emblematic warning against Taiwan’s unification 
with mainland China and a symbol of reconciliation between different Taiwanese ethnic 
groups.146 On many occasions, as this chapter has shown above, the organisers of the 
demonstration highlighted China’s military threat, the need to prevent China from governing 
Taiwan, the protection of Taiwan’s democracy, and the ideal of ethnic harmony. The main 
theme of the rally was the safeguarding of Taiwan’s sovereignty and self-awareness, and 
saying ‘no’ to China.  
Under this discourse, what the historical lessons of the ‘2-28’ had taught the Taiwanese 
was the ruthlessness of China’s rule. The 2-28 Incident was represented as a warning of the 
consequences that an enforced unification demanded by the PRC would necessarily have. 
One of the main reasons for the uprising and its brutal suppression by China was the fact 
that, in 1947, Taiwan and China were divided by a deep cultural and political rift, which led 
to a friction after the KMT took over the island, finally culminating in the 2-28 Incident. 
Nowadays, the rifts that separate Taiwan and China run deeper, especially after Taiwan 
became a democratic country. If Taiwan was forced to agree to a renewed unification with 
China, a second ‘2-28 Incident’ would follow with the same inevitability. Moreover, while the 
rally organisers emphasised the importance of democracy and freedom to the Taiwanese, the 
incident also signified Taiwan’s suffering from single-party totalitarianism. The totalitarian 
nature of the Chinese regime has not changed, despite the fact that economic changes have 
taken place. Due to the adoption of a capitalist economic system and the result of the rapid 
economic growth of China in the last decades, the gap in living standards between the two 
                                                
145 After the incident, KMT was perceived as an occupying force and the Mainlanders were regarded 
as ‘foreign’. 
146 Similar arguments can be found in Chen Hsiang-chun’s (2005) studies on arts exhibitions of  2-28 
Incident and Stenfen Fleischauer’s studies (2006) on Taiwan Independence Movement.  
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sides of Taiwan Strait has narrowed. Yet, the PRC has never given up its single-party 
totalitarianism. Therefore, the historical tragedies of ‘2-28’ cannot be forgotten.  
To avoid the repetition of this traumatic history, the only way to do so is to safeguard 
Taiwan’s sovereignty. In facing China’s military threat, the Taiwanese people must 
demonstrate their determination to self-defence. Large-scale military exercises are not the 
sole way that power can be demonstrated, as this task can be fulfilled through the display of 
people’s determination. In this vein, the human chain of 2004 was a means of demonstrating 
the will of the people of Taiwan to oppose Chinese domination. Holding hands was a way of 
making a pro-peace and anti-war case and standing up against the Chinese regime. The rally 
should not therefore be considered the campaign strategy of any particular political party or 
ethnic group. Popular participation in the rally was a demonstration of popular will, and 
ultimately, a claim to Taiwanese sovereignty.  
To defend the aspirations of the Taiwanese people, the advocates of the human chain 
held, the country leaders are expected to display courage to counter China’s overwhelming 
diplomatic, military, and economic pressure. Any other thinking is viewed as ‘wrong’ and 
‘illegitimate’. Opposing China (and its missiles) and defending Taiwan’s sovereignty (love 
Taiwan) for the rally proponents is the only ‘truth’ – an unchallenged truth. Any scepticism 
towards the rally campaign, referendum and, above all, Taiwanese identity was portrayed as 
the deplorable habit of surrendering to China. Any individual or political party in Taiwan 
could express differing opinions about public affairs and propose various policies in an 
effort to win the election. However, no one should disregard the country’s national security 
and sovereignty in advancing their own interests. Acting like this would be irresponsible and 
would endanger Taiwan and its people. Moreover, any scepticism about the legitimacy of the 
referendum and the rally, designed to oppose China’s missiles, is seen as unacceptable. And, 
since the rally was interpreted as a display of the solidarity of the Taiwanese people with 
China and the entire world, those people – mostly supporters of the Pan-Blue – who did not 
join the event or criticised it, were seen as disloyal. And the Pan-Blue’s fear of provoking 
Beijing, as well as its policy proposal concerning the casting aside of the issue of Taiwan’s 
sovereignty for the sake of peace, run counter to the proper and legitimate way of protecting 
the collective interests of Taiwan. To those critics of the Pan-Blue, such behaviour totally 
disregards the sense of national self-identification and community built upon popular will 
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and national consciousness. On this view, Pan-Blue party members ignore the fact that this 
sense of political community and national identity has become the core value of democratic 
Taiwan. Opponents of the campaign are de facto against democracy. And politicians who 
continue to hold illusions about unification completely disregard China’s political and 
military claim to (regional) hegemony. An editorial of a Taiwanese newspaper stated:  
The rally clearly showed Beijing the determination of the people of Taiwan to 
protect the nation, but these Pan-Blue people branded it an activity to create ethnic 
division. Even though they were intimidating people in order to prevent them from 
attending the rally, they nevertheless held a ‘Heart-to-Heart Rally’, which included a 
blood donation drive to symbolize ethnic reconciliation, marked by the slogan, ‘I 
am in your blood and you are in my blood.’ But they have never criticised the 
Chinese government, which has suppressed Taiwan, undermined its internal 
solidarity by using the independence-unification issue, and threatened it with 
missiles. Does the ‘you’ (I am in your blood…) in the above slogan refer to the bandit regime 
across the Strait? Why are they afraid to take Beijing to task? (Lin, TT 05/03/04, 8; 
emphasis added) 
The significance of the event to those pro-independence advocates is a determination, 
expressed by the people of Taiwan, to refuse subjugation by China. Moreover, it also served 
to demonstrate the people’s discontent with the Pan-Blue and its ‘one China’ principle. And 
finally, the tragic massacres of the Incident also reminded the Taiwanese people of the 
decades of KMT’s totalitarian rule over Taiwan during the periods of white terror and the 
martial law.  
In the face of Beijing’s increasing missile threats and diplomatic isolation, pro-
independence advocates believe it is time for the 23 million population of Taiwan, and 
regardless of their ethnicity, gender, political affiliation, generation or class, to speak up and 
seek an equal treatment by China. To do so, they should stand together, demonstrating the 
common moral principles shared among them to stand for their homeland Taiwan. ‘United 
we stand; divided we fall.’ For those advocates, it is true that in the past many people in 
Taiwan perceived the 2-28 Incident as a massacre of native Taiwanese by the ruling Chinese 
regime. Every year since 1990s, there has been discussion of Taiwan’s ethnic divisions and 
problems around the time of 2-28 Memorial Day. However, the 2-28 Incident should not be 
a taboo topic. People in Taiwan – across all ethnic groups – have come to realise that such 
an interpretation is an over-simplified depiction of the tragedy. Everyone who lives here is 
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‘Taiwanese’. What does it mean to be ‘Taiwanese’ then? A newspaper editorial interestingly 
stated that 
They have to be a united group which turn their backs on China. After all, this is 
why any person of Han origin is in Taiwan. It doesn’t matter if they came to Taiwan 
in the 1630s to work for the Dutch, the 1940s to escape the Communists or 
yesterday as an illegal immigrant to escape the hellhole that is China today. All came 
to Taiwan to get away from China. Turning your back on China and turning toward 
the opportunity that for 300 years Taiwan has represented – that is a pretty good 
definition of what it means to be a New Taiwanese. (Editorial, TT 01/03/04, 8) 
To those advocates, people from all walks of life came together on this historic day of 
sorrow and turned it into a day of hope for peace and freedom for the future. The rally has 
put behind the Taiwanese the sorrow and tears of the 2-28 Incident to build a new 
atmosphere of ethnic harmony. Solidarity amongst the people has been greatly strengthened 
by the rally, which will definitely help them in their pursuit of a free and democratic society. 
In fact, it was the intention of the organisers to highlight the theme of ethnic harmony and 
unity throughout the event – as demonstrated by the participation of people from every 
ethnic group, and the invitation of representatives of all major ethnic groups in Taiwan to 
stand next to Chen and Lee. This is also the reason why the rally could attract so many 
people, because the appeal of ‘protecting Taiwan’ and ‘unifying Taiwan’ touched the hearts 
of the Taiwanese people. Perhaps this indicates it is time for national reconciliation, for 
getting beyond the traumatic memories of the past and for moving forward to a bright 
future. Let there be no more ethnic problems. One Taiwan problem remains: the ambiguity 
surrounding Taiwan’s relationship with China, which demands a political and diplomatic 
resolution. Only this can ensure that Taiwan would be granted the formal respect due to a 
sovereign country. If these aspirations materialise, China would no longer be in a position to 
ignore the power of the Taiwanese people. Such political ambition was mobilised by the 2-28 
Hand-in-Hand Rally to establish and consolidate this ‘post-2-28’ ethnically and politically 
harmonious utopia where it seemed that the 2-28 Incident was passé and Taiwan had 
embarked on its ‘post-2-28’ future. In effect, the wounds caused by the 2-28 incident, which 
had for a long time caused a deep hostility and suspicion between the different ethnic groups 
in Taiwan, now could lead to mutual understanding and solidarity. Through acts of forgiving 
and reconciliation, the memory of 2-28 could turn into a resource of a renewed strength and 
unity to safeguard Taiwan’s interests against the mainland.  
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As a result, this rhetoric employed by the rally activists was indistinguishable from that 
advocated by the KMT while it was a ruling party in the 1990s. As shown above, the 
discourse regarding the 2-28 Incident formulated by the KMT government in the 1990s also 
emphasised the need to move on and look into the future rather than return to the historical 
scar of the past. Both of them propagated, to some degree, the idea of a post-2-28 united 
and harmonious ‘people’ who reside on the island of Taiwan, whether this ‘people’ is called 
the Chinese  (ROC citizens) or the Taiwanese. This similarity between the KMT and the 
DPP rhetoric reflects/manifests the role of the sovereign power of the nation state in the 
construction of the collective memory of the Incident. The collective memory of the 
traumatic events conducted by the sovereign power always aims to consolidate the legitimacy 
of sovereign power itself. Those traumatic events therefore need to be remembered but also 
to be forgotten. In this vein, the power transition from the KMT to the DPP and the 
identity transformation from Chinese to Taiwanese should not be perceived as unqualified 
‘progress’. 
As a result, the 2-28-incident is regarded as a symbol of the reconciliation of different 
ethnic groups, a warning about unification with mainland China, and above all, a symbol of 
autonomous Taiwanese nation and statehood. The mass-rally is designed to produce a 
harmonious post-2-28 political utopia like a pastoral paradise: a new Taiwan nation. Such 
political rhetoric brings out the very contradictory nature of the process of remembering the 
2-28 Incident, manifesting two necessary elements in the process of nation building. First, 
the 2-28 Incident must be commemorated as a trauma in order to differentiate Taiwan from 
China. Second, it is also necessary to forget 2-28 in order to form a united and harmonious 
Taiwanese nation on the other. Indeed, Taiwanese nation-building is very much intertwined 
with ‘remembering’ and ‘forgetting’ the history of 2-28.  
Above all, this chapter suggests that the 2-28 Hand-in-Hand Rally as an event, as a 
social practice, helps re/constitute Taiwanese national identity. First of all, by holding a mass 
rally on a military threat from the PRC, the Pan-Green was trying to establish political unity, 
and such political coherence can be read as a form of distinctive identity. Second, Taiwan’s 
distinctive consciousness is characterised by the living memory evolving from the island of 
Taiwan and continued resistance to China. The 2-28 Incident, by its name, seeks to 
demonstrate that people in Taiwan are constantly threatened by oppression from the 
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mainland. Third, the content of the rally was intended to draw a clear line of separation 
between Taiwan and China, and voters were asked to choose between the two. Joining the 
rally suggested that one was acting to prioritise Taiwan.  
The mass rally, as a political ritual, is designed to construct/consolidate a shared identity 
through a mass mobilisation and collective labour of the people. Such a rally has a double 
focus: it is a physical object – a material reality such as a human chain, and also a symbol or 
something of spiritual significance, something shared by the group that is superimposed on 
this physical reality. The physical display of the human chain would certainly disappear after 
the campaign. Nevertheless, the fading of the human chain would not dismantle the 
collective memory of a certain group of people, since they create symbolic representations of 
those physical objects. Those symbolic representations detach those objects from their 
physical environment and connect them with the beliefs of the group. The rally should 
therefore be understood as a physical performance of remembering the Incident itself. It 
materialized the Incident. The rally, moreover, transformed its materiality to a much more 
abstract, conceptual and spiritual symbolic representation. And through this symbolic 
representation, a specific remembrance of the 2-28 Incident was reserved and a political 
community - the Taiwanese nation - was accordingly kept in existence. Hence, while the 
actual performance – the 2-28 Hand-in-Hand Rally - was effaced, the group’s beliefs became 
stronger. 
 
5-5. Conclusion  
Three observations should be pointed out in concluding this chapter. Firstly, the 
interpretation of the 2-28-incident as an instrument to oppose the PRC is very problematic. 
At a first glance, this interpretation might not seem very convincing – considering the fact 
that the PRC was not even founded until more than two years after the incident occurred. In 
fact, Chinese communists were involved in the incident, helping the revolt of the Taiwanese 
against nationalist China under the KMT regime. There might be little evidence to back up 
the contention that Communists played a major role in the incident. Yet, one cannot deny 
that some communists, most famously Xie Xue-Hong, were involved in it by resisting 
Chiang’s KMT regime during that time. More importantly, this way of commemoration 
dismisses those 2-28 victims who were members of Taiwanese Communist Party but fled to 
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China in the wake of the incident to avoid execution by the KMT. Their 
experiences/memories/narrations of the incident are silenced. One example is the DPP 
government’s refusal in 2004 to grant an entry visa to an ethnic Taiwanese who escaped to 
China in 1949, and who as a victim of the 2-28 incident, planned to visit Taiwan for shooting 
a documentary on the tragic event. Secondly, commemorating the 2-28 Incident in 2004 – 
remembering and forgetting – conceals a troubling issue: the violence of the sovereign state 
against its citizens. The problematic aspect of the ‘2-28 Hand-in-Hand Rally’ is its state-led 
nature. The Incident indeed serves a variety of agendas, one of which is that the state-led 
commemoration evokes the incident as part of a narrative of national awakening. In the final 
analysis, the rally should not be perceived as a resistance towards sovereign power, but as 
another concealed form of state violence towards it citizens through the creation of a 
narrative of a coherent national identity or an oppressive national unity. The case of the rally 
demonstrates a situation in which the sovereign state inserts meaning into a traumatic event 
by imposing a specific reading of the past in the light of a present needs – political 
competition. 
In effect, this chapter aimed to understand how the election campaign as a social 
practice discursively contributed to the process of people’s self-identification in Taiwan, 
inquiring into what elements characterised this self-identification. To do so, it scrutinised a 
specific election campaign in the 2004 presidential election – the 2-28 Hand-in-Hand Rally. 
Drawing from Maurice Halbwachs’ elaborations of the social construction of memory in the 
light of present needs and Jenny Edkins’s studies about the role of sovereign power in the 
production of traumatic memory, the discussion investigated how collective memory of 
trauma was produced in the course of commemorating the 2-28 Incident in the context of 
the 2004 election campaign, and how this memory production led to the parallel formation 
of a Taiwanese national identity. This chapter has shown that political considerations during 
the election campaign as ‘present needs’ shape the various views of the past as they are 
manifested. The 2004 demonstration was designed to remember the 2-28 Incident as a 
historical trauma in order to be forgotten. The remembering of 2-28 Incident must be 
regarded as a constructive process as opposed to a retrieval process. The memory of the 2-
28 Incident was selectively constituted in favour of sovereign power.  
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The limits of this chapter need to be pointed out at the end. Firstly, the chapter does 
not intend to investigate how people from different classes, generations, ethnic groups, 
regions or genders memorise the 2-28 Incident. Each social group from different generations 
and locations of course has its own memory of the 2-28 Incident which differs from others 
to a greater or lesser extent. Secondly, this chapter does not claim that either the organisers 
of the mass-rally or in a more general sense, the sovereign power, can achieve their aims in 
full. Resistance is always possible, although it is not within the remit of this chapter to tackle 
this issue. The next chapter will explore the possibility of resistance to sovereign power by 
looking at a social movement in Taiwan – the Anti-Corruption Movement in 2006.  
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CHAPTER 6 
Essay on Resistance  
The Anti-Corruption Movement in 2006 in Taiwan 
 
 
6-1. Introduction  
6-1-1. The Myth of Sisyphus – A Vain Labour of Resistance?   
In the painting, a naked man against the red and dark sky is straining to raise the huge 
stone, rolling it and pushing it up a slope. His face is screwed up, his cheek tight against the 
stone, his shoulder bracing the mass, his foot wedging it, his arms outstretched upholding 
the stone. What this painting does not illustrate is that when the man’s goal has been 
attained, he will watch the stone roll back down the slope to the bottom, from where he has 
to push it up again toward the summit. Works of art are made for the imagination to breathe 
life into them.  
The protagonist of this oil painting (1920), illustrated by a German Symbolist painter 
Franz von Stuck (1863-1928), is Sisyphus of Greek mythology. Sisyphus was a king who was 
punished by the gods for his avarice and deceitfulness. He was compelled for all eternity to 
roll a huge stone up a steep hill, but before he reached the top of the hill, the rock always 
escaped him and he had to begin again. This eternal torture that Sisyphus suffered 
personifies a vain labour. He was bound to an eternity of frustration – pointless and 
interminable labouring. The situation of Sisyphus, as this chapter tries to argue, symbolises 
human efforts in pursuit of total freedom and autonomy – the ultimate goal of resistance to 
domination.  
The (im)possibility of resistance147 was a central theme in the political and social theory 
of a group of French philosophers in the 1960s and the 1970s. Among others, Foucault 
                                                
147. The term resistance that this chapter is concerned with refers to a critical resistance. According to 
Hoy (2005), the word ‘resistance’ does not distinguish between freedom and domination. It can be 
against domination, and in the name of  emancipation. But it can also be domination’s resistance to 
emancipatory efforts – a reactionary resistance (2005, 12). That is why he puts the word ‘critical’ to 
speak of  emancipatory resistance.      
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contends that ‘humanity does not gradually progress from combat to combat until it arrives 
at universal reciprocity, where the rule of law finally replaces warfare; humanity installs each 
of its violences in a system of rules and thus proceeds from domination to domination’ 
(Foucault 1977a, 151). He goes on to argue that the story of the modern era can be narrated 
in terms of a kind of progress, although ironically progress takes the form of the refinement 
and spreading of techniques of domination. This position is in fact similar to that of Adorno, 
who spoke of the disastrous continuity of history ‘leading from slingshot to the megaton 
bomb’ (Adorno 1973; cited in Best et al. 1991, 37).  
Indeed, Foucault’s historical analysis in works such as Discipline and Punish and History of 
Sexuality attempt to write the history of ‘polymorphous techniques of power’, manifesting 
the delicate and omnipresent exercises of power in the modern era. Power is portrayed as 
diffused throughout the social field, constituting subjectivities, knowledge and the pleasures 
of the individual. However, if Foucault is correct in depicting power as being so pervasive 
and omnipresent, then any kind of resistance seems impossible and ultimately pointless. His 
own interventions into political struggles and genealogical critiques of the social world would 
accordingly make very little sense. Fredric Jameson argues that Foucault is trapped in a 
‘winner loses’ logic, that is, the more Foucault wins by portraying power as omnipresent and 
omnipotent, the more he loses insofar as his critical voice of refusal becomes incompetent 
(Jameson 1984; cited in Hoy 2005, 9).  
It is however arguable, as shown in Chapter Two, whether Foucault’s notion of power 
is as absolutely repressive as many critiques have contended, allowing no possibility of 
resistance. In fact, Foucault argues that as soon as there is a power relation, there is the 
possibility of resistance. Resistance for Foucault refers to the challenge of subjectification. 
Because the subject/subjectivity is produced within power relations, resistance accordingly 
signifies a renunciation of the subject. The core task of the social movements in 
contemporary society is therefore to challenge all forms of subjectification. His studies form 
part of a strategy of resistance, exposing the beginnings and developments of the discourses 
and practices through which human beings are subjectified. Hence Foucault does not reject 
the possibility of resistance, for it is a commitment to this possibility that animates his work.  
Nevertheless, one should not neglect the fact that Foucault’s works emphasise 
domination over resistance in a significantly unbalanced way. Indeed, most of his historical 
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works can be read as a critique of ‘modernity’, a modernity which has produced a set of 
disciplinary institutions, practices, and discourses which legitimate its modes of domination 
and control. To Foucault, everything is dangerous, even resistance in the name of 
‘emancipation’. What he tries to remind us is that, when one thinks of a successful resistance 
– the dissolution of an old subjectivity – one merely produces a new subjectivity – another 
form of domination. Moreover, because resistance can become domination, Foucault avoids 
providing an adequate account of what it might involve (e.g. the scope, details and tactics of 
resistance) as he analyses the technologies of power, although he has on occasion pointed to 
tactics of resistance. What he suggests is a concept of micro-politics, in which numerous 
local groups contest diffuse and decentred forms of power spreading throughout society. 
Since power is plural and decentred, so in turn must be forms of resistance. Foucault 
therefore calls for a plurality of autonomous struggles waged throughout the micro-levels of 
society, without linking these various struggles to form a unified ‘counter-hegemonic bloc’, 
in Gramscian terminology.  
Indeed, domination and resistance are intimately related to each other. They are 
inseparable. It is therefore difficult to specify what counts as ‘progress/improvement’ insofar 
as the relations between domination and resistance can always be reversed. That is, resistance 
to a form of domination would produce another form of domination - a circular relationship 
between domination and resistance.  
In the case of Taiwan, the formation of Taiwanese national identity/Taiwanese 
nationalism is commonly regarded as a resistance to various forms of domination. This way 
of understanding the nature of Taiwanese identity derives, as Chapter Three has shown, 
from two prevailing strands of arguments in the current scholarly literature. Firstly, the 
formation of Taiwanese identity is narrated as a resistance to Japanese colonisation and the 
KMT’s re-colonisation of Taiwan. Secondly, it is comprehended as a revolt against 
Communist China’s military intimidation and its authoritarianism. The formation of 
Taiwanese identity in the end is gauged as an emancipation of the subject or a creation of the 
subjectivity of Taiwan/the Taiwanese.  
Nevertheless, the rise of Taiwanese nationalism also turned out to be a form of 
domination, in the sense that it has blocked many other viable forms of life and identities. 
Frantz Fanon in The Wretched of the Earth (1963) and Edward W. Said in Culture and Imperialism 
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(1994) have both indicated the problematic aspects of the rise of nationalism and its 
complicity in the oppression of people in former colonies of Western nations. Indeed, 
Taiwanese nationalists often tell the people of Taiwan who they really are and what they really 
ought to do – a subjectification of ‘the Taiwanese’, which refers to various ways in which the 
people of Taiwan are made into a subject of a particular kind. The suspicion arises that this 
subjectification is itself a form of domination that blocks political alternatives.148 However, 
the above-discussion of the connections between resistance and domination suggests that 
resistance to the rise of Taiwanese nationalism cannot lead to ultimate freedom – the 
liberation of the subject – but only to another form of domination. Just as Sisyphus rolls the 
boulder up the hill only to see it roll back down, resistance inevitably produces domination. 
However, does this mean that resistance is inevitably ineffectual or hopeless? Must we just 
accept any kind of domination? A consideration of Albert Camus’ discussion of Sisyphus’s 
situation might be a helpful way of thinking through these questions.  
To Camus, life is meaningless, or what he called ‘the absurd’. Yet, if life has no meaning, 
is life worth living? This is the central question addressed in his philosophical essay, The Myth 
of Sisyphus. The answer he suggested is ‘yes’. Camus is in fact interested in pursuing a third 
possibility, that is, that we can accept and live in a world devoid of meaning or purpose. To 
Camus, living with the absurd does not entail suicide but, on the contrary, allows us to live 
life to its fullest. Camus presents this argument in his discussion of the situation of Sisyphus. 
As he claims, Sisyphus is the ideal absurd hero and that his punishment is a metaphor for the 
human condition – a ceaseless and pointless toiling at futile jobs with no hope of success. 
The fate of human beings is no less absurd and is, indeed, tragic. Nevertheless, according to 
Camus, acknowledging the truth will conquer it. Camus argues that Sisyphus is truly happy 
precisely because the futility of his task is beyond doubt: the certainty of Sisyphus’s fate frees 
him to recognise the absurdity of his plight and to carry out his actions with contented 
acceptance, which Camus argues to be a form of true happiness. He writes:  
Sisyphus, proletarian of the gods, powerless and rebellious, knows the whole extent 
of his wretched condition: it is what he thinks of during his descent. The lucidity that 
was to constitute his torture at the same time crowns his victory. There is no fate 
that cannot be surmounted by scorn. If the descent is thus sometimes performed in 
sorrow, it can also take place in joy. This word is not too much. Again I fancy 
                                                
148 i.e. social identities – gender, class, sexuality, and etc – or other spatial identities – subregional, 
regional, postnational, transnational, cosmopolitan, and etc. 
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Sisyphus returning toward his rock, and the sorrow was in the beginning. When the 
images of earth cling too tightly to memory, when the call of happiness becomes too 
insistent, it happens that melancholy rises in man’s heart: this is the rock’s victory, 
this is the rock itself. The boundless grief is too heavy to bear. These are our nights 
of Gethsemane. But crushing truths perish from being acknowledged. (1995, 117-8)   
Sisyphus, just like the absurd man, keeps pushing. As long as Sisyphus accepts that there is 
nothing more to life than this absurd struggle, then he can find happiness in it. Camus 
concludes, ‘the struggle itself towards the heights is enough to fill a man’s heart. One must 
imagine Sisyphus happy’ (ibid, 119).  
What Camus tried to say is that the meaning of life is found in life itself. In considering 
resistance, one can also contend that the meaning of resistance exists in the practice of 
resisting, in the struggle itself. Resistance in this aspect should be perceived not only as 
practice, but also an attitude. It is the practice of refusal. It is also an attitude that refuses to 
give in to resignation.  
The aim of this chapter is to contemplate questions about what is meant by resistance 
and how it is (im)possible. To do so, this chapter investigates the so-called Anti-Corruption 
Movement in 2006. It is argued that the movement should be regarded as a resistance to the 
formation of Taiwanese national identity – a specific subjectification of the people of Taiwan 
as ‘the Taiwanese’. 
6-1-2. The Anti-Corruption Movement in 2006 in Taiwan  
The Anti-Corruption Movement to depose President Chen Shui-Bian and to oppose 
corruption in the government marks a new chapter in the history of the democratic 
movement in Taiwan. Chen had been accused of corruption since he was reelected in 2004 
for his second term. The term has been plagued by scandals: his close aids and his relatives, 
including the first lady, all have been indicted for corruption. The president’s problems 
worsened in May 2006 when his son-in-law was detained and later indicted on suspicion of 
insider trading and taking bribes. Chen publicly apologised for his son-in-law’s behaviour. 
Prosecutors then began looking at whether Chen had misused funds intended for national 
affairs and questioned him, even though prosecutors have no authority to formally indict 
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Chen while he is in power.149 The constitution gives the president immunity. Chen denied 
any wrongdoing, but his approval ratings fell to about 20% (CT 28/05/06, A3).  
Following a series of accusations of corruption against Chen and members of the first 
family, the Pan-Blue decided to initiate a recall in the legislature in June 2006 to push Chen 
out of office. The recall motion was, however, defeated. Out of the 221-member legislature, 
119 lawmakers from the Pan-Blue and non-partisan legislators supported the recall – 29 
votes short of the two-thirds majority (147 ballots needed to pass the motion) (CT 28/06/06, 
A1).150 If passed, it would have triggered a national referendum on whether Chen should 
step down. Chen successfully retained the support of the Pan-Green. DPP legislators refused 
to cast votes, while TSU cast invalid votes.  
After the failure of the recall motion initiated by the Pan-Blue, Chen faced another 
political challenge when his own camp appeared divided on whether he should step down 
amid allegations of corruption. Although the DPP did not withdraw its support for Chen, 
certain elements politely hinted that it would be best for Chen to resign.151 The most 
significant event was the release by a group of pro-Green academics of a statement on 15 
July 2006 – the so-called ‘715 Proclamation’ – calling for Chen to consider stepping down. 
The second wave of the challenge to Chen was initiated by the former DPP chairman and 
long-time democracy and independence activist Shih Ming-Teh in early August 2006, when 
he announced a sit-in protest against Chen, and expressed his determination to remove Chen 
from his post. The movement went through four major mobilisation peaks, namely the early 
sit-in protests, the ‘Surround the City’ protest, the ‘Surround the Island’ protest, and the 
‘Besiege the Presidential Office’ demonstration respectively. Lasting for two months, and 
with immense intensity, the movement finally went into an abrupt decline in mid-October.  
                                                
149. He was accused of  pocketing cash from a Presidential Office expense fund by claiming 
reimbursement for fake expenditures. Prosecutors found only half  the funds for which Chen’s office 
had declared receipts and suspected that some of  the money might have been used illegally. 
150. According to ‘Law Governing Legislators’ Exercise of Power’, one quarter of lawmakers must 
agree on a recall proposal before it can proceed to the legislature’s Procedure Committee. The 
consent of two-thirds of lawmakers must be obtained to pass the proposal. The recall motion must 
then be put to a referendum. If more than half of the electorate casts ballots in the referendum and a 
simple majority of the ballots cast are in support of the motion, then the recall motion becomes 
effective. 
151. There have been calls from within his own party for his resignation, since there was some fear 
among the DPP that the scandals would affect the legislative election of  2007 and the Presidential 
election in 2008. 
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6-1-3. Research Questions, Key Arguments and Outline of the Chapter  
Through a study of the movement, this chapter aims to contribute to an understanding 
of the particular ways in which subjectivity is resisted, and what kind of alternative 
subjectivity is produced in contemporary Taiwanese society. It asks four sets of related 
questions. Firstly, in what sense was the movement a resistance, a resistance to what? And if 
resistance is to challenge subjectification, then what specific subjectification(s) of ‘the 
Taiwanese’ was/were contested in the movement? Secondly, if it was a resistance, what was 
the movement’s discourse? How was it organised; what were their strategies; what actions 
were conducted and what rhetoric was produced? Thirdly, how did the Pan-Green respond 
to the movement? In other words, what counter-discourse(s) existed, if any? And fourthly, 
how did it fail in the end?  
Three characteristics of this movement are briefly pointed out at the beginning of this 
chapter. Firstly, this is an autonomously gathering movement. There was no evidence of 
mobilisation by any political party (e.g. KMT). Secondly, as many political commentators (e.g. 
Chao 2006) have indicated, the movement transcended gender, class and ethnic divisions. In 
terms of gender, it was plain from media coverage that female participants far exceeded their 
male counterparts. In terms of class, the movement was not simply a middle-class anti-
corruption movement. Its participants included people from middle and lower classes of all 
trades. In terms of ethnicity, the participants were not only the Mainlanders – well 
represented in most political campaigns organised by the Pan-Blue – but also the native 
Taiwanese, especially the Minnan people, who are generally regarded as strong supporters of 
the DPP. Minnan dialect was often heard during the campaign. Thirdly and most 
importantly, this movement was ostensibly intended to transcend partisan, ideological and 
identity divisions. Campaign organisers and supporters expressed a strong reluctance to 
being pushed into either the green (independence, identification with Taiwan) or the blue 
(unification, identification with China) camps. Campaign organisers argued that many 
public/social issues, such as corruption, were hijacked by party affiliations and identity 
politics. The movement therefore intends to establish the possibility of  creating grass-roots 
networks outside the traditional party system and identity politics, expanding the scope and 
focus of  the island’s fledgling democracy. However, this non-partisan stand was intensely 
challenged by the Pan-Green when the movement emerged. Pan-Green politicians argued 
that one should not neglect the fact that ideology-identity politics were still being played out 
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within the movement. Although the campaign leaders and supporters did not use any 
Chinese nationalist rhetoric in this movement, ‘Chinese identity’ still played important roles 
in the movement to overthrow the DPP government, the first ‘indigenized’ regime, thereby 
dismantling Taiwanese identity.  
As a result, the major battlefield between the two sides is clear. That is, how the ‘nature’ 
of the movement – the campaign’s appeals, its organisers and supporters – is defined and 
represented. In effect, both sides struggled to either define or counter-define the movement 
through any possible means – actions and words. Newspapers, magazines and broadcasters 
gave extraordinary attention to the movement. Academics were also involved in the wrangle. 
A series of press conferences and forums were held by both sides. Moreover, both sides 
organised a number of mass rallies, competing with each other. The activities/actions of 
those mass rallies were carefully designed, including the decoration of the venue, the route of 
the protest, the choice of theme colour and songs. Those efforts were all aimed at defining 
the nature of movement. The movement became not simply a physical site but a discursive 
space in which different forces completed and contested. The whole event was actually a 
confrontation among discourses and through discourses. This chapter scrutinises those 
discourses.  
Through investigating this event, this chapter argues three things. Firstly, while many 
people perceived the formation of Taiwanese identity as a resistance towards Chinese 
chauvinism/nationalism – a post-colonial form (politically and culturally) of resistance – it 
effectively turned into domination in the name of emancipation/liberation insofar as it 
prevents other forms of political life. Secondly, the anti-corruption movement should be 
understood as resisting the formation of Taiwanese national identity for several reasons. The 
first of these is that it opposed the idea that everything under the name of ‘love Taiwan’, 
‘nation-state-building’, or ‘localisation’ can be legitimised. The second is that the 
campaigners deliberately rejected all talk of identity issues. This rejection itself should be 
understood as an act of resistance. Finally, it attempted to resist the dichotomy of 
Green/Blue, Independence/Unification, and Taiwanese/Chinese, aiming to resort to higher 
universal values. The third point argued in the chapter is that the movement, on the surface, 
has failed. It failed because, obviously, the president did not step down. And more 
importantly, the movement failed because it unwittingly became trapped in the 
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confrontation between the two political camps, two ideologies, and after all, two national 
identities. The movement eventually ended as a vigorous battle over partisan politics and 
national identity – just as Sisyphus rolls the boulder up the hill only to see it roll back down.  
Nevertheless, the chapter does not draw the conclusion that the movement is 
meaningless. The movement is both a practice and an attitude of resistance to domination: a 
certain subjectification of ‘the Taiwanese’. It opens the possibility of alternative forms of 
political life and is an indefinite political struggle grounded in the belief that things could be 
otherwise, even if one does not know exactly how. Yet, this chapter does not intend to 
suggest that this movement of resistance, even if it had succeeded, would offer ultimate 
freedom for the subject – a total revolution. It is indeed very likely that the movement would 
turn into another form of domination. While the movement resists a specific subjectification 
(i.e. becoming Taiwanese), it, in effect, produces another subject. However, although the 
movement can become another form of domination, this chapter intends to justify its 
necessity for the creation of an alternative form of life. Meaning is found in the practice of 
resisting, in the struggle itself.  
Section One of this chapter deals with the early stage of the anti-corruption movement. 
It focuses on a joint-statement – the so-called ‘July 15 Proclamation’ – issued by a group of 
pro-green academics, as well as the fundraising campaign for the oust- Chen protest initiated 
by Shih Ming-Teh. In addition, it also investigates the Pan-Green’s counter-strategies and 
analyses its rhetoric. Section Two investigates the middle stage of the movement. It looks 
over both sides’ political rhetoric and campaign activities. Section Three explores the final 
stage of the movement, in which the movement became captured in partisan/identity 
politics. The conclusion justifies the necessity of this ‘failed’ resistance.   
 
6-2. Pushing Sisyphus’ Stone up a Slope – The Early Stage of the Anti-
Corruption Movement (from the ‘July 15 Proclamation’ to Shih-Ming 
Teh’s Fundraising) 
6-2-1. The ‘July 15 Proclamation’ 
Almost after the controversy created by the presidential recall motion in June had died 
down, the next wave of calls for Chen to step down gathered force. The difference this time 
was that it was no longer the Pan-Blue calling for his resignation, but rather a group of pro-
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green academics and former political prisoners. On 15 July, 2006, a group of formerly 
staunch supporters of the DPP held a press conference, issuing a joint statement entitled, 
‘Democracy and the Moral Crisis of Taiwanese Identity: Our Appeal to the President, the 
Ruling Party and Taiwanese Citizens’ (DMCTI), urging Chen to resign voluntarily. The 
statement was drafted by Wu Nai-De, an Academia Sinica research fellow, and supported by 
other academics and social activists, such as Zhang Fu-Zhong, known for his fight for 
democracy while Taiwan was still under the martial law imposed by the KMT, and some 
younger scholars associated with the 1990 DPP-led student movement.152 Together with a 
signature drive launched earlier, the statement attracted more than 4,000 signatures on the 
date of the press conference.  
In the statement (DMCTI), these scholars said that the scandals that related to the 
president’s close aides and family members are moral and political crises that are not unusual 
in democratic countries. It said that one should see them as an opportunity for reflection, a 
chance to elevate the stronger qualities of Taiwan’s practices of democracy and seize the 
chance to reconsider the contents of what it means to ‘be Taiwanese’. However, the statement 
noted that the DPP politicians do not do what they ought to do, but rather mobilise and 
manipulate ethnic sentiments. It indicated: 
It is truly regrettable when the DPP leaders, rather than reflecting on themselves, 
attempted to mobilise and manipulate ethnic sentiments. More seriously, the people 
in Taiwan and even some academic figures had tried to divert the corruption issues 
in the direction of ethnic conflicts and national identity issues, aiming to repress the 
pursuit of democracy through resort to identity politics. As a consequence, the 
quality of democracy cannot be improved and Taiwanese identity turns to be an 
empty political motto. (Ibid)  
The statement continued:  
When the people of Taiwan no longer trust the president because of his alleged 
corruption involving his aides and family, they will also lose their trust in the 
government’s policies and decisions…As he [the president] has lost the people’s 
trust and dignity, the president should seriously consider resigning from his post. 
(Ibid) 
The statement also indicated that the failed presidential recall vote in June showed that Chen 
had sufficient muscle to keep his presidency. But if he chose to resign despite his power, he 
                                                
152 For the full list of  65 original initiaters of  the statement, please see China Times (16/07/06, A5) 
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would set a ‘precious paradigm’ for and make a contribution to Taiwan’s democracy. The 
statement concluded:   
To those Taiwanese citizens, we make this appeal: let us use the value and ideal of 
democracy to enrich the contents of Taiwanese identity. When we abandon our 
struggle to elevate the quality of Taiwan’s democracy, we effectively tarnish our self-
identification with Taiwan…The improvement of the quality of Taiwan’s democracy 
is the only foundation that Taiwanese identity should be set upon. (Ibid)   
At first glance, the statement is seen as a message to Chen to ask him to resign. Those 
scholars in the statement accused the president of failing to clear up the corruption charges, 
and said he has lost the ability to solve the country’s crisis as the leader of pro-localisation 
forces. They therefore urged Chen to take political and moral responsibility and seriously 
consider stepping down. However, the statement should also be read as a deep reflection on 
Taiwanese national identity by pro-green academics and activists who once advocated the 
construction of Taiwanese national identity.   
The statement focused on the interrelation between democracy and identity. To those 
scholars, in the process of the nation’s pursuit of democracy, as every step towards 
democracy, Taiwan has further clarified ‘what Taiwan is’ and ‘who we are.’ Democratisation 
had led to localisation and the formation of a Taiwanese identity. Democratisation and the 
formation of Taiwanese national identity are intimately intertwined. Good practices of 
democracy produce good contents of ‘Taiwanese national identity’. Hence, corruption that 
happened in the process of democratisation, particularly when the president wantonly 
exercised his power in the name of a localised regime, would deteriorate the contents of 
‘being Taiwanese’. And it would even further lead to the country’s identity crisis as people 
become frustrated and disappointed with the DPP and the president. One article published 
in a newspaper exemplified this point of view. It states: 
I can no longer remember when the term ‘localisation’ first became popular. The 
only thing I am sure of is that identity issues have been the focus of every election in 
Taiwan in recent years. This has brought with it self-proclaimed pro-localisation 
activists and organisations, although we are never told what their actual contribution 
to Taiwan is, except that they are always there when the DPP asks for support. In 
the same way, they will always defend the DPP if someone criticises it…This is how 
most Taiwanese perceive the pro-localisation forces. The question is whether pro-
localisation activists need to be so blind and ignorant? (Lin Yu-Jen, TT 19/07/06, 8) 
Indeed, the DPP has sought to expand its political map by promoting itself as a native 
   236
 
party devoted to building Taiwan. But this platform has lost its appeal after a spate of 
corruption scandals came to light. To those scholars, localisation should not be used as a veil 
by any political party to cover up impotence and corruption. As they claimed at the press 
conference held on 15 July, the true meaning of localisation is to ensure clean politics and 
honesty, bringing happiness to the Taiwanese people. Localisation should not be a tool to 
legitimatise corruption. Allegations of corruption involving Chen became the major culprits 
undermining the localisation and democratisation of Taiwan. According to this line of 
thought, it was best for Chen to step down. This is not because clean government is more 
important than democracy, but because corruption had made Chen unable to represent 
Taiwan’s democracy and Taiwan’s national identity. Therefore, Chen must go. Only by his 
resignation can the quality of democracy be strengthened, thereby enriching Taiwan’s 
national identity (CT 16/07/06, A3). The statement indeed points out a predicament in the 
process of Taiwan’s nation-state building. 
In addition, it is important to note that these pro-green scholars carefully manoeuvred 
their petition so as not to fall into the trap of antagonism between green and blue, between 
pro-independence and pro-unification, and between Taiwanese identity and Chinese identity. 
They carefully chose their rhetoric. For instance, Wu Nai-De, a chief organiser of the 
campaign, denied at the press conference the move was an ‘anti-Chen movement’. He said 
their major aim is to improve Taiwan’s democracy, not to ‘topple’ Chen (ibid.). He 
emphasised that seeking a more mature democracy and Taiwanese identity are the ultimate 
goal. Wu stated, ‘Taking down the president is not the objective. The problem is not about 
pro-Chen or anti-Chen issues. Rather, it is all about what kind of democracy Taiwan’s people want’ 
(ibid.; also TN 16/07/06; emphasis added). Another scholar Lin Kuo-Ming who signed the 
statement expressed similar concerns. He wrote a commentary in the press. The article states:  
[I]n trying to ascertain how responsible Chen is for the scandals, we’ve become stuck 
in the quagmire of partisan politics. Amid clashes between the pan-blue and pan-
green camps, any attempt to show how shortcomings in our legal institutions may 
have contributed to abuses of power and corruption – and how reform should be 
implemented – has incited accusations that we were trying to vindicate Chen for his 
role in recent scandals. This, in turn, has suppressed reasonable efforts to set in 
motion institutional reforms. (Lin, TT 31/07/06, 8) 
Indeed, if those scholars and signatories were labelled as blue sympathisers, the power of the 
statement would be weakened. As the then-KMT Chairman Ma Ying-Jiu said, the Pan-Blue’s 
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views differed very little from those expressed by the pro-DPP scholars. But the same 
remarks made by the Pan-Blue were described as ‘a political struggle or an attempt to fan 
ethnic conflicts.’ Ma continued, ‘Now that the pro-green academics have come out and 
made their statement, it’s easier to see the problem more clearly’ (CP 16/07/07). 
The ‘715 campaign’ in short marked the first attempt of the pro-DPP figures’ formal 
demands, pressing Chen to step down in the wake of a series of alleged corruption. The 
statement attracted much attention from all sectors of society. It indeed cast a shadow over 
Chen’s already fragile leadership. It had a more forceful effect on Chen than scathing 
criticism by the opposition parties, not only because the voice of academics carries some 
weight in Taiwan’s society, but more importantly, because what they said was seen as 
domestic critique within the green camp. Nevertheless, it should be noted that a counter-
discourse existed. Many other Pan-Preen and pro-independent figures disagreed with those 
academics’ view. They worried that the threat to Chen’s presidency arose from a scheme 
orchestrated by the KMT and China to foment chaos in Taiwan. The ultimate goal of this 
chaos was believed to be the destruction of the democratic regime and of DPP’s efforts to 
consolidate Taiwanese national identity. It was therefore argued to be necessary to support 
Chen – the Son of Taiwan – the first ‘native’ non-KMT president.  
6-2-2. Shih Ming-Teh’s Fundraising Campaign  
The next wave in the green camp to call for Chen’s resignation came in early August 
2006, when Shih Ming-Teh launched a fundraising campaign to finance a series of 
demonstrations, with the objective of ousting him from office.  
Shih is a legendary and a highly respected political figure in Taiwanese political circles, 
dubbed ‘Taiwan’s Nelson Mandela’ for spending years in jail for fighting against the KMT’s 
authoritarian rule. In 1962, Shih was convicted of sedition for running a cadet discussion 
group that challenged the KMT’s authoritarian rule, and he was sentenced to life 
imprisonment. He was, however, released in 1977 following Chiang Kai-Shek’s death in 
1975. The amnesty was granted to prisoners, a gesture typically performed at the end of a 
Chinese emperor’s reign. Once out of prison, he devoted himself full-time to the 
oppositional movement. Shih was the most radical among other figures. He was sentenced 
to life imprisonment for sedition for the second time. While in prison between 1985 and 
1986, Shih went on hunger strike. Many of his friends wrote articles and letters calling on the 
   238
 
international community to put pressure on the KMT regime. Eventually, he was released in 
1990. Chen Shui-Bian acted as his defence lawyer while Shih and the other participants were 
on trial. Shih spent more than 25 years in total in jail under the KMT’s rule. Afterwards, Shih 
served as DPP chairman between 1994 and 1996 before quitting the party in 2000 (CT 
10/08/06, A3; Shih 2007, 2). 
Shih’s campaign was called ‘A Million Voices against Corruption – President Chen Must 
Go’. It began with Shih’s private letter to the president. The content of the letter was 
published in the Chinese-language newspaper China Times on 9 August 2006. In the letter, 
dubbing himself the president’s ‘old comrade in arms’, Shih urges Chen to step down from 
his post since he had lost the people’s trust following the corruption allegations. He writes: 
‘For the sake of Taiwan and the DPP, I urge the president to step down bravely. Only a truly 
brave warrior admits his mistakes and gives up what he holds dear’ (CT 09/08/06, A1).153 
The letter argued that the leader of an/the ‘indigenous’ regime is not irreplaceable. ‘The 
value of democracy lies in the fact that the country is unafraid to have a change of leaders’ 
(ibid).   
Shih told the China Times reporters on 9 August 2006 to elaborate his motives for 
writing the letter. He said that he was agonised over writing it, yet he had to speak on behalf 
of the ordinary people. Shih urged Chen to step down as soon as possible since the 
Presidential Office has become a source of social unrest. He said, ‘the head of state has the 
responsibility to solve problems (for the country), and when he becomes the source of the 
trouble, he has to ponder whether it’s time to go’ (CT 10/08/06, A3; TN 10/08/06). 
Referring to the opposition parties’ failed recall motion in July due to the DPP legislators’ 
opposition, Shih said that Chen cannot rely only on his party and supporters to come to his 
rescue, because if such defence were effective, the trouble would have been over long ago. 
Shih stressed that he would not want to see ‘revolutionary measures’, but if the impasse 
continued, he would not believe that Chen and his administration could stay in peace. He 
then said, ‘Because the people have lost their trust and faith, the country won’t be freed from 
the crisis. This is what motivated me to write the letter’ (ibid.). 
Shih announced on the following day that he would intensify his campaign, hoping to 
                                                
153 The content of  Shih’s letter can also be found in: 
http://www.red.org.tw/index.php?stat=News&DAId=6 
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gain the support of at least one million people. He also urged KMT chairman Ma and Vice 
President Lu to join his effort. Shih appealed to the public to donate NT$100 (US$3) each to 
the campaign, which he said would show their commitment and authorisation in support of 
the campaign and was a way to examine people’s feelings about Chen. All donations would 
be used to fund the protest. He announced that after collecting the support of one million 
people the campaign to oust Chen would be launched on 9 September with daily sit-ins in 
front of the Presidential Office. The unused funds after the campaign would be donated to 
children from poor families. He added, his campaign was organised after all other measures, 
including calls from the people, the recall staged by the opposition parties, and pleas by pro-
DPP scholars, had failed to unseat Chen.   
On 12 August, Shih formally launched his fundraising campaign at Taipei’s 2-28 Peace 
Memorial Park in the company of dozens of academics, doctors and personalities. At the 
event, Shih said that the campaign was supported by people with various political affiliations 
and ethnic origins. He said  
When one million citizens stand up, it won’t be an ethnic clash or political 
confrontation. Our only goal would be to oppose corruption and depose A-Bian 
[president Chen’s nickname]. (CT 13/08/06, A3; also TT 13/08/06, 1) 
In Taiwan’s politicised society, he added, there is neither black nor white but only blue and 
green. Shih thus vowed to change this situation. He accused Chen of falling into nepotism 
and cronyism. Giving a thumbs-down to the president, Shih emphasised that he took action 
on behalf of Taiwan, justice and integrity. He said that the campaign was not launched 
because he does not love the president or the DPP. ‘It’s because I love Taiwan, justice and 
integrity more’ (ibid). He also noted that if the judicial system can transparently carry out its 
investigations into the scandals surrounding Chen, then people’s discontent with Chen 
would not be so great.  
Shih then called for various social groups to raise their voices and ask Chen to resign. 
Shih’s remarks were echoed widely in Taiwan’s society. A group of artists – more than one 
hundred members of the literary and arts community – backed Shih’s call. The famous 
photographer Xie Chun-De was particularly highlighted (CT 16/08/06, A3). Xie helped 
Chen to campaign for the posts of Taipei mayor in 1994 and president in 2000. Another 
former DPP chairman Xu Xin-Liang also led a group of former DPP members to show 
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their support for Shih’s campaign (CT 19/08/06, A3). Moreover, representatives of 14 bar 
associations around the country also launched a campaign, asking their colleagues 
nationwide to sign their joint statement urging Chen to resign. Wei Qian-Feng, an attorney 
and the former chairman of the Taiwan Association for Human Rights, and Attorney Luo 
Bing-Cheng, who served as Chen’ defence attorney in the lawsuit over the vote recount after 
the 2004 presidential election, all joined Shih’s campaign (CT 20/08/06, A3; TT 20/08/06, 
1). 
The target to collect NT$100 million was accomplished within six working days. Shih’s 
campaign announced that total contributions had hit NT$100 million as of 22 August. On 
24 August, all donation accounts were closed, and the next day Shih announced that the 
fundraising campaign had raised NT$109,180,809 (CT 25/08/06, A2). The speed and the 
scale of the fundraising campaign took many by surprise. Shih argued that the campaign 
would make Chen realise the great number of people – supposedly more than one million – 
calling for Chen to voluntarily resign.  
Shih’s series of initiatives designed to compel Chen to step down came under the local 
media spotlight. Shih’s activities have symbolic significance due to his historical ties with the 
DPP and his important role in the dissident movement of the Martial Law era and in the 
nation’s democratisation process. Realising the significance of Shih’s move, president Chen, 
in response, aimed to consolidate the Pan-Green, preventing any other Pan-Green 
heavyweights such as the Former President Lee from joining Shih’s camp. In addition, 
Chen’s camp attempted to define Shih’s movement as part of the Pan-Blue’s attempt to 
overthrow the ‘localised regime’ in the context of the confrontation between the Pan-Blue 
and Pan-Green.  
6-2-3. Pan-Green’s Counter-Strategies: (I) Consolidating Pan-Green Camp 
Earlier on, in response to the call from some pro-Green academics for him to 
voluntarily resign, Chen had arranged to meet with several presidential advisers, key players 
within his administration and party, legislators, as well as city and county chiefs, to 
consolidate their support and solicit their opinions. Although some meetings were called off 
due to dissatisfaction with Chen within the green camp,154  Chen successfully secured 
                                                
154 For instance, the talk with members of  the party and the executive and legislative branches 
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sufficient backing within his camp by pledging himself to push Taiwan’s nation-state 
building project.   
Among them, one of the most decisive meetings was with eleven (former) presidential 
advisers at the Taipei Guest House, advisers who are generally regarded as the pro-
independence hardliners. The meeting came one day after the group of pro-green academics 
urged Chen to step down on 15 July. After the meeting, Chen showed his determination to 
forge on as president. According to the then-Presidential Office Secretary-General Chen 
Tang-Shan (also known as Mark Chen), all eleven advisers told the president that it was not 
necessary for him to step down because he was elected by the people to serve a four-year 
term and that he should stay on the job until his term expires. They also advised Chen to 
establish a sound mechanism to safeguard Taiwan’s national security and sovereignty so the 
nation could be free from fear caused by China’s military intimidation, as one of the former 
senior advisers invited to the meeting told the press (TT 17/07/06, 1). Chen in response 
vowed to spend the rest of his term realising his 2004 campaign platform, including 
constitutional reform.155 
Chen’s pledge to those pro-independence hardliners was soon reflected in his statement 
issued on 21 July, on the eve of the DPP’s national convention, in which he insisted that he 
would never consider resigning. In his 3,000-word statement, entitled ‘Democratic 
Predicament and Political Ethics’, a response to the ‘715 Proclamation’, Chen pledged to 
uphold Taiwan’s national consciousness and implement social justice in his remaining two 
years as president. He stated: 
Insistence on ‘Taiwan awareness’ and the fulfilment of social fairness and justice are A-
Bian’s core values for the next two years. Localisation, culture, environmental 
protection, ecology and the weak will all be the key focuses of efforts. (LT 22/07/06; 
TN 22/07/06; emphasis added) 
Chen then said that creating a suitable new constitution was the key to consolidating and 
                                                                                                                                            
scheduled on 17 July 2006 was cancelled at the last minute at the suggestion of  the then-DPP 
Chairman Yu Shyi-Kun, while some of  the DPP legislators complained that the meetings with the 
President Chen were only a ‘lecture’ to them rather than a true communication between two parts. 
As one of  the legislators said, ‘no one will take part in such meetings in the future if  it turns out to be 
yet another lecture session’ (CP 16/07/06, A3).      
155 As stated elsewhere in this thesis, the new constitution has long been seen as one of  the most 
important steps towards the de jure independence of  Taiwan by most Taiwanese independence 
proponents. 
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deepening democracy. ‘If Taiwan loses its sovereignty and becomes a second Hong Kong, 
its democracy will have no opportunity to develop further’ (ibid.). In the statement, Chen 
also pledged to delegate some of his powers to the DPP party, allowing DPP’s central 
standing committee to serve as a platform for policy coordination and consultation between 
the party, the Executive Yuan and the DPP legislative caucus (ibid.).156 These measures 
handing over some of his powers to the other members of DPP were generally believed in 
Taiwan to be an effort by Chen to seek support within his own party.  
After Shih launched his fundraising campaign, Chen in response said on various 
occasions that he would continue the pursuit of Taiwan’s independence. For instance, Chen 
gave a speech at the Ketagalan Institute on 12 August in response to Shih. The institute was 
founded by Chen after he became the president in 2000, following in the footsteps of past 
two authoritarian leaders, Chiang Ching-Kuo and Lee Teng-Hui. The school was set up to 
train future national leaders. His choice to give the speech at his own political school was the 
most risk-free decision possible, and also the most authoritarian. Speaking on the ‘Arts of 
Leadership’ (AL),157 Chen firstly stressed the importance of ‘the rule of law in democracy’. 
He insisted that any moves against him must adhere to the constitution. He stated:  
If a president has done a poor job, then the Constitution offers express provisions, 
including recall, impeachment or even a vote of no confidence in the Cabinet, all 
of which are very important parts of the constitutional order…Using revolutionary 
means which lead to the shedding of blood does not produce progress in a 
democracy, but instead engenders its regression…the issue is by no means who 
should step down…The core issue is the constitutional system. 
Secondly, he also spoke of problems relating to the constitutional system. He said, ‘The 
serious issue is the constitutional system, and we need to make efforts to firmly establish a 
constitutional system.’ He then continued to reaffirm his ‘historical mission’ of crafting a 
new constitution for Taiwan. He said that his biggest dream in life is to create a new 
constitution for Taiwan, and that he would have everlasting regret if he cannot fulfil this 
dream. He stressed that he would ‘shoulder the cross of Taiwan’s history,’ insisting ‘on 
Taiwan’s sovereignty’ and pushing ‘for constitutional re-engineering’ in his remaining time in 
                                                
156 During the first recall motion initiated by Pan-Blue, Chen had promised to give the then-Premier 
Su Zhen-Chang a free rein regarding personnel appointments in the Cabinet.  
157 The full content of  Chen’s speech can be found in 
http://www.ketagalan.org.tw/index.php?framework_num=116&CID=151 
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office. Thirdly, in the speech Chen also spoke of how the issue of a ‘national identity’ had 
created numerous political conflicts. He stressed that identifying with Taiwan and sticking to 
the Taiwanese identity is the right path for the country. He noted that ‘Taiwan is Taiwan, 
and China is China. Taiwan is definitely not China.’ He said the identity issue in effect 
affected Taiwan’s UN bid. Instead of asking for representation in the UN under the name of 
the ‘Republic of China’, which poses a problem as it competes with the ‘People’s Republic of 
China’, Chen said Taiwan should seriously consider applying for UN entry under the name 
of ‘Taiwan’.  
Likewise, on another occasion when delivering a speech to supporters from his 
hometown at a gathering in Taipei, Chen made similar remarks. Chen told the people that he 
was particularly heartened by the boost from his long-term supporters. He stressed that he 
would follow the path of ‘insisting on a separate identity for Taiwan, and the realisation of 
social justice’ (CT 20/08/06, A2; TN 20/08/06). Similar to the remarks he made at 
Ketagalan Institute, Chen said that he would stay in office to ‘press on with helping the 
country to join the UN under the name of Taiwan’ and ‘push for a new constitution’ (ibid). 
In addition, Chen also resorted to the social stability rhetoric. He urged people to stay away 
from politically motivated activities, saying that stability is better for their livelihood from 
preventing China to take over Taiwan. He noted:  
It is dangerous to create a stir in society as chaos may give Beijing an excuse to 
invade Taiwan. That would do us no good at all. So let’s cherish what we have and 
look forward and join hands in protecting Taiwan. (Ibid) 
Chen’s resort to Taiwanese nationalism rhetoric was clearly the key to his resistance to 
any form of pressure from the calls for his resignation. Despite a small number of Pan-
Green supporters being sceptical about Chen’s objection to resigning, most of them lauded 
Chen’s promise to kick off Taiwan’s UN bid and introduce a new constitution for Taiwan. 
Members of the pro-independence groups called for proponents of Shih’s campaign to pay 
more attention to other national issues of greater importance. They said that the name 
change for Taiwan’s offices overseas, Taiwan’s bid for joining the UN under the name of 
Taiwan, engineering of a new constitution, and moving Taiwan towards becoming a ‘normal 
country’ would better reflect Taiwan’s current realities and better meet the needs of Taiwan.  
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6-2-4. Pan-Green’s Counter-Strategies: (II) ‘Red’ is ‘Blue’ 
Together with Chen’s resort to Taiwanese nationalist rhetoric to consolidate his own 
camp, Chen’s camp also attempted to define Shih’s movement as parts of Pan-Blue’s 
conspiracy.      
As spelled out elsewhere in this thesis, it is noted that Taiwan’s political situation has 
long been deadlocked because of the confrontation between the blue and green camps, and 
the two camps are split along lines of national identity (Taiwanese versus Chinese) as well as 
of ideology (pro-independence versus pro-unification). In green’s supporters’ mentality, the 
blue camp refused to respect the results of the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections. The 
Pan-Blue politicians therefore resorted to any means to achieve their goal of unseating Chen, 
commencing unrelenting struggle to undermine the ‘democratically elected’ and ‘localised’ 
government, including producing stories about the need for Chen to step down such as 
corruption allegations. Hence, Pan-Green supporters tend to back down or at least hold 
great reservations about giving support to causes if they are deemed to be Pan-Blue activities, 
and would hardly back any campaign to oust Chen initiated by or affiliated with the blue 
camp, even if they were disappointed with Chen’s performance on every ground. This kind 
of mentality was clearly manifested in an article, written by a prominent pro-independence 
scholar Lee Hsiao-Feng. 
The article, under the title ‘Building a new country is more important than anything 
else,’ began with the author’s dissatisfaction with president Chen’s performance. Lee writes:   
To be blunt, during his six years in office, Chen has not put all his efforts into 
building a new country…I have been particularly angered by the increasingly KMT 
demeanour of the DPP. Good examples of this behaviour can be seen in the alleged 
corruption of presidential aide…and the president’s son-in-law… The scandal 
surrounding the Presidential Office’s special allowances fund further underscores the 
problem. (LT 20/08/06, 15; also in TT 22/08/06, 8) 
The author however said that he would not be participating in the efforts to force Chen out 
of office. He noted that the attempts by Pan-Blue to oust Chen were not a new 
phenomenon. The only difference was that this time, they had found a new excuse – anti-
corruption. Yet, he said he never believed that the KMT was working against corruption. In 
fact, the KMT was ‘engaging in political warfare…trying to destroy the image of the 
localised government in order to restore their old regime’ (ibid). With this basic 
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understanding, Lee stated: 
It is of course impossible for me to follow up on the failed recall motion by joining 
hands with the pro-green academics in a continued attempt to accomplish Pan-
Blue’s unfinished undertaking. It would be even more impossible for me to get up 
on stage with former DPP chairman Shih and let him use me as his tool, especially 
after having found that this group of people is filled with those looking for publicity, 
a platform or benefits. (Ibid) 
He added that he actually sympathised with those pro-green ‘715 scholars’, who want Chen 
to step down. Lee however criticised them for only focusing on the corruption issues. For 
Lee, considering the overall strategy of nation-state building, this was quite disproportionate. 
He also questioned Shih for not supporting their side in the past few years when they had 
been under vicious attack by Pan-Blue and their ‘communist backers’. He asked, ‘Why is 
Shih now instead standing on the side of Pan-Blue and calling on the president to step down’ 
(ibid)? According to Lee, those issues all needed to be considered in discussions over 
whether Chen should step down. 
The aforementioned article to great degree represents the collective rationale upheld by 
the Pan-Green supporters. Under this political situation, there is little room in the nation’s 
politics for so-called ‘moderates’ or ‘impartial figures’. And each side’s political figures had 
no influence over supporters of its counterpart. Particularly for figures with a strong 
affiliation or background on one side, their original supporters would rightly consider that 
those figures have betrayed them if they swung rapidly and sharply to the other side. 
Therefore, although Shih had been a political dissident during the KMT authoritarian era 
and served as the chairman for the DPP in the 1990s, people were wondering where he 
stood now, with the green or the blue. If Shih is conceived as being in Pan-Blue, he would 
then have no influence in the DPP and among Pan-Green voters in general. To put this 
point differently, although Shih’s campaign had gathered a level of support from the general 
public and garnered great media attention, the crucial question was: ‘who exactly?’ If the bulk 
of support came from supporters of the blue camp, then this would hardly have been 
constructive in terms of making Chen to step down.  
Thus, the key question for Shih’s camp was whether the campaign could attract support 
from the wider community of green supporters and civic groups; more accurately speaking, 
whether the campaign could be defined or interpreted as a transcending-party/colour 
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movement. Once the characteristics of the movement were determined, it would either draw 
more (green) supporters to participate in or repel them from it. As a result, as to Shih’s camp, 
the last thing that Shih would want is to have his campaign too closely associated with the 
Pan-Blue. As to Chen’s camp, its main task, reversely, would be to paint Shih’s campaign 
with a blue colour. If Pan-Green successfully defined the anti-corruption movement as a 
collaborative effort between Shih and Pan-Blue, then the movement would be doomed to 
failure. It would change nothing, no matter how great the number of people who had 
participated in it and how great an amount of money people had donated to Shih’s campaign. 
They are just, as described by a pro-independence writer, a group of people ‘who can yell 
and scream as loud as they like and indulge in their desire to create disorder.’ But the 
movement, which began as a heroic tragedy, would ‘ultimately end as a farce’ (Cho, TT 
05/10/06, 8). 
The first attempt of this kind was initiated by a DPP legislator Wang Shi-Jian. Wang said 
in a press conference that although the anti-corruption sit-in seemed to be led by Shih, it was 
actually a political struggle dictated by the blue camp. Wang expressed his suspicion that 
most of the people making donations to Shih were being driven by the KMT. He said that 
the KMT recently made a huge fortune by selling its ill-gotten assets, thereby it is only a 
piece of cake for the party to ask its party members to contribute NT$100 each to Shih’s 
fundraising account. Wang claimed, ‘[Former] Chairman Shih, please be careful that you 
don’t accept the KMT’s money. If not, it might destroy your reputation’ (TT 16/08/06, 3). 
Wang’s accusation was echoed by Shih’s ex-wife Linda Gail Arrigo. Arrigo and Shih 
were married in 1978 and later divorced. She issued a letter to Shih in the press, putting her 
speculation over Shih’s financial support coming from the KMT (Arrigo, TT 17/08/06, 8). 
In her letter, she first praised Shih’s earlier struggles to stand up to the dictatorship of the 
KMT regime in pursuit of democracy in Taiwan. However, according to Arrigo’s account of 
Shih’s political life, Shih began to ‘lose the idealism and clarity of purpose’ after he, when 
serving as chairman of the DPP, made a deal in late 1995 with the New Party, which 
advocated unification with China. Shih then began to hobnob with ‘former enemies’ – the 
Pan-Blue politicians. Arrigo then continued saying that there has been a clear pattern of the 
KMT using former DPP figures to attack the DPP, while the KMT, as one of the richest 
political parties in the world, has the resources to make this ploy attractive. She then harshly 
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questioned Shih’s relationship with Pan-Blue. She writes:   
If Shih is to set himself up as the centre of a crusade against corruption, then I think 
it is fair to ask him to make public his own finances for the last several years, and to 
face squarely whether he has any financial links to the KMT… (Ibid.)  
Likewise, another former political dissident, Gao Jun-Ming, a respected reverend, also 
speculated that Shih accepted the KMT’s money. Gao was jailed by the KMT for four years 
for giving shelter to Shih in the 1980s when Shih was on the run from the authorities.158 He 
criticised Shih as ‘greedy’ and ‘materialistic’, for not being able to resist temptations, and 
accused him of selling out Taiwan. Similar to Arrigo’s rhetoric, Gao said that he does not 
regret aiding Shih 20 years ago because he loves Taiwan. Gao however delivered a stinging 
critique of Shih’s claims to moral authority. ‘The reverend said that avarice was the root of 
vice, and a basic principle for people who truly loved their community was to resist the lure 
of money, sex and alcohol’ (CT 24/08/06, A2; TT 24/08/06, 1). Gao also made reference to 
allegations that Shih was receiving money from the KMT, Beijing or both. ‘If political figures 
cannot resist these temptations,’ said Gao, ‘forcing 100 presidents to step down in the hope 
of saving Taiwan would be in vain’ (ibid.).  
Following this line of criticism, the green camp then condemned Shih for betraying 
those who used to help him in the past but cooperating with, or being the pawn of the KMT, 
the oppressor. For instance, a DPP Legislator called on Shih to wake up and realise that the 
KMT had been responsible for the break-up of his family. It is said, ‘It is ironic that you 
[Shih] let the old ghost of an evil regime dictate to you and are willing to go all out to serve 
the KMT’ (TT 24/08/06, 3). To those criticisms, Shih’s cooperation with the KMT had 
made him a traitor to the Taiwanese democratic and independence movement. They 
reminded Shih that Pan-Blue politicians were part of the oppressive KMT regime, being 
responsible for Taiwan’s 38 years of martial law and Shih’s own imprisonment. To them, 
someone like Shih, a man who sacrificed 25 years of his life for the cause of democracy, 
sacrificing his dignity and becoming a tool of Pan-Blue was totally incomprehensible.  
So why did this happen? Why did a democratic pioneer go from being a leader of the 
anti-KMT democracy movement to cooperating with the KMT? While some argued that it is 
                                                
158. In 1979, when Shih was the most-wanted fugitive after the Kaohsiung Incident, Gao gave Shih 
asylum and helped keep him in hiding. 
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because Shih has a bad case of Stockholm syndrome, others claimed that Shih had 
accustomed himself to colonial rule and could never escape from the shadow of this slavish 
mentality. As to the former, it was said that Shih suffered from Stockholm syndrome, 
thereby taking the side of those who ‘kidnapped’ him decades ago and turning his wrath on 
pro-localisation forces (Kuo, TT 04/09/06, 8). The latter accused Shih of ‘uncritically and 
without shame accepting colonial rule’ (Lee, TT 29/08/06, 8). Moreover, it is noted that in 
the latter rhetoric those who accustomed themselves to colonial rule not only refer to Shih 
himself but also his followers. The article portrayed the supporters of Shih’s campaign as 
‘empty, soulless bodies’. They were being described as follows:  
[they] generally lack understanding of their national identity and behave as 
opportunistic immigrants might, defending the colonial system and resolutely 
rejecting political reform and the nation’s reconstruction…I see that the mutual 
alienation under colonial rule has led to utilitarianism. I also see that people attach 
themselves to a foreign power [KMT], disregarding the fact that this power is 
threatening their country. These people are constantly deceiving and humiliating 
themselves. (Ibid) 
Another line of attack targeting Shih was to question his credentials as a democracy 
activist. One of the most dramatic moves occurred when DPP legislators claimed that they 
obtained a letter written by Shih to the dictator Chiang Kai-Shek. In the 1960s, when Shih 
was sentenced to life on charges of rebellion, he was believed to have written a letter to 
Chiang asking for a pardon. In the letter, Shih wrote that he was filled with remorse over his 
past mistakes. He stressed that it was foolish to insist on independence. The contents of the 
letter were later made public by Shih’s first wife Chen Li-Zhu (TT 25/08/06, 1).  
Through questioning his relations with Pan-Blue and disclosing the contents of the 
letter, Shih’s credentials as a democracy pioneer were called into question. A DPP Legislator 
even said that he wished Shih had been sentenced to death when he was indicted for treason 
25 years ago, so that he ‘would have become a Taiwanese hero, earned the respect of the 
people and been well remembered’ (TT 18/08/06, 3). Also, while ‘morality’ was set as the 
theme in Shih’s campaign and the main reason for demanding Chen to resign, to reveal 
Shih’s character faults would not only damage Shih’s reputation, but would in turn impair 
the legitimacy of the anti-corruption movement. Pan-Green politicians had asked Shih to 
subject himself to stringent public scrutiny of his morals because he had questioned the 
president’s morality. In this aspect, morality was a doubled-edged sword to Shih.  
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In addition to those attacks on Shih, Pan-Green also criticised Taipei Mayor Ma, who 
also serves as the KMT chairman, for giving Shih’s group permission to stage an around-the-
clock sit-in demonstration on Ketagelan Boulevard. Although an open-ended 24-hour 
demonstration has never been allowed before, the Taipei City Government granted Shih’s 
camp permits. DPP legislators thus lashed out at Ma for allowing the sit-in to be staged, and 
put their sceptical wondering over how close the ties are between Shih’s campaign and the 
KMT (TT 19/08/06, 3).  
The aforementioned political rhetoric was all manifested in Pan-Green’s series of street 
protests, organised to counter Shih’s campaign. For instance, a rally, called ‘Courage, Peace, 
Safeguard Taiwan and Encourage A-Bian’, took place on 26 August at Taipei’s 2-28 Peace 
Memorial Park when thousands of people took part. The organisers said that they chose the 
park as the venue because they wanted to tell dissidents who have passed away that the 
Taiwanese people were determined to defend their homeland. They also condemned Shih 
for betraying the green camp. As one of the organisers said to the crowd at the start of the 
rally, ‘What terrifies us are not those “Chinese dogs”, What is really terrifying are DPP 
traitors like Shih Ming-Teh’ (TT 27/08/06, 1). Shih’s former wife Chen Li-Zhu, DPP 
chairman Yu Shyi-Kun and other DPP lawmakers also showed up at the rally. On the same 
day, another two DPP legislators, together with some DPP city councillors from Tainan and 
Kaohsiung – a traditional stronghold of the DPP – also organised a protest outside Shih’s 
office in Taipei, asking him to return the NT$2 million they donated to Shih’s three 
legislative bids. More than 2,000 people from southern Taiwan staged a protest. At the event, 
one of the organisers who had once served as Shih’s campaign manager when Shih was 
running for legislator tried to present the receipts that he had collected from Shih’s donors – 
totalising NT$2 million (US$62,500) – to Shih’s office. He used a pair of scissors to cut in 
half a yellow ribbon that bore the title of Shih’s campaign manager, saying ‘He is no longer 
the Shih Ming-Teh of Taiwan but has become the Shih Ming-Teh of China’ (ibid; emphasis added).  
In short, Shih’s campaign came under fire from the green camp. While several DDP 
members made personal attacks on Shih to challenge his relations with the blue camp, others 
aimed to dismantle his reputation as a democracy pioneer. Also, they accused Taipei Mayor 
Ma for giving Shih special treatment by relaxing laws in the expense of public interests. All 
these efforts were made to imply that Shih’s camp was associated with Pan-Blue. ‘Red’ is 
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actually ‘Blue’. Under this rhetoric, it is easy for the green camp to conclude that Shih has 
abandoned his convictions and betrayed his former ideals; and most people who signed 
Shih’s petition or donated NT$100 to his campaign are in fact the Pan-Blue supporters. So it 
does not matter how many people send donations. One million people come out to only 
about 4.5 percent of the population in Taiwan. ‘Is this really enough to force a head of state 
to step down?’ they questioned (TT 28/08/06, 3). Even if half of the voters (about 6 million) 
participated in Shih’s campaign, said a pro-independence academic, the legitimacy of its 
appeal is questionable as they are just supporters of Pan-Blue (ibid). Shih’s campaign is thus 
not representative of a third force, thereby lacked legitimacy.  
Pan-Blue and Shih’s camp were both clearly aware of the predicament the movement 
had faced. Pan-Blue in effect attempted to keep its distance from Shih in order to prevent 
the movement from being labelled as a political conflict between the blue and the green. To 
Shih, he had earlier described supporters of his campaign as a ‘motley crowd’. However, 
more efforts to represent its campaign as being a transcending-parties/colours movement 
were demonstrated in Shih’s camp’s design of its protest, which is the focus of the next 
section.  
 
6-3. Sisyphus’s Stone Reaching the Top of the Hill? Middle Stage of the 
Movement (From Early Sit-in Protests to ‘the Surround the City’ 
Protest) 
6-3-1. The Sit-in Protests on Ketagelan Boulevard  
Shih’s camp held a press conference on 28 August on Ketagelan Boulevard in front of 
the Presidential Office in Taipei, where they were planning to stage a round-the-clock sit-in. 
Shih vowed at the press conference that the demonstrations would be a non-stop peaceful 
demonstration without any ‘exit strategy’ until Chen has stepped down (TT 29/08/06, 3). 
Although the sit-in officially began on 9 September, Shih’s camp launched ‘trial sit-ins’ first 
in order to boost public interest in the event. Organisers prepared 230 seats on Ketagalan 
between 1 Sept and 7 Sept, open to supporters every night. The people were requested to 
book sit-in seats online or in person. Each person was only allowed to take a seat for an 
hour. The number of seats however increased to 2,300 when the protest officially began, 
which symbolised the 23 million people of Taiwan. The organisers claimed that if 2,300 
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people took a seat in the sit-in each hour, this would mean a total of 41,400 people a day 
participating in the 18-hour long protests. If those numbers were met, the total number of 
participants would exceed one million people over a 24-day period (CT 30/08/06, A3; TT 
30/08/06, 1). In addition, the organisers asked participants to wear red clothes to the protest. 
The sit-in area was also flanked by curtains painted with red flames. According to the 
organisers, the flames and red motif were meant to reflect the anger generated by Chen’s 
corrupt government (CT 31/08/06, A3). The selection of ‘red’ for the theme colour of the 
campaign was however surprising to many people.  
The colour red is generally associated with the Chinese Communist Party and with 
Mao’s Cultural Revolution. For decades after Chiang’s KMT regime retreated to Taiwan, 
‘red’ has been taboo in Taiwanese politics. Under martial law, the people who advocated 
democracy were often labelled as communists, convicted of treason.159 After democratisation 
in the 1990s, ironically enough, ‘red’ is still a political taboo for many Taiwanese. In political 
circles particularly, most politicians tried to dissociate themselves from this colour, 
preventing themselves from being labelled as conspiring with the PRC against Taiwan, the 
betrayers of the Taiwanese nation. Indeed, there was a worry in Shih’s camp from the 
beginning that by choosing the colour red the movement might be labelled as associated 
with the PRC or with unification with China. He De-Fen, a spokeswoman in Shih’s camp, 
for instance, strenuously objected to the choice of red (CT 02/09/06, A2). However, Shih’s 
camp still decided to use colour red for their theme colour. Shih particularly insisted on it. 
He said, ‘I am a very confident man, and red has been politically labelled for too long in 
Taiwan. The people have the right to choose any colour’ (Bradsher, International Herald 
Tribune 05/10/06). Shih’s statement quoted above clearly demonstrated his confidence for 
not being labelled as conspiring with China against Taiwan due to his sacrifice for Taiwan in 
his earlier life.  
In addition to the choice of the colour red, the four moral principles in traditional 
Confucianism – ‘Li’ (Propriety), ‘Yi’ (Righteousness), ‘Lian’ (Honesty) and ‘Chi’ (Shame) – 
                                                
159. Although martial law was lifted in 1987, the deep fear of colour red was still held, being buried 
within the unconscious of the people in Taiwan in the context of politics. According to an 
anthropologist, when she in 2005 interviewed a man in his fifties while conducting research on 
trauma and social memory regarding the White Terror, the word ‘communist’ and the image ‘red flag’ 
instantly caused goose bumps to appear on his arms. ‘This indicates his physical fear of communism 
and its association with the colour red’ (Shih Fang-Lung 2007).  
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were proposed as a main theme for the campaign. The selection of these four virtues was to 
let the people know that Taiwan’s incumbent president Chen has no sense of propriety, 
righteousness, honesty, and shame (CT 31/08/06, A3).160 To echo the main theme, Shih’s 
camp also decided to ask the protestors to make a pattern visible from the sky, a concept 
inspired by Peru’s Nazca Lines (Figure 6-1). The Nazca Lines are geoglyphs resembling 
animals that cannot be recognised, except from high above the Earth. They were created 
more than a millennium ago. Some people believe the lines must not be the work of human 
creators alone. They said that the creators received help from extraterrestrials in making the 
lines, because humans could not have seen their work from Earth using human technology 
at the time. Fan Ke-Qin (also known as Jerry Fan), one of the key organisers in Shih’s camp, 
said that in the spirit of the Nazca Lines, the anti-Chen campaign would position 
demonstrators in the shape of a giant drawing compass. He explained that the message 
implicit in the pattern was that President Chen must hold himself to a strict moral standard. 
This is based on a play-on-words, as the Chinese character for ‘compass’ (Yuan-Gui) and 
‘rules’ (Gui-Ju) share the character Gui. He went on to say that the compass pattern is ‘a 
ceremony to call on the heavens and earth for strength,’ and it also resembles a Taiwanese 
Aboriginal warrior ‘grasping a blade and poised to slash corruption’ (TT 05/09/06, 3). As 
the organisers hoped, bringing together Confucian values and the Nazca lines as Chinese and 
foreign values would help people to highlight the sense of justice and morality lacking in the 
president.  
On Saturday, 9 September, people started to gather on Ketagalan in front of the 
Presidential Office before the protest formally started at 3pm (Figure 6-2). Shouting ‘A-Bian 
step down!’ and giving the thumbs-down sign, tens of thousands of red-clad protesters 
packed Ketagalan and adjacent roads. The campaign leader Shih arrived on a jeep at 3:30pm, 
and led the crowd in marching in circles around the boulevard. Protesters were asked to sit 
down and remain silent at about 6pm. Those who had already registered online were asked 
to sit in the ‘static’ area along the boulevard, while others gathered in the ‘moving’ area along 
neighbouring roads. The protestors read a ‘Million Voices Against Corruption Pledge’ 
                                                
160 Shih’s camp originally planned to wrap the Jing-Fu Men – a traditional-style gate of Taipei City 
located in a traffic circle in front of the Presidential Office – with 20m-high red cloth, with each cloth 
carrying one of these four virtues, making it the ‘spiritual fortress’ of its demonstration. The plan was 
however abandoned because the Taipei City Government had rejected their application over plans to 
decorate this historical monument (CT, 31/08/06; also TT, 01/09/06).  
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together at 6pm, stating:  
I am attending the Million Voices against Corruption Movement, I promise to 
dedicate myself to democracy…Anti-corruption and demanding A-Bian to step 
down are my beliefs. I will not tolerate any violence or ethnic issues getting involved. 
I will try my best to show the strength of silent resistance and set a good example for 
future generations. (TT, 10/09/06) 
As Shih led the crowd to begin the sit-in at around 5pm, rain began to fall. Organisers called 
on the participants not to let the weather conditions weaken their determination. Many Pan-
Blue figures turned up to show their support.  
Rain continued as the campaign entered its second day (Sunday, 10 Sept). Undaunted by 
the pouring rain, tens of thousands of demonstrators on Ketagalan still went on their 
around-the-clock sit-in rally. A plan for demonstrators to form imitation ‘Nazca lines’ at 3pm 
was suspended due to heavy rain. Shih however made an appearance at 5pm to lead the 
crowd after demonstrators spontaneously tried to form the line. The weather forecast had 
warned of more rain to come over the next couple of days, but Shih called on supporters to 
come out and not to miss the historic event. Despite the lower-than-expected turnout due to 
the bad weather, Shih said that he was touched and satisfied with the success of the protest. 
He stressed, ‘Sit-in participants across party lines did not need to be strong-armed or specially 
mobilised to show up and voice their opposition against the nation’s incompetent leader’ 
(TN 11/09/06); emphasis added. As the campaign entered its third day (Monday, 11 
September), the number of protestors fell sharply in the morning. The campaign organisers 
had earlier expected the sharp decline in protest numbers on Monday morning as many 
people opted to return to work. By evening their ranks had however swelled back to 
Sunday’s numbers when several thousand protesters came back to the protest site after work. 
The surge of evening arrivals boosted the flagging morale of organisers. As the Taipei City 
Police put it, the number of people at the protest site was always at around 10,000. The 
remaining four days (12 Sept to 15 Sept) sustained this level of turnout. The campaign 
organisers also encouraged people to hang red decoration in cars, houses or offices or simply 
wear red to show their support for the movement if they wish to join the cause but cannot 
come to the sit-in site.   
During this time, the organisers built a stage at Ketagalan Boulevard, encouraging 
people – with different ethnic groups, different ages, different classes and different walks of 
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life – to stand on the stage, sharing their opinions and entertaining the crowd. The organisers 
particularly welcomed personnel in uniform such as students, lawyers, etc, as well as people 
dressed in their costumes showing their ethnicities (Figure 6-3; 6-4; 6-5). Various activities 
were held on the stage, including performances by children reciting an ancient Chinese text, 
Daxue, written by Confucius and his followers talking about how to be a person of high 
moral integrity. A popular singer composed a jingle in support of  the protests. There were 
many traditional Taiwanese folk art performances, including some by aboriginals, staged 
during the rally. On the protest site, people could buy T-shirts and key chains featuring the 
group’s thumbs-down logo as well as tiny president Chen’s voodoo dolls. Some protesters 
raised props and banners they had made to express their voice. For instance, a group of 
young people held up placards ironically describing Chen as ‘Son of Scandal,’ referring to his 
alleged involvement in a spate of corruption scandals. Chen used to be termed ‘Son of 
Taiwan’ during the president race in 2000. The organisers also called for protesters to tie red 
ribbons around the trees near Ketagalan. 
The atmosphere of the campaign was often described as carnivalesque. For instance, a 
reporter from the Taipei Times (TT 02/10/06, 3) stated:  
Shih’s red-clad crowd, chanting a variety of slogans in its effort to oust President 
Chen, is boisterous and energetic. It has become common for political commentators 
to describe the campaign as sort of like a festival.  
It went on describing the venue of the demonstration as follows:  
During the day, the majority of the protesters taking part in the sit-in are housewives 
and retirees. In late afternoon and the evening, students, young adults and office 
workers often start showing up after school or work. The venue has become a social 
hot spot, where young people decked out in red outfits can get together. Every 30 
minutes or so, the campaign’s organisers lead the crowd in chanting slogans such as 
‘A-bian step down!’ and do ‘exercise dances’ come rain or shine. At nights, the 
protest becomes a stage performance, with actors, singers and artists taking turns 
entertaining the crowd with pop songs, dances and comedy…  
The article also described the enthusiasm of the protesters:   
Participants’ enthusiasm was notable during the first week of the protest, during 
which people brought free food and goods to the site and gave them away to the 
protesters. In addition to ‘Grandpa Chang’s’ free water booth, which was sponsored 
by an overseas Taiwanese residing in Canada, people distributed a variety of free 
goods, including foodstuffs – ranging from traditional deep-fried bread sticks, lunch 
boxes, stir-fried noodles, cakes and hot ginger tea – raincoats, tents and 
   255
 
newspapers…Around meal time, there is always a long line of participants – and 
even some homeless people – waiting to get the free food distributed near the 
campaign’s headquarters on Ketagalan…  
While the demonstration was still taking place on Ketagalan, the leadership of Shih’s 
camp started to show divisions about how they should proceed with the protest, while Chen 
was still showing no signs of stepping down. One of the issues on which they were divided 
was a proposal to launch a nationwide strike to increase the pressure on Chen to resign. Jian 
Xi-Jie, an organiser for the anti-Chen campaign and also a labour movement activist who 
used to be a legislator nominated by DPP, proposed an idea to initiate a nationwide strike in 
October if the campaign’s demand was not met. Although Jian insisted that the strike would 
be the last resort, many other campaign organisers publicly disapproved of the idea, worrying 
that it would paralyse the country’s economy (CT 12/09/06, A2).  
Instead of reaching an agreement on whether or not to initiate the strike, Shih’s camp 
decided to organise a parade on Friday night, 15 September, the so-called ‘Surrounding the 
[Taipei] City’, which would symbolically ‘besiege’ the Presidential Office and the president’s 
official residence (Yu-Shan Residence). The decision was a response to the DPP’s move, 
which successfully booked the Ketagalan from 16 September to 20 September. The DPP 
and pro-independence organisations were planning to hold a mass rally in the afternoon on 
16 September to counter Shih’s campaign and support the president. But the move also 
effectively drove the Shih’s camp, which had been using the same venue, to terminate their 
sit-in protest on Ketagalan. Considering the disruption this would cause for their 
demonstration, Shih’s camp therefore planned to hold a march on the one hand to flex their 
muscle, and on the other to move sit-in participants to another venue, a much smaller plaza 
in front of Taipei Railway Station by midnight (15 September), where they could continue 
their sit-in protest until 21 September before they returned to Ketagalan.  
On 15 September, the heavy rain did not deter throngs of people from joining the 
march. Hundreds of thousands of protesters, donning red clothes and wielding red 
glowsticks or flash lights covered with red transparent paper,161 poured into the streets to 
                                                
161. Shih’s camp originally organised the rally with each person holding a candlelight in his hand 
during the parade, symbolising the public shining an ‘anti-corruption torch’ on the country. Safety 
concerns prompted the Shih’s camp to cancel the plan and instead encouraged participants to bring 
flashlights or red-glowing-sticks. 
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join the mass rally (Figure 6-6; 6-7). The ‘siege’ started at 6pm on Ketagalan, earlier than the 
scheduled 7pm, as there was no room for more participants at the plaza in front of the 
Presidential Office. Led by Shih who stood on a jeep, the protestors marched from 
Ketagalan along a designated route, parading towards the Presidential Office, then onwards 
around the presidential resident to the new rally site outside the Taipei Railway Station, 
forming a red circle that stretched for almost 6km. Many protestors, including many 
housewives, senior citizens and students constantly flashed the thumb-down sign and 
shouted ‘step down!’ whenever a voice yelled ‘A-Bian.’ The protestors held placards reading 
‘Shame on Chen Shui-Bian’ and ‘Oust Corruption and Greed’. Among the crowd were Xu 
Xin-Liang, another former DPP chairman, the PFP chairman James Soong, and many other 
Pan-Blue politicians. KMT chairman Ma was however absent from the march for fear it 
would give the DPP reason to brand the protest a KMT plot. About three hours later 
around 10:30, Shih arrived at Taipei Railway Station. As he arrived, Shih shed some tears and 
kneeled down on the stage in front of the crowd to thank the crowd that had been waiting 
there. At midnight, tens of thousands of protestors remained outside the station for the sit-in 
protest continued until Wednesday, before the camp moves back to Ketagalan on 20 
September.  
As for the exact number of the turnout for the ‘Surrounding the City’, it is still a 
disputed issue. The campaign organisers put the crowd at more than one million, claiming it 
was a record turnout for a demonstration in Taiwan, but the police had a much lower 
estimate of 360,000 people attended the march.162 No matter which number is more correct, 
the protest apparently made it the largest ever parade in Taipei. Also, about 5,000 
riot/special police were deployed to prevent violence erupting during the campaign, and 
barricades were also deployed around the Presidential Office and the Yushan Residence to 
maintain security. The march, however, proceeded peacefully. No violence-related injuries 
were reported.  
6-3-2. Rhetoric of Autonomous Citizens  
During the movement, some Taiwanese scholars attempted to boost the campaign’s 
                                                
162. The turnout was important in demonstrations organised by private groups. For private organisers, 
the number of participants signifies power. There is often a wide disparity between estimates given 
by event organisers and city police.  
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legitimacy by claiming that it transcended the Blue/Green divide. A group of Taiwanese 
scholars, mainly composed of members of an academic journal, Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in 
Social Studies (TRQ) – the so-called ‘Taishe’ in Chinese – engaged in the formation of the 
rhetorical claiming that the anti-corruption movement transcends the partisan, ideological 
and identity division. The editors of the journal published a series of articles in Taiwan’s 
leading Chinese Newspapers, mainly The China Times and United Daily News. Those articles 
were later collected as a booklet under the title ‘Autonomous Citizen Entering the 
Movement’ (ACEM), which was widely distributed on various occasions at Shih’s protest 
sites. As stated in the booklet, the ACEM are committed to rethinking the notion of 
democracy and to finding new ways of imagining politics. They dubbed Shih’s campaign 
‘New Civil Movement’. Their arguments can be summarised as a political motto, 
‘Autonomous Citizen’.  
In one representative article entitled, ‘Autonomous Citizens Entering the Movement – 
Our Appeal to All Citizens,’ ACEM provides a definition of what ‘the autonomous citizen’ 
means. The article states:    
The most obvious characteristics of autonomous citizens are that they: will not 
support the blue or the green camp through others’ influence; will not take an anti-
blue or anti-green stance without thinking; and will not attack one side for the sake of 
the other side. (ACEM, 3; also in CT 31/08/06, A15) 
According to this definition, ‘those who want to depose the president to support the blue 
camp’ or ‘those who are counterattacking those who want to depose the president to 
support the green camp’ are not real autonomous citizens (ibid, 3). The article writes:  
They may be respectable citizens, but they surrender themselves to an ulterior motive, 
giving up the serious reflection on their own belief and action as well as the 
responsibility of faithfully defending the people’s self-interest…Without self-
autonomy, citizens will always be the puppets of existing political forces (incumbent 
or opposition), being used by others, sacrificing not only their own interest, but also 
the fundamental civil subjectivity. A system without a body of autonomous 
citizenship as its basis is invariably not a true democratic system, even if this system 
may have elections and political parties. (Ibid, 3) 
The article, however, states that they do not support Shih’s campaign unquestioningly. The 
key, as it is noted, is whether or not their conducts can be considered real autonomous citizens’ 
actions, which, the article further elaborates, require the organisers and participants 
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possessing autonomous consciousness and being highly critical of Taiwanese partisan 
politics (Ibid, 5). 
This article demonstrated a total disillusionment with and scepticism towards party and 
identity politics. It encouraged the anti-corruption movement to transcend the blue-and-
green dichotomy, to go beyond ethnic antagonism and to reject the negative rhetoric of 
identity politics. It called for resistance to the current political framework given by Taiwan’s 
party and identity politics. Those who reject a certain form of subjectivity imposed by two 
political camps and decline the demand to be either Taiwanese or Chinese, can be called 
‘autonomous citizens’. Only with the appearance of ‘autonomous citizens’ can Taiwan form 
a real democratic society. Under this autonomous citizen rhetoric, the anti-corruption 
movement, as those scholars contended, is an example of ‘real autonomous citizens actions’. 
Another article – entitled, ‘Society Must be Defended’ – written by a sociologist Chao Kang, 
expressed this line of opinion. He writes:   
This movement is not only what all people are calling a ‘middle-class anti-
corruption’ movement. Its participants actually include people from middle and 
lower classes of all trades. It is also a desperate self-help movement; people are 
forced to participate due to the DDP regime’s selling off national assets and 
collaborating with business conglomerates while facing the decrease of their 
fortunes, the increase of taxes, unemployment, salary cut-backs and the inability to 
survive…The most poignant meaning of this movement of which people 
spontaneously participate is simply the aim to collectively save the imminent 
breakdown of the infrastructure of Taiwanese society. This is the most humble and 
basic collective civil action taken to defend our society…(ACEM, 43-4; Chao, 
UDN 18/09/06, A15) 
The article then added: 
Once we understand these characteristics, we can truly understand why this is an 
autonomous gathering that does not need any party’s mobilisation as well as grasp 
the basic meaning of why this movement could ‘transcend the labels of green and 
blue’. For people who used to belong to either the blue or the green camps are 
converging in this place with the intent of defending themselves, putting their past 
animosities behind them with a laugh. To everyone’s surprise, ‘A-Bian’ becomes 
the catalyst for the ‘big reconciliation’. Therefore, we can understand why red is the 
colour people can all accept, because it symbolizes the hot-blooded resistance, the 
indomitable sense of justice and the people’s desire not to engage in the green and 
blue dog fight but to work together to defend society. (Ibid, 44)  
Likewise, another important member of Taishe, Chen Kuan-Hsing, a prominent 
professor in Taiwan, also expressed a similar viewpoint. In his article ‘What does “Red” 
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Mean?’ Chen firstly gives a description of his observation of the anti-corruption protest 
while attending the 915 ‘Surrounding the City’ campaign. He writes:  
Friday 7 p.m., September 15, 2007, about a dozen members of Taiwan Radical 
Quarterly…participated in a demonstration consisting of over a million people, 
seeking to depose Bian. However, the place was over-crowded by the people in 
Red, with some people calling the scene a ‘Red Sea’. We could barely enter 
Ketagalan, therefore, we walked against the tide and made a detour to Taipei 
Station…Later, we realised that such ‘free walking’, without any leadership from ‘centre’ in a 
traditional political/social movement, is the key point of the whole parade. We couldn’t hear 
what was happening from the command platform…More peculiar was the way in 
which the middle class, who has been criticised as alienated and apathetic by the 
academics, suddenly changed their demeanour. They got rid of their drained bodies 
and dull facades, started to greet strangers who were identified as their red 
companions…(ACEM, 68-9; emphasis added)    
In the presentation of the above ‘free walking’ scenes, the author stated that what they had 
witnessed was not only a transcendence of blue-green dichotomy and ethnic hostility, but 
also ‘a transcendence of the given frameworks (such as the planned route of the 
demonstration) and alienated relation among people’ (ibid, 70). The author writes, ‘The 
participants have actualised their “autonomy” in actions, with mutual support’ (ibid, 70). The 
author then asked ‘what does the red mean?’  According to him,   
The key for identification with the Red was based on a complete and fundamental 
disappointment and scepticism to party politics. In this sense, transcending the 
dichotomy of Blue and Green means transcending and abandoning party politics. 
(Ibid, 70)  
He added:  
Fundamentally, the Red means rethinking what democracy is. Party politics is no 
longer the core in the imagination of democratic politics. Democracy is liberation of 
people’s vitality; it is a confinement and regulation of the State/government/regime 
by the society. (Ibid, 72) 
In addition, according to the author, the ‘red’ also means the emergence of a new form 
of social subjectivity. He argues that the emergence of a Red subjectivity implies an 
implosion of the multi-dimensional problems underlying the Taiwan democratic movement 
since the end of WWII. He points out that ‘Pro-U.S., anti-Communist’ is the main 
component of Taiwan subjectivity. While the Taiwanese adore the U.S. democratic model 
and reject other alternative imaginations of democracy; the American two party system has 
become the fundamental scheme in pursuing and evaluating the democratic movement in 
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Taiwan. As a result, ‘democratic politics has been reduced to voting. The idea of democracy 
and politics is then abducted by political parties’ (ibid, 73). Thus, the author states,  
The Red is to say goodbye to party politics, with our thumbs-down to depose Bian 
[President Chen]. At the same time, our thumbs-up is pointing towards the 
expansion of a social subjectivity. (ibid, 74) 
To the author, the complexity of the anti-corruption movement provides the opportunity for 
the people in Taiwan to question and breakthrough the limitations of their existing political 
imagination.  
In short, the rhetoric of ‘Autonomous Citizen’ indeed had great influence on Shih 
camp’s political rhetoric and its decision-making. For instance, Shih’s camp afterwards called 
its campaign a ‘civil movement’ as well. In addition, the aforementioned rhetoric also 
demonstrated that many people had high expectations of the anti-corruption campaign. They 
hoped that it would transform from a simple movement to depose Chen to a broad-based 
effort concerned with protecting social values and a truly ‘new civic movement.’ Their hope 
is that the movement would be able to transcend partisan divisions and bring civic thinking 
into people’s daily lives instead of letting them be influenced by ethnic/ideological/identity 
rifts manipulated for political motives. Nevertheless, this line of thinking, together with Shih 
camp’s political rhetoric, was strongly challenged by the green camp, in particular in the 
choice of colour red.  
6-3-3. Shih’s ‘Associations’ with China and Pan-Blue  
After Shih’s camp urged people to wear ‘red’ – a colour that was associated with 
communist China – to participate in the demonstration, the Pan-Green began to liken Shih 
to Mao Zedong, Shih’s supporters to Red Guards, as well as his campaign to the Cultural 
Revolution.  
One of the examples is Pan-Green’s criticism of Shih’s choice of 9 September as the 
starting date for his campaign. They argued that the date marked the 30th anniversary of 
Mao’s death. Shih’s ex-wife Arrigo, for instance, urged Shih to stop the demonstration, 
saying that  
9 September is the 30th anniversary of Mao’s death. On that day Chinese people will 
gather in Tiananmen Square to commemorate Mao by raising Red flags and by 
distributing Mao’s Little Red Book...If Taiwanese people also use the colour red to 
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protest against their elected president, this will lead people to associate Taiwan’s 
Ketagalan Boulevard with Red Square. (cited in Shih 2007, 4) 
Moreover, they also argued that the tactics of the Shih’s camp resembled those used to whip 
up hysteria and violence in China’s most notorious phase of the modern era Cultural 
Revolution. Lin Bao-Hua, a pro-independence political commentator, claimed that the 
people would not know what the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s was until they come to 
Taiwan in 2006. In his article in Liberty Times, Lin states that Pan-Blue and its media’s 
‘disclosure’ of Chen’s corruption are similar to the Cultural Revolution’s attitude to ‘question 
and attack everything’ (LT 13/09/06, 4). Shih and Pan-Blue’s latent hatred and resentment 
harboured towards pro-independence forces allowed them to make irrational accusations 
against Chen and pro-independence forces. Taiwan’s pro-independence forces are now 
being beaten and forced to apologise just like the ‘Five Black Classes’ during the Cultural 
Revolution. Lin writes: 
Although there is no Mao here, China’s influence is everywhere…I worry that Shih’s 
campaign will bring the Cultural Revolution back from the dead. (Ibid) 
While Shih’s campaign was analogised to China’s Cultural Revolution, Pan-Green 
politicians also put a dent in the speculation that Beijing is behind this new ‘Red Army’ in 
Taipei, having a hand in the anti-corruption movement. They argued that Beijing was 
interfering in Taiwan’s internal affairs, attempting to use Shih’s campaign to create political 
turmoil to divide Taiwan. For instance, a pro-independence group, the Northern Taiwan 
Society, hosted a forum discussing influences on Taiwan’s democratic development in view 
of Shih’s campaign. A Chinese political dissident Ruan Ming, who served as a national policy 
adviser to the president, said at a forum that Taiwan’s current political unrest was a sign that 
China’s power is on the rise and the US’ democratic power is ebbing. He noted that Beijing’s 
power has infiltrated Taiwan and the anti-corruption movement is the beginning of Beijing’s 
strategy to divide Taiwan (TT 02/10/06, 3). Also, there was a rumoured conspiracy in green 
circles that claimed that the pro-unification proponents would gradually take over leadership 
of Shih’s camp and eventually hijack it in order to promote unification with China.163 
                                                
163. For instance, a DPP Legislator questioned the motives of  anti-Chen campaign’s consultant Hsu 
Po-Yun, who travelled to China for attending an academic conference during the protest period. Hsu 
was accused of  reporting to the Chinese authorities on the progress of  the anti-Chen campaign on 
behalf  of  Shih and receiving further instructions (TT 24/09/06, 3). 
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Meanwhile, Pan-Green legislators expressed similar concerns in the Legislative Yuan. 
When meeting with Taiwan’s intelligence officials, Pan-Green legislators questioned those 
officials over whether they had found evidence that Beijing was lending support to Shih’s 
protests. Despite the officials’ denial, Pan-Green legislators remained dubious, insisting that 
Beijing had a hand in Shih’s campaign, if not directly. One TSU legislator said that China had 
spent billions of Taiwan dollars to financially support Taiwan’s media. ‘That’s why so many 
have shown their bias by promoting the anti-Chen campaign’ (TT 23/09/06, 3). Also, 
another TSU legislator asked the officials to investigate whether Beijing had sent agents to 
Taiwan under the guise of tourists to attend the anti-Chen campaign. He noted, ‘On 14 
September, 467 Chinese tourists came to Taiwan, which was higher than the average of 
about 100 people. This made me wonder whether they actually came for the anti-Chen 
campaign’s massive march on 15 September’ (ibid). 
Although there is no evidence to prove Beijing is behind the campaign, Pan-Green kept 
accusing Shih’s camp.164 DPP chairman Yu described Shih’s demonstration as ‘Red Terror’, 
and interpreted it as ‘a sign of Mainland Chinese bullying the Taiwanese.’ Yu appealed 
several times at different occasions to back Chen with this rhetoric. One example is Yu’s 
remarks made in his three-day visit to Washington in mid-September. When speaking to 
reporters at the National Press Club in the US, Yu complained about China’s interference in 
Taiwanese domestic affairs. Yu said he did not have any evidence. However, he would 
suggest that ‘Pan-Blues and China were coordinating their efforts to discredit Chen and 
force a wedge between Taiwan and the US’ (TT 14/09/06, 3). At another occasion when he 
attended the DPP’s weekly Central Standing Committee meeting, Yu told the local media 
that 
                                                
164 While the Pan-Green associated Shih’s campaign with the PRC, China’s officials ironically kept a 
low profile. China’s media remained silent on Shih’s campaign and the ‘Taiwan Affairs Office’ 
declined to comment on it, repeatedly saying that it was a domestic affair (Shih 2007). Augustine Tan 
in the Asia Times (17/11/06) argued that China does not want to see Chen being ousted because of 
his alleged corruption. ‘It is apparent that Beijing is afraid that reporting Chen’s predicament in the 
mass media could backfire. The public might raise questions along the lines of “What can we do with 
official corruption?”’ Shih himself dismissed Pan-Green’s speculations of his association with China. 
He said that he never visited China, unlike many DPP heavyweights who formed groups to visit 
China for business and other causes. Shih added, ‘Many people know how much I abhor China, I 
have even refused to visit Hong Kong since 1997 and Macao since 1999. I will continue to do so 
until China agrees to abandon the use of military means to resolve cross-strait disputes’ (TT 
31/08/06, 3).  
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Many people do not want to see Taiwan become a normal country, especially 
China…It is a shame that the campaign Shih has become a pawn of the pan-blue camp and 
that the pan-blues have become a pawn of China. (TT 21/09/06, 3; emphasis added)  
The rationale behind the aforementioned statement reflects a common mentality upheld 
by the Pan-Green politicians and their supporters. That is, Pan-Blue tilts towards China at 
the expense of the interests of the Taiwanese. Under this rhetoric, PRC and Pan-Blue are 
interchangeable. And Shih’s campaign was bound up with both of them. Shih’s campaign – 
its organisers and followers – was then defined as a movement of Pan-Blue, pro-unification, 
and after all, Chinese identifiers. Any illusions that Shih’s camp tried to create about the 
protest being a non-partisan affair were therefore absurd. 
For instance, a pro-independence proponent issued an article in Liberty Times under the 
title ‘Beyond blue and green? You’ve got to be joking’. The article rebuked the claim that 
Shih’s campaign was a broad-based civic movement, going beyond blue and green. It stated:  
Some facts are indisputable. The Pan-Blue rejects Taiwan’s right to become a normal 
and independent country. The pan-green camp wants to lead Taiwan down the path 
toward a new constitution, a change in its official title and nationhood. If the anti-
Chen movement really isn’t about mainstream blue-green politics, then it should 
tolerate people of either political persuasion. But why is it that people who support an 
independent Taiwan at the anti-Chen rallies are abused by the red-clad demonstrators…?165 Why 
is it that when the sea of anti-Chen protesters yells ‘long live the Republic of 
China’…Shih is all smiles? Aren’t his followers supposed to be above political 
division? (Cao, TT 11/10/06, 8; emphasis added)  
The article added that even though it is true that Shih’s movement has green followers in it, 
its ideology is centred completely around the blue camp’s anti-independence stance. 
Therefore, it stated that Shih’s campaign is ‘nothing but a cover for yet another episode in 
the series of anti-Chen and anti-green efforts the KMT has engaged’ (ibid.). The article 
concluded:  
In essence, therefore, it is still about blue versus green, the old power versus the 
reformers, unification versus independence. But this time, they’ve lined up three 
different armies for the attack. The first wave is Shih’s ‘red army,’ the second wave 
is the KMT and waiting behind both is the Chinese Communist Party. (Ibid)  
                                                
165. Here the author referred to an incident when Wang Li-Ping, spokeswoman of Shih’s camp was 
booed off the podium in Shih’s demonstration when she said that, ‘The people of the Republic of Taiwan 
will not be defeated by some rain.’ Upon hearing Wang’s remark, the throng of demonstrators 
demanded an apology, for they found the term ‘Republic of Taiwan’ unacceptable. Afterwards, Shih’s 
camp offered apologies to pacify the disgruntled demonstrators.  
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The article in short indicated that Shih’s protest was aligned with pro-unification and pro-
Chinese identity. The anti-corruption movement was then interpreted as a combat of 
national identity. DPP Chairman Yu seems to sympathise with this line of thought, as he 
described the anti-Chen campaign as ‘political strife’ and ‘fighting over national 
identification’ (TT 19/09/06, 1).  
Moreover, Pan-Green supporters also accused Shih’s camp of receiving help from what 
they called the ‘pro-unification media’. They charged that many media outlets in Taiwan have 
played the part of a provocateur and instigator, blatantly interfering in the political furore. 
Some of those media outlets resorted to ‘fabricating’ or ‘running unverified stories as front-
page news or broadcasting hearsay’ (Editorial, TT 24/08/06, 8). The media acted on 
information they have themselves generated. Also, they condemned the news media of 
helping prop up the anti-Chen campaign with round-the-clock-news coverage. They 
particularly referred to a cable channels TVBS for providing 24-hour blanket coverage of the 
event, interspersed with provocative ‘news’ features on the Ukraine’s ‘Orange Revolution’ 
and the Philippine’s ‘People Power Movement’ (Editorial, TT, 20/09/06, 8). According to 
them, while the confrontation between the blue and green camps had become tense, the 
media intensified social and political confrontation through biased and exaggerated coverage.  
Pro-independence groups initiated a series of forums to lash out at Taiwan’s media. At 
the forum, the participants described the campaign as ‘the product of the anti-Taiwan 
media’s smear campaign’ to paralyse the DPP government (TT 10/09/06, 3). They also 
argued that the DPP administration was the victim of its own evil deeds. One of the 
participants noted: 
The pro-unification media occupy a large portion of the local market. They run 
misleading reports about the Chen administration and therefore help the anti-Chen 
campaign gain momentum. Such a phenomenon has a lot to do with the 
administration’s implementation of Chinese colonial education. Since the DPP came 
to power, it has failed to aggressively push for a Taiwanese education system, instead 
continuing with China-centric education. (Ibid) 
President Chen seemed to concur with this line of criticism. He at different occasions 
publicly condemned the media for letting false allegations against him circulate. While 
meeting with local leaders in Hualien, Chen described himself as bearing ‘the cross of 
persecution’ as Taiwan’s media were unrelenting in their criticism of him. He, however, 
   265
 
refused to step down because of those criticisms and added that he is willing to bear the 
cross of persecution for the sake of the nation. He noted:  
It is like mountain climbing. I am leading the way in the front and I want the people 
behind me to have an easier climb. Although I may suffer cuts or even bleed along 
the way, I don’t mind. It is not a problem that A-Bian gets hurt. (TT 14/08/06, 1) 
Some pro-independence advocates even attributed Taiwan’s biased media to China’s 
conspiracy to use Taiwan’s media to achieve its goal for unification. A former national policy 
adviser to the president, Huang Tien-Lin, issued a series of articles in the press, arguing that 
Taiwan has already been drawn into China’s ‘unlimited war’ and in fact finds itself in a state 
of quasi-war, though most Taiwanese people seem not to realise that they are on the brink of 
a national crisis. The term ‘unlimited war’, according to Huang, is a new concept invented by 
China’s People’s Liberation Army, whose central presumption is that ‘the battlefield is 
everywhere.’ Anything can be turned into a weapon. The media, particularly, is deemed an 
effective tool to manipulate people’s opinions. Huang added that those pro-China media are 
the platform that China can exploit in its unlimited warfare. Thus, the scandals surrounding 
Chen that had exploded since 2004 were not spontaneous, as many people in Taiwan had 
supposed, but as a planned and calculated move initiated by the PRC (Huang, TT 18/09/06, 
8) 
In short, in Pan-Green’s political rhetoric, the practices of Shih’s camp, the blue camp, 
and the pro-unification media demonstrated that the anti-corruption movement is not about 
opposing corruption or seeking to transcend the blue-green divide, but rather that it is just 
another pro-unification forces’ strategy – possibly with supports from the PRC - to topple 
the DPP government, bullying the Taiwanese. Thus, the green camp must work to protect 
its interests in its confrontation with those ‘pro-unification forces’. The unity of Pan-Green 
was not needed but imperative. Supporting Chen meant supporting Pan-Green and Taiwan. 
Neutrality does not exist in politics in Taiwan.  
Many elements featured in Pan-Green’s rhetoric discussed above are clearly articulated 
in a pro-Chen demonstration on 16 September, when Ketagalan was handed over to the 
green camp. This pro-Chen demonstration is called ‘Formosa Sunlight Rally’.   
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6-3-4. The Pan-Green ‘Formosa Sunlight’ Rally  
The rally was organised by two pro-independence groups, Northern Taiwan Society and 
Taiwan Society, and backed by the DPP,166 showing their support for Chen and their 
determination to protect Taiwan. The organisers describe the meaning of the rally as follows:  
[The rally will be] held to safeguard the Taiwanese government and universal ideals 
of freedom, democracy, stability and prosperity. We will not allow anyone to infringe 
upon these universal ideals, nor the authority of the Presidential Office and the 
[Chen’s] administration. (TT 13/09/06, 1)  
They then explained that the theme of the rally would be ‘love, hope and light’, which 
implied that participants in their rally were on the side of ‘the light’ while protestors in the 
anti-Chen campaign were on the side of ‘darkness’. They said that they want to show ‘the 
spontaneous and positive energy of the people of Taiwan,’ and offer the people of Taiwan a 
different option (ibid). In contrast to the thumbs-down gesture of the Shih’s camp, The 
organisers introduced their own campaign gesture: using the index and middle fingers of the 
right hand to draw a circle in the air before placing them over the heart. The gesture 
symbolises that Taiwan and its people are always in their hearts. They also released an 
advertisement shown on TV to encourage people to participate. The message they wanted to 
get across in the advertisement was, said the organisers:  
They opposed Sinicisation but wanted stability, that they opposed revolution but 
wanted law and order, and that they opposed social unrest but wanted to improve 
the economy. (Ibid.)  
On 16 September, despite the rain brought on by a typhoon, thousands of 
demonstrators packed Ketagalan again. However, this time the rally was to support Chen, 
and opposing Shih and Pan-Blue. The crowd chanted ‘Go! Taiwan’ and ‘Go! A-Bian.’ They 
also prominently displayed banners with slogans saying ‘Go Away, Red China!’ and ‘Resist 
the Red Guard!’. Many high-ranking officials from the Presidential Office, Executive Yuan 
and DPP legislative caucus as well as activists of Taiwan’s independence movement all 
attended the rally. DPP Chairman Yu, while leading the crowd in chants of ‘Long Live 
Taiwan Republic’, called on the people of Taiwan to stand up and support Chen. He accused 
the anti-corruption campaign of being a tool used by ‘the Chinamen to bully the Taiwanese 
                                                
166 The DPP issued a mobilisation order, asking its legislators, local chapters and county 
commissioners across Taiwan to enlist people to attend the rally (CT 13/09/06, A1). 
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people’ (CT 17/09/06, A2). Yu also blamed the KMT chairman Ma for approving Shih’s 24-
hour sit-in and therefore creating social unrest. He said Ma was fully responsible for the 
current social instability, and added that the people in Taiwan deserve to return to their 
normal daily life and the country must focus on improving the economy. Yu concluded that,  
Many people braved the bad weather and came here today. It shows your sturdy 
support for Taiwan…We, Taiwanese people, cannot be ruined nor defeated by the 
‘red terror’ exerted by the anti-Chen campaign. (TT 17/09/06, 1)   
While the president decided not to attend the rally but toured the outlying island county 
of Penghu, he sent Secretary-General of the Presidential Office Chen Tang-Shan to the rally 
with greetings for the crowd. Chen Tang-Shan said that the president wanted him to convey 
his regards and appreciations to the crowd, and to tell them that he was determined to 
safeguard the democratic system established by the 23 million people of Taiwan. Another 
speaker Zang Gui-Hai, who is the vice president of Taiwan Society, turned his criticism to 
some local media outlets, including China Times, United Daily News, TVBS and CTITV – all of 
them were portrayed as pro-unification media – for painting a negative picture of Taiwan. 
He told to the crowd, ‘If you love Taiwan, don’t watch CTITV, TVBS or read China Times 
and United Daily News’ (ibid).  
Zang’s remarks were apparently echoed by the pro-Chen protesters. Several news 
reporters working for those so-called ‘pro-China’ TV stations were attacked while they 
broadcast live coverage of the rally. A CTITV anchor and a cameraman, who were trying to 
hold a live interview with a DPP Legislator on a platform set up in the campaign site, were 
forced to stop their interview as demonstrators started shaking the platform and pounding it 
with their umbrellas. One pro-Chen demonstrator jumped up on the platform and tried to 
speak, eventually unplugging a power cable. CTITV cut off its coverage, cutting back to their 
news desk. Their colleague, a female news reporter also complained of being assaulted and 
felt violated by the pro-Chen protesters.167 Also, an ETTV anchorwoman and cameraman, 
who were presenting a live broadcast on another raised platform next to that of CTITV, 
were forced to stop their broadcast after six or seven demonstrators jumped onto the 
                                                
167 She said that a middle-aged protester standing next to her told her that he refused to watch her 
station because he thought the coverage was biased and pro-China. The protester then started to 
grab her microphone. When she refused to let go, other people around her started cursing her. The 
man then touched her cheek and asked her not to be upset. 
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platform and interrupted it. Meanwhile, an FTV cameraman, who was wearing a red T-shirt 
and had forgotten to peel off an anti-Chen sticker from his camera, was chased by 
demonstrators (CT 17/09/06, A3; TT 17/09/06, 1). In addition to the skirmishes that took 
place between the news reporters and Pro-Chen campaigners, numerous scuffles also broke 
out in Taipei between supporters of Chen and followers of Shih’s camp.168  
The early and middle stages of the anti-corruption campaign had been relatively 
peaceful and the public’s emotions were kept under control apart from some minor 
incidents. However, after the siege of the Presidential Office on 15 September and the pro-
Chen demonstration on 16 September, no one could guarantee whether the movement 
could continue as before. The battle between anti-Chen and pro-Chen not only became 
intensified, but more importantly, assumed the form of traditional confrontations between 
Pan-Green and Pan-Blue, between independence and unification, and after all, between 
Taiwanese and Chinese identity. This trend of development is, ironically, contradicted by 
what organisers had claimed in the first place. 
 
6-4. Sisyphus’ Stone Rolling Down: The Late Stage of the Movement 
(from the ‘Surround the Island’ Protest to the ‘Besiege the Presidential 
Office’ Demonstration) 
6-4-1. ‘Surround the Island’ Protest  
After a week-long sit-in protest on Ketagalan, most people realised that the sit-in by 
itself was not going to be enough to force Chen to step down; and it was also not in 
anyone’s interest for the impasse to continue indefinitely. The demonstration was unlikely to 
achieve anything unless the protest was intensified. This is why Shih’s camp was earlier 
thinking through the possibility of initiating a strike. In addition to the strike plan, they also 
planned to hold similar kinds of protest outside Taipei, in particular, in Southern Taiwan, 
which is traditionally a DPP stronghold, the majority of the population being of Minnan 
ethnicity. As they saw it, if they succeeded in organising a large scale – though not necessarily 
as large as it had been in Taipei – mass-rally in southern Taiwan, that would demonstrate 
that their call for Chen’s resignation was backed by Pan-Green supporters. Chen then would 
                                                
168 Most of the skirmishes took place around Taipei Railway station as the DPP supporters passed by 
the area on their way home after taking part in a pro-Chen rally on Ketagalan (CT 17/09/06, A5).  
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have no choice but to step down.  
One of the first of such attempts was proposed by Fan Ke-Qin, a campaign spokesman 
for Shih’s camp. On 16 September, Fan told a press conference that the anti-Chen sit-in 
protest would be held in Kaohsiung (the biggest city in Southern Taiwan) on 19 September, 
followed by a ‘Besiege the Kaohsiung City Government’ on 29 September. They were also 
planning to stage anti-Chen demonstrations in most of the major cities in Taiwan. Fan’s 
remarks were, however, subsequently dismissed by campaign leader Shih. Shih said that his 
camp would not initiate any protests outside Taipei (CT 17/09/06, A4; TT 17/09/06, 3). 
After Shih had given the order, the camp called off aforementioned plans. Fan told the press 
conference later that the decision was made in an impromptu meeting shortly after Pan-
Green’s rally on 16 September that had caused clashes. Fan noted that during the meeting 
Shih voiced concerns about social unrest around the country (TT 18/09/06, 3). Although 
Shih’s camp decided to back away from expanding protests to other cities, there were a few 
anti-Chen protests being held in Southern Taiwan by some local politicians, which indeed 
caused strong opposition from the green supporters and engendered serious confrontations, 
ending in violence.    
At night on 18 September, a former DPP Kaohsiung City councilor held an informal 
‘Evening Tea Gathering’ in downtown Kaohsiung, with approximately 100 anti-Chen 
protesters sat in. In the beginning, there were just a few hundred of president Chen’s 
supporters gathered to counter the protest. Police used barbed wire barricades to cordon off 
the site of the altercations. Divided by police barricades, the rival camps traded barbs. A few 
hours later, thousands of Chen’s supporters in this traditional DPP stronghold thronged to 
the site after watching TV news reports of the standoff. Some of Chen’s supporters clashed 
with police while trying to break through police barricades. While the number of Chen’s 
supporters on the scene continued to increase, the anti-Chen protesters gradually left under 
police escort. At about 11:30pm, Chen’s supporters broke through the police barricades, 
plunging the scene into chaos. The situation was brought under control by the midnight. 
The standoff between the two rival camps lasted almost six hours (CT, 19/09/06 A5; TT 
19/09/06, 3).  
Following violent clashes in Kaohsiung City, a tense shouting match took place between 
rival protesters in Tainan City – the second largest city in Southern Taiwan – where about 
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300 anti-Chen protesters were staging a sit-in. The anti-Chen protesters, led by Tainan city 
councilor of the KMT, obtained permission from the city government to stage a sit-in from 
19 September until 24 September in a parking lot behind the city council building. On the 
first day, hundreds of police officers were dispatched to the scene and barricades were set up 
to prevent scuffling between the two camps due to the clash earlier in Kaohsiung. As 
expected, over a thousand of Chen’s supporters were mobilised against the sit-in. Clashes 
occurred several times during the evening. Twenty-six people were arrested and at least ten 
were injured in clashes (CT, 20/09/06 A6). On the second and the third day, although police 
were on hand to maintain order, clashes still took place. Several civilians and police officers 
were injured. To prevent a replay of the past three nights’ clashes, the city council finally 
cancelled the permission for the anti-Chen sit-in (CT 21/09/06, A1; TT 23/09/06, 1). 
While the protest rallies down south turned violent, Shih’s camp still decided to hold 
another demonstration in Taipei. The camp announced its plan to call on protesters, once 
again, besieging the Presidential Office on 10 October, Taiwan’s National Day (‘Double Ten 
Day’). Noting that by convention the government holds a flag-raising ceremony and a series 
of celebrations in front of the Presidential Office to celebrate the national day, the organisers 
said that ‘a siege on that day would ensure that the people’s voices are heard around the 
world’ (CT 19/09/06, A3; TT 19/09/06, 3). To prepare this mass-rally, Shih’s camp also 
came to a conclusion that Shih would travel around the island of Taiwan, joining forces with 
other cities and counties and expanding the influence of its ‘siege’ on the national day. Shih 
made the announcement when he spoke to his followers, saying that he intends to use the 
nationwide trip to stir the public to stand up against corruption, ‘turning the march in Taipei 
into one around Taiwan’ (CT 26/09/06, A1). Shih’s camp set off on an eight-day tour, 
taking off on 29 September. Shih travelled with 24 buses to 16 cities and counties including 
Hsinchu, Taichung, Kaohsiung, Miaoli and Ilan before returning to Taipei on 6 October. 
The camp invited 500 volunteers to join them on the tour, though they had to travel at their 
own expense. The tour was entitled ‘Flowers Blossoming Everywhere Peacefully’. 
Meanwhile, as Shih’s campaign prepared for its nationwide tour, they faced the 
obstructions enacted by the DPP as many DPP County Commissioners in Southern Taiwan 
refused to approve the legal requests from Shih’s camp to assemble or march in their 
counties. Shih criticised local DPP government chiefs for suppressing the people’s rights to 
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protest. He said, ‘Some local DPP chiefs fought against the government for democracy 
before. Now that they have power, they would not allow differing voices in their cities and 
counties’ (TT 28/09/06, 3). Shih particularly lashed out at DPP Kaohsiung County 
Commissioner Yang Qui-Xing, for refusing to grant the movement access to certain 
locations. Shih said, ‘Yang used to hold protests around the nation with me, and now he is 
trying to repress the people’s right to express their opinions.’ Yang in response accused 
Shih’s ‘Red Army’ of delivering a blow to his county’s economy (ibid.). 
Shih’s camp began a nationwide tour on 29 September, departed from Taipei with 
Hsinchu City as its first stop. The scene of Shih’s departure from Taipei was festooned with 
red flowers and balloons. Supporters of the campaign waved red flags as 20 tour buses 
departed from the sit-in area in the southern plaza of Taipei Railway Station. Before leaving 
Taipei, Shih urged participants to keep the tour ‘peaceful and non-violent.’ He said that both 
his supporters and opponents are ‘brothers’ who simply have different stances on the anti-
Chen issue. ‘Opposing the president doesn’t mean opposing the DPP, and opposing the 
DPP doesn’t mean opposing Taiwan. All of the 2.3 million people love Taiwan deeply’ (CT 
30/09/06, A3; TT 30/09/06, 3).  
The hurdles that Shih’s island-wide-tour faced increased as he moved south. The tour’s 
first few stops in Hsinchu City and Miaoli County in northern Taiwan went through 
peacefully. In Taichung County, the central Taiwan, Shih’s group had to abandon their 
original plan to stay the night at a temple, because Chen’s supporters had threatened the 
temple not to accommodate them (CT 30/09/06, A3). In Tainan County, where the riot 
took place earlier on 19 September, Shih’s group was forced to change course after its route 
was blocked by the police. The campaign organisers subsequently filed a lawsuit against 
Tainan County Commissioner Su Huan-Zhi, accusing him of negligence and violating their 
human rights. As a campaign organiser complained, Su used to be a human rights lawyer, but 
now as a local commissioner he repressed people’s rights and blocked their route so they 
couldn’t enter the city (CT 04/10/06, A6). The tour then entered Kaohsiung County, where 
it held a protest. When the tour passed through Kaohsiung City, Shih’s followers and Chen’s 
supporters shouted at each other from across the streets. Several thousand police gathered 
along the camp’s route to separate the two sides and maintain public order. After staying the 
night in Pingtung County, the southernmost county of Taiwan, the campaign turned to the 
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East, arriving in the Pan-Blue stronghold of Taitung City. Shih’s nationwide tour returned to 
Taipei on 7 October, before holding a large-scale evening protest in Taichung City, marking 
the end of the nationwide tour.  
While Shih was leading his followers around the island of Taiwan, the sit-in continued at 
the plaza in front of Taipei Railway Station.169 The campaign organisers in Taipei organised a 
series of so-called ‘flash mob’ protest in Taipei streets.170 In addition, Shih’s camp also called 
on people to donate their A-Bian memorabilia, such as A-Bian hats and A-Bian dolls (CT 
25/09/06, A3). Those memorabilia were the items that Chen’s campaign team produced to 
boost his support in Chen’s previous elections. The symbolic ten A-Bian dolls were sent to 
the DPP as ‘a gift for the party’s 20th anniversary,’ urging it to draw a line between the party 
and Chen. Shih’s camp said the dolls had been donated by former supporters of the 
president. Jian Xi-Jie, a former DPP legislator and deputy commander of Shih’s camp, said, 
‘This is proof that many of Chen’s campaign supporters used to support the DPP. Now they 
have donated the dolls because they are ashamed of the party’ (TT 29/09/06, 3). Another 
organiser also said that they want the president to ponder why the people who supported 
him in 2000 detest him now (ibid). 
6-4-2. Double Ten Day 
Shih’s camp on 8 September released the detailed plan of the so-called ‘siege’ on 10 
                                                
169 While clashes were occurring in southern Taiwan, Shih’s camp in Taipei also struggled with the 
Pan-Green to obtain legal rights to continue their sit-in in Taipei. Following the mass rally on 15 Sept, 
the camp moved its sit-in to Taipei Railway Station, as the Pan-Green received approval to use 
Ketagalan until 20 Sept. On 21 Sept, anti-Chen protesters moved back to Ketagalan. Yet, they only 
received a permit to hold protests there until 28 September. The right to use the boulevard was given 
over to the DPP from 28 Sept to 29 Sept and then to the ‘Double Ten Day Ceremony Preparation 
Committee’ from 30 Sept to 12 Oct. Shih’s camp originally had refused to move to the station, and 
had pledged to stay on Ketagalan until they were ‘dragged away’ by the police. Organisers of the 
protests lashed out at the DPP for reserving the Ketagalan despite having no plans to hold events. A 
campaign organiser expressed their dissatisfaction, condemning the DPP’s continuous efforts to 
prevent protesters from exercising their assembly and rally rights (CT 26/09/06, A4). Shih’s camp 
finally made a concession, agreeing to move its sit-in protest to the Taipei Railway Station. They said 
the decision was made considering the pressure both Taipei Mayor Ma and the Taipei City Police 
Department would face if they refused to leave Ketagalan (CT 28/09/06, A5). Shih’s camp returned 
to Taipei Railway Station at midnight on 27 Sept, ahead of setting out on a planned nationwide tour.  
170 A flash mob is a group of  people assembled in a public place to do something unusual or notable, 
and then disperse. Shih’s camp called for people to gather at 11:45am on 5 October at the No. 1 Exit 
of  all Taipei tube stations and railway stations in other cities and counties, chanting slogans such as 
‘A-bian step down’ for 10 minutes, and dispersed, before police warned them to move along (CT 
01/10/06, A4; TT  01/10/06, 3). 
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October. They called on two million protesters to join this protest and encircle the 
Presidential Office building and nearby Ketagalan, where thousands of foreign and local 
dignitaries and students were scheduled to hold an official ceremony. As it was announced, 
the protest rally would take place simultaneously on four gathering points around the fringes 
of the National Day ceremony zone in front of the Presidential Office building (Figure 6-8). 
It aims to prevent the ‘embattled’ president from entering or leaving his office on the 
national day (TT 08/10/06, 3). Shih held a press conference on 9 September to give a final 
call for the public to participate in the protest. He insisted that the siege would proceed with 
‘love, peace and non-violence,’ and added that  
The only thing we ask for is a government free from corruption and a harmonious 
nation without divided ethnic communities and confrontations between parties… 
We would like to establish [a country where we can] teach our children and students 
what honour and sense of shame is, what sense of responsibility is, what honesty is 
and what justice is. (TT 10/10/06, 1) 
President Chen on the day before the national day announced that he would attend 
celebrations despite the risk of being humiliated by his opponents in the presence of 
hundreds of foreign dignitaries. In the meantime, the DPP legislative caucus also issued a 
mobilisation order to its 85 members to be present at the celebrations, and about 60 
legislators agreed to show up. As for the Pan-Blue, the KMT chairman and Taipei City 
Mayor Ma said he would attend the ceremony as local chief, with normal clothing and would 
not attend the protest. He insisted that the party would not be directly involved, but their 
members were free to attend the protest as individuals. Many KMT legislators and all PFP 
legislators said they would wear red attending the ceremony, though they promised that they 
would not interfere with Chen’s speech during celebrations (CT 10/10/06, A1). However, 
fistfights, vocal protests and minor scuffles marked official national day celebrations. 
On 10 October, the official ceremony was marred by scuffles between Pan-Green and 
Pan-Blue legislators while the president was delivering the National Day speech outside the 
Presidential Office. The legislators had been invited onto the stage with the president and 
foreign dignitaries. The seats for legislators were allocated on the two sides of the main 
podium, with two huge white cloth barriers enacted respectively, in order to separate the 
legislator’s seats from the president’s grandstand, preventing any interference with the 
president by legislators. About forty Pan-Blue legislators were further separated into two 
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sections on each side of the main podium, with DPP legislators being arranged to sit 
between the Pan-Blue legislators and the president’s grandstand. While the white cloth 
barrier had blocked Chen’s view of the legislators, the red-clad KMT and PFP legislators 
started to beat on the barrier, chanting ‘A-Bian step down,’ making thumbs-down gestures 
and holding up red banners that read ‘Depose Chen,’ as Chen began his address. Security 
officers stepped in when one opposition legislator attempted to hurl a chair at the 
grandstand on the main podium. He was carried away by security officers. Legislators began 
to scuffle with their opposition counterparts, pushing and kicking each other and creating a 
stir that aroused the attention of the guests including foreign dignitaries on the main podium. 
As Chen quickly left the grandstand after his address, Pan-Blue legislators led by PFP 
chairman Soong broke through a cordon of security officers to march into the rally site as 
honour guards were parading. Furious DPP legislators again tried to stop the opposition 
from disrupting the parade, resulting in an injury to a KMT legislator, who later filed a 
lawsuit for assault against the DPP contingent.     
President Chen, amid protests staged by opposition lawmakers at the ceremony, 
addressed a speech to the estimated 50,000 of local and foreign quests invited to the event. 
Chen appealed for national unity, saying people on the island must work together to 
overcome various problems in building up Taiwan. He said that freedom of speech is a 
constitutional right and Taiwan is a free country, but he went on to say that while the 
government tolerated opposing views, people must not destroy the island’s unity. He said,  
Different people have different opinions, but they cannot sabotage national solidarity. 
Different people have different national identifications, but they cannot divide the 
country nor drive the government into an idle spin. (TT 11/10/06, 1) 
Chen then added that the 23 million people of Taiwan are all in the same boat, regardless 
of their differences or political affiliations, and went on saying 
We respect the right of free choice, but it is our common responsibility to facilitate 
the nation’s development and growth. Only with greater unity can we weather the 
storm and sail toward a brighter future. (Ibid) 
Before making the speech outside the Presidential Office building, Chen delivered a 
speech to Cabinet officials in the auditorium of the Presidential Office. He described an 
opposition-initiated recall motion as ‘a new chapter in the partisan struggle’ which has 
persisted since the transfer of power in 2000. He said that the political unrest over the past 
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six years reflects the fact that the opposition parties have refused to cope with the reality that 
they lost power, adding that the country faces a dilemma common to other emerging 
democracies. He said that he would try to uphold national dignity rather than take cheap 
shots at the clowns in red running amok (ibid.).  
Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of protesters, clad in red, took to the streets to join 
the ‘siege’ around the Presidential Office building. The protesters began to gather around the 
fringes of the ceremony zone in the early morning. They were separated by barbed-wire 
barricades set up by police to prevent them from coming near the celebration. They tried to 
block a few lanes of a main road leading to the ceremony zone, to prevent the president’s 
motorcade from entering and leaving the celebration site. Unable to tell which car Chen was 
in, the crowd rushed onto the road from the sidewalks whenever an official-looking black 
car appeared. Several of the entrapped vehicles were carrying top government officials and 
foreign diplomatic guests. Protesters encircled the vehicles, smacking and kicking at the cars. 
Prior to the start of the ceremony, some DPP legislators had been blocked from entering by 
protesters, and had to be escorted into the ceremony by police. The protestors also unfurled 
huge red banners reading ‘Shame on You’ and ‘Oust Chen Shui-Bian.’ At the time Chen was 
giving a speech at the stage, the protesters shouted ‘A-Bian step down’ and flashed the 
thumbs down gesture outside the ceremony zone, trying to interrupt his speech and making 
sure that Chen had heard their voices. Several violent incidents were reported in the morning 
(TT 11/10/06, 1, 3).   
After the mock ‘siege’ of the Presidential Office in the morning, a second wave of 
rallies was held a few hours later. Shortly after 4pm, Shih led his followers in a parade rally 
along the main streets of Taipei City before returning to Taipei Railway Station. The 
protestors then occupied the road next to Taipei Railway Station, blocking traffic as ten 
thousands of protesters sat or lay on the road. This impromptu parade in the afternoon of 
course caused traffic chaos. The protest on the day was illegal because the anti-Chen camp 
organisers had not applied for a permit. Even though it was illegal, the police did not 
disperse the crowd. Police only focused on not allowing protesters to enter the celebration 
site, but did not remove protesters parading from several directions as they ‘besieged’ the 
Presidential Office. Following a long day of protest, Taipei Mayor Ma, after communicating 
with Shih, who had agreed to persuade the protesters to refrain from rallying on the road, 
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requested the protesters disperse by 11pm. However, about 5,000 diehards refused to leave 
the road or move back to the square outside the station. Riot police were dispatched to the 
scene at 10pm. At about 4am, with only 400 protesters rallied on the site, 1,400 riot police 
started their dispersal action. The area was cleared after the last protesters were carried away 
at about 5am, with a few protesters injured. The organisers claimed 1.5 million people 
showed up to demand Chen’s resignation, while police estimated the turnout at around 
500,000. 
After the ‘Besiege the Presidential Office’ demonstration, the movement went into an 
abrupt decline. Shih’s camp was no longer able to mobilise any other mass rally. Although 
Shih vowed to demonstrate indefinitely outside the presidential office until Chen resigns, he, 
however, went back on this pledge in December, retiring to an apartment near the train 
station and promising to remain there until Chen’s term was over. 
 
6-5. A ‘Failed’ Movement? – By Way of Conclusion 
Weeks after commencing a high-profile, round-the-clock demonstration, the anti-
corruption campaign appeared to have lost its momentum and came under heavy criticism 
following its ‘siege’ on National Day. While some critics had condemned the ‘illegal’ 
demonstration for disturbing public order, other rebukes came from some of the campaign’s 
own supporters, with some questioning indecisive leadership in Shih’s camp.  
The campaign started on a high note. It received public donations totalising NT$111 
million when Shih first introduced the campaign in early August, attracting a great number 
of protesters to its sit-ins and other forms of demonstrations. The campaign reached its peak 
with hundreds of thousands of people flooding the streets and joining its mock ‘siege’ of the 
Presidential Office on 15 September. However, the campaign seemed to lose momentum 
since then, with subsequent demonstrations attracting a lower number of participants. Along 
with losing its momentum, more seriously, the campaign became more turbulent.  
On the surface, it is obvious that the movement failed. It failed because, firstly, Chen 
did not step down after two months of intense protest. Instead, the movement went into an 
abrupt decline in mid-October. Secondly and more importantly, in opposition to what the 
campaign organisers originally claimed, the campaign unwittingly became trapped in the 
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confrontation between the two political camps, two ideologies, and two national identities. 
Shih’s campaign originally attempted to put a stop to the squabbling between the blue and 
green camps and create a space for the rise of a third force. Developments, however, 
showed no signs of moving in this direction. The movement eventually ended up a more 
vigorous battle over partisan politics and national identity than ever before. 
Indeed, the political tension in Taiwan was greatly intensified during this period. One 
foreign photographer commented at a conference that he often thinks twice about the 
colour of his attire before going out, and is careful not to dress in ‘red’ or ‘green’ (TT 
23/09/06, 3). Also, a psychologist noticed more and more people seeking treatment for 
depression at the hospital where he works. The psychologist attributed this to deepening 
political tensions. He said,  
These kinds of depression cases can be separated into three categories: Anti-Chen 
patients who are upset that their movement hasn’t been successful yet; pro-Chen 
patients who are upset that the anti-Chen movement hasn’t fizzled out yet; and those 
without a clear political affiliation who are upset by all the disorder and chaos 
resulting from the political tug-of-war. (Ibid)  
In this sense, if the success of Shih’s campaign is measured by the extent to which it went 
beyond traditional political divisions, ideological confrontation, and identity conflict, it must 
be judged to have failed. It transcended nothing but widened the division between the two 
camps on the island of Taiwan. It resulted in another wave of social cleavage and partisan 
wrestling. In effect, Shih’s campaign was incorporated into the traditional division based on 
national identity politics. As a result, the spectre of ‘nationalism’ or ‘national identity’ still 
plays a large part in the confrontation between ‘Depose Chen’ and ‘Against the deposition’.  
How did Shih’s campaign fail?  
In an interview published by United Daily News, Shih, when analysing the reasons his 
campaign had not yet succeeded, lashed out at Vice President Lu’s failure to support his 
campaign. He said, ‘Lu is [the president’s] biggest accomplice [and the main reason] why 
Chen hasn’t stepped down yet’ (UDN 14/10/06). Indeed, Shih’s comment points out the 
fact that his camp failed to inspire more green supporters to show up in his campaign. One 
can argue that president Chen’s strategy of manipulating the independence-unification issue 
was successful in consolidating his support within the green camp. Analysts also said the 
anti-Chen demonstrations in effect helped the DPP to unite and mobilise its base supporters, 
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incited a backlash from Pan-Green, restricted room for internal discussion in the green camp 
and proved to be Chen’s saver. In this sense, Shih did Chen a favour by initiating the anti-
Chen protest. Chen’s failure to uphold higher moral standards and enforce stricter discipline 
among his family and staff has disappointed a lot of the green supporters.  
Indeed, when Shih officially launched the demonstrations on 9 September, the DPP 
was divided, with some members supporting Chen and others criticising him. However, after 
the movement transformed itself from anti-corruption to partisan and ethnic confrontation, 
Chen’s critics fell silent. Although some Pan-Green supporters might have lost confidence in 
the DPP at the beginning of the campaign, they were compelled to defend the party 
administration as protests became more radical. Some political commentators even argued 
that Shih’s protest had helped Chen to do some ‘house-cleaning,’ forcing those DPP 
members who opposed Chen’s leadership to leave the green camp. In this sense, although 
some of the campaign decision-makers are either DPP members or close to the DPP, Chen 
greatly succeeded in defining/representing the movement as affiliated with Pan-
Blue/unification/Chinese identity or even the PRC. The focus of the movement became 
obscured. The Pan-Green supporters were therefore forced to choose sides. 
So, in the end, nothing substantially changed, as if Sisyphus’ stone rolled back down the 
slope to the bottom.  
Moreover, as argued in the beginning of this chapter, domination and resistance are 
intimately related to each other. Every power relation has its resistance dimension, and every 
resistance has its dominatory facet. Even if the Anti-Corruption Movement had succeeded in 
resisting a specific subjectification, it would very likely produce another form of domination, 
just as the rise of Taiwanese nationalism as a resistance to KMT’s Chinese chauvinism 
turned into domination, blocking many other viable forms of life and identities. The 
interrelation between domination and resistance is always ambiguous and, certainly, 
reversible. It is reversible in the sense that it is very possible to construe domination and 
resistance the other way around, by for example interpreting the 228 Hand-in-Hand Rally 
discussed in Chapter Five as being about resistance (rather than about domination, as this 
thesis argued) and the Anti-corruption Movement analysed in this chapter as being about 
domination (rather than about resistance). Nevertheless, this chapter intends to justify the 
interpretation of the Anti-Corruption Movement as a resistance. It argues that the main 
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target of an effective critical elaboration is always dominant discourses – authoritative words 
and acts. 171  Since everyone in contemporary Taiwanese society is presumed to feel 
comfortable being Taiwanese – claiming that they are Taiwanese and cannot be otherwise, 
disapproving of social activities that are against this line of thought – the Anti-Corruption 
Movement opposed this dominant discourse and can justifiably be conceived as a resistance, 
albeit temporarily and spatially. By all means, the discussion over the circular relationship 
between domination and resistance can only be attained in a specific contextualisation, in a 
certain timeframe, and in a particular subjectivity.   
Consequently, the chapter does not follow that the movement was meaningless. The 
movement was both a practice and an attitude to resist domination. It opened the possibility 
of alternative ways of political life and was an indefinite political struggle grounded in the 
belief that things could be otherwise, even if one did not know exactly how. The anti-
corruption movement is the practice of refusal. It is also an attitude that refuses to give in to 
resignation. Indeed, the meaning of resistance exists in the practice of resisting, in the 
struggle itself. As Camus concludes, ‘the struggle itself toward the heights is enough to fill a 
man’s heart. One must imagine Sisyphus happy’ (Camus 2005, 119).  
Indeed, one must imagine Sisyphus happy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
171 On this account, although the thesis acknowledges that the PRC on the one hand, and Pan-Blue 
on the other are also sources of power that define the political on Taiwan, they are not the foci of 
this thesis, since they, in the context of contemporary Taiwanese society since 1990, have not defined 
the dominant discourse.  
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CHAPTER 7 
The Death of ‘the Taiwanese’  
‘A’ Conclusion 
 
 
7-1. The Death of ‘the Taiwanese’  
Taiwanese National Identity as a ‘Discursive Entity’ 
As shown in the previous chapter, the Anti-Corruption Movement should be 
understood as an example of resistance to a specific form of Taiwanese identity, and 
opposition to the idea that everything associated with ‘Taiwanese identity’ can be legitimised. 
The identity being resisted, as argued in this thesis, is itself a ‘discursive entity’. That is to say 
that Taiwanese identity, ontologically, exists only in discourse. 
As shown in Chapter Two, ‘discourse’ was understood in this thesis as highly diverse, 
fragmented and heterogeneous in nature. It is a realm that includes both linguistic and non-
linguistic acts, a synthesis that encompasses discursive practices and social practices, and a 
domain in which discursive practice and social practice are exercised. The distinction 
between discursive practices and social practices is highly ambiguous and, indeed, 
interchangeable. Any social practice has its discursive dimension; any discursive practice has 
its material foundations and is, in effect, a social practice. The thesis therefore punctuates 
these two terms with a slash. In view of this understanding, when it was stated that 
Taiwanese identity is constituted in discourse, the term ‘discourse’ refers to a domain of 
dispersion, in which various discursive/social practices intersect, intertwine and interact. It is 
the realm in which the discourse concerning ‘Taiwanese-ness’ is formed by various practices, 
the context in which the discourse is disseminated throughout the society of Taiwan, and the 
site in which the discourse of Taiwanese national identity is reproduced, forming the subject: 
the ‘Taiwanese’. In other words, there is a discourse of/about ‘Taiwanese-ness’, and this 
discourse is constituted, sustained, undermined, or transformed by an intricate web of 
discursive/social practices; when discursive/social practices ‘speak’ of the ‘Taiwanese’, the 
Taiwanese are formed as a result of this ‘speaking’. 
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Accordingly, to treat Taiwanese identity as a discursive entity is to make a particular claim: 
it is to say that Taiwanese identity is a way of talking and doing things relative to what sort of 
people the Taiwanese are; it suggests that every word and action contributes to the idea that 
there is such a thing as ‘Taiwanese-ness’ and helps to substantialise the qualities/features 
attaching to it; it proposes that all statements, utterances and actions related to ‘the 
Taiwanese’ and ‘Taiwanese-ness’ constitute ‘Taiwanese’ as an identity. Moreover, this 
process of construction is not simply one way. A particular discourse of ‘Taiwanese-ness’, in 
turn, makes certain statements, utterances, and types of conduct possible, conditioning what 
people say and do. What people say and do in relation to the issue of Taiwanese identity 
constrains and enables what people are able to say and do about the issue of Taiwanese 
identity. In other words, Taiwanese national identity does not exist prior to the processes of 
this discursive constitution; rather, those discursive/social practices construct and constrict, 
structure and deconstruct, the ways national self-identification are imagined and represented. 
This thesis therefore did not enquire into what the residents of Taiwan have lost or been 
deprived of in the process of this discursive constitution. The Taiwanese-ness is neither 
naturally given nor premeditated there, but exists in the way people talk and act. At the same 
time though, it is integral to other things people say and do and is in turn sustained or 
undermined by these things. Taiwanese identity is therefore a practice, which belongs to the 
realm of discourse, and is determined, sustained, undermined or transformed by various 
meticulous, varied and heterogeneous practices which are, in turn, discursive. 
In short, the discourse of Taiwanese identity represents what ‘Taiwanese-ness’ is, gives 
meaning to the identity of ‘being Taiwanese’, and fixes ‘Taiwanese’ as a focus of 
identification in the island of Taiwan. There is no such thing as ‘Taiwanese-ness’ outside of 
this process of constitution. Taiwanese-ness – the identity, the practice, and the process of 
constitution – exists only in discourse.  
Social Practices/Events in the Discursive Constitution of Taiwanese National 
Identity since 1990 
The thesis investigated the discursive proliferation of Taiwanese identity as a national 
identity since 1990. It puts forward a number of arguments on the importance of several 
selected social practices/events that coalesced around the question and the politics of 
identity formation in the post-authoritarian environment.  
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Taiwan since 1990 has experienced a discursive proliferation on the subject of 
‘Taiwanese-ness’ (or/and ‘Taiwanese identity’). People in Taiwan from all walks of life have 
been enthusiastic and passionate in talking about it. Numerous statements, utterances and 
interventions concerning ‘Taiwanese-ness’ in terms of culture, history, and people, have been 
made. ‘Taiwanese-ness’ has been articulated as a national identity in this wave of discursive 
activity; and this identity has been produced through differentiation from that of ‘Chinese-
ness’. Notably, this discursive proliferation coincides with Taiwan’s process of 
democratisation. Various statements, utterances and forms of conduct that had been 
suppressed for so long by the KMT regime were finally liberated amid the introduction of 
democracy. The practices of democracy that possessed a greater degree of freedom of 
expression offered the political conditions of possibility for this discursive proliferation. 
Moreover, accompanying the democratisation was a redistribution of political power 
between native Taiwanese and Mainlander elites within and outside the KMT during the 
1990s, and this was followed by political competition between the Pan-Blue and Pan-Green 
in the 21st century. Issues of ethnicity (Mainlander vs. native Taiwanese), of ideology 
(Unification vs. Independence), and of national identity (Taiwanese vs. Chinese) have often 
been used to advance one political camp over another. The high frequency of political 
elections has also encouraged people to talk about these issues, and the intensive media 
coverage has ensured that political rhetoric is disseminated throughout the whole of society. 
Consequently, the practice of democracy in, and political competition through, the form of 
election has indeed contributed to the high exposition of political rhetoric concerning 
people’s self-identification.  
This thesis examined various types of social practices/events amid this wave of 
discursive proliferation that incited people to talk about Taiwanese-ness. Certain things, with 
different positions, forms and organisations, were said and done; and with various power 
relations, they mutually intersected, interacted and competed; the things being said in turn 
underpinned the production of a particular kind of Taiwanese identity, that is, the birth of 
the Taiwanese. The social practices selected in this thesis included the production of 
knowledge (Chapter Three), a book publication (Chapter Four), an election campaign 
(Chapter Five), and a political demonstration (Chapter Six). Those aforementioned practices 
are just a few of the many practices that have conjointly contributed to the emergence of a 
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particular way of talking about the national identity of the Taiwanese people that did not 
really exist before 1990. 
It is crucially noted that the social practices through which the idea of Taiwanese-ness 
being constituted are recurring practices, rather than one-off events. The concept of ‘social 
practice’ implies a thing that occurs again periodically and repeatedly. For instance, in terms 
of political demonstration, there are hundreds or even thousands of political demonstrations 
taking place in Taiwan each year. Methodologically, then, it is therefore difficult to 
investigate a social practice constantly, in particular when this thesis intended to offer a 
meticulous description of these practices. As a result, with the exception of Chapter Three 
(the production of knowledge), the thesis explores only certain representative events involved, 
aiming to show the twists and turns since 1990 which ended up creating a specific sort of 
Taiwanese identity. The events selected in this thesis should therefore not be taken to have 
any ‘particular’ significance since they are recurring, though in various forms and producing 
each time different consequences. There is then a certain ambiguity in the distinction 
between the social practice and the event in this thesis. Moreover, attempting to link those 
disparate events and establish causal succession between them should be avoided. The world 
that this thesis tried to present is a place full of discontinuity, difference, conflict, 
contradiction, diversity and rupture. This thesis opposed a form of writing history seeking to 
totalise history, tracing its internal development, and to offer the reassurance of an end 
toward which history moves. It did not aim to provide ‘a’ sequence of events that culminates 
in the formation of Taiwanese national identity. 
On this account, the analysis made in this thesis is both causal and non-causal. Causal, in 
the sense that the events discussed in the thesis (have) contributed to constituting Taiwanese 
national identity with the specific attributes attached to it. Yet it is also non-causal, in that 
the formation of Taiwanese national identity cannot be deducted and deduced, either fully or 
partly, from a number of events. The social practices/events being selected should be 
understood as related and unrelated. Related, for all of them speak, or appear to be speaking, of 
one and the same thing, at any rate, the Taiwanese-ness. But also unrelated, for this thesis 
does not intend to provide a chronicle or linear narrative of the formation of Taiwanese 
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national identity, i.e. an event causing another event.172 And finally, the research is both a 
meticulous (as it was claimed) and a selective study of the formation of Taiwanese national 
identity. It was meticulous in its detailed description of the selected events. It was selective, 
in that the events (as well as social practices) demonstrated in this thesis are just a few of the 
numerous events that occur periodically or repeatedly.  
As a result, the selection of these events as examples was arbitrary and contingent. They 
were intentionally and strategically included (whilst simultaneously excluding alternatives) as 
texts and events that best present and represent the overlapping and dispersed nature of 
identity formation in the post-authoritarian Taiwan. It is possible to elucidate the reasons for 
choosing these events, but it is not possible to ‘legitimise’ them. The publication of 
Kobayashi’s manga (comic book) and the 2004 commemoration of the 2-28 Incident were 
selected to demonstrate how Taiwan’s past of ‘the Japanese colonisation’ and ‘the KMT’s re-
colonisation’ had been replicated in a certain way, thereby helping to constitute people’s self-
identification in Taiwan, respectively. It is however important to keep in mind that there are 
many other social practices/events contributing to the ‘restoration’ of Taiwan’s past, though 
pulling in different, un-unified and sometimes contradictory, directions.   
To summarise, the cases being studied in this thesis, as a practice, an event, or an 
accident, provided different occasions in which discourses that differed in origin, form, 
organisation and function, intersected, interacted and competed. They all manifested a 
number of complicated and multileveled battles, contests, confrontations or power relations 
among discourses and through discourses. Those events became a discursive realm of power 
struggle. Each force, by adopting different tactics, endeavoured to grasp the power to define, 
determine, and above all, reconstitute what Taiwanese-ness is. The aim of this research is to 
draw a map, to speak of those combats, to reconstruct these confrontations and battles, and 
to rediscover the interaction of these discourses as weapons of attack and defence in the 
formation of Taiwanese national identity.  
 
 
                                                
172 On this account, the order in which events are discussed in this thesis (i.e. the publication of the 
manga, moving to the 2-28 Hand-in-hand Rally, and to Anti-corruption Movement) can always be 
reversed or restructured.    
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Summary of Chapters  
Chapter Three investigated the close relationship between the production of knowledge 
and the constitution of Taiwanese identity. The chapter concentrated on two forms of 
knowledge: historical knowledge and political knowledge. The former – historical knowledge 
– attempts to yield the narrative of Taiwan’s history, aiming to delineate the process and 
elucidate the origins of the formation of Taiwanese identity. Its arguments can be 
summarised as follows: for more than four hundred years the people of Taiwan have been 
governed by external and invading forces (most importantly, the Japanese and the KMT); 
political and cultural resistance from the local people to those forces throughout those 
periods formed a distinctive collective consciousness, producing a ‘people’ that differs very 
much from that of China. The latter – political knowledge – expounds the reasons why 
people in Taiwan form a shared identity as Taiwanese, and how this relates to the process of 
democratisation. Their arguments can be summarised into three lines of argument. Firstly, 
Taiwanese consciousness was long suppressed under the authoritarian KMT regime; 
democratisation offered space for the free expression of a pent-up ‘true’ identity. Second, the 
practice of democracy accustoms people to participating in the deliberation of ‘national’ 
affairs, thereby creating a shared political identity, common values and a sense of 
achievement. Third, the long-existing and ever-growing threats from China foster a sense of 
common suffering, unifying the people of Taiwan regardless of their ethnicity and producing 
a shared identity. Regarding the aforementioned two forms of knowledge, Chapter Three 
argued that these two forms of knowledge demonstrate not only two explanations of 
Taiwanese identity formation, but more importantly, two modes of construction of people’s 
self-identification. Historical knowledge plays a significant role in the formation of 
Taiwanese identity since the identity formation is intimately associated with how the people 
narrate their ‘past’, excavate their ‘memory’, and interpret their ‘history’. Political knowledge 
in comparison participates in the ongoing process of identity formation by providing an 
illusion of what a group of people will become, what sort of life style they shall look for in 
the future. Taiwanese identity is in fact constituted in a dissemination of specific historical 
and political narratives. Through various social practices, those narratives take precedence 
over other alternative ones, so that other alternatives are excluded, made to disappear and 
silenced. The chapter therefore suggested that an important task of current studies on 
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Taiwanese identity is to illustrate the process of how specific narratives take precedence over 
alternatives, thereby helping to constitute a Taiwanese identity with specific features attached. 
Chapter Four investigated how the historically concluded process of Japanese 
colonisation has emerged again as an ongoing structuring force in the creation of certain 
forms of identity among the population in contemporary Taiwanese society. The chapter 
scrutinised the controversy surrounding a Japanese manga On Taiwan, a book which provides 
a very positive evaluation of the legacy of Japanese colonialism in Taiwan. When the Chinese 
translation of the book was published in Taiwan in 2001, it immediately aroused strong 
reactions, inspiring serious debate and identity-related conflict in Taiwanese society. On the 
one hand, protestors called on the public to boycott it. They went into the streets burning 
copies of the book. On the other hand, equally strong voices welcomed the author’s 
idealistic and nostalgic depiction of Taiwan. They distributed the book in the street. The 
event lasted almost three months. During this period, extraordinary attention was focused 
on this manga in Taiwanese society. A great number of statements, utterances and conducts 
concerning this manga were produced. The publication of this manga became a discursive 
realm of political battle, in which different discourses interact, intersect and compete with 
each other. This chapter analysed those statements, utterances and conducts that were made 
by those who have various positions (i.e. the Taiwanese sympathisers vs. Chinese 
sympathisers), in an attempt to comprehend how the discourses of Japanese colonialism and 
Sino-chauvinism reciprocally conflict and compete with each other in ways that affect 
people’s self-identification, producing a particular form of subjectivity of Taiwan. Which 
issues/discourses/ideologies have been raised and how they have been discussed; what other 
alternative issues/discourses/ideologies, if any, have been repressed, silenced and made to 
disappear in the process of the event.  In short, this chapter is an effort to demonstrate how 
and through which social practices Taiwan’s past colonial experiences had been discursively 
produced in a certain way and what other alternatives had been excluded from this process, 
thereby helping to constitute people’s self-identification in Taiwan. It argued that the 
embodiment of contemporary Taiwanese national identity must be apprehended and 
articulated in the contradictory and irreducible triangular interrelation among residual 
Japanese colonialism during the colonial time, the once-dominant Chinese nationalism 
during the KMT’s authoritarian period and the currently dominant Taiwanese nationalism in 
the post-democratic era. 
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Chapter Five analysed how an election campaign, understood as a social practice, 
contributed to people’s self-identification in Taiwan. To do so, the chapter scrutinises a 
specific election campaign in the 2004 presidential election, the 2-28 Hand-in-Hand Rally, 
which was designed to commemorate the 2-28 Incident, a traumatic event in Taiwan’s 
modern history. This chapter aimed to understand how a specific collective memory of the 
incident was produced in the context of an election campaign; and how this specific 
memorialising of the incident actually contributes to a particular conception of what it means 
to ‘Be Taiwanese’. This chapter gave a thick description of the rally. Two aspects of the 
event were stressed: first, the political context of the mass-rally, and second, the precise 
manner of the performance. The former refers to the political competition during the 
election campaign in 2004 in relation to identity politics in Taiwan since the 1990s. The latter 
in turn deals with the details of the rally, including a series of press conferences in the run-up 
to the demonstration, the location of the gathering, the activities of the campaign, etc. This 
chapter argued that political interests and aspirations from the election campaign shaped the 
various views of the past, conditioning the political possibility for the remembrance of the 2-
28 Incident. As shown in the chapter, the 2-28 Incident was represented in the rally as a 
warning about unification with China and a symbol of the reconciliation of different ethnic 
groups. The political message manifested in the event can be summarised as follows: The 
shadow of the 2-28 Incident has covered Taiwan for over fifty years; besides remembrance 
and reflection, what the Taiwanese should do today is on the one hand remember the tragic 
history caused by Chinese rule, and on the other hand move on from the trauma, transform 
the suffering, and form a unified and solid Taiwanese nation. Such political rhetoric brings 
out the very contradictory nature of the process of remembering the 2-28 Incident. It 
manifests two necessary elements in the process of nation building. First, the 2-28 Incident 
must be commemorated as a trauma in order to differentiate Taiwan from China. Second, it 
is also necessary to forget 2-28 in order to form a united and harmonious Taiwanese nation 
on the other. Indeed, Taiwanese nation-building is very much intertwined with 
‘remembering’ and ‘forgetting’ the history of 2-28.  
Although certain political consequences were produced by the Hand-in-Hand Rally, this 
thesis does not want to suggest that authority can achieve exactly what it wants to achieve. 
Chapter Six therefore turned its gaze on the possibility of resistance by investigating the so-
called Anti-Corruption Movement in Taiwan. The movement began in the summer of 2006 
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when groups of people including scholars, social activists and politicians launched a series of 
protests to force Taiwan’s president Chen to resign. The president was accused of 
corruption. The movement lasted for two months with immense intensity, but it finally went 
into an abrupt decline in mid-October. It was ostensibly intended to transcend partisan 
ideological and identity divisions. The organisers of the movement expressed a strong 
reluctance to being pushed into either the green (identification with Taiwan) or the blue 
(identification with China) camps. They argued that many public issues (such as corruption) 
were hijacked by party affiliations and identity politics, leaving people’s interests unaddressed. 
However, this non-partisan stand was intensely challenged by the ruling party. It argued that 
one should not neglect the fact that identity politics were still being played out within the 
movement; ‘Chinese identity’ played important roles in the movement to overthrow the 
DPP government – the first ‘indigenised’ regime – thereby dismantling Taiwanese identity. 
As a result, the major battlefield between the two sides is clear. That is, how the ‘nature’ of 
the movement is defined and represented. Both sides therefore struggled to either define or 
counter-define the movement through any possible means – actions and words. The 
movement became not simply a physical site but a discursive space in which different forces 
competed. The whole event was actually a confrontation among discourses and through 
discourses. Through investigating those actions and words, this chapter argued that the 
movement should be understood as a resistance to a specific subjectification of the 
Taiwanese, since it opposed the idea that everything under the name of ‘Taiwanese identity’ 
can be legitimised – a prominent feature of Taiwanese national identity formation since 1990. 
The movement, however, ultimately failed because it unwittingly became trapped in the 
confrontation between the two political camps, two ideologies, and two national identities. 
Nevertheless, the chapter did not think that the movement was meaningless. The movement 
was an indefinite political struggle grounded in the belief that things could be otherwise. In 
short, this chapter aimed to contribute to an understanding of the particular ways in which 
subjectivity is contested. 
The Death of the ‘Taiwanese’ 
This thesis, in sum, is an attempt to understand how various social practices/events 
enable or disable certain ways in which people make sense of their past and their political 
lives that come to terms with their belongings, their allegiances, and their situated-ness. It is 
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also an attempt to understand how people’s self-identifications in turn rearticulate and 
redefine the social practices/events and the way people imagine political possibilities. 
Taiwanese-ness is spoken of, not only literally but also symbolically, and it is this process of 
being ‘spoken of’ that constitutes Taiwanese-ness – the birth of the ‘Taiwanese’. If the 
concept of ‘Taiwanese’ is not an essence but in fact a discursive entity, existing only on 
surface practices – what people said and do, it follows that it may be only a temporary 
preoccupation of contemporary politics. This leads to the conclusion of this thesis, the end 
of the subject – the death of the ‘Taiwanese’.  
That is to say: the Taiwanese is composed of his own figure in the interstices of 
fragmented words and actions; when people stop talking/doing things about ‘Taiwanese-
ness, it will disappear one day, being preserved only in the archive. Indeed, if ‘Taiwanese’ 
was constituted at a time when language was doomed to dispersion, will he not also be 
dispersed when language regains its unity, in a development paralleling Nietzsche’s death of 
God and Foucault’s prediction regarding ‘the end of man’? In Nietzsche’s view, the 
secularisation of modern society and developments in the sciences (in the West) had actually 
‘killed’ God. Nietzsche does not suggest that modern human has proven God’s existence to 
be false, but contended that the Western thought that built upon the Christianity that had 
served as the bedrock of meaning and value for a thousand years had been replaced by 
modern philosophical thought. It is in this sense that Nietzsche claims the ‘last man’ has 
killed God. Following Nietzsche, Foucault further heralds the end of God’s murderer. For 
Foucault, the modern episteme ‘was formed towards the end of the eighteenth century and 
still serves as the positive ground of our knowledge…which constituted man’s particular 
mode of being and the possibility of knowing him empirically’ (Foucault 1970, 385). Yet, ‘if 
this same language (the modern episteme) is now emerging with greater and greater 
insistence in a unity that we ought to think but cannot as yet do so, is this not the sign that 
the whole of this configuration is not about to topple, and that man is in the process of 
perishing…’ (ibid., 386). Nietzsche and Foucault here both indicate a sharp rupture of 
human thoughts. Foucault concludes:  
As the archaeology of our thought easily shows, man is an invention of recent date. 
And one perhaps nearing its end. If those arrangements were to disappear as they 
appeared, if some event of which we can at the moment do no more than sense the 
possibility…were to cause them to crumble, as the ground of classical thought 
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did…then one can certainly wager that man would be erased, like a face drawn in 
sand at the edge of the sea. (ibid., 387). 
 
7-2. Dismantling ‘Taiwanese’ – An Ethical Aspect of the Thesis 
As elaborated above, this thesis was in general an attempt to uncover the discursive 
nature of Taiwanese identity as the national identity of the people of Taiwan. But what is the 
broader objective of this sort of effort? The thesis itself has its political orientations. To put it 
plainly, it aims to dismantle ‘Taiwanese-ness’, which is seen as an unproblematic truth in 
Taiwan.  
As was argued in this thesis, Taiwanese-ness is not naturally given, but exists in the way 
people talk and act. There is no such a thing as ‘Taiwanese-ness’ in the sense of the pure, 
authentic, quality of a unified community. The subject – Taiwanese-ness/Taiwanese national 
identity – is conceptualised as having no fixed, essential, or permanent identity. Taiwanese 
identity becomes what Hall described as a ‘moveable feast’ (Hall 1995, 598). It formed and 
transformed continuously in relation to the ways people talk and act. It is not united around 
a coherent ‘Self’. Within the ‘Self’ are un-unified, and sometimes contradictory and 
conflicting, discursive constitutions, pulling in different directions. ‘Being identical’ is in 
effect continuously being shifted about. The meaning of ‘Taiwanese’ is always deterred and 
deferred. It never has final or fixed meaning, and each ‘stop’ is arbitrary and contingent. In 
other wards, Taiwanese national identity is conditional, lodged in contingency. Contingency 
involves a sense of dependence on other practices, events and political contexts. It has 
determinate conditions of existence – including the material and symbolic resources – 
required to sustain it.  
Moreover, it should be stressed that each ‘stop’ in effect is not only arbitrary and 
contingent, but more importantly entails power relations. As shown in Chapter Two, the 
discourse involves a complex set of practices that keeps certain statements, utterances and 
conducts in circulation, while silencing other statements, utterances and conducts. One 
cannot just ‘say’ and ‘do’ what one wishes to ‘say’ and ‘do’. The use of words and actions has 
limits. These complex sets of practices involve the play of power, thereby implying the 
production of exclusion and inclusion. Indeed, only certain discourses are disseminated in 
society, thereby only certain forms of subject are formed accordingly. Thus, identity is a 
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question of which and whose statements, utterances and forms of conduct emerge and 
which and whose do not; it is a site at which different discourses interact, intersect and 
compete; and it is about the politics of the appearance and disappearance of certain 
statements, utterances and modes of conduct. The study of discourse therefore needs to get 
involved in exposing power relations that exist within society at any given moment in order 
to consider how marginal and subordinate groups are oppressed by the dominant group; or 
alternatively, how they might secure or win, however temporarily, space. A specific discourse 
limits or excludes alternative ways in which Taiwanese-ness can be constituted. Since many 
other alternative political possibilities – subjectivity – are omitted, repressed and made to 
disappear in the discursive formation of ‘Taiwanese-ness’, the concept itself on that account 
needs to be critically interrogated.  
This thesis therefore problematised ‘Taiwanese national identity’. It put Taiwanese-ness 
in a historical motion, and dissolved this comforting illusion of identity and firmness and 
solidity. The political position of identity that one takes up should not be set in stone. One 
needs to reposition oneself over time and in different circumstances. Once one sees that 
Taiwanese-ness is constituted in the pervasiveness, dispersion, intricacy, contingency, and 
layering of our social practices, one also sees that any attempt to sum up what is going on is 
bound to be a potentially dangerous distortion, and indeed, a violation. This thesis in this 
regard should be seen as a critique of identity politics as defined in terms of an absolute, 
undivided commitment to, and identification with, ‘the nation of Taiwan’. It wishes to open 
up alternative possibilities for politics. This thesis therefore intends to create a history of the 
different modes in which people residing in the island of Taiwan are made subject and to 
expose the dispersed beginnings and developments of the discourses and practices through 
which human beings are subjectified. It aims to unmask ideologically permeated and often 
obscured structures of power, political control, and discriminatory inclusion and exclusion in 
the construction of Taiwan’s national identity. The thesis always asks how we become who 
and what we are in our present form. It is intended as a history of the present that de-
familiarises and de-comforts us from what we now take for granted by revealing in detail 
how things can be otherwise. 
That is how (and why) the genealogical method was employed in this thesis. Elaborated 
by Foucault, genealogy forms part of a strategy that challenges people’s understanding of 
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who they are in ways that lead them to resist their attachments to their social identities. 
Hence, this thesis rejects a particular storyline that makes it sound as if Taiwanese-ness has 
its origins and develops ineluctably to the present state of affairs. It rejects any meta-
narrative or inevitability thesis. It argued that writing a history of Taiwanese national identity 
as the result of an evolutionary Taiwanese history with a traceable origin is problematic, 
since it only legitimises the current world without questioning it. Taiwanese identity as a 
unified identity is constituted in a comforting story or narrative of the self about itself. On 
this account, the method developed in this thesis is to be contrasted with the way of writing 
history that is more conformist, aimed at familiarising us with what we are, though it should 
not be denied that both methods, conforming and non-confirming, are forms of political 
intervention.   
The thesis therefore does not intend to provide a theory of Taiwanese national identity 
or national identities in general. It is not by any means intended to replace theories of the 
formation of Taiwanese national identity with a new one.  Such an effort is problematic, 
since it would simply fix a new notion of Taiwanese-ness that concurrently excludes other 
alternatives. As argued throughout this thesis, identity is a process over which we must 
struggle, rather than a static object we can simply describe or provide a grand, overarching, 
theory of. Identity is a site of ongoing struggle that can never be guaranteed for one side or 
the other. On this account, the contribution of this thesis does not simply expose the politics 
of identity, but also to reveal the fact that identity is itself political.   
To summarise, this thesis provided a genealogical account of ‘Taiwanese’ as a national 
identity.  It refused to view such an identity formation as a linear development of history that 
has traceable origins; it rejected the possibility that the idea of being Taiwanese has a deep 
meaning, fixed essence or that it reflects primordial truth and instead locates its meaning in 
surface practices. In contrast, the thesis attempts to discover the constitution of the meaning 
of ‘Taiwanese’ from its surface practices; it tries to seek the emergence of ‘Taiwanese’ from 
numberless points.  
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7-3. ‘I’ – A Personal Dimension  
A final point I want to make is that this thesis is the work of a stranger. The whole 
thesis was written in Wales. Holding a Taiwanese passport and being categorised as ‘foreign 
student’, I am apparently a ‘stranger’ here. More importantly, I am a stranger in the society of 
Taiwan as well. Although I am from a Minnan ethnic family, all of my early education (until 
high school) had been Chinese-centred. Yet, entering the 1990s, ironically enough, I was told 
to become ‘Taiwanese’ again. In this sense, I was born as an ethnic ‘Taiwanese’ but grew up 
to be a ‘Chinese’, and then needed to ‘return’ to a ‘Taiwanese’ identity. In my life up until 
now I have had to shift my identity three times. It was infuriating. I was of course irritated at 
the KMT’s propagandist, Sino-centric type of education. Yet, I do not see anything 
‘progressive’ in the establishment of ‘Taiwanese subjectivity’ since 1990 either. The word 
‘Chinese’ was simply replaced by the word ‘Taiwanese’. Nothing substantive has changed. 
The government (now, the democratic one) uses exactly the same measures to push their 
own version of nation-state building, establishing people’s patriotism. We are still being told 
to be ‘a’ particular ‘people’. Everyone has been compelled, or has consented, to become 
‘Taiwanese’, regardless of his/her backgrounds, experiences, and feelings. Indeed, there is 
very little choice of identity for individuals in Taiwan; in some cases there is no choice at all. 
Identity is always being given. Hence, I have decided to reject, intentionally, being pushed to 
become either ‘Chinese’ or ‘Taiwanese’, though this makes me feel as if I am a ‘stranger’ in 
my own country, with a sense of alienation from my community. Yet, when I use the term 
‘alienation’ I do not mean this in an entirely negative sense. On the contrary, it enables me to 
understand myself and the world I am living in more easily. Much of the personal 
investment in this thesis derives from this sense of alienation. In other words, this thesis was 
written in the specific societies and problems I have been living through. I do not think that 
there is any knowledge production in the human sciences that can ever ignore or disclaim its 
author’s involvement in his/her own circumstances. The only real things to me are those 
that we experience physically. 
To conclude this thesis, I end with the hope that it would contribute to the scholarly 
debate in three ways. The first is through the genealogical method developed in this thesis 
that aims to demonstrate how ideas acquire authority, ‘normality’, and even the status of 
‘natural’ truth. Second, it provides a critical understanding of the character of Taiwanese 
national identity formation as a process, which might be applied to emergent nationalisms in 
   294
 
other contexts. If this thesis has any future use, I hope that it will be as a modest 
contribution to that challenge, and as a warning: that systems of thought like nationalism and 
patriotism can all too easily be made, applied, and guarded. Third, this thesis should be 
located in a much broader project that aims to offer an effective critique of state sovereignty, 
and the harm connected with it. Above all, apart from aforementioned points, I also hope 
that this thesis will enable me to have better understanding of myself.  
   295
 
Appendix 1 Glossary 
 
Place Name:  
 
Changlung   =  
Chunghua    0 
Chienkuo Road    .~ 
Fujian    _. 
Guangdong    -C 
Hainan Island    O+ 
Hoping Island    ,+ 
Hsinchu    <e 
Hualien    ou 
Kaohsiung     
Keelung    
Kinmen     
Maioli    pF 
Matsu    ] 
Oluanpi     
Penghu    TR 
Pingtung    (C 
Sangchung     
Taichung    
Tainan     
Taitung    C 
Xiluo Bridge    yxJ 
Yu-Shan Residence   X)$ 
 
Person’s Names  
 
Bo Yang    E    G 
Cao Chang-Ching   @ 
Cai Kun-Can [Tsai Kuan-tsan]  vUW 
Cai Tong-Rong [Tsai Tung-Jung] vI 
Chao Kang [Zhao Gang]  }     
Chen Kuan-Hsing [Chen Guang-Xing]  
    m 
Chen Li-Zhu [Chen Li-Chu]  Y 
Chen Ming-Zhang   >c 
Chen Qing-Bao [Chen Ching-Pao] P' 
Chen Shi-Chang   = 
Chen Shui-Bian    M9 
Chen Tang-Shan (Mark Chen)  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
Chen Xue-Sheng [Chen Hsueh-Sheng]  
    !k 
Chen Ying-Zhen   ?\ 
Dai Guo-Hui    8V 
Fan Ke-Qin [Jerry Fan]   rK 
Feng Ding-Guo [Feng Ting-Kuo] % 
Feng Hu-Xiang    S^ 
Gao Jun-Ming [Kao Chun-Ming] > 
He De-Fen [Ho De-Fen]  {2n 
Hsu Shih-Kai    zH 
Hsu Yung-Ming   1N> 
Hu Wen-Hui    l; 
Huang Jing-Juan   d  
Huang Fu-San    & 
Huang Tien-Lin    
Huang Wei-Fung   * 
Jian Xi-Jie [Chien Hsi-Chieh]  g[ 
Chiang Wei-Shui [Jiang Wei-Shui] wQM 
Jin Mei-Ling [Alice King]  j 
Lai Shi-Bao    |t 
Lee Teng-Hui [Li Deng-Hui]  BZ  
Lee Min-Yong [Li Min-Yong]  B: 
Lee Hsiao-Feng [Li Xiao-Feng]  Bf* 
Li Qiao    B     
Li Ying-Yuan [Lee Ying-Yuan]  B5
 
Lian Zhan [Lien Chan]       7 
Lin Hong-Zong [Lin Hong-Tsung]  
    D"# 
Lin, Paul [Lin Bao-Hua]   Ds 
Lin Yi-Fu    DL 
Lin Zhao-Yi    DA	 
Liu Guang-Hua    s 
Joyce Liu [Liu Ji-Hui]   h3 
Liu Li-Er     
Lu Xiu-Lian [Annette Lu]  `u 
Luo Bing-Cheng [Lo Bing-Cheng]  
    ia6 
Luo Fu-Quan [Lo Fu-chuan]  i_ 
Ma Ying-Jiu [Ma Ying-Jeou]  q 
Peng Hui-Xian    /3 
Qin Hui-Zhu [Chin Huei-chu]  b4Y 
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Ruan Ming    K    I Shih Ming-Teh [Shi Ming-De]   
Song Chu-Yu [James Soong]  $1 
Song Ze-Lai [Sung Tse-lai]  *? 
Su Huan-Zhi    B+  
Su Zhen-Chang    BE 
Sun Da-Chan     
Sun Qing-Yu    O 
Wang Fu-Chang   ,3 
Wang Li-Ping [Wang Lie-Ping]  ,Q@ 
Wang Jian-Xuan   ,0  
Wang Mei-Xiu    ,:. 
Wang Shi-Jian [Wang Shi-Cheng] , 
Wang Xiao-Bo [Wang Hsiao-po]  ,!' 
Wei Qian-Feng [John Wei]  P 
Wei Rui-Ming    P2 
Wu Nai-De [Wu Nai-Teh]  
 
Xia Zhen [Hsia Chen]       - 
Xiao Fu-De    A6 
Xiao Mei-Qin [Hsiao Bi-Khim]  A:/ 
Xie Chun-De [Hsieh Chun-Tel]  D 
Xie Xue-Hong    DN9 
Xu Bo-Yun [Hsu Po-Yun]  C	 
Xu Wen-Lung [Hsu Wen-Lung]  CR 
Xu Xin-Liang [Hsu Hsin-Liang]  C= 
Yang Qui-Xing [Yang Chiu-Hsing]  
    #8< 
Yang Yong-Min   #& 
Yu Shyi-kun [You Xi-Kun]  )J 
Yu Zheng        % 
Zeng Gui-Hai [Tseng Kei-Hai]  "F( 
Zhang Bo-Ya [Chang Po-Ya]  	M 
Zhang Chuan-Tian   4 
Zhang Jun-Xiong [Chang Chun-Hsiung]  
    L 
Zhang Fu-Zhong [Chang Fu-Chung]  
     
Zhang Yi-Shan    5G 
Zheng Cheng-Gung   H 
Zheng Xiu-Juan   H7 
Zhuang Ming-Yao [Chuang Ming-Yao]  
    >I;
Notions, Expressions, Names of Organisation, Movement & Law 
 
Aged-Japan-junky       lA32 
Aged-imperial-subject       YL< 
Alliance to Campaign for Rectifying the Name of Taiwan   F;nZM 
A Million Voices against Corruption – President Chen Must Go  Ja<k\-n 
Autonomous Citizen       ]< 
Autonomous Citizen Entering the Movement    ]<m 
Bondojin        8( 
Benshengren        8O 
China College of Maritime Technology     @' 
Chinaman and dog not permitted to enter    ^H*m 
China Medical University      qc $ 
Chinese Cultural University      0 $ 
Chthonic        sw 
Chung Hua University       ` $  
Commitment to the Public Good and the Annihilation of Self  .TG; CT! 
Daxue          $ 
Democracy and the Moral Crisis of Taiwanese Identity: Our Appeal to the President, the Ruling 
Party and Taiwanese Citizens     </=^FhKo+9 
Dangjia Zuozhu       I&	 
Doka          
Get Out! China Pig       jD 
Go Away, Red China!       V_Dd 
Gui-Ju         fP 
Hakka         %& 
Han-Chinese Traitor       E" 
‘Japanese devils’       38x# 
Japanese-dog        38H 
Jing-Fu Men        6Rr 
Kominka        L< 
Law Governing Legislators’ Exercise of Power    U>u[:e
> 
Mainlanders        O 
Ming Dynasty        47 
Minnan        t 
Musha Uprising        vQ 
Naichijin         
New Civil Movement       1<n 
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Figure 5-2: Campaign Route For the 2-28 Campaign Rally 
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Figure 6-1: Nazca Lines in Taipei City 
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Figure 6-6: Surrounding (Taipei) City on 15 September 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-7: Surrounding City in Taipei Station 15 September 2006 
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Figure 6-8: Route of ‘Besiege the Presidential Office’ Demonstration on 10 October 
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